Appendix: State "Currencies" and the Transition
to U.S. Dollar:
Clarifying some Confusions
by Ron Michener and Robert E. Wright
There are many areas where our views differ greatly from Professor Grubb. We tried to confine our published comments to the most salient
issues, while this appendix is devoted to other matters raised by Grubb where we
felt a critical commentary was in order. The table of contents below links to
the issues explored in this appendix.
- What
was the legal tender status of colonial and confederation-era bills of credit?
Explicitly in the case of colonial issues, and implicitly in the
case of confederation issues, Grubb denies these bills were usually a legal
tender. We disagree. Why is it important? Anti-paper money
rhetoric in the confederation era often denounced legal-tender paper
money. If legal tender paper money was the rule, and not the exception,
this rhetoric must be taken more seriously.
- Why
did colonial bills of credit in the Middle colonies maintain a nearly constant
value? Our view is that merchants' agreements rating the full-bodied
specie coins circulating within those colonies served to fixed the value of
bills of credit in terms of specie. These agreements were durable
because emissions were never so large as to wholly displace specie from
circulation. Grubb disagrees, and alternately suggests that the respective
colonial assemblies maintained the constant value through careful control of
emissions and retirements, and that the bills were "accepted in payment for
the issuing government’s taxes at an announced rate relative to pound sterling
... [which] provided the anchor that allowed the bills to circulate as cash
within that colony." The first of Grubb's alternatives was disputed in the
paper, and this section disputes the second.
- To what extent can Grubb draw support for his AER paper from his other
related work? Our view is that the related work, cited by Grubb for
support, simply illustrates the weakness of his methodology. In
particular, using
runaway ads, as Grubb (2004b) does, would reverse the conclusions about the
medium of exchange in the confederation era drawn by Grubb (2003, 2004a)
using indentured servant transactions.
- In an effort to depict the Bank of North America as weak and ineffectual,
Grubb makes many statements we consider questionable.
We
discuss six specific instances.
- Grubb's econometrics. We argue
that the test for structural breaks in Table 3 is very sensitive to the exact
timing of the purported structural breaks, and that Grubb's rationale for
placing the breaks where he does is weak. We argue that the comparison
of variances done in Table 4 relies on mistaken distribution theory, and that
using a less objectionable technique reduces most of the Grubb's
"statistically significant" differences to insignificance. Finally, we
point out that the tests performed in Table 5 do not even use the correct
data. Moreover, the ADF test Grubb uses is notorious for its low power against
near unit root alternatives and Grubb's sample sizes never exceed 17
observations. Accepting a null hypothesis under such circumstances is
unremarkable and hardly proves the null is true.
- Our skeptical attitude towards Grubb's propositions is based in large part
on our reading of certain original source documents. The relevant documents
are generally inaccessible, and few historians and even fewer economists have
bothered to examine them. Below, we present some of these documents,
with a brief discussion of their importance.
- In Figure 1,
we present an example of prices current from a Philadelphia newspaper. In the lower right hand corner, one
can find the price quotes for paper money (the "last emission, trading at
133 to 140 for 100" refers to the Pennsylvania bills of credit emitted in
1785). Note how the paper money is grouped with other speculative
"public securities," and that the selfsame table presents prices for many
commodities. Bezanson's Pennsylvania price index, used by Grubb in his
econometrics, is derived from just such newspaper reports of prices
current. Since the price of paper money is 133 to 140 for 100, it is
evident that paper money can't be the numeraire in which prices are
quoted. That numeraire must be the specie-based unit of account.
Although Grubb (2003, p. 1783) cites the stability of confederation era
commodity prices as evidence that Pennsylvania's confederation era bills of
credit were successful, those prices were not even being quoted in paper
money.
- From other Philadelphia newspapers, we find various ads places by
brokers, offering to buy Pennsylvania's paper money -- ads that buttress our
argument that the Pennsylvania bills of credit the brokers dealt in were no
longer circulating as a medium of exchange.
Figure 2 is an ad
specifically mentioning Pennsylvania's 1780 and 1781 emissions, while
Figure 3
artificially conjoins two other ads (dating from the period after the 1785
emission had ceased to circulate) mentioning paper money without
distinction.
- That the specie basis for the monetary system hardly changed
between the colonial and confederation eras, and the confederation and
federal eras, can be illustrated vividly by examining coin rating tables
published in almanacs in each of these eras.
Figure 4 is an
example from colonial Pennsylvania;
Figure 5 is an
example from Pennsylvania during the Confederation;
Figure 6 is from
Pennsylvania in the early Federal era.
- In the 1790s, as the unit of account in common use began to switch from
local pounds and pence to dollars and cents, a minor industry was spawned as
a blizzard of pamphlets were printed designed to help the
arithmetically challenged convert the old units into the new ones, and back
again. Figure 7 is a
single page from one
such Pennsylvania publication.
Two things are evident from examining it. First, that the conversion
is as mechanical as the conversion of inches into centimeters. Second,
the basis of the conversion is the rating of the Spanish dollar, which
(outside South Carolina and Georgia) was precisely the same in 1793 as it
had been during the late colonial era.
- That coins and paper money could have circulated in colonial times as
perfect substitutes without a central bank or other government agency
standing by to freely exchange one for the other strikes many economists as
surprising. Though the theoretical basis for such an outcome was
established by Karekan and Wallace, imagining how it worked is a challenge
for those accustomed to a dominant central bank. The best contemporary
description of how the colonial system worked was given in a retrospective
by Eugenio, in the New Jersey Gazette, 30 January 1786.
Although we quoted Eugenio in our published comment, the issue is so important
and controversial that we believe readers may wish to see a lengthier
excerpt. You will
find a transcription
here;
Figure 8 is a
scan of the original document.
Exchange Rate Data. The exchange rate data used to produce Figure 3 is
made available here in three spreadsheets. The
first gives the raw data
and sources. We only used prices of bills of exchange on 60 days sight, so
as to maintain comparability with the Baltimore-White series. The
second gives a summary of
our data, and the third
merges our data with Bezanson's.
References
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