Appendix: State "Currencies" and the Transition to U.S. Dollar:

Clarifying some Confusions

by Ron Michener and Robert E. Wright

 

There are many areas where our views differ greatly from Professor Grubb. We tried to confine our published comments to the most salient issues, while this appendix is devoted to other matters raised by Grubb where we felt a critical commentary was in order. The table of contents below links to the issues explored in this appendix.

  1. What was the legal tender status of colonial and confederation-era bills of credit?  Explicitly in the case of colonial issues, and implicitly in the case of confederation issues, Grubb denies these bills were usually a legal tender.  We disagree.  Why is it important?  Anti-paper money rhetoric in the confederation era often denounced legal-tender paper money.  If legal tender paper money was the rule, and not the exception, this rhetoric must be taken more seriously.
  2. Why did colonial bills of credit in the Middle colonies maintain a nearly constant value? Our view is that merchants' agreements rating the full-bodied specie coins circulating within those colonies served to fixed the value of bills of credit in terms of specie.  These agreements were durable because emissions were never so large as to wholly displace specie from circulation. Grubb disagrees, and alternately suggests that the respective colonial assemblies maintained the constant value through careful control of emissions and retirements, and that the bills were "accepted in payment for the issuing government’s taxes at an announced rate relative to pound sterling ... [which] provided the anchor that allowed the bills to circulate as cash within that colony." The first of Grubb's alternatives was disputed in the paper, and this section disputes the second.
  3. To what extent can Grubb draw support for his AER paper from his other related work?  Our view is that the related work, cited by Grubb for support, simply illustrates the weakness of his methodology.  In particular, using runaway ads, as Grubb (2004b) does, would reverse the conclusions about the medium of exchange in the confederation era drawn by Grubb (2003, 2004a) using indentured servant transactions.
  4. In an effort to depict the Bank of North America as weak and ineffectual, Grubb makes many statements we consider questionable.  We discuss six specific instances.
  5. Grubb's econometrics.  We argue that the test for structural breaks in Table 3 is very sensitive to the exact timing of the purported structural breaks, and that Grubb's rationale for placing the breaks where he does is weak.  We argue that the comparison of variances done in Table 4 relies on mistaken distribution theory, and that using a less objectionable technique reduces most of the Grubb's "statistically significant" differences to insignificance.  Finally, we point out that the tests performed in Table 5 do not even use the correct data. Moreover, the ADF test Grubb uses is notorious for its low power against near unit root alternatives and Grubb's sample sizes never exceed 17 observations. Accepting a null hypothesis under such circumstances is unremarkable and hardly proves the null is true.
  6. Our skeptical attitude towards Grubb's propositions is based in large part on our reading of certain original source documents. The relevant documents are generally inaccessible, and few historians and even fewer economists have bothered to examine them.  Below, we present some of these documents, with a brief discussion of their importance.
    1. In Figure 1, we present an example of prices current from a Philadelphia newspaper.  In the lower right hand corner, one can find the price quotes for paper money (the "last emission, trading at 133 to 140 for 100" refers to the Pennsylvania bills of credit emitted in 1785).  Note how the paper money is grouped with other speculative "public securities," and that the selfsame table presents prices for many commodities.  Bezanson's Pennsylvania price index, used by Grubb in his econometrics, is derived from just such newspaper reports of prices current.  Since the price of paper money is 133 to 140 for 100, it is evident that paper money can't be the numeraire in which prices are quoted.  That numeraire must be the specie-based unit of account.  Although Grubb (2003, p. 1783) cites the stability of confederation era commodity prices as evidence that Pennsylvania's confederation era bills of credit were successful, those prices were not even being quoted in paper money.
    2. From other Philadelphia newspapers, we find various ads places by brokers, offering to buy Pennsylvania's paper money -- ads that buttress our argument that the Pennsylvania bills of credit the brokers dealt in were no longer circulating as a medium of exchange.  Figure 2 is an ad specifically mentioning Pennsylvania's 1780 and 1781 emissions, while Figure 3 artificially conjoins two other ads (dating from the period after the 1785 emission had ceased to circulate) mentioning paper money without distinction.
    3. That the specie basis for the monetary system hardly changed between the colonial and confederation eras, and the confederation and federal eras, can be illustrated vividly by examining coin rating tables published in almanacs in each of these eras.  Figure 4 is an example from colonial Pennsylvania; Figure 5 is an example from Pennsylvania during the Confederation; Figure 6 is from Pennsylvania in the early Federal era.
    4. In the 1790s, as the unit of account in common use began to switch from local pounds and pence to dollars and cents, a minor industry was spawned as a blizzard of  pamphlets were printed designed to help the arithmetically challenged convert the old units into the new ones, and back again. Figure 7 is a single page from one such Pennsylvania publication.  Two things are evident from examining it.  First, that the conversion is as mechanical as the conversion of inches into centimeters.  Second, the basis of the conversion is the rating of the Spanish dollar, which (outside South Carolina and Georgia) was precisely the same in 1793 as it had been during the late colonial era.
    5. That coins and paper money could have circulated in colonial times as perfect substitutes without a central bank or other government agency standing by to freely exchange one for the other strikes many economists as surprising.  Though the theoretical basis for such an outcome was established by Karekan and Wallace, imagining how it worked is a challenge for those accustomed to a dominant central bank.  The best contemporary description of how the colonial system worked was given in a retrospective by Eugenio, in the New Jersey Gazette, 30 January 1786.  Although we quoted Eugenio in our published comment, the issue is so important and controversial that we believe readers may wish to see a lengthier excerpt.  You will find a transcription here; Figure 8 is a scan of the original document.

    Exchange Rate Data. The exchange rate data used to produce Figure 3 is made available here in three spreadsheets.  The first gives the raw data and sources. We only used prices of bills of exchange on 60 days sight, so as to maintain comparability with the Baltimore-White series. The second gives a summary of our data, and the third merges our data with Bezanson's.

    References

 

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