Online Appendix to ‘Eligibility Recertification and Dynamic Opt-in Incentives in Income-tested Social Programs: Evidence from Medicaid/CHIP’

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A. Extensions of the Baseline Model: Discrete Labor Supply Choices, Heterogeneous Elasticity and Program Participation Cost

In subsection II.A, the income/labor supply choice is assumed to be continuous, the income/labor supply elasticity $e$ is held constant across agents, and perfect compliance (i.e. those eligible will participate in Medicaid/CHIP) is assumed. This subsection investigates the implications of relaxing these assumptions and shows that the qualitative predictions in the previous subsections still hold true.

Discrete Labor Supply Choices In the preceding subsection, agents’ pre-tax income choice is assumed to be continuous, implying that agents are free to choose their hours and hence perfectly control their income. Obviously, this may not be a realistic restriction as per Ashenfelter (1980), Ham (1982), Kahn and Lang (1991), Altonji and Paxson (1992), Dickens and Lundberg (1993) and Chetty et al. (2011). In this subsection, I will first derive the theoretical prediction only allowing an agent finitely many hours choices. The main implication is still that certain agents will lower their labor supply in order to claim benefit when a notch is introduced.

Because of the discrete labor supply restriction, $Z$ in this section is written explicitly as $wH$ where the monthly wage, $w$, is considered to be distributed smoothly among agents. For exposition purposes, I discuss the case when $H$ can only vary along the extensive margin; that is, an agent can only work full time or not work at all. The general case where $H$ is allowed to take on more than two values is analogous. Let $H = 0$ and $H = 1$ denote the labor supply choice of not working and working full time, respectively. If workers are constrained to only these two labor supply options, then the maximization problem becomes $\max_{H \in \{0, 1\}} u(C, wH)$ subject to the budget constraint (2) where $Z$ is replaced by $wH$, and I solve the maximization problem by considering the following two scenarios.

1. $w \leq \gamma$. An agent with potential monthly wage below the cutoff can claim benefits whether she works or not. In other words, the budget constraint she faces is only the segment to the left of $\gamma$: $C = (1-t)wH + g$. Consequently, maximizing utility involves the comparison of $u(g, 0)$ and $u((1-t)w + g, 1)$. To characterize the solutions, consider the agent of type $\tilde{n}$ who is indifferent between choosing

$^{1}$The working paper versions of Saez (2010), Saez (1999) and Saez (2002), address this extension in their simulation section but do not discuss the predictions from a theoretical perspective.
$H = 0$ and $H = 1$ at wage $w$. Therefore, $\bar{n}^l$ solves

$$u(g, 0) \equiv g = (1 - t)w + g - \frac{n}{1 + 1/e} \left( \frac{w}{n} \right)^{1+1/e} \equiv u((1 - t)w + g, 1)$$

which implies that $\bar{n}^l(w) = \left( \frac{w^{1+1/e}}{(1 - t)w + g} \right)^e$. Since $\frac{n}{1 + 1/e} \left( \frac{w}{n} \right)^{1+1/e}$ is decreasing in $n$ (i.e. the disutility of working is less for an agent with high $n$), agents with wage $w$ and of type $n \geq \bar{n}^l(w)$ choose $H = 1$ and those with $n < \bar{n}^l(w)$ choose $H = 0$. Because of the quasilinear utility functional form, $\bar{n}^l(w)$ also characterizes the work choice in the absence of the transfer program.

2. $w > \gamma$. An agent with potential monthly wage above the cutoff is eligible for benefits only if she chooses not to work. The type of agent who is indifferent between working and not working at wage $w$ equates $u(g, 0)$ and $u((1 - t)w, 1)$. Because her type $\bar{n}^r$ solves

$$u(g, 0) \equiv g = (1 - t)w - \frac{n}{1 + 1/e} \left( \frac{w}{n} \right)^{1+1/e} \equiv u((1 - t)w, 1)$$

$\bar{n}^r(w) = \left( \frac{w^{1+1/e}}{(1 - t)w - g} \right)^e$. Analogous to case 1, agents with $n \geq \bar{n}^r(w)$ choose to work full time while those with $n < \bar{n}^r(w)$ choose not to work.

Let $\bar{n}_{0,1}$ denote the type of agents who are indifferent between working and not working, and it follows that $\bar{n}_{0,1}(w) = \begin{cases} \bar{n}^l(w) & \text{if } w \leq \gamma. \text{ The threshold } \bar{n}_{0,1} \text{ varies smoothly with } w \text{ for } w \leq \gamma \text{ and for } w > \gamma, \text{ but there is a discontinuous increase in } \bar{n}_{0,1} \text{ as } w \text{ crosses } \gamma \text{ because } g > 0. \text{ This means that certain workers will choose not to work when a notch is introduced if } n \text{ and } w \text{ have a smooth joint distribution } f_{n,w} \text{ supported over the first quadrant of } \mathbb{R}^2. \end{cases}$

**Heterogeneous labor supply elasticities** The qualitative prediction of the model holds true when elasticities are heterogeneous across families. In subsection II.A, the threshold taste parameter, $\bar{n}$, is a function of $e$ as per equation \[^{[3]}\], and all statements are true for each $e > 0$. Denote this type threshold by $\bar{n}(e)$, let the conditional c.d.f. of $n$ given $e$ by $F_{n|e}$, and suppose that $e$ is distributed smoothly across agents with a p.d.f. of $f_e$. The fraction of agents that lower their labor supply when a benefit notch is introduced is simply

$$\frac{\int_0^\infty \left( F_{n|e}(\bar{n}(e)|e) - F_{n|e}(n_{\gamma}(e)) \right) f_e(e) de}{\int_0^\infty f_e(e) de}$$

where $n_{\gamma}(e) \equiv \frac{\gamma}{(1 - t) e}$ as defined in subsection II.A. This fraction is positive because $\bar{n}(e) > n_{\gamma}(e)$ for $e \geq 0$.

**Non-participation** To account for non-participation among eligible agents, I

\[^{2}\]The superscript $l$ here stands for left as $w$ lies to the left of $\gamma$. The superscript $r$ will be used in the next case.

\[^{3}\]Note that a positive $n^r$ exists – $n^r$ has to be positive for the marginal utility of work to be negative – when $(1 - t)w > g$, which means that the post-tax income of working full time at wage $w$ is larger than the value of benefit $g$. This is most likely satisfied for families with a wage above the CHIP cutoff.
follow a conventional approach by Moffitt (1983) and introduce a cost term to program participation. The cost term can encapsulate the simple psychological cost of being perceived as a beneficiary of government programs, but also the time and monetary cost of applying for benefits, such as filling out the required forms and acquiring program-related information. The simplest formulation is to add a flat cost to the utility function if the agent decides to participate in the program:

$$\max_{C, Z, P} u(C, Z) - \phi P$$

where an agent’s welfare participation decision $P \in \{0, 1\}$ depends on the cost parameter $\phi > 0$.

In effect, introducing cost shifts down the program segment of the budget constraint $[Z(1-t) + g]_{Z \leq \gamma}$ by $\phi$ and therefore reduces the public insurance notch to $\max\{g - \phi, 0\}$. If $\phi$ is constant across agents and $\phi < g$, then all the analyses in subsection II.A carry through by replacing $g$ with $\tilde{g} = g - \phi$. When $\phi$ is heterogeneous, the income distribution is smooth for the sub-population with $\tilde{g} = g - \phi \leq 0$, and analyses from previous subsections only hold true for those with $\tilde{g} > 0$. In the entire population, the qualitative predictions from subsection II.A are still valid if $(n, e, \phi)$ follows a smooth distribution supported on $\mathbb{R}^{3+\varepsilon}$.

**B. Dynamic Labor Supply Model in Subsection II.B**

In this section, I provide details for the dynamic labor supply model in subsection II.B. Formally, the state variable $s$ is the number of months until recertification ($s$ is defined to be 0 for those not claiming benefits since they will face the eligibility check when they apply). Let $\tau$ be the number of months of provided continuous eligibility. In each period, an agent chooses whether to participate in the program:

$$V_s = \max_{P_s} P_s V_s^1 + (1 - P_s) V_s^0$$

where $P_s = 0, 1$ denotes participation choice, and $V_s^1$ and $V_s^0$ are utilities associated with participating and not participating in the program when agents are $s$ months away from an eligibility check. The expressions for $V_s^1$ and $V_s^0$ are

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4Note the same argument applies if heterogeneity in $g$ is allowed, and the model’s prediction still holds true in that case. Heterogeneity in $g$ may be expected because families with healthier children value health insurance less than those with sicker children, for example.
\[ V_s^1 = \max_{C,Z} \{ u(C, Z) + \beta V_{s'} \} \quad \quad \quad V_s^0 = \max_{C,Z} \{ u(C, Z) + \beta V_{s'} \} \]

s.t. \( Z < \gamma \) if \( s = 0; C = (1 - t)Z + g \)

\[ s' = \begin{cases} 
  s - 1 & \text{if } s > 0 \\
  \tau - 1 & \text{if } s = 0 
\end{cases} \]

\[ s' = \begin{cases} 
  s - 1 & \text{if } s > 0 \\
  0 & \text{if } s = 0 
\end{cases} \]

I introduce the notation \( \{ C_s^p, Z_s^p \} = \arg \max V_s^p \) for \( p = 0, 1 \), and the dynamic problem simplifies to

\[ V_0 = \max_{P_0} \{ u(C_0^1, Z_0^1) + \beta V_1 \} + (1 - P_0) \{ u(C_0^0, Z_0^0) + \beta V_0 \} \]

(B2) \[ V_1 = \max_{P_1} \{ u(C_1^1, Z_1^1) + \beta V_0 \} + (1 - P_1) \{ u(C_1^0, Z_1^0) + \beta V_0 \} \]

I characterize the optimal \( P_s, C_s^p \) and \( Z_s^p \)'s below for \( s = 0, 1 \) and \( p = 0, 1 \).

First note that choosing \( P_1 = 1 \) strictly dominates \( P_1 = 0 \) because \( (C_1^0, Z_1^0) \) lies in the interior of the budget set for an agent with \( s = 1 \). In other words, when benefits can be claimed without having to lower income, a rational family will do so. This reasoning simplifies the expression for \( V_1 \) to \( V_1 = u(C_1^1, Z_1^1) + \beta V_0 \). Plugging in this expression of \( V_1 \) into that of \( V_0 \) leads to

\[ V_0 = \max_{P_0} \{ u(C_0^1, Z_0^1) + \beta u(C_1^1, Z_1^1) + \beta^2 V_0 \} + (1 - P_0) \{ u(C_0^0, Z_0^0) + \beta V_0 \} \]

For the agents indifferent between choosing \( P_0 = 0 \) and \( P_0 = 1 \),

\[ V_0 = u(C_1^1, Z_1^1) + \beta u(C_1^0, Z_1^0) + \beta^2 V_0 = u(C_0^0, Z_0^0) + \beta V_0 \]

and therefore \( V_0 = \frac{u(C_0^0, Z_0^0)}{1 - \beta} \). It follows that

(B3) \[ u(C_0^0, Z_0^1) + \beta u(C_1^1, Z_1^1) = u(C_0^0, Z_0^0) + \beta u(C_0^0, Z_0^0) \]

For quasi-linear utility \( u \), \( C_1^1 = C_0^0 + g \) and \( Z_1^1 = Z_0^0 \). Consequently, \( u(C_1^1, Z_1^1) = u(C_0^0, Z_0^0) + g \), and (B3) leads to

(B4) \[ u(C_1^1, Z_1^1) + \beta g = u(C_0^0, Z_0^0) \]

Suppose \( (C_0^1, Z_1^1) \) satisfying (B4) is an interior solution. Then the convex indifference curve passing through the bundle \( (C_0^1, Z_1^1) \) is tangent to the program segment of the budget constraint and therefore lies above the non-program budget constraint \( C = (1 - t)Z \). Consequently, \( u(C_1^1, Z_1^1) > u(C_0^0, Z_0^0) \) implying that

\[ u(C_0^1, Z_1^1) + \beta g > u(C_0^0, Z_0^0) \]

(B4). Therefore, the \( (C_0^1, Z_1^1) \) that satisfies (B4) has to be a corner solution with \( Z_0 = \gamma \). Denote the indifferent agent's
type by \( \bar{n}^d \) and expanding (B4) using the quasi-linear functional form leads to

\[
(B5) \quad \gamma(1-t) + (1+\beta)g - \frac{\bar{n}^d}{1+1/e} (\gamma \bar{n}^d)^{1+1/e} = \bar{n}^d(1-t)^{1+\epsilon} - \frac{\bar{n}^d}{1+1/e} (1-t)^{1+\epsilon}
\]

Equation (B5) states that an agent of type \( \bar{n}^d \) is indifferent between choosing her interior solution on the budget constraint segment \( C = (1-t)Z1_{\{Z>\gamma\}} \) and the post-tax/pre-tax income bundle \( (\gamma(1-t) + (1+\beta)g, \gamma) \).

C. OPTIMAL LENGTH OF THE CONTINUOUS ELIGIBILITY PERIOD: DETAILS

C1. Further discussion of the social welfare function in Section V

The formulation of the social welfare function (6) differs from a textbook approach (e.g., Salanie (2003)) in the following two respects. First, government surplus does not typically enter a social welfare function directly but through a balanced budget constraint. As noted by Salanie (2003), however, the dependence of utility on \( S \) is omitted in a textbook model because the spending on the public good is held constant. The specification (6) simply extends that of Salanie (2003) by allowing the production of the public good to be variable.

Second, having a “notched” lump sum transfer schedule with the associated cutoff \( \gamma \) as the policy instrument is not prevalent in the optimal design literature. In fact, if the income tax schedule is completely flexible and that \( \Psi \circ u \) is strictly concave, then the government should choose a transfer function that equalizes consumption across agents when labor supply decisions are not considered in the model (a special case is studied as early as in Edgeworth (1897)). When labor supply incentives are considered, the seminal paper Mirrlees (1971) shows that the marginal tax rate always lies between zero and one, which precludes a discrete drop in the consumption-pre-tax-income schedule if the optimal tax schedule is completely flexible. However, Blinder and Rosen (1985) and Slemrod (2013) argue that it is possible to institute a notch as part of an optimal schedule when the set of income tax instruments is limited, e.g., linear. By continuing with the specification of (6), I take as given the existence of the notch-creating transfer programs like Medicaid and CHIP.

C2. Optimal Recertification Frequency: Additional Results

This subsection presents additional results from the optimal continuous eligibility period calculations. First, I investigate the optimal recertification frequency

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5 The theoretical properties of means-tested in-kind transfers in an optimal-design context have also been studied in Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982), Blackorby and Donaldson (1988), Gahvari (1995), Gremer and Galvari (1997), Singh and Thomas (2000), etc. These studies typically consider the problem with two types of agents and a transfer scheme that ensures second-best allocation, i.e., the high type does not pretend to be the low type and claims benefit transfer. See Currie and Galvari (2008) for a survey.
under partial take-up. The point-in-time participation rate among eligibility children is estimated to be 82 percent in 2008 by Kenney et al. (2011), which is the value I use in my calculations below.

Table C1 presents the optimal length of the continuous eligibility period from simulations under 25 combinations of $\kappa$ and $\phi$—five values of $0, \$9.5, \$19, \$28.5$ and $\$38$ for both $\kappa$ and $\phi$, three values of $\eta, \eta = 0, 0.5, 1$, and two assumptions governing the take-up rates. The prevalence of the optimal continuous eligibility periods that are multiples of 4 under 100 percent take-up is again due to the seam bias; it is not so for the partial take-up results because of the random monthly program participation introduced. Under 100 percent take-up (column blocks (a) and (c)), the optimal recertification frequency is indeterminate for the utilitarian government ($\eta = 0$) when monitoring is costless because transferring wealth across population leads to no change in the overall welfare. When monitoring is costly, any eligibility check imposes a deadweight loss and therefore the implied optimal interval is the corner solution of 35 months. For the concave social welfare functions considered ($\eta > 0$), the optimal $\tau$ is smaller because of the pressure to efficiently target the needy. As with the patterns in Table 5, an increase in the cost on families, $\phi$, is more likely to lengthen the recertification period than an increase in $\kappa$ of the same magnitude. Under partial take-up (columns block (b) and (d) of Table C1), the calculated optimal $\tau$'s are no longer monotone in the cost parameters because of the randomness in take-up behavior in the simulations. As mentioned in section V, the recertification periods are longer under partial take-up because short continuous eligibility periods lead to coverage gaps, reducing welfare for low-income families.

Next, I investigate the sensitivity of the normative results to alternative sample restrictions. Specifically, I carry out the same exercise in section V but use families with children who did not appear for the entire panel. The two alternative samples are: a) the “24-month sample”: families with children who appeared consecutively for at least 24 months (i.e., the number of consecutive appearances between 24 and 35 months for the 2001 panel, and between 24 and 47 months for the 2004 panel); b) the “12-month sample”: families with children who appeared consecutively for at least 12 months but no more than 23 months. To contrast with these alternative samples, I will refer to the sample used in section V as the “full-panel sample”.

Using the 24-month sample leads to very similar results as those in Table 5.
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<th>Optimal Length of the Continuous Eligibility Period in Months (τ)</th>
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*Note:* The optimal lengths of the continuous eligibility period, τ, are calculated based on the framework in section V. The choice set of τ is {1, 2, ..., 35}. The calculation is carried out for different recertification cost parameters in 2010 dollars, φ (to the family) and κ (to the government), different values of the social welfare function parameter η and different assumptions governing take-up rates. The SIPP sample that serves the basis of the calculation consists of families with children who had appeared every month during the 2001 and 2004 panels.
and the optimal continuous eligibility period is at least 12 when $\phi \geq $19. In comparison, the 12-month sample yields somewhat shorter eligibility periods: when $\phi \geq $19, the optimal recertification period is eight months assuming full take-up. The reason for the shorter optimal period in the 12-month sample is that there appear to be more eligibility threshold crossing in that sample: the average number of times over a 12-month period that family income crosses the Medicaid eligibility threshold is 1.90 and 1.53 for the 12-month samples in the two SIPP panels; the corresponding numbers are 0.90 and 0.75 for the full-panel samples. The crossings in the 12-month sample call for more frequent recertification to improve targeting efficiency.

However, assuming partial take-up pushes the continuous eligibility period to the corner solution of 11 months in the 12-month sample. In addition, the 12-month sample only accounts for about one third of the families in the three samples. Overall, the 12-month lower bound for the continuous eligibility period is not very sensitive to alternative sample restrictions.

**C3. Comparison to Prell (2008)**

The normative framework presented in this study relates to and extends the informative Prell (2008) model in studying the optimal WIC recertification frequency along several major dimensions. First, Prell (2008) assumes constant hazard rates in the transitions between eligibility and ineligibility, which makes the problem analytically tractable and provides nice insights. In comparison, I carry out the exercise non-parametrically by relying on the empirical distribution of incomes and provide a computational solution. This approach also allows the incomes to endogenously respond to tax rates, transfer notches as long as they do not respond to the eligibility recertification period. Second, Prell (2008) assumes 100 percent program participation but acknowledges that take-up behavior or “program access” should be modeled. Estimating the take-up probability and building it into the normative framework brings this analysis a step closer to the goal. Third, the value of the transfer to different individuals is assumed to be the same from the social planner’s perspective in the Prell (2008) framework whereas I calculate the optimal recertification interval under alternative social welfare functions. Using my framework, the implied optimal continuous eligibility periods under the 100 percent take-up rate are moderately longer than those of Prell (2008) in the WIC context, while those under partial take-up are much larger.
D. Supplemental Figure

**Figure D1. Number of Child Public Insurance Enrollees and Percentage Captured in SIPP from Oct 2000 to Dec 2007**

*Note:* The solid line with the left y-axis represents the total number public insurance enrollees per month between October 2000 and December 2007 who were eligible as dependent children; the underlying data are extracted from the Medicaid Statistical Information System. The two dashed lines with the right y-axis represent the number of child enrollees estimated from the 2001 and 2004 panels of SIPP, respectively, as a percentage of the administrative total (the solid line). The deviation of the dashed lines from the value of 1 reflect the degree of under-reporting.