

Supplemental Appendix for “Education and Partisanship” by Daniel Firoozi

A In-Sample Survey Appendix

A.1 Survey Descriptive Statistics




Figure A.1: Poll Respondent Ideologies and Two-Party Preference

Note: The two ideological indexes in this figure are calculated using the questions in Block 3 of the Survey in Section A.2. Index values are calculated as the average policy view on a particular set of questions with the most liberal response assigned -1, the most conservative response assigned +1, and all other responses interpolated at equidistant points. Each dot reflects a point in the two-dimensional ideology space. The darker the color of a dot, the more individuals are located at that particular point. The color gradient from blue to red reflects the proportion of individuals at a given point who say they favor the Democratic Party over the Republican Party on policy issues, with blue dots corresponding to the Democratic Party and red dots corresponding to the Republican Party. Plugging in the median response for each question from Pew Research samples of American voters yields a score of (0,0).




Figure A.2: Mean Respondent Ideology by Voter Registration Status

Note: The two ideological indexes in this figure are calculated using the questions in Block 3 of the Survey in Section A.2. Index values are calculated as the average policy view on a particular set of questions with the most liberal response assigned -1, the most conservative response assigned +1, and all other responses interpolated at equidistant points. Each dot reflects the average ideological scores of a particular voter registration group from in-sample respondents in the two-dimensional ideology space. The dots are sized roughly based on the number of respondents within the particular voter registration group. Plugging in the median response for each question from Pew Research samples of American voters yields a score of (0,0).

Table A.1: Comparison of Survey Takers and Full Sample

Demographics	Respondents	Full Sample
Female	52.2%	52.8%
Underrepresented Minority	25.2%	24.4%
Likely Cal Grant Eligible	38.1%	34.0%
First Generation Student	45.2%	45.1%
FAFSA Filer	68.9%	63.7%
Student Works Pre-College	5.1%	4.7%
Low Enrollment County	5.3%	5.6%
Low Quality High School	14.2%	14.1%
Raised by Single Parent	17.1%	15.6%
Dad's Years of Schooling	14.2 years	14.3 years
Mom's Years of Schooling	14.0 years	14.0 years
ISIR Family Income	\$77,594	\$81,476
Reported Family Income	\$88,413	\$93,056
High School GPA	3.61	3.59
Household Size	3.95	4.04
Party Registration	Respondents	Full Sample
No Registration	45.3%	48.9%
Democratic	32.1%	29.5%
No Party	15.6%	14.8%
Republican	4.8%	4.8%
Third Party	2.0%	1.7%
College Sector	Respondents	Full Sample
University of California	56.7%	52.8%
California State University	15.2%	15.1%
California Private	7.1%	7.2%
Out-of-State	8.0%	9.2%
2-yr or No College	12.7%	15.3%

Note: The column titled "Respondents" reflects the mean value or percentage among people who participated in my proprietary survey, which was sent to all in-sample UC applicants. The column titled "Full Sample" shows the corresponding value for all UC applicants within my sample, regardless of whether or not they participated in the survey.

Table A.2: Two-Party Policy Preference by Party Registration

Registration Status	Two-Party Preference		
	Republican	Democratic	Total %
Democratic	6.2	93.8	100.0
Non-Partisan	26.6	73.4	100.0
Not Registered	25.7	74.3	100.0
Other	21.7	78.3	100.0
Republican	77.4	22.6	100.0
N	243	862	1,105

Note: The Democratic and Republican columns reflect the proportion of survey respondents with a given voter registration status who say they favor a given major political party on policy issues. “Non-partisan” refers to individuals who are registered to vote, but are unaffiliated with a political party. “Other” refers to individuals who are registered members of third parties.

Table A.3: Ideology Scores by Party Registration

Registration Status	Mean Ideology	
	Economic	Social
Democratic	-0.595	-0.638
Non-Partisan	-0.329	-0.434
Not Registered	-0.399	-0.458
Other	-0.333	-0.536
Republican	0.192	-0.022

Note: The economic and social columns reflect the mean ideological score of survey respondents with a given voter registration status. The two ideological indexes are calculated using the questions in Block 3 of the Survey in Section A.2. Index values are calculated as the average policy view on a particular set of questions with the most liberal response assigned -1, the most conservative response assigned +1, and all other responses interpolated at equidistant points. “Non-partisan” refers to individuals who are registered to vote, but are unaffiliated with a political party. “Other” refers to individuals who are registered members of third parties.

Table A.4: Self-Reported Political Influence Ratings

College Enrollment	Mean Influence Score			
	Family	Friends	Coworkers	Educators
UC	1.91	1.86	3.46	2.77
CSU	1.66	1.96	3.57	2.80
Other CA	1.80	2.03	3.41	2.77
Other OOS	1.72	1.98	3.56	2.74
No 4 Yr	1.86	2.01	3.49	2.64
Total	1.84	1.92	3.48	2.75

Note: Each column reflects the mean self-reported influence rank respondents assign to a particular group. The most influential group is assigned the value 1, the second most influential is assigned the value 2, the third is assigned 3, and the least influential is assigned the value 4. Responses are sorted into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. “Other OOS” refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.5: Self-Reported Current Events Discussions with Family

College Enrollment	Discusses Current Events with Family				
	Rarely	Yearly	Monthly	Weekly	Total
UC	11.2	9.1	32.4	47.4	100.0
CSU	8.9	7.7	34.3	49.1	100.0
Other CA	11.4	5.1	32.9	50.6	100.0
Other OOS	9.0	5.6	32.6	52.8	100.0
No 4 Yr	9.2	2.8	29.8	58.2	100.0
Total	10.4	7.5	32.4	49.7	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who say they discussed current events with the stated frequency. Responses are sorted into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. “Other OOS” refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.6: Self-Reported Current Events Discussions in College

College Enrollment	Discussed Current Events in College				
	Rarely	Yearly	Monthly	Weekly	Total
UC	16.4	4.8	26.5	52.3	100.0
CSU	15.4	7.7	26.6	50.3	100.0
Other CA	13.9	2.5	25.3	58.2	100.0
Other OOS	13.5	4.5	14.6	67.4	100.0
No 4 Yr	15.6	5.0	19.9	59.6	100.0
Total	15.7	5.1	24.6	54.6	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who say they discussed current events with the stated frequency. Responses are sorted into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. “Other OOS” refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.7: Self-Reported Current Events Discussions with Friends

College Enrollment	Discusses Current Events with Friends				
	Rarely	Yearly	Monthly	Weekly	Total
UC	4.3	4.6	29.2	61.9	100.0
CSU	7.1	2.4	34.9	55.6	100.0
Other CA	1.3	10.1	29.1	59.5	100.0
Other OOS	6.7	0.0	29.2	64.0	100.0
No 4 Yr	7.1	3.5	30.5	58.9	100.0
Total	5.1	4.2	30.2	60.5	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who say they discussed current events with the stated frequency. Responses are sorted into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. “Other OOS” refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.8: Self-Reported College Student Housing

College Enrollment	Ever Lived with Students		
	Yes	No	Total
UC	82.8	17.2	100.0
CSU	57.4	42.6	100.0
Other CA	84.8	15.2	100.0
Other OOS	88.8	11.2	100.0
No 4 Yr	58.2	41.8	100.0
Total	76.4	23.6	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who say they have or have not ever lived in on-campus student housing or in a housing complex mostly composed of college students. Responses are sorted into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. “Other OOS” refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.9: Self-Reported Perceptions of Friend Ideology

College Enrollment	Perceived Friend Ideology			Total
	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	
UC	63.2	31.1	5.7	100.0
CSU	54.4	36.7	8.9	100.0
Other CA	64.6	30.4	5.1	100.0
Other OOS	64.0	31.5	4.5	100.0
No 4 Yr	56.0	36.9	7.1	100.0
Total	61.1	32.7	6.2	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who would use the respective ideological label to characterize their friends. Responses are sorted into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. “Other OOS” refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.10: Self-Reported Perceptions of Coworker Ideology

College Enrollment	Perceived Coworker Ideology			
	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Total
UC	38.3	47.7	14.0	100.0
CSU	33.1	47.9	18.9	100.0
Other CA	40.5	39.2	20.3	100.0
Other OOS	41.6	46.1	12.4	100.0
No 4 Yr	42.6	48.2	9.2	100.0
Total	38.5	47.1	14.5	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who would use the respective ideological label to characterize their coworkers. Responses are sorted into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. “Other OOS” refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.11: Self-Reported Perceptions of Educator Ideology

College Enrollment	Perceived Educator Ideology			Total
	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	
UC	57.6	38.9	3.5	100.0
CSU	55.0	37.3	7.7	100.0
Other CA	50.6	44.3	5.1	100.0
Other OOS	51.7	42.7	5.6	100.0
No 4 Yr	56.0	38.3	5.7	100.0
Total	56.0	39.3	4.7	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who would use the respective ideological label to characterize their professors or teachers. Responses are sorted into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. “Other OOS” refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

A.2 Survey Questions

Survey Block 1

Question 1. Indicate how often you have: (Select one option in each row)

	Rarely	Yearly	Monthly	Weekly
Discussed current events with friends				
Discussed current events with family				
Discussed current events during college				
Demonstrated or volunteered for a cause				
Attended religious services				

Question 2. Rank the following groups of people based on how big of an impact you feel they had on your political views. (Drag and drop to move them. 1 means largest impact, 4 means smallest impact.)

Your Professors or Teachers

Your Friends

Your Family

Your Coworkers

Question 3. At roughly what age would you say that you developed most of your social and economic views?

Before age 18

Ages 18 to 21

Ages 21 to 24

Ages 24 to 30

After age 30

Question 4. Have you ever lived in an on-campus college dormitory or in a housing complex mostly composed of college students?

Yes

No

Question 5. If you had to choose, which party is more closely aligned with your policy views?

the Republican Party

the Democratic Party

Survey Block 2

Question 6. Compared to other Americans, would you say that members of {Unselected choice from Question 5} are more, about the same, or less... (Select one option in each row)

	More	About the Same	Less
Moral			
Open-minded			
Intelligent			

Question 7. To the best of your knowledge, which the following claims are true and which are false? (Select one option in each row)

	True	False
COVID killed over 5 times as many Americans as the flu and pneumonia last year.		
Over 95% of climate scientists agree that humans are causing global warming and climate change.		
The violent crime and murder rates were lower last year than 30 years ago.		
More than 75% of immigrants currently in the US are living in the country legally.		
Over 90% of expert economists believe gas price changes are predominantly due to market forces, not government policy.		

Question 8. Which of the following best describes the beliefs of... (Select one option in each row)

	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
Your Family			
Your Friends			
Your Coworkers			
Your Professors or Teachers			
Yourself			

Survey Block 3

Question 9. Which of the following statements comes closest to your overall view of gun laws in the United States?

Gun laws should be MORE strict than they are today

Gun laws are about right

Gun laws should be LESS strict than they are today

Question 10. Do you think abortion should be...?

Legal in all cases, no exceptions

Legal in most cases, some exceptions

Illegal in most cases, some exceptions

Illegal in all cases, no exceptions

Question 11. When it comes to transgender people which statement comes closest to your views, even if neither is exactly right?

Someone's gender can be different from the sex they were assigned at birth

Someone's gender is determined by the sex they were assigned at birth

Question 12. Which comes closest to your views about what needs to be done to ensure equal rights for all Americans regardless of their racial or ethnic backgrounds, even if none are exactly right?

Most U.S. laws and major institutions need to be completely rebuilt because they are fundamentally biased against some racial and ethnic groups

While there are many inequities in U.S. laws and institutions, necessary changes can be made by working within the current systems

Little needs to be done

Nothing at all needs to be done

Question 13. Should LEGAL immigration into the United States be...?

Increased

Kept at present level

Decreased

Question 14. Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for people convicted of murder?

Strongly Favor

Somewhat Favor

Somewhat Oppose

Strongly Oppose

Question 15. Thinking about the assistance government provides to people in need, do you think the government...?

Should provide MORE assistance

Is providing about the right amount of assistance

Should provide LESS assistance

Question 16. Thinking about the country's energy supply, do you think the US should...?

Phase out the use of fossil fuels completely, relying instead on renewable sources only

Use a mix of energy sources including fossil fuels along with renewable energy sources

Question 17. Would you favor or oppose making tuition at public colleges and universities free for all American students?

Strongly Favor

Somewhat Favor

Somewhat Oppose

Strongly Oppose

Question 18. Do you think it is the responsibility of the federal government to make sure all Americans have health care coverage?

Yes, it should be provided through a single national health insurance system run by the government

Yes, it should be provided through a mix of private insurance companies and government programs

No, but government should continue programs like Medicare and Medicaid for seniors and the very poor

No, government should not be involved in providing health insurance at all

Question 19. Would you favor or oppose raising the federal minimum wage to \$15.00 an hour?

Strongly Favor

Somewhat Favor

Somewhat Oppose

Strongly Oppose

Question 20. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer services, or a bigger government providing more services?

Bigger government, more services

Smaller government, fewer services

B Descriptives and First-Stage Appendix

B.1 Matching Procedure and Description

For reference, I match on full name and date of birth, whereas many papers in this literature match on full name but not date of birth. Empirically, the match rate is relatively high in the near-threshold UC applicant sample: roughly 53 percent of college applicants are matched to a voter registration record using full name and date of birth. There are several substantive reasons why a UC applicant would not match to a registration record even in the absence of linkage error: (1) noncitizens are ineligible to register, (2) some students move out of state or out of the country, (3) some die or are otherwise disenfranchised, and (4) a nontrivial share of eligible students simply chooses not to register (which is itself an outcome of interest in the paper). The remaining non-matches likely reflect linkage frictions like surname changes (including after marriage), other legal name changes, use of nicknames, and/or use of alternative spellings across the UC application and voter file.

In the data, Name-Date-of-Birth duplicates are exceedingly rare. Fewer than 0.5 percent of people share both a full name and birthdate with another person. In these cases, I assign one of the registration records at random to the college applicant. As a plausibility check on match rates, internal UC survey evidence indicates that roughly 70 percent of eligible students are registered to vote, while administrative records at the campus from which I use data suggest that about 18 percent of students are noncitizens. Scaling the observed match rate by eligibility yields $0.53/(1 - 0.18) \approx 0.65$, which is reasonably close to the survey-based registration benchmark, with the gap plausibly attributable to the name changes and spelling issues described above. Because the estimated treatment effects I find are larger for men than for women, and because the RD design balances pre-treatment characteristics near the threshold, I do not view imperfect matching as a major threat to the interpretation of the results, though it may reduce precision.

B.2 1st Stage

I focus on reduced-form effects, because scoring above the 96th percentile threshold impacts multiple dimensions of admission and enrollment, violating the exclusion restriction.²² I also present IV estimates using total UC admissions as the treatment to help interpret magnitudes. I view total UC admissions as a better measure of treatment than a binary variable for admission to any UC or enrollment outcomes, because of substitution between

²²It is worth noting that reduced-form effects are also preferable because the composition of a prospective student's college applications, which includes campuses outside of the UC system, is unobserved.

UC campuses and less severe exclusion restriction violations. Substitution between UC campuses matters because there are meaningful within-system differences in campus characteristics that may act as causal mechanisms. The exclusion restriction is violated for many enrollment measures because enrollment changes along multiple dimensions.²³

I begin by illustrating the impact of the UC’s top percentile policy on UC applications and admissions. The UC conferred a significant advantage to college applicants who ranked marginally above the 96th percentile of reweighted GPA. I illustrate this visually in Figure B.1 by plotting against students’ centered GPA values (1) the number of UC campuses to which they applied in gray and (2) the number of UC campuses to which students were admitted in black. Just below the threshold for eligibility, the typical student applied to roughly 4.5 and was admitted to just under 3 UC campuses. While there is a discrete jump in the number of admissions per student, there is no comparable change in the total number of UC applications.

I show the estimates for these outcomes explicitly in Table B.1, varying the inclusion of covariate controls, the order of a polynomial control for the running variable, and the bandwidth used between 0.3 GPA points and the MSE-optimal bandwidth (Calónico et al., 2020). I find consistently across specifications that there are no meaningful or statistically significant changes in UC application rates at a 90 percent confidence interval. However, there is a sizable discontinuity in UC admission rates on the order of roughly 0.4 campuses at the threshold. Although I prefer the reduced-form estimates throughout this paper, I use this admission effect as a first-stage to understand the scale of the top percentile policy’s impact.

Turning to enrollment, I demonstrate that the UC’s top percentile admission policy changes the enrollment patterns of policy-eligible students along multiple dimensions. Conferring an admission advantage at the UC increased enrollment at both the extensive margin of four-year college attendance and the intensive margin of selectivity, in part by attracting students to highly selective UC campuses from CSUs and, to a smaller degree, from less selective UCs, two-year colleges, or non-enrollment in college.

In Figure B.2, I illustrate the effect of the UC’s top percentile policy on UC application success rates, and enrollment in UCs, CSUs, private Californian colleges, out-of-state colleges, and two-year colleges or no college enrollment.²⁴ The final two panels in the figure

²³This leads the net changes I observe for any single measure of enrollment to understate the gross proportion of applicants who change their enrollment decision. The result would be both overstated IV estimates for enrollment and the potential for misattribution of the effect to one particular enrollment characteristic, when another is more consequential. Aggregate UC admissions faces a similar but less severe problem if eligibility for top percentile admission increases college application rates outside of the UC or changes the composition of UCs to which eligible students apply.

²⁴UC application success rates refer to the ratio between the number of UC campuses an applicant was

decompose four year colleges by a collapsed version of Opportunity Insights’ selectivity ratings.²⁵ I find that student enrollment rises at highly selective colleges and UCs, primarily at the expense of CSUs, less selective colleges, and non-enrollment in college. Specifically, I find a 6 percentage point increase in highly selective colleges, driven by UCs in this category, with one quarter of counterfactual enrollment coming from two-year colleges or non-enrollment, half coming from CSUs, and the final quarter coming from UCs below the “Highly Selective” category. Figure B.3 illustrates that students flow to UC campuses with higher instructional expenditures, applicant rejection rates, timely graduation rates, and median graduate earnings than counterfactual institutions. I demonstrate robustness by testing each of these intermediate outcomes across six different specifications in Tables B.2 and B.3, finding similar results across each.

admitted to and the number of UC campuses to which they applied.

²⁵Four-year colleges rated highly selective or better are categorized as “Highly Selective”, four year colleges rated selective or below are labeled “Selective”, and all other enrollment categories are grouped into “2 Year/No College”.

Table B.1: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on First Stage Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
UC Applications	-0.0088 (0.0210)	-0.0138 (0.0205)	-0.0267 (0.0198)	-0.0308 (0.0192)	0.0202 (0.0284)	0.0087 (0.0277)
UC Admissions	0.4153** (0.0277)	0.4043** (0.0268)	0.3784** (0.0216)	0.3749** (0.0207)	0.4542** (0.0309)	0.4425** (0.0298)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “UC Applications” refers to the aggregate number of UC campuses to which an applicant applied. “UC Admissions” refers to the aggregate number of UC campuses to which an applicant was admitted.

Table B.2: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Admission and Enrollment

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Admission Outcomes</i>						
UC Success Rate	0.0947** (0.0050)	0.0940** (0.0049)	0.0900** (0.0038)	0.0899** (0.0037)	0.0999** (0.0054)	0.0991** (0.0053)
<i>B. Enrollment Decomposed by Sector</i>						
UC	0.0339** (0.0075)	0.0332** (0.0073)	0.0318** (0.0068)	0.0309** (0.0065)	0.0382** (0.0098)	0.0391** (0.0094)
CSU	-0.0399** (0.0052)	-0.0391** (0.0051)	-0.0289** (0.0041)	-0.0282** (0.0041)	-0.0433** (0.0059)	-0.0422** (0.0058)
Other CA	0.0042 (0.0040)	0.0038 (0.0040)	0.0026 (0.0040)	0.0023 (0.0039)	0.0040 (0.0057)	0.0032 (0.0057)
Other OOS	0.0162** (0.0049)	0.0148** (0.0048)	0.0086* (0.0039)	0.0082* (0.0038)	0.0185** (0.0055)	0.0169** (0.0054)
2 Year/No College	-0.0147** (0.0041)	-0.0140** (0.0040)	-0.0141** (0.0036)	-0.0132** (0.0036)	-0.0174** (0.0053)	-0.0171** (0.0052)
<i>C. Four Year Enrollment Decomposed by Selectivity</i>						
Highly Selective	0.0743** (0.0085)	0.0739** (0.0082)	0.0604** (0.0064)	0.0588** (0.0062)	0.0834** (0.0093)	0.0816** (0.0089)
Selective	-0.0587** (0.0073)	-0.0572** (0.0071)	-0.0463** (0.0059)	-0.0456** (0.0058)	-0.0660** (0.0085)	-0.0645** (0.0083)
2 Year/No College	-0.0147** (0.0041)	-0.0140** (0.0040)	-0.0141** (0.0036)	-0.0132** (0.0036)	-0.0174** (0.0053)	-0.0171** (0.0052)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). The “UC Success Rate” refers to the ratio between the number of UC campuses an individual applied to and the number of UC campuses to which they were actually admitted. “Other OOS” refers to out-of-state four year colleges. “Highly Selective” refers to four year colleges classified by Opportunity Insights ratings as Highly Selective, Elite, or Ivy Plus. “Selective” refers to four year colleges classified by Opportunity Insights ratings as Selective or a lower category of selectivity.

Table B.3: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Enrollment by Quality and Selectivity

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Instr. Spending	2646.47** (235.59)	2594.58** (228.96)	2496.89** (184.78)	2456.31** (178.38)	2962.02** (263.99)	2898.69** (257.02)
Rejection Rate	0.0395** (0.0041)	0.0388** (0.0040)	0.0378** (0.0032)	0.0371** (0.0031)	0.0445** (0.0046)	0.0435** (0.0044)
Graduation Rate	0.0311** (0.0040)	0.0305** (0.0039)	0.0290** (0.0032)	0.0281** (0.0030)	0.0367** (0.0046)	0.0359** (0.0044)
Median Income	1997.58** (176.18)	1958.35** (169.12)	1765.27** (136.62)	1743.78** (130.32)	2242.71** (197.44)	2187.53** (189.78)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Instr. Spending” refers to average per student instructional expenditures. “Rejection Rate” refers to the fraction of applicants to a particular campus who were rejected. “Graduation Rate” refers to the proportion of first time full-time freshmen who enter a given campus who complete their intended degree within 150 percent of normative time to degree. “Median Income” in this context refers to the median post-enrollment earnings for students who attended a given campus. Data are from Opportunity Insights.




Figure B.1: RD Graph of UC Applications and Admissions

Note: Gray dots reflect the number of UC applications per student. Black dots reflect the number of UC admissions per student. Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort.




Figure B.2: RD Graphs of College Enrollment

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table B.2.




Figure B.3: RD Graphs of College Quality

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table B.3.

C ITT, IV, and HTE Estimates Appendix

Table C.1: Intent-to-Treat Effects of UC Admission Policy on Registration and Partisanship

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Total Voter Registration Rate</i>						
Registered to Vote	0.0118 (0.0078)	0.0110 (0.0078)	0.0127 ⁺ (0.0069)	0.0119 ⁺ (0.0069)	0.0158 (0.0102)	0.0148 (0.0101)
<i>B. Political Party Membership</i>						
Republican Party	-0.0060 ⁺ (0.0032)	-0.0061 ⁺ (0.0032)	-0.0061* (0.0029)	-0.0063* (0.0028)	-0.0089* (0.0043)	-0.0091* (0.0043)
Democrat/Independent	0.0202* (0.0080)	0.0197* (0.0079)	0.0188** (0.0069)	0.0182** (0.0069)	0.0247* (0.0103)	0.0239* (0.0102)
Democratic Party	0.0107 (0.0069)	0.0103 (0.0069)	0.0100 (0.0064)	0.0097 (0.0063)	0.0113 (0.0093)	0.0110 (0.0093)
No Party Preference	0.0097 ⁺ (0.0056)	0.0094 ⁺ (0.0056)	0.0113* (0.0049)	0.0109* (0.0049)	0.0146 ⁺ (0.0076)	0.0142 ⁺ (0.0076)
Third Party	-0.0025 (0.0016)	-0.0025 (0.0016)	-0.0024 (0.0016)	-0.0024 (0.0016)	-0.0013 (0.0024)	-0.0013 (0.0024)
<i>C. Early Life Conversion between Major Parties</i>						
Republican Convert	-0.0026** (0.0010)	-0.0025** (0.0010)	-0.0015 ⁺ (0.0008)	-0.0014 ⁺ (0.0008)	-0.0027* (0.0012)	-0.0026* (0.0012)
Democratic Convert	-0.0013 (0.0014)	-0.0014 (0.0014)	-0.0013 (0.0014)	-0.0013 (0.0014)	-0.0013 (0.0020)	-0.0014 (0.0020)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Democrat/Independent” refers to the fraction of students who are registered as Democrat, as a no party preference voter, or as a member of a third party. Democratic and Republican converts are voters who are currently registered with the Democratic and Republican Party in California, but at any time in the past were a registered member of the other major party.

Table C.2: IV Estimates of Effects on Voter Registration Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Total Voter Registration Rate</i>						
Registered to Vote	0.0113 (0.0166)	0.0092 (0.0170)	0.0336 ⁺ (0.0184)	0.0317 ⁺ (0.0185)	0.0347 (0.0225)	0.0335 (0.0229)
<i>B. Political Party Membership</i>						
Republican Party	-0.0129 ⁺ (0.0069)	-0.0139* (0.0070)	-0.0162* (0.0075)	-0.0169* (0.0076)	-0.0196* (0.0095)	-0.0206* (0.0097)
Democrat/Independent	0.0349* (0.0173)	0.0334 ⁺ (0.0175)	0.0498** (0.0184)	0.0486** (0.0185)	0.0543* (0.0228)	0.0541* (0.0233)
Democratic Party	0.0118 (0.0154)	0.0113 (0.0156)	0.0264 (0.0167)	0.0259 (0.0168)	0.0249 (0.0206)	0.0249 (0.0210)
No Party Preference	0.0218 ⁺ (0.0120)	0.0210 ⁺ (0.0123)	0.0299* (0.0130)	0.0291* (0.0132)	0.0322 ⁺ (0.0168)	0.0321 ⁺ (0.0172)
Third Party	-0.0067 (0.0040)	-0.0067 (0.0041)	-0.0065 (0.0042)	-0.0065 (0.0043)	-0.0029 (0.0053)	-0.0029 (0.0054)
<i>C. Early Life Conversion between Major Parties</i>						
Republican Convert	-0.0018 (0.0018)	-0.0016 (0.0018)	-0.0038 ⁺ (0.0021)	-0.0038 ⁺ (0.0021)	-0.0059* (0.0028)	-0.0060* (0.0028)
Democratic Convert	-0.0025 (0.0033)	-0.0028 (0.0033)	-0.0033 (0.0037)	-0.0036 (0.0037)	-0.0029 (0.0044)	-0.0032 (0.0045)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Democrat/Independent” refers to the fraction of students who are registered as Democrat, as a no party preference voter, or as a member of a third party. Democratic and Republican converts are voters who are currently registered with the Democratic and Republican Party in California, but at any time in the past were a registered member of the other major party. Crossing the 96th percentile threshold is used as the excluded instrument for the number of UC campuses to which an individual was admitted.

Table C.3: IV Estimates of Effects on Voter Turnout Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Total Voter Turnout Rates</i>						
Ever Voted	0.0057 (0.0162)	0.0037 (0.0165)	0.0203 (0.0182)	0.0184 (0.0183)	0.0307 (0.0222)	0.0294 (0.0227)
Total Votes Cast	0.1005 (0.0764)	0.0961 (0.0782)	0.1412 (0.0895)	0.1360 (0.0903)	0.1509 (0.1104)	0.1443 (0.1127)
<i>B. Presidential and Midterm Election Votes</i>						
Presidential Votes	0.0648 (0.0541)	0.0610 (0.0554)	0.0989 (0.0626)	0.0951 (0.0632)	0.1029 (0.0767)	0.0992 (0.0783)
Midterm Votes	0.0361 (0.0283)	0.0330 (0.0289)	0.0423 (0.0320)	0.0409 (0.0322)	0.0480 (0.0401)	0.0451 (0.0410)
<i>C. General and Primary Election Votes</i>						
General Votes	0.0329 (0.0519)	0.0286 (0.0530)	0.0568 (0.0584)	0.0530 (0.0589)	0.0473 (0.0715)	0.0425 (0.0729)
Primary Votes	0.0809* (0.0338)	0.0792* (0.0345)	0.0843* (0.0378)	0.0830* (0.0381)	0.1036* (0.0468)	0.1017* (0.0479)
<i>D. Partisan Primary Turnout Rates</i>						
Republican Primaries	-0.0054 (0.0084)	-0.0064 (0.0085)	-0.0057 (0.0088)	-0.0064 (0.0089)	-0.0048 (0.0107)	-0.0057 (0.0110)
Democratic Primaries	0.0434* (0.0213)	0.0437* (0.0217)	0.0488* (0.0231)	0.0490* (0.0232)	0.0580* (0.0284)	0.0584* (0.0290)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: $^+ p < 0.1$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calónico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Voted” refers to the extensive margin of ever having cast a ballot in a regularly scheduled federal election and “votes” refers to the aggregate number of ballots cast by an individual in a regularly scheduled federal election. Republican and Democratic primaries refer to the total ballots cast in partisan presidential primary elections. Crossing the 96th percentile threshold is used as the excluded instrument for the number of UC campuses to which an individual was admitted.

Table C.4: Effects of Compulsory Schooling on Partisanship by Race and Ethnicity

Race	(1) White	(2) White	(3) Minority	(4) Minority
<i>A. Political Party Membership</i>				
Republican	-0.0068** (0.0013)	-0.0062** (0.0013)	-0.0026** (0.0009)	-0.0022* (0.0009)
Democrat/Independent	0.0068** (0.0013)	0.0062** (0.0013)	0.0026** (0.0009)	0.0022* (0.0009)
Democrat	0.0055** (0.0013)	0.0047** (0.0012)	0.0021+ (0.0011)	0.0010 (0.0011)
No Party	0.0014 (0.0012)	0.0019 (0.0012)	-0.0005 (0.0011)	0.0008 (0.0010)
Third Party	-0.0002 (0.0007)	-0.0005 (0.0007)	0.0010+ (0.0005)	0.0004 (0.0005)
Bandwidth	70	70	70	70
Polynomial	1	1	1	1
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	2,112,126	2,112,126	2,998,190	2,998,190

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Bandwidths are measured in days relative to the compulsory schooling law cutoff birthdate. In this table “White” is defined as all registrants self-identifying as non-hispanic white, whereas all other registrants are categorized as “Minority”. Controls include sex, race, state of voter registration, and year of birth fixed effects.

Table C.5: Effects of UC Policy on Partisanship per Year of Elite College by Gender

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Self-Identify as Male or Other Gender</i>						
Registered to Vote	0.0087 (0.0473)	0.0035 (0.0501)	0.0646 (0.0463)	0.0627 (0.0475)	0.0118 (0.0521)	0.0070 (0.0520)
Republican Party	-0.0439 ⁺ (0.0242)	-0.0487 ⁺ (0.0257)	-0.0488* (0.0232)	-0.0517* (0.0239)	-0.0527* (0.0267)	-0.0547* (0.0266)
Democrat/Independent	0.0836 ⁺ (0.0465)	0.0830 ⁺ (0.0481)	0.1135* (0.0474)	0.1144* (0.0488)	0.0645 (0.0525)	0.0617 (0.0525)
Democratic Party	0.0462 (0.0448)	0.0470 (0.0466)	0.0674 (0.0441)	0.0685 (0.0453)	0.0058 (0.0475)	0.0040 (0.0475)
Independent	0.0348 (0.0403)	0.0335 (0.0428)	0.0460 (0.0385)	0.0459 (0.0397)	0.0587 (0.0446)	0.0577 (0.0447)
<i>B. Self-Identify as Female</i>						
Registered to Vote	0.0285 (0.0385)	0.0250 (0.0403)	0.0463 (0.0385)	0.0435 (0.0392)	0.0755 ⁺ (0.0414)	0.0753 ⁺ (0.0430)
Republican Party	-0.0091 (0.0139)	-0.0109 (0.0145)	-0.0105 (0.0138)	-0.0114 (0.0140)	-0.0121 (0.0151)	-0.0133 (0.0157)
Democrat/Independent	0.0421 (0.0385)	0.0398 (0.0395)	0.0568 (0.0385)	0.0549 (0.0392)	0.0876* (0.0424)	0.0886* (0.0440)
Democratic Party	0.0031 (0.0364)	0.0014 (0.0378)	0.0257 (0.0358)	0.0240 (0.0364)	0.0548 (0.0388)	0.0562 (0.0402)
Independent	0.0310 (0.0268)	0.0310 (0.0281)	0.0311 (0.0272)	0.0309 (0.0277)	0.0328 (0.0299)	0.0323 (0.0311)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Democrat/Independent” refers to the fraction of students who are registered as Democrat, as a no party preference voter, or as a member of a third party. Crossing the 96th percentile threshold is used as the excluded instrument for the expected year of elite college education a student completes.

Table C.6: Effects of UC Policy on Partisanship per Year of Elite College by Family Income

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Students from Lower Income Families</i>						
Registered to Vote	0.0834 ⁺ (0.0476)	0.0881 ⁺ (0.0522)	0.1098* (0.0466)	0.1149* (0.0505)	0.1463* (0.0655)	0.1603* (0.0708)
Republican Party	-0.0242 (0.0156)	-0.0246 (0.0169)	-0.0170 (0.0147)	-0.0173 (0.0158)	0.0124 (0.0197)	0.0148 (0.0213)
Democrat/Independent	0.1171* (0.0485)	0.1180* (0.0513)	0.1268** (0.0468)	0.1322** (0.0507)	0.1339* (0.0643)	0.1455* (0.0692)
Democratic Party	0.0913* (0.0440)	0.0903 ⁺ (0.0469)	0.1125** (0.0428)	0.1151* (0.0457)	0.0863 (0.0580)	0.0925 (0.0617)
Independent	0.0123 (0.0325)	0.0159 (0.0355)	0.0143 (0.0319)	0.0171 (0.0344)	0.0476 (0.0440)	0.0530 (0.0474)
<i>B. Students from Higher Income Families</i>						
Registered to Vote	-0.0167 (0.0389)	-0.0218 (0.0395)	0.0221 (0.0384)	0.0171 (0.0380)	0.0136 (0.0378)	0.0065 (0.0384)
Republican Party	-0.0244 (0.0171)	-0.0271 (0.0174)	-0.0321 ⁺ (0.0169)	-0.0342* (0.0168)	-0.0435* (0.0177)	-0.0462* (0.0181)
Democrat/Independent	0.0290 (0.0377)	0.0261 (0.0379)	0.0542 (0.0385)	0.0512 (0.0380)	0.0571 (0.0385)	0.0527 (0.0391)
Democratic Party	-0.0169 (0.0357)	-0.0161 (0.0360)	0.0038 (0.0353)	0.0051 (0.0348)	0.0171 (0.0347)	0.0154 (0.0354)
Independent	0.0413 (0.0296)	0.0385 (0.0299)	0.0503 ⁺ (0.0290)	0.0462 (0.0286)	0.0400 (0.0300)	0.0372 (0.0305)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Democrat/Independent” refers to the fraction of students who are registered as Democrat, as a no party preference voter, or as a member of a third party. Crossing the 96th percentile threshold is used as the excluded instrument for the expected year of elite college education a student completes.

Table C.7: Effects of UC Policy on Partisanship per Year of Elite College by Home County

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Students from Rural, Low College Counties</i>						
Republican Party	-0.0724 (0.0955)	-0.0969 (0.1285)	-0.0784 (0.1362)	-0.1123 (0.1851)	0.1173 (0.2004)	0.1241 (0.2163)
Democrat/Independent	0.1949 (0.2499)	0.2420 (0.3196)	0.2313 (0.2888)	0.2923 (0.3929)	-0.3392 (0.5588)	-0.3660 (0.6198)
Democratic Party	-0.0263 (0.1761)	-0.0210 (0.2128)	0.0102 (0.2186)	0.0346 (0.2687)	-0.1142 (0.3367)	-0.1654 (0.3919)
Independent	0.2033 (0.1631)	0.2513 (0.2227)	0.2211 (0.2511)	0.2577 (0.3370)	-0.2249 (0.3883)	-0.2005 (0.3894)
<i>B. Students from Urban, High College Counties</i>						
Republican Party	-0.0204 ⁺ (0.0122)	-0.0223 ⁺ (0.0127)	-0.0240* (0.0119)	-0.0249* (0.0120)	-0.0243 ⁺ (0.0129)	-0.0254 ⁺ (0.0130)
Democrat/Independent	0.0539 ⁺ (0.0295)	0.0516 ⁺ (0.0300)	0.0745* (0.0298)	0.0732* (0.0301)	0.0677* (0.0312)	0.0657* (0.0314)
Democratic Party	0.0228 (0.0274)	0.0220 (0.0282)	0.0431 (0.0269)	0.0423 (0.0271)	0.0319 (0.0281)	0.0303 (0.0282)
Independent	0.0221 (0.0227)	0.0217 (0.0235)	0.0314 (0.0218)	0.0309 (0.0221)	0.0358 (0.0238)	0.0354 (0.0240)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Democrat/Independent” refers to the fraction of students who are registered as Democrat, as a no party preference voter, or as a member of a third party. Crossing the 96th percentile threshold is used as the excluded instrument for the expected year of elite college education a student completes.

D RD Validation Appendix

Table D.1: Balance Checks for Predicted Voter Registration Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>A. Total Voter Registration Rate</i>			
Predicted Voter Registration	0.0008 (0.0008)	0.0008 (0.0008)	0.0006 (0.0012)
<i>B. Political Party Membership</i>			
Predicted Republican	0.0002 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0003)
Predicted Non-Republican	0.0008 (0.0007)	0.0006 (0.0007)	0.0004 (0.0010)
Predicted Democrat	0.0003 (0.0006)	0.0003 (0.0006)	0.0002 (0.0009)
Predicted No Party	0.0004 (0.0004)	0.0003 (0.0005)	0.0003 (0.0007)
Predicted Third Party	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)
<i>C. Midlife Conversion Between Major Parties</i>			
Predicted Republican Conversion	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0001 ⁺ (0.0000)
Predicted Democrat Conversion	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0001 (0.0001)
Bandwidth	Optimal	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2
Sample Size	Varies	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 2.

Table D.2: Balance Checks for Predicted Voter Turnout Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>A. Total Voter Turnout Rates</i>			
Predicted Voter	0.0010 (0.0008)	0.0007 (0.0008)	0.0006 (0.0012)
Predicted Votes Cast	0.0027 (0.0041)	0.0019 (0.0043)	0.0023 (0.0062)
<i>B. Presidential and Midterm Election Votes</i>			
Predicted Regular Votes	0.0017 (0.0028)	0.0013 (0.0030)	0.0012 (0.0043)
Predicted Midterm Votes	0.0007 (0.0013)	0.0005 (0.0013)	0.0011 (0.0019)
<i>C. General and Primary Election Votes</i>			
Predicted General Votes	0.0016 (0.0027)	0.0011 (0.0028)	0.0012 (0.0040)
Predicted Primary Votes	0.0011 (0.0014)	0.0007 (0.0015)	0.0012 (0.0022)
<i>D. Partisan Primary Turnout Rates</i>			
Predicted Republican Primary Votes	0.0002 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0002)	0.0003 (0.0003)
Predicted Democratic Primary Votes	0.0002 (0.0008)	0.0002 (0.0008)	0.0002 (0.0012)
Bandwidth	Optimal	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2
Sample Size	Varies	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 2.

Table D.3: Balance Checks for Predicted Partisanship (Conditional on Registration)

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)
Predicted Republican	0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0002 (0.0005)
Predicted Dem/Ind	-0.0001 (0.0004)	-0.0001 (0.0004)	-0.0002 (0.0005)
Predicted Democrat	-0.0001 (0.0010)	-0.0003 (0.0011)	-0.0004 (0.0015)
Predicted No Party	0.0002 (0.0007)	0.0002 (0.0007)	0.0003 (0.0011)
Predicted Third Party	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Bandwidth	Optimal	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2
Sample Size	Varies	78,195	78,195

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Results correspond to those in Table D.1, but with outcomes that are predicted using partisanship conditional on registration rather than unconditional partisanship. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 2.

Table D.4: Covariate Balance Checks

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female	0.0024 (0.0070)	-0.0012 (0.0067)	0.0028 (0.0099)
URM	-0.0066 (0.0053)	-0.0045 (0.0056)	-0.0103 (0.0083)
Cal Grant	-0.0041 (0.0066)	-0.0030 (0.0066)	-0.0093 (0.0095)
First Generation	-0.0039 (0.0070)	-0.0022 (0.0067)	-0.0101 (0.0095)
Dad's Schooling	0.0760 ⁺ (0.0403)	0.0541 (0.0418)	0.1105 ⁺ (0.0594)
Mom's Schooling	0.0202 (0.0408)	0.0202 (0.0408)	0.0722 (0.0574)
Dad's Info Missing	0.0024 (0.0037)	0.0038 (0.0039)	-0.0016 (0.0058)
Mom's Info Missing	-0.0022 (0.0030)	-0.0020 (0.0033)	-0.0042 (0.0049)
FAFSA Filed	0.0016 (0.0057)	0.0021 (0.0061)	-0.0053 (0.0089)
Application Year	0.0127 (0.0177)	0.0190 (0.0185)	0.0300 (0.0240)
ISIR Income	1128.7592 (1065.6962)	826.7595 (1090.0484)	2124.8770 (1597.6353)
ISIR Missing	-0.0035 (0.0058)	-0.0043 (0.0062)	0.0037 (0.0090)
Self-Reported Income	986.2342 (1219.9420)	666.3863 (1159.4477)	809.9436 (1651.7142)
No Income Self-Report	-0.0002 (0.0047)	-0.0011 (0.0051)	0.0073 (0.0076)
Bandwidth	Optimal	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2
Sample Size	Varies	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#).

Table D.5: Covariate Balance Checks

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)
Household Size	-0.0110 (0.0121)	-0.0063 (0.0130)	-0.0145 (0.0193)
Low Quality HS	-0.0011 (0.0050)	-0.0011 (0.0048)	0.0025 (0.0063)
Low Enrollment County	-0.0000 (0.0030)	0.0004 (0.0031)	-0.0027 (0.0040)
Student Worker	0.0003 (0.0013)	0.0001 (0.0013)	-0.0012 (0.0018)
Bandwidth	Optimal	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2
Sample Size	Varies	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#).




Figure D.1: RD Graph of Predicted Voter Turnout Outcomes

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 2.




Figure D.2: Covariate RD Graphs

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort.




Figure D.3: Covariate RD Graphs

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort.




Figure D.4: Covariate RD Graphs

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort..




Figure D.5: Predicted Outcome Bandwidth Graphs

Note: Each graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the discontinuity at the threshold in a given predicted outcome using a local linear specification at a respective bandwidth. Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 2.




Figure D.6: Predicted Outcome Bandwidth Graphs

Note: Each graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the discontinuity at the threshold in a given predicted outcome using a local linear specification at a respective bandwidth. Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 2.




Figure D.7: Covariate Bandwidth Graphs

Note: Each graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the discontinuity at the threshold in a given covariate using a local linear specification at a respective bandwidth.




Figure D.8: Covariate Bandwidth Graphs

Note: Each graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the discontinuity at the threshold in a given covariate using a local linear specification at a respective bandwidth.




Figure D.9: Covariate Bandwidth Graphs

Note: Each graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the discontinuity at the threshold in a given covariate using a local linear specification at a respective bandwidth.

Table D.6: Effects of Compulsory Schooling on Partisanship

Location	(1) Rep.	(2) Rep.	(3) Ind.	(4) Ind.	(5) Dem.	(6) Dem.
Treated	-0.0041** (0.0012)	-0.0044** (0.0012)	0.0011 (0.0013)	0.0011 (0.0013)	0.0030* (0.0012)	0.0033** (0.0012)
Sample	FL	FL	FL	FL	FL	FL
Bandwidth	70	70	70	70	70	70
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	1	1
Labor Day	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No
Sample Size	2,380,489	2,380,489	2,380,489	2,380,489	2,380,489	2,380,489

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Bandwidths are measured in days relative to the compulsory schooling law cutoff birthdate. “Labor Day” refers to a fixed effect for being born on Labor Day.




Figure D.10: Birthdate Density around Labor Day

Note: Birthdates are normalized relative to Labor Day.




Figure D.11: Partisanship among People Born around Labor Day

Note: Birthdates are normalized relative to Labor Day.

Table D.7: Compulsory Schooling Law Demographic Balance Tests

Location	(1) Female	(2) White
Treated	-0.0004 (0.0009)	0.0007 (0.0009)
Sample	All	All
Bandwidth	70	70
Polynomial	1	1
Kernel	Uniform	Uniform
Sample Size	5,110,316	5,110,316

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Bandwidths are measured in days relative to the compulsory schooling law cutoff birthdate.

E Alternative Admission Policies Appendix

To complement findings from the UC’s top percentile policy, I evaluate the impact of enrollment at individual UC campuses using two more admission rules that sharply increase the selectivity of institutions that students attend. The two admission rules vary a distinct margin of treatment – the intensive margin of college selectivity – and are used to confirm the generalizability of my findings to different campuses and different near-threshold sample populations. The relevant colleges are renamed UC San Andreas and the Elite UC to preserve their anonymity per my data agreement.

Starting with the first-stage for each policy, I plot admission outcomes and enrollment choices against students’ normalized, reweighted GPAs in Figures E.9 for UC San Andreas and Figure E.10 for the Elite UC. In each case, being just above the GPA threshold for a campus increases the probability a student will be admitted to and enroll at the relevant campus. For UC San Andreas’s admission policy, this raises both the extensive margin of 4-year college enrollment and the average selectivity of the college a student attends proxied by the college’s applicant rejection rate and the selectivity category from Opportunity Insights. For the Elite UC’s admission policy, this raises the total number of UC campuses to which a student was admitted and the intensive margin of campus selectivity, but not the extensive margin of 4-year college enrollment. Students conferred an admission advantage to the Elite UC are more likely to enroll at UC campuses that are at least as selective as the Elite UC, at colleges with higher applicant rejection rates, and at colleges labeled highly selective or elite by Opportunity Insights.

Figures E.11 and E.12 show measures of partisanship plotted against normalized GPA for each admission policy. Enrolling at UC San Andreas reduces the share of students who are registered Republicans and increases the share who are independents with no party affiliation. Enrollment at the Elite UC also reduces the share of students who eventually register as Republicans and increases the share who are independents with no party preference. Notably, attending the Elite UC also reduces the share of students who switch between major parties in either direction, with larger reductions in Democratic to Republican switches. Tables E.1 and E.2 estimate results formally using the same set of outcomes as Table C.1, testing for robustness to different specifications that vary the bandwidth used for inference, the inclusion of pre-treatment covariate controls, and the order of a polynomial control for the running variable.

Overall, these two RD designs provide evidence that corroborate my main findings for UC admission from the ELC policy. In each case, UC campuses raise the selectivity of the college at which a student ultimately enrolls, shifting those same students away from

Republican Party registration and toward registration as either independents or Democrats. Effects appear to grow rather than shrink over a longer time window. The fact that these policies generate variation in admission to different campuses illustrates that these effects are not an artifact of a single campus within the UC system. Moreover, the use of near-threshold sample populations from different points of the GPA distribution with alternative less-selective counterfactual enrollment choices underscores the generalizability of my findings to a broader set of college applicants on different treatment margins.




Figure E.1: McCrary Test for UC San Andreas Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for UC San Andreas.




Figure E.2: Covariate RD Graphs for UC San Andreas Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for UC San Andreas.




Figure E.3: Covariate RD Graphs for UC San Andreas Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for UC San Andreas.




Figure E.4: Covariate RD Graphs for UC San Andreas Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for UC San Andreas.




Figure E.5: McCrary Test for Elite UC Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for the Elite UC.




Figure E.6: Covariate RD Graphs for Elite UC Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for Elite UC.




Figure E.7: Covariate RD Graphs for Elite UC Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for Elite UC.




Figure E.8: Covariate RD Graphs for Elite UC Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for Elite UC.




Figure E.9: RD Graphs of College Enrollment for UC San Andreas Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for UC San Andreas. The outcome UCSA Admission refers to a binary variable for admission to UC San Andreas. UCSA enrollment likewise refers to enrollment at UC San Andreas. College Rejection Rate refers to the proportion of college applicants that were rejected by the college at which a student enrolled, with this outcome set to zero of open access institutions and non-enrollment in college. Highly Selective College refers to a binary indicator for enrollment at any 4-year college rated as Highly Selective, Elite or Ivy-Plus by Opportunity Insights. Selective College refers to a binary indicator for enrollment at any 4-year college rated as Selective or Non-selective by Opportunity Insights. No College/2-Year refers to enrollment at 2-year colleges, community colleges, online colleges, or not having any college enrollment record.




Figure E.10: RD Graphs of College Enrollment for Elite UC Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for Elite UC. The outcome Total UC Admissions refers to the total number of UC campuses to which a student was admitted. Elite UC enrollment refers to a binary indicator for enrollment at the Elite UC campus or any campus that is more selective than the Elite UC. College Rejection Rate refers to the proportion of college applicants that were rejected by the college at which a student enrolled, with this outcome set to zero of open access institutions and non-enrollment in college. Highly Selective College refers to a binary indicator for enrollment at any 4-year college rated as Highly Selective, Elite or Ivy-Plus by Opportunity Insights. Selective College refers to a binary indicator for enrollment at any 4-year college rated as Selective or Non-selective by Opportunity Insights. No College/2-Year refers to enrollment at 2-year colleges, community colleges, online colleges, or not having any college enrollment record.




Figure E.11: RD Graphs of Voter Registration Outcomes for UC San Andreas Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for UC San Andreas. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table E.1.




Figure E.12: RD Graphs of Voter Registration Outcomes for Elite UC Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for Elite UC. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table E.2.

Table E.1: Effects of UC San Andreas Admission Policy on Registration and Partisanship

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Total Voter Registration Rate</i>						
Registered to Vote	-0.0073 (0.0078)	-0.0093 (0.0077)	-0.0040 (0.0069)	-0.0063 (0.0068)	-0.0068 (0.0106)	-0.0084 (0.0105)
<i>B. Political Party Membership</i>						
Republican Party	-0.0073* (0.0029)	-0.0073* (0.0028)	-0.0069* (0.0030)	-0.0069* (0.0029)	-0.0074 (0.0045)	-0.0077+ (0.0045)
Democrat/Independent	0.0010 (0.0078)	-0.0010 (0.0077)	0.0030 (0.0068)	0.0007 (0.0068)	0.0007 (0.0105)	-0.0007 (0.0105)
Democratic Party	-0.0032 (0.0075)	-0.0044 (0.0074)	-0.0058 (0.0062)	-0.0072 (0.0062)	-0.0045 (0.0096)	-0.0050 (0.0095)
No Party Preference	0.0106* (0.0044)	0.0096* (0.0044)	0.0072 (0.0048)	0.0064 (0.0048)	0.0022 (0.0075)	0.0013 (0.0074)
Third Party	0.0010 (0.0020)	0.0010 (0.0020)	0.0015 (0.0019)	0.0015 (0.0019)	0.0030 (0.0029)	0.0029 (0.0029)
<i>C. Early Life Conversion between Major Parties</i>						
Republican Convert	-0.0002 (0.0009)	-0.0002 (0.0009)	0.0001 (0.0009)	0.0001 (0.0009)	0.0009 (0.0014)	0.0010 (0.0014)
Democratic Convert	0.0009 (0.0014)	0.0009 (0.0014)	0.0001 (0.0013)	-0.0000 (0.0013)	0.0025 (0.0020)	0.0024 (0.0020)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	85,482	85,482	85,482	85,482

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Democrat/Independent” refers to the fraction of students who are registered as Democrat, as a no party preference voter, or as a member of a third party. Democratic and Republican converts are voters who are currently registered with the Democratic and Republican Party in California, but at any time in the past were a registered member of the other major party.

Table E.2: Effects of Elite UC Admission Policy on Registration and Partisanship

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Total Voter Registration Rate</i>						
Registered to Vote	-0.0017 (0.0119)	-0.0007 (0.0119)	0.0116 (0.0090)	0.0089 (0.0090)	-0.0007 (0.0137)	0.0026 (0.0136)
<i>B. Political Party Membership</i>						
Republican Party	-0.0082 ⁺ (0.0043)	-0.0076 ⁺ (0.0043)	-0.0077* (0.0036)	-0.0073* (0.0036)	-0.0112* (0.0055)	-0.0101 ⁺ (0.0055)
Democrat/Independent	0.0073 (0.0119)	0.0072 (0.0119)	0.0193* (0.0091)	0.0162 ⁺ (0.0091)	0.0104 (0.0137)	0.0127 (0.0137)
Democratic Party	-0.0065 (0.0113)	-0.0065 (0.0112)	0.0088 (0.0085)	0.0063 (0.0085)	-0.0060 (0.0129)	-0.0041 (0.0129)
No Party Preference	0.0174* (0.0087)	0.0170* (0.0087)	0.0133* (0.0066)	0.0125 ⁺ (0.0066)	0.0191 ⁺ (0.0100)	0.0194 ⁺ (0.0100)
Third Party	-0.0036 (0.0028)	-0.0034 (0.0028)	-0.0028 (0.0020)	-0.0027 (0.0020)	-0.0027 (0.0032)	-0.0025 (0.0032)
<i>C. Early Life Conversion between Major Parties</i>						
Republican Convert	-0.0026* (0.0012)	-0.0026* (0.0012)	-0.0017 ⁺ (0.0009)	-0.0017 ⁺ (0.0009)	-0.0031* (0.0015)	-0.0031* (0.0015)
Democratic Convert	-0.0069** (0.0026)	-0.0063* (0.0026)	-0.0056** (0.0018)	-0.0058** (0.0018)	-0.0066* (0.0029)	-0.0061* (0.0029)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	49,201	49,201	49,201	49,201

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Democrat/Independent” refers to the fraction of students who are registered as Democrat, as a no party preference voter, or as a member of a third party. Democratic and Republican converts are voters who are currently registered with the Democratic and Republican Party in California, but at any time in the past were a registered member of the other major party.

F Robustness Test and External Validity Appendix

Table F.1: Effects of UC Top Percent Policy on Partisanship (Conditional on Registration)

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Political Party Membership</i>						
Republican Party	-0.0146* (0.0059)	-0.0142* (0.0059)	-0.0133** (0.0052)	-0.0130* (0.0051)	-0.0187* (0.0078)	-0.0181* (0.0077)
Democrat/Independent	0.0146* (0.0059)	0.0142* (0.0059)	0.0133** (0.0052)	0.0130* (0.0051)	0.0187* (0.0078)	0.0181* (0.0077)
Democratic Party	0.0055 (0.0089)	0.0057 (0.0088)	0.0042 (0.0089)	0.0042 (0.0088)	0.0032 (0.0135)	0.0023 (0.0133)
No Party Preference	0.0125 (0.0089)	0.0122 (0.0089)	0.0143+ (0.0083)	0.0138+ (0.0083)	0.0186 (0.0126)	0.0187 (0.0126)
Third Party	-0.0055+ (0.0029)	-0.0053+ (0.0029)	-0.0051+ (0.0029)	-0.0051+ (0.0029)	-0.0031 (0.0044)	-0.0028 (0.0044)
<i>B. Early Life Conversion between Major Parties</i>						
Republican Convert	-0.0048** (0.0018)	-0.0048** (0.0018)	-0.0028+ (0.0015)	-0.0028+ (0.0015)	-0.0051* (0.0023)	-0.0050* (0.0023)
Democratic Convert	-0.0026 (0.0026)	-0.0026 (0.0026)	-0.0028 (0.0025)	-0.0028 (0.0025)	-0.0029 (0.0037)	-0.0030 (0.0037)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	42,108	42,108	42,108	42,108

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Democrat/Independent” refers to the fraction of students who are registered as Democrat, as a no party preference voter, or as a member of a third party. Democratic and Republican converts are voters who are currently registered with the Democratic and Republican Party in California, but at any time in the past were a registered member of the other major party.

Table F.2: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Voter Registration Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>A. Total Voter Registration Rate</i>				
Registered to Vote	0.0126 ⁺ (0.0070)	0.0124 ⁺ (0.0070)	0.0135 (0.0103)	0.0138 (0.0102)
<i>B. Political Party Membership</i>				
Republican Party	-0.0063* (0.0029)	-0.0063* (0.0029)	-0.0084 ⁺ (0.0043)	-0.0083 ⁺ (0.0043)
Democrat/Independent	0.0189** (0.0070)	0.0188** (0.0070)	0.0219* (0.0103)	0.0220* (0.0103)
Democratic Party	0.0099 (0.0064)	0.0098 (0.0064)	0.0118 (0.0094)	0.0116 (0.0094)
No Party Preference	0.0108* (0.0050)	0.0108* (0.0050)	0.0108 (0.0077)	0.0112 (0.0076)
Third Party	-0.0018 (0.0016)	-0.0018 (0.0016)	-0.0007 (0.0024)	-0.0008 (0.0024)
<i>C. Early Life Conversion between Major Parties</i>				
Republican Convert	-0.0010 (0.0008)	-0.0011 (0.0008)	-0.0023 ⁺ (0.0012)	-0.0024* (0.0012)
Democratic Convert	-0.0015 (0.0014)	-0.0015 (0.0014)	-0.0016 (0.0020)	-0.0015 (0.0020)
Bandwidth	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
HS-Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample Size	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). These outcomes correspond to those in Table [C.1](#).

Table F.3: Effects on Party Registration with Bias-Corrected CIs

Outcome	(1)	(2)
<i>Voter Registration</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0140 (0.0085)	0.0131 (0.0084)
Robust 95% CI	[-.003 ; .036]	[-.004 ; .035]
Robust p-value	0.096	0.113
<i>Republican Party</i>		
RD_Estimate	-0.0082* (0.0034)	-0.0083* (0.0034)
Robust 95% CI	[-.017 ; -.001]	[-.017 ; -.002]
Robust p-value	0.021	0.018
<i>Democrat/Independent</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0228** (0.0088)	0.0222* (0.0087)
Robust 95% CI	[.005 ; .046]	[.005 ; .045]
Robust p-value	0.015	0.017
<i>Democratic Party</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0099 (0.0077)	0.0098 (0.0077)
Robust 95% CI	[-.006 ; .03]	[-.006 ; .03]
Robust p-value	0.181	0.181
<i>No Party Preference</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0138* (0.0061)	0.0133* (0.0061)
Robust 95% CI	[.002 ; .03]	[.001 ; .029]
Robust p-value	0.027	0.032
<i>Third Party</i>		
RD_Estimate	-0.0019 (0.0017)	-0.0019 (0.0018)
Robust 95% CI	[-.006 ; .002]	[-.006 ; .002]
Robust p-value	0.369	0.385
<i>Republican Convert</i>		
RD_Estimate	-0.0026* (0.0011)	-0.0026* (0.0011)
Robust 95% CI	[-.005 ; -.001]	[-.005 ; -.001]
Robust p-value	0.015	0.017
<i>Democratic Convert</i>		
RD_Estimate	-0.0013 (0.0015)	-0.0014 (0.0015)
Robust 95% CI	[-.005 ; .002]	[-.005 ; .002]
Robust p-value	0.432	0.404
Bandwidth	MSE-Optimal	MSE-Optimal
Polynomial	1	1
Covariates	No	Yes

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Each row titled “RD Estimate” shows the conventional point estimate and standard errors in parentheses for a given outcome variable. These are calculated using a triangular kernel at the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). The rows “Robust 95% CI” and “Robust p-value” show the bias-corrected confidence interval and the bias-corrected p-value for the same outcome variable ([Calonico et al., 2014](#)). These outcomes correspond to those in Table C.1.

Table F.4: Effects on Party Registration with Honest CIs

Outcome	(1)	(2)
<i>Voter Registration</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0140 (0.0075)	0.0139 (0.0074)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0022; .0284]	[-.0025; .0303]
Robust 90% CI	[.0001; .0278]	[.0000; .0277]
<i>Republican Party</i>		
RD Estimate	-0.0076 (0.0032)	-0.0072 (0.0030)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0147; -.0005]	[-.0143; -.0001]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0136; -.0017]	[-.0132; -.0011]
<i>Democrat/Independent</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0213 (0.0076)	0.0211 (0.0074)
Robust 95% CI	[.0049; .0378]	[.0046; .0376]
Robust 90% CI	[.0074; .0352]	[.0072; .0350]
<i>Democratic Party</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0101 (0.0068)	0.0105 (0.0069)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0044; .0248]	[-.0042; .0252]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0021; .0225]	[-.0019; .0229]
<i>No Party Preference</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0128 (0.0055)	0.0126 (0.0054)
Robust 95% CI	[.0009; .0247]	[.0008; .0245]
Robust 90% CI	[.0028; .0228]	[.0026; .0226]
<i>Third Party</i>		
RD Estimate	-0.0013 (0.0020)	-0.0020 (0.0017)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0058; .0032]	[-.0069; .0029]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0051; .0025]	[-.0062; .0023]
<i>Republican Convert</i>		
RD Estimate	-0.0024 (0.0010)	-0.0019 (0.0009)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0046; -.0002]	[-.0042; .0004]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0043; -.0006]	[-.0038; .0000]
<i>Democratic Convert</i>		
RD Estimate	-0.0012 (0.0015)	-0.0013 (0.0015)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0046; .0020]	[-.0046; .0020]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0040; .0015]	[-.0040; .0015]
Bandwidth	MSE-Optimal	0.3
Polynomial	1	1

Note: Each row titled “RD Estimate” shows the point estimate and standard errors in parentheses for a given outcome variable using a triangular kernel and the bounded seconded derivative method (Kolesar and Rothe, 2018). The rows “Robust 95% CI” and “Robust 90% CI” show the honest confidence intervals for the same outcome variable. These outcomes correspond to those in Table C.1.




Figure F.1: Registered

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure F.2: Republican

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure F.3: Democrat or Independent

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure F.4: Democrat

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure F.5: No Party Preference

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure F.6: Third Party

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure F.7: Democratic Conversion

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure F.8: Republican Conversion

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.

Table F.5: Effects of Compulsory Schooling on Partisanship

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Location	All	All	FL	FL	CA	CA
<i>A. Political Party Membership</i>						
Republican	-0.0044** (0.0012)	-0.0048** (0.0011)	-0.0027 (0.0018)	-0.0038* (0.0017)	-0.0058** (0.0015)	-0.0058** (0.0015)
Democrat/Independent	0.0044** (0.0012)	0.0048** (0.0011)	0.0027 (0.0018)	0.0038* (0.0017)	0.0058** (0.0015)	0.0058** (0.0015)
Democrat	0.0028* (0.0013)	0.0032* (0.0013)	0.0017 (0.0018)	0.0025 (0.0018)	0.0036* (0.0018)	0.0038* (0.0018)
No Party	0.0011 (0.0012)	0.0012 (0.0012)	0.0014 (0.0019)	0.0017 (0.0018)	0.0011 (0.0016)	0.0008 (0.0016)
Third Party	0.0004 (0.0006)	0.0004 (0.0006)	-0.0004 (0.0007)	-0.0004 (0.0007)	0.0011 (0.0010)	0.0012 (0.0010)
Bandwidth	70	70	70	70	70	70
Polynomial	2	2	2	2	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	5,110,316	5,110,316	2,380,489	2,380,489	2,729,827	2,729,827

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Bandwidths are measured in days relative to the compulsory schooling law cutoff birthdate. Democratic and Republican converts are voters who are currently registered with the Democratic and Republican Party in California, but at any time in the past had another party registration status. Controls include sex, state of voter registration, and year of birth fixed effects.




Figure F.9: Robustness of CSL Results by Bandwidth

Note: Treatment effects for each respective outcome variable are shown at each bandwidth, measured in days, on the horizontal axis.

Table F.6: Placebo Test of Compulsory Schooling among Naturalized Immigrants

	(1)	(2)
Location	CA	CA
Republican	-0.0001 (0.0015)	0.0005 (0.0015)
Democrat/Independent	0.0001 (0.0015)	-0.0005 (0.0015)
Democrat	-0.0009 (0.0018)	-0.0008 (0.0018)
No Party	0.0013 (0.0016)	0.0008 (0.0016)
Third Party	-0.0003 (0.0007)	-0.0005 (0.0007)
Bandwidth	70	70
Polynomial	1	1
Controls	No	Yes
Sample Size	1,281,463	1,281,463

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Bandwidths are measured in days relative to the compulsory schooling law cutoff birthdate. Democratic and Republican converts are voters who are currently registered with the Democratic and Republican Party in California, but at any time in the past had another party registration status. Controls include sex, state of voter registration, and year of birth fixed effects. The immigrant indicator includes individuals whose place of birth includes the following countries or regions: Mexico, Philippines, Vietnam, China, India, Korea, El Salvador, Iran, Taiwan, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Germany, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, Peru, Thailand, Pakistan, Russia, Nicaragua, Armenia, and Ukraine, as well as any entries containing the term “Foreign-Born”. These national origins collectively represent all foreign born entries in voter’s place of birth field that appear for more than 0.25 percent of the sample of registered Californian voters who were not born in California but were born within 70 days of the CSL cutoff.

G Falsification Test Appendix




Figure G.1: Republican

Note: Each graph reflects the cumulative distribution of estimated t-statistics using the falsification tests described in Section 3.2.2. The red dashed line denotes the t-statistic estimated at the true 96th percentile policy threshold.




Figure G.2: Democrat or Independent

Note: Each graph reflects the cumulative distribution of estimated t-statistics using the falsification tests described in Section 3.2.2. The red dashed line denotes the t-statistic estimated at the true 96th percentile policy threshold.




Figure G.3: Republican Conversion

Note: Each graph reflects the cumulative distribution of estimated t-statistics using the falsification tests described in Section 3.2.2. The red dashed line denotes the t-statistic estimated at the true 96th percentile policy threshold.

H Mechanisms Appendix

Table H.1: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Enrollment by Student Characteristics

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality</i>						
White	-0.0090** (0.0024)	-0.0093** (0.0024)	-0.0075** (0.0022)	-0.0077** (0.0021)	-0.0092** (0.0031)	-0.0100** (0.0031)
Asian	0.0150** (0.0027)	0.0152** (0.0026)	0.0110** (0.0022)	0.0110** (0.0022)	0.0173** (0.0032)	0.0179** (0.0031)
Black	0.0007 (0.0005)	0.0007 (0.0004)	0.0008 ⁺ (0.0004)	0.0008 ⁺ (0.0004)	0.0002 (0.0006)	0.0002 (0.0006)
Hispanic	-0.0102** (0.0012)	-0.0098** (0.0012)	-0.0062** (0.0009)	-0.0060** (0.0008)	-0.0111** (0.0012)	-0.0106** (0.0012)
International	0.0024** (0.0004)	0.0023** (0.0003)	0.0020** (0.0003)	0.0020** (0.0003)	0.0027** (0.0004)	0.0026** (0.0004)
<i>B. Peer Family Income</i>						
Median Income	2958.64** (379.12)	2830.96** (356.97)	2708.18** (329.26)	2653.35** (307.64)	3516.16** (468.53)	3324.75** (444.65)
Bottom 80 Percent	-0.0133** (0.0017)	-0.0127** (0.0016)	-0.0121** (0.0014)	-0.0118** (0.0014)	-0.0161** (0.0021)	-0.0152** (0.0020)
Top 5 Percent	0.0134** (0.0014)	0.0128** (0.0013)	0.0120** (0.0012)	0.0118** (0.0011)	0.0151** (0.0017)	0.0143** (0.0016)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Median Income” in this context refers to the median family income of peers at a given campus. “Bottom 80 Percent” and “Top 5 Percent” refer to the fraction of students at a given campus who hail from families within a given range of the household income distribution within the United States. Data are from Opportunity Insights.

Table H.2: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Enrollment by Imputed Peer Ideology

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Self-Reported Freshman Ideology</i>						
Far-Right Peers	-0.0003** (0.0001)	-0.0003** (0.0001)	-0.0003** (0.0001)	-0.0003** (0.0001)	-0.0004** (0.0001)	-0.0004** (0.0001)
Conservative Peers	-0.0007 (0.0005)	-0.0007 (0.0005)	-0.0008+ (0.0005)	-0.0008+ (0.0005)	-0.0007 (0.0007)	-0.0008 (0.0007)
Moderate Peers	-0.0035** (0.0005)	-0.0034** (0.0005)	-0.0030** (0.0004)	-0.0029** (0.0004)	-0.0041** (0.0006)	-0.0040** (0.0005)
Liberal Peers	0.0045** (0.0007)	0.0045** (0.0007)	0.0040** (0.0006)	0.0039** (0.0006)	0.0050** (0.0009)	0.0050** (0.0009)
Far-Left Peers	0.0001+ (0.0000)	0.0001+ (0.0000)	0.0001 (0.0000)	0.0001 (0.0000)	0.0001* (0.0001)	0.0001* (0.0001)
<i>B. GOP Share of Institution's Graduates</i>						
GOP Graduate Share	-0.0053** (0.0007)	-0.0053** (0.0007)	-0.0051** (0.0006)	-0.0051** (0.0006)	-0.0058** (0.0009)	-0.0057** (0.0009)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “GOP Share” refers to the share of registered voters from my sample who attended a given institution who are members of the Republican Party in 2021. Data on other outcomes are imputed from UCLA’s HERI surveys using the method described in [Section 4](#).

Table H.3: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Enrollment by Imputed Peer Religion

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Self-Reported Freshman Religion</i>						
Protestant Peers	-0.0030** (0.0008)	-0.0030** (0.0008)	-0.0028** (0.0007)	-0.0028** (0.0007)	-0.0031** (0.0010)	-0.0032** (0.0010)
Catholic Peers	-0.0037** (0.0007)	-0.0036** (0.0007)	-0.0035** (0.0006)	-0.0033** (0.0006)	-0.0043** (0.0009)	-0.0043** (0.0009)
Jewish Peers	0.0022** (0.0003)	0.0021** (0.0002)	0.0017** (0.0002)	0.0016** (0.0002)	0.0023** (0.0003)	0.0023** (0.0003)
Other Peers	0.0013** (0.0004)	0.0013** (0.0004)	0.0013** (0.0004)	0.0013** (0.0003)	0.0014** (0.0005)	0.0015** (0.0005)
No Religion Peers	0.0034** (0.0008)	0.0034** (0.0007)	0.0033** (0.0007)	0.0032** (0.0007)	0.0037** (0.0010)	0.0038** (0.0010)
<i>B. Aggregate Self-Reported Christians</i>						
Christian Peers	-0.0067** (0.0013)	-0.0065** (0.0012)	-0.0063** (0.0011)	-0.0061** (0.0011)	-0.0074** (0.0016)	-0.0075** (0.0016)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Christian Peers” is a simple aggregation of the share of peers who self identify as Catholic or Protestant. Data are imputed from UCLA’s HERI surveys using the method described in Section 4.

Table H.4: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Enrollment by Imputed Faculty Ideology

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Self-Reported Faculty Ideology</i>						
Far-Right Faculty	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Conservative Faculty	-0.0041** (0.0006)	-0.0041** (0.0006)	-0.0037** (0.0006)	-0.0037** (0.0006)	-0.0047** (0.0008)	-0.0047** (0.0008)
Moderate Faculty	-0.0023** (0.0004)	-0.0023** (0.0004)	-0.0019** (0.0003)	-0.0019** (0.0003)	-0.0026** (0.0005)	-0.0026** (0.0005)
Liberal Faculty	0.0050** (0.0008)	0.0050** (0.0007)	0.0043** (0.0007)	0.0043** (0.0006)	0.0057** (0.0009)	0.0057** (0.0009)
Far-Left Faculty	0.0014** (0.0003)	0.0014** (0.0002)	0.0013** (0.0002)	0.0013** (0.0002)	0.0017** (0.0003)	0.0017** (0.0003)
<i>B. Aggregate Left-Liberal Faculty</i>						
Left-Liberal Faculty	0.0063** (0.0010)	0.0062** (0.0010)	0.0056** (0.0009)	0.0056** (0.0009)	0.0073** (0.0013)	0.0074** (0.0012)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Left-Liberal Faculty” is a simple aggregation of the share of faculty who self-identify as liberal or far-left. Data are imputed from UCLA’s HERI surveys using the method described in Section 4.

Table H.5: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Neighborhood Choice

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Census Block Characteristics</i>						
Median Education	0.0358 (0.0338)	0.0383 (0.0288)	-0.0090 (0.0297)	0.0031 (0.0250)	0.0953* (0.0421)	0.0848* (0.0355)
Median Income	157.39 (1185.33)	238.76 (1036.12)	-1156.06 (1041.74)	-709.47 (902.25)	2152.28 (1510.40)	1716.07 (1317.17)
<i>B. Local Partisanship</i>						
Republican Neighbors	0.0002 (0.0021)	0.0006 (0.0021)	0.0003 (0.0021)	0.0006 (0.0021)	-0.0019 (0.0031)	-0.0015 (0.0030)
Democratic Neighbors	0.0009 (0.0022)	0.0007 (0.0021)	0.0004 (0.0021)	0.0001 (0.0021)	0.0019 (0.0031)	0.0018 (0.0031)
No Party Neighbors	0.0001 (0.0009)	-0.0001 (0.0009)	-0.0007 (0.0008)	-0.0008 (0.0008)	0.0008 (0.0011)	0.0005 (0.0011)
Third Party Neighbors	-0.0005 (0.0003)	-0.0005 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0000 (0.0003)	-0.0009* (0.0004)	-0.0008* (0.0004)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	Varies	Varies	Varies	Varies

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Median Education” refers to the median years of schooling within a Californian registrant’s census block. “Median Income” refers to the estimated median household income within a Californian registrant’s census block. “Neighbors” refer to the respective proportion of registered voters with a given party registration status within a Californian registrant’s local area. Data are from L2’s VM2 California voter file.




Figure H.1: RD Graphs of Peer Characteristics

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table H.1.




Figure H.2: RD Graphs of Imputed Peer Ideology

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table H.2.




Figure H.3: RD Graphs of Imputed Peer Religion

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table H.3.




Figure H.4: RD Graphs of Imputed Faculty Ideology

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table H.4.




Figure H.5: RD Graphs of Neighborhood Characteristics

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table H.5.

I Voter Turnout Appendix

Given the UC’s observed impact on partisanship and extant research on the civic externalities of education, it is important to test the university system’s effects on voter turnout (Firoozi and Geyn, 2025). Starting with Figure I.1, I plot eight different measures of voter turnout. First, I show the extensive margin of ever having participated in a regular election and a measure of the total ballots a student cast in regular elections.²⁶ Next, I decompose the total number of ballots a student cast between 2012 and 2020 by whether they were cast in a presidential or midterm election cycle as well as by whether they were cast in a primary or general election. Finally, the bottom two panels illustrate the number of ballots cast in Republican and Democratic presidential primaries between 2012 and 2020. I find clear visual evidence of an increase in primary ballots cast, particularly in Democratic presidential primaries, and note noisy, positive increases in all other margins of voter turnout besides Republican primary participation.

Table I.1 reflects the results for each of the eight voter turnout outcomes in the preceding figure. Following the same order, Panel A highlights total election participation, Panel B decomposes the number of ballots cast between 2012 and 2020 by the type of election cycle, Panel C decomposes the number of ballots cast by whether they were a primary or general election, and Panel D closes out the table with the number of ballots cast in Republican and Democratic presidential primaries. Each column represents a different specification, varying the RDD bandwidth, inclusion of covariate controls, and the order of a polynomial control for the running variable. Consistent with the visual evidence of discontinuities in Figure I.1, I find that the UC’s top percentile policy increases the number of ballots students eventually cast in primary elections by roughly 0.07 to 0.11 votes for each additional UC admission, with most of the effect accruing to Democratic presidential primaries (see Table C.3). Estimates of turnout effects in other elections are positive, with the exception of Republican presidential primaries, but too imprecisely identified to distinguish from zero.

For robustness checks and falsification tests I repeat the procedures used in Section 3.2.2. Tables I.2 through I.4 reflect my main estimates for these outcomes using bias-aware confidence intervals and with high dimensional high school-year fixed effects (Calónico et al., 2014; Kolesar and Rothe, 2018). I also demonstrate the robustness of my point estimates across the full range of potential bandwidths, varying both the order of a polynomial control for the running variable and the inclusion of covariate controls in Appendix Figures I.2 through I.9. For most outcomes, point estimates are fairly stable across bandwidth and

²⁶Regular elections in this context refers to all elections coinciding with primary or general elections for federal offices, excluding special elections.

specification but are less consistent than those of registration outcomes. I also reproduce the “synthetic threshold” falsification test for primary election ballots and Democratic presidential primaries in Appendix Figures [I.10](#) and [I.11](#), finding that 4 out of 8 specifications exceed the 95th percentile of synthetic t-statistics at other thresholds and all specifications exceed the 90th percentile of synthetic t-statistics.

Table I.1: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Voter Turnout Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Total Voter Turnout Rates</i>						
Ever Voted	0.0088 (0.0077)	0.0079 (0.0076)	0.0077 (0.0069)	0.0069 (0.0069)	0.0140 (0.0101)	0.0130 (0.0100)
Total Votes Cast	0.0445 (0.0328)	0.0410 (0.0328)	0.0534 (0.0339)	0.0510 (0.0338)	0.0685 (0.0500)	0.0638 (0.0498)
<i>B. Presidential and Midterm Election Votes</i>						
Presidential Votes	0.0259 (0.0220)	0.0234 (0.0220)	0.0374 (0.0237)	0.0356 (0.0237)	0.0467 (0.0348)	0.0439 (0.0346)
Midterm Votes	0.0160 (0.0121)	0.0153 (0.0121)	0.0160 (0.0121)	0.0153 (0.0121)	0.0218 (0.0182)	0.0200 (0.0181)
<i>C. General and Primary Election Votes</i>						
General Votes	0.0074 (0.0207)	0.0047 (0.0206)	0.0215 (0.0221)	0.0199 (0.0221)	0.0215 (0.0325)	0.0188 (0.0323)
Primary Votes	0.0319* (0.0143)	0.0311* (0.0143)	0.0319* (0.0143)	0.0311* (0.0143)	0.0470* (0.0210)	0.0450* (0.0210)
<i>D. Partisan Primary Turnout Rates</i>						
Republican Primaries	-0.0032 (0.0034)	-0.0034 (0.0034)	-0.0021 (0.0033)	-0.0024 (0.0033)	-0.0022 (0.0049)	-0.0025 (0.0049)
Democratic Primaries	0.0170* (0.0084)	0.0168* (0.0083)	0.0185* (0.0087)	0.0184* (0.0087)	0.0263* (0.0128)	0.0258* (0.0128)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: $^+ p < 0.1$, $^* p < 0.05$, $^{**} p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Voted” refers to the extensive margin of ever having cast a ballot in a regularly scheduled federal election and “votes” refers to the aggregate number of ballots cast by an individual in a regularly scheduled federal election. Republican and Democratic primaries refer to the total ballots cast in partisan presidential primary elections.




Figure I.1: RD Graphs of Voter Participation Outcomes

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table I.1.

Table I.2: Effects on Voter Turnout with Bias-Corrected CIs

Outcome	(1)	(2)
<i>Ever Voted</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0106 (0.0084)	0.0098 (0.0084)
Robust 95% CI	[-.005 ; .033]	[-.006 ; .032]
Robust p-value	0.160	0.183
<i>Total Votes Cast</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0586 (0.0368)	0.0546 (0.0362)
Robust 95% CI	[-.023 ; .149]	[-.026 ; .143]
Robust p-value	0.151	0.175
<i>Presidential Votes</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0376 (0.0246)	0.0338 (0.0241)
Robust 95% CI	[-.018 ; .096]	[-.021 ; .091]
Robust p-value	0.183	0.218
<i>Midterm Votes</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0184 (0.0136)	0.0170 (0.0134)
Robust 95% CI	[-.012 ; .052]	[-.013 ; .05]
Robust p-value	0.223	0.253
<i>General Votes</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0199 (0.0233)	0.0166 (0.0227)
Robust 95% CI	[-.035 ; .073]	[-.038 ; .068]
Robust p-value	0.494	0.585
<i>Primary Votes</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0382* (0.0158)	0.0366* (0.0156)
Robust 95% CI	[.005 ; .078]	[.004 ; .076]
Robust p-value	0.027	0.032
<i>Republican Primary Votes</i>		
RD_Estimate	-0.0020 (0.0037)	-0.0023 (0.0037)
Robust 95% CI	[-.011 ; .006]	[-.012 ; .006]
Robust p-value	0.545	0.487
<i>Democratic Primary Votes</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0206* (0.0092)	0.0202* (0.0091)
Robust 95% CI	[.002 ; .044]	[.002 ; .044]
Robust p-value	0.033	0.034
Bandwidth	MSE-Optimal	MSE-Optimal
Polynomial	1	1
Covariates	No	Yes

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Each row titled “RD Estimate” shows the conventional point estimate and standard errors in parentheses for a given outcome variable. These are calculated using a triangular kernel at the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). The rows “Robust 95% CI” and “Robust p-value” show the bias-corrected confidence interval and the bias-corrected p-value for the same outcome variable ([Calonico et al., 2014](#)). These outcomes correspond to those in Table I.1.

Table I.3: Effects on Voter Turnout with Honest CIs

Outcome	(1)	(2)
<i>Ever Voted</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0104 (0.0076)	0.0100 (0.0074)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0061; .0269]	[-.0064; .0265]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0035; .0243]	[-.0039; .0240]
<i>Total Votes Cast</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0582 (0.0367)	0.0588 (0.0373)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0213; .1378]	[-.0210; .1386]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0088; .1253]	[-.0084; .1259]
<i>Presidential Votes</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0407 (0.0259)	0.0139 (0.0074)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0156; .0970]	[-.0156; .0971]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0067; .0882]	[-.0067; .0882]
<i>Midterm Votes</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0154 (0.0123)	0.0181 (0.0134)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0113; .0421]	[-.0094; .0455]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0071; .0379]	[-.0050; .0411]
<i>General Votes</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0213 (0.0245)	0.0212 (0.0243)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0319; .0745]	[-.0320; .0744]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0236; .0661]	[-.0236; .0661]
<i>Primary Votes</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0329 (0.0140)	0.0376 (0.0156)
Robust 95% CI	[.0028; .0631]	[.0060; .0691]
Robust 90% CI	[.0075; .0583]	[.0110; .0641]
<i>Republican Primary Votes</i>		
RD Estimate	-0.0020 (0.0037)	-0.0022 (0.0036)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0100; .0060]	[-.0102; .0058]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0088; .0047]	[-.0089; .0046]
<i>Democratic Primary Votes</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0198 (0.0088)	0.0214 (0.0096)
Robust 95% CI	[.0008; .0389]	[.0018; .0411]
Robust 90% CI	[.0038; .0359]	[.0049; .0380]
Bandwidth	MSE-Optimal	0.3
Polynomial	1	1

Note: Each row titled “RD Estimate” shows the point estimate and standard errors in parentheses for a given outcome variable using a triangular kernel and the bounded seconded derivative method (Kolesar and Rothe, 2018). The rows “Robust 95% CI” and “Robust 90% CI” show the honest confidence intervals for the same outcome variable. These outcomes correspond to those in Table C.1.

Table I.4: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Voter Turnout Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>A. Total Voter Turnout Rates</i>				
Ever Voted	0.0074 (0.0069)	0.0073 (0.0069)	0.0113 (0.0102)	0.0115 (0.0101)
Total Votes Cast	0.0550 (0.0342)	0.0545 (0.0342)	0.0636 (0.0508)	0.0616 (0.0505)
<i>B. Presidential and Midterm Election Votes</i>				
Presidential Votes	0.0374 (0.0239)	0.0366 (0.0239)	0.0425 (0.0353)	0.0407 (0.0351)
Midterm Votes	0.0176 (0.0122)	0.0179 (0.0122)	0.0211 (0.0184)	0.0209 (0.0184)
<i>C. General and Primary Election Votes</i>				
General Votes	0.0228 (0.0223)	0.0224 (0.0223)	0.0170 (0.0329)	0.0160 (0.0327)
Primary Votes	0.0322* (0.0144)	0.0321* (0.0144)	0.0466* (0.0214)	0.0456* (0.0213)
<i>D. Partisan Primary Turnout Rates</i>				
Republican Primaries	-0.0022 (0.0034)	-0.0021 (0.0034)	-0.0020 (0.0049)	-0.0019 (0.0049)
Democratic Primaries	0.0190* (0.0088)	0.0187* (0.0088)	0.0293* (0.0130)	0.0284* (0.0130)
Bandwidth	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
HS-Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample Size	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). These outcomes correspond to those in Table I.1.




Figure I.2: Ever Voted

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure I.3: Total Votes Cast

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure I.4: Presidential Votes

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure I.5: Midterm Votes

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure I.6: General Votes

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure I.7: Primary Votes

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure I.8: Republican Primary Votes

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure I.9: Democratic Primary Votes

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure I.10: Primary Votes Cast

Note: Each graph reflects the cumulative distribution of estimated t-statistics using the falsification tests described in Section 3.2.2. The red dashed line denotes the t-statistic estimated at the true 96th percentile policy threshold.




Figure I.11: Democratic Presidential Primary Votes Cast

Note: Each graph reflects the cumulative distribution of estimated t-statistics using the falsification tests described in Section 3.2.2. The red dashed line denotes the t-statistic estimated at the true 96th percentile policy threshold.

J CIRP Entering Freshman Survey Appendix

Table J.1: Political Ideology of Californian Students by Type of College

How would you characterize your political views?	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	%
Far right	0.7	1.5	1.3	2.1	1.2
Conservative	14.6	24.8	17.5	18.6	19.2
Middle of the road	43.1	38.9	47.5	50.0	43.2
Liberal	38.4	31.8	30.8	25.5	33.3
Far left	3.2	3.1	2.9	3.7	3.1
N	120,552	139,172	125,714	9,993	395,431

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table J.2: Economic Views of Californian Students by Type of College

View: A national health care plan is needed to cover everybody's medical costs	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	7.2	11.8	7.0	5.5	8.6
Somewhat Disagree	19.4	21.2	18.4	17.3	19.6
Somewhat Agree	43.9	39.8	42.4	42.7	42.1
Strongly Agree	29.5	27.2	32.2	34.5	29.7
N	59,400	55,756	54,829	2,707	172,692
View: Addressing global warming should be a federal priority	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	4.6	10.9	6.8	9.1	7.3
Somewhat Disagree	15.6	19.4	20.1	21.6	18.3
Somewhat Agree	41.9	36.7	42.0	44.6	40.3
Strongly Agree	37.8	33.0	31.1	24.7	34.1
N	25,510	22,801	22,122	287	70,720
View: Federal military spending should be increased	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	29.6	25.1	22.9	20.5	25.8
Somewhat Disagree	49.9	47.3	48.3	46.0	48.4
Somewhat Agree	17.5	23.5	24.2	26.8	21.8
Strongly Agree	3.0	4.1	4.6	6.7	4.0
N	87,181	88,685	79,958	5,558	261,382
View: The federal government is not doing enough to control pollution	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	2.0	3.4	2.8	2.8	2.7
Somewhat Disagree	12.3	16.6	16.0	16.9	14.9
Somewhat Agree	44.4	42.1	44.9	44.7	43.8
Strongly Agree	41.3	38.0	36.4	35.6	38.6
N	59,548	55,938	54,924	2,708	173,118

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table J.3: Economic Views of Californian Students by Type of College

View: The federal government should raise taxes to reduce the deficit	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	15.4	19.6	20.8	24.5	18.5
Somewhat Disagree	49.0	48.8	51.2	51.5	49.7
Somewhat Agree	29.7	26.7	23.8	20.7	26.8
Strongly Agree	5.9	4.8	4.2	3.3	5.0
N	50,706	42,123	43,521	1,621	137,971
View: Through hard work, everybody can succeed in American society	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	4.7	5.3	3.8	3.5	4.6
Somewhat Disagree	19.8	21.1	15.5	13.9	18.8
Somewhat Agree	40.2	39.2	37.2	32.6	38.9
Strongly Agree	35.3	34.3	43.4	50.0	37.8
N	51,555	44,693	44,613	2,442	143,303
View: Wealthy people should pay a larger share of taxes than they do now	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	10.8	18.0	13.4	16.6	14.3
Somewhat Disagree	28.7	31.8	30.9	32.6	30.6
Somewhat Agree	40.9	34.9	38.5	34.2	37.9
Strongly Agree	19.5	15.3	17.1	16.6	17.2
N	110,887	132,583	120,352	8,420	372,242

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table J.4: Sociocultural Views of Californian Students by Type of College

View: Abortion should be legal	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Strongly Disagree	15.5	27.6	21.3	30.1	22.0
Somewhat Disagree	15.8	14.5	17.6	19.7	16.0
Somewhat Agree	32.4	25.4	31.3	29.2	29.6
Strongly Agree	36.3	32.5	29.7	20.9	32.5
N	114,301	130,571	119,204	10,176	374,252
View: It is important to have laws prohibiting homosexual relationships	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Strongly Disagree	56.9	52.5	49.2	39.1	52.4
Somewhat Disagree	25.1	23.0	28.1	30.0	25.5
Somewhat Agree	11.6	12.4	13.7	16.8	12.7
Strongly Agree	6.4	12.1	8.9	14.0	9.4
N	103,144	121,853	110,066	8,179	343,242
View: Marijuana should be legalized	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Strongly Disagree	27.8	32.9	31.2	35.2	30.9
Somewhat Disagree	32.2	28.3	29.1	27.1	29.8
Somewhat Agree	27.7	26.4	26.7	24.1	26.8
Strongly Agree	12.3	12.3	13.0	13.6	12.5
N	113,751	130,050	118,662	10,133	372,596
View: Racial discrimination is no longer a major problem in America	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Strongly Disagree	38.0	37.0	35.8	35.5	36.9
Somewhat Disagree	45.5	45.4	43.9	40.5	44.8
Somewhat Agree	14.3	15.4	17.3	20.0	15.8
Strongly Agree	2.3	2.2	3.1	4.1	2.6
N	113,962	130,302	118,683	10,106	373,053

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table J.5: Sociocultural Views of Californian Students by Type of College

View: Same-sex couples should have the right to legal marital status	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	
Strongly Disagree	12.5	23.3	16.7	23.2	17.9
Somewhat Disagree	16.4	16.4	18.7	20.9	17.2
Somewhat Agree	29.5	23.7	30.0	29.8	27.6
Strongly Agree	41.7	36.6	34.7	26.1	37.3
N	113,369	129,623	118,132	10,045	371,169
View: The activities of married women are best confined to the home and family	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	
Strongly Disagree	61.0	61.6	52.4	41.3	57.9
Somewhat Disagree	21.7	21.4	24.5	28.1	22.7
Somewhat Agree	12.8	12.5	17.1	22.5	14.4
Strongly Agree	4.6	4.4	6.0	8.1	5.1
N	59,179	89,497	75,205	6,681	230,562
View: The death penalty should be abolished	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	
Strongly Disagree	20.2	24.1	27.6	30.6	24.2
Somewhat Disagree	41.1	38.1	41.0	37.7	39.9
Somewhat Agree	24.8	22.3	20.6	20.9	22.5
Strongly Agree	13.8	15.4	10.7	10.8	13.3
N	102,917	121,422	109,820	8,147	342,306
View: The federal government should do more to control the sale of handguns	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	
Strongly Disagree	4.8	6.8	6.1	6.8	6.0
Somewhat Disagree	13.7	13.9	14.3	13.9	14.0
Somewhat Agree	42.5	38.2	39.2	33.9	39.7
Strongly Agree	39.0	41.1	40.4	45.5	40.3
N	110,705	132,563	119,936	8,438	371,642

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table J.6: Sociocultural Views of Californian Students by Type of College

View: There is too much concern in the courts for the rights of criminals	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	7.9	8.5	6.8	7.7	7.8
Somewhat Disagree	37.5	35.7	30.7	25.8	34.4
Somewhat Agree	47.6	46.9	51.9	52.0	48.9
Strongly Agree	6.9	8.8	10.7	14.6	9.0
N	112,581	128,426	117,293	10,035	368,335
View: Undocumented immigrants should be denied access to public education	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	29.8	24.9	32.0	38.4	29.1
Somewhat Disagree	36.3	34.9	30.4	28.3	33.9
Somewhat Agree	22.9	24.8	22.5	19.6	23.3
Strongly Agree	11.0	15.4	15.0	13.6	13.7
N	51,242	44,268	44,369	2,428	142,307

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table J.7: Descriptive Statistics on Californian Students by Type of College

Race/Ethnicity Group	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
American Indian	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.1
Asian	39.4	15.3	17.8	13.3	23.3
Black	2.5	3.3	4.2	5.0	3.4
Hispanic	14.6	10.4	24.8	45.5	17.2
White	30.1	55.5	38.3	21.8	41.4
Other	3.7	3.0	3.9	4.7	3.5
Two or more race/ethnicity	9.6	12.3	10.9	9.4	11.0
N	124,121	144,094	132,593	11,043	411,851
Citizenship status:	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Neither/None of the above	2.0	3.2	2.1	5.1	2.5
Permanent resident	7.1	2.9	5.4	8.4	5.1
U.S. citizen	91.0	93.9	92.5	86.5	92.4
N	127,474	145,738	136,435	11,304	420,951
Your religious preference	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Protestant	28.8	42.7	33.5	35.9	35.3
Roman Catholic	23.3	25.2	32.2	36.6	27.1
Jewish	3.7	3.3	1.7	0.6	2.8
Other	12.8	6.3	8.8	8.8	9.1
None	31.5	22.6	23.9	18.0	25.6
N	123,909	142,197	130,339	10,591	407,036

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table J.8: Political Ideology of American Students by Type of College

How would you characterize your political views?	Institution Type			
	University	4-year	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%
Far right	1.5	1.8	2.5	1.7
Conservative	21.2	22.3	20.3	21.8
Middle of the road	43.8	45.8	51.9	45.0
Liberal	30.4	26.9	21.3	28.4
Far left	3.0	3.2	4.0	3.1
N	1,655,052	2,060,615	42,014	3,757,681

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among American institutions from 2000 to 2010. "University" refers to research university freshmen, "4-year" refers to teaching college freshmen, and "2-year" refers to community college freshmen.

Table J.9: Descriptive Statistics on American Students by Type of College

Race/Ethnicity Group	Institution Type			
	University %	4-year %	2-year %	Total %
American Indian	0.3	0.3	1.6	0.3
Asian	11.4	4.7	4.2	7.6
Black	6.5	8.2	16.8	7.6
Hispanic	5.7	5.1	21.7	5.6
White	68.0	74.1	47.0	71.1
Other	2.2	1.9	3.0	2.0
Two or more race/ethnicity	5.9	5.8	5.7	5.8
N	1,722,161	2,164,260	46,650	3,933,071
Citizenship status:	Institution Type			
	University %	4-year %	2-year %	Total %
Neither/None of the above	2.1	2.0	2.8	2.0
Permanent resident	3.2	1.8	5.7	2.5
U.S. citizen	94.6	96.2	91.5	95.5
N	1,765,970	2,199,465	47,923	4,013,358
Your religious preference	Institution Type			
	University %	4-year %	2-year %	Total %
Protestant	40.2	46.8	52.8	44.0
Roman Catholic	27.7	28.4	24.8	28.0
Jewish	4.6	2.3	0.5	3.3
Other	6.9	5.0	7.0	5.9
None	20.7	17.5	14.9	18.9
N	1,708,947	2,133,420	45,219	3,887,586

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among American institutions from 2000 to 2010. "University" refers to research university freshmen, "4-year" refers to teaching college freshmen, and "2-year" refers to community college freshmen.

K HERI Faculty Survey Appendix

Table K.1: Political Ideology of Californian Faculty by Type of College

How would you characterize your political views?	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Far right	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.2
Conservative	8.4	14.8	12.3	20.8	13.2
Middle of the road	34.2	35.5	33.7	42.0	35.2
Liberal	50.4	43.8	46.3	34.0	45.1
Far left	6.9	5.6	7.6	2.8	6.3
N	1,632	2,768	2,640	712	7,752

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.2: Campus Views of Californian Faculty by Type of College

View: Racist/sexist speech should be prohibited on campus	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Disagree strongly	27.2	22.4	20.7	19.9	22.6
Disagree somewhat	24.0	23.6	25.1	19.5	24.0
Agree somewhat	24.2	23.9	24.7	25.2	24.3
Agree strongly	24.6	30.1	29.5	35.4	29.1
N	687	1,261	1,268	226	3,442

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.3: Political Ideology of Californian Faculty by STEM and Type of College

<i>Panel A. STEM Faculty</i>					
How would you characterize your political views?	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Far right	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.2
Conservative	10.1	14.7	13.7	23.8	13.4
Middle of the road	42.2	38.7	38.7	45.4	40.2
Liberal	45.0	42.7	42.9	29.2	42.7
Far left	2.5	3.7	4.6	1.5	3.5
N	733	653	786	130	2,302
<i>Panel B. Non-STEM Faculty</i>					
How would you characterize your political views?	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Far right	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.2
Conservative	7.0	14.9	11.7	20.1	13.1
Middle of the road	27.7	34.5	31.6	41.2	33.1
Liberal	54.8	44.2	47.7	35.1	46.2
Far left	10.5	6.2	8.8	3.1	7.5
N	899	2,115	1,854	582	5,450

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.4: Career Objectives of Californian Faculty by Type of College

Objective: Becoming an authority in my field	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	1.5	9.8	9.8	16.4	8.7
Somewhat important	11.5	23.2	25.1	26.5	21.6
Very important	33.2	34.0	34.3	32.0	33.7
Essential	53.8	33.0	30.9	25.1	36.0
N	1,680	2,818	2,685	737	7,920
Objective: Influencing the political structure	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	44.6	39.4	36.5	39.1	39.5
Somewhat important	37.6	40.4	38.5	37.1	38.8
Very important	13.6	15.9	18.1	17.3	16.3
Essential	4.2	4.2	6.9	6.5	5.4
N	1,672	2,809	2,673	734	7,888
Objective: Influencing social values	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	27.4	17.8	17.2	13.6	19.2
Somewhat important	41.1	33.9	38.7	33.5	37.0
Very important	24.0	35.3	31.8	36.5	31.8
Essential	7.5	13.0	12.4	16.5	12.0
N	1,670	2,807	2,676	735	7,888
Objective: Helping to promote racial understanding	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	8.4	6.1	5.8	5.3	6.4
Somewhat important	40.0	31.0	29.1	25.8	31.7
Very important	33.5	36.9	37.8	37.4	36.5
Essential	18.1	26.0	27.4	31.5	25.3
N	1,664	2,804	2,667	737	7,872
Objective: Obtaining recognition from my colleagues for contribution to my field	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	3.0	10.9	9.0	21.6	9.6
Somewhat important	21.9	34.3	34.3	43.7	32.6
Very important	42.1	35.9	37.6	23.6	36.6
Essential	33.0	18.9	19.1	11.1	21.2
N	1,669	2,803	2,675	737	7,884

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.5: Instructional Goals of Californian Faculty by Type of College

UG Goal: Develop moral character	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Not important	14.4	8.0	10.6	5.0	9.9
Somewhat important	41.0	28.7	36.5	26.9	33.8
Very important	29.6	34.5	33.5	37.0	33.4
Essential	14.9	28.9	19.4	31.2	22.9
N	1,569	2,671	2,627	722	7,589
UG Goal: Help students develop personal values	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Not important	12.9	6.4	8.2	4.6	8.2
Somewhat important	40.1	26.9	35.5	23.8	32.3
Very important	33.9	39.5	39.0	44.0	38.6
Essential	13.1	27.2	17.4	27.6	20.9
N	1,565	2,665	2,626	720	7,576
UG Goal: Enhance students' knowledge of and appreciation for other races	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Not important	14.6	10.9	4.6	8.7	9.3
Somewhat important	35.2	24.9	25.8	25.5	27.0
Very important	32.1	33.8	33.2	28.1	32.6
Essential	18.1	30.3	36.4	37.7	31.1
N	321	758	624	231	1,934
UG Goal: Prepare students for responsible citizenship	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Not important	10.5	9.4	6.9	4.8	8.3
Somewhat important	34.8	28.8	27.2	26.7	29.3
Very important	38.2	40.4	38.3	37.4	39.0
Essential	16.5	21.4	27.5	31.2	23.4
N	978	1,739	1,648	439	4,804
UG Goal: Develop ability to think clearly	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Not important	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1
Somewhat important	0.5	0.4	0.7	1.0	0.6
Very important	8.5	11.2	9.4	12.6	10.2
Essential	91.0	88.2	89.9	86.4	89.2
N	1,582	2,683	2,651	723	7,639

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.6: Institutional Goals of Californian Faculty by Type of College

Inst Priority: To promote the intellectual development of students	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Low priority	1.6	1.3	3.9	2.4	2.3
Medium priority	10.7	9.8	18.2	13.1	13.2
High priority	33.2	34.7	32.6	37.3	33.9
Highest priority	54.5	54.2	45.3	47.2	50.6
N	1,650	2,784	2,656	718	7,808
Inst Priority: To help students examine and understand their personal values	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Low priority	21.0	7.3	17.2	7.9	13.6
Medium priority	45.2	25.8	42.7	34.5	36.4
High priority	27.6	40.1	29.6	37.2	33.6
Highest priority	6.3	26.8	10.5	20.3	16.3
N	1,637	2,775	2,644	718	7,774
Inst Priority: To help students learn how to bring about change in society	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Low priority	38.9	23.4	32.1	22.5	29.5
Medium priority	41.8	40.6	40.6	42.7	41.0
High priority	15.8	26.7	20.1	24.7	22.0
Highest priority	3.4	9.3	7.3	10.1	7.4
N	1,616	2,755	2,630	712	7,713
Inst Priority: To maintain a climate where different opinions can be aired	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Low priority	5.9	9.6	8.5	8.1	8.1
Medium priority	25.5	27.1	25.4	27.8	26.2
High priority	41.7	40.5	40.4	42.6	41.0
Highest priority	26.9	22.8	25.8	21.5	24.6
N	573	698	733	270	2,274
Inst Priority: To develop among students and faculty multicultural appreciation	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Low priority	9.8	8.8	6.8	6.7	8.1
Medium priority	38.5	33.6	29.3	31.1	33.1
High priority	36.5	39.5	38.9	39.6	38.6
Highest priority	15.2	18.2	25.0	22.6	20.2
N	572	697	737	270	2,276

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.7: Teaching Methods of Californian Faculty by Type of College

Instructional Method: Class discussions	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	8.5	6.7	4.9	6.9	6.5
Some	34.2	21.7	25.8	22.4	25.7
Most	22.8	19.5	21.3	17.9	20.7
All	34.4	52.0	48.0	52.8	47.1
N	1,310	2,244	2,352	665	6,571
Instructional Method: Cooperative learning (small groups)	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	48.4	27.9	26.9	22.6	31.1
Some	35.3	33.8	39.4	34.8	36.2
Most	9.1	15.9	15.6	16.5	14.5
All	7.1	22.5	18.1	26.1	18.2
N	1,305	2,232	2,348	660	6,545
Instructional Method: Experiential learning/Field studies	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	60.9	46.5	48.7	52.4	50.7
Some	25.7	27.9	29.4	24.4	27.7
Most	7.0	11.7	11.7	9.6	10.6
All	6.4	13.9	10.2	13.6	11.0
N	1,294	2,223	2,341	655	6,513
Instructional Method: Teaching assistants	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	25.6	56.4	70.3	79.4	58.5
Some	39.7	22.3	21.6	13.1	24.2
Most	19.0	10.2	4.5	3.3	8.9
All	15.8	11.1	3.6	4.2	8.5
N	774	1,639	1,690	427	4,530

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.8: Teaching Methods of Californian Faculty by Type of College

Instructional Method: Group projects	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
None	56.2	35.8	37.1	48.0	41.5
Some	34.8	37.9	41.2	31.0	37.8
Most	5.5	13.5	12.2	10.7	11.2
All	3.5	12.8	9.4	10.3	9.5
N	1,297	2,229	2,344	662	6,532
Instructional Method: Extensive lecturing	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
None	8.1	20.6	15.3	23.8	16.5
Some	21.1	31.6	29.5	30.2	28.6
Most	38.0	27.8	32.5	26.4	31.4
All	32.8	20.1	22.7	19.6	23.5
N	1,304	2,228	2,347	663	6,542
Instructional Method: Readings on racial and ethnic issues	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
None	73.7	56.2	58.6	62.7	61.2
Some	15.5	25.4	23.5	21.4	22.3
Most	4.8	9.2	9.0	7.4	8.1
All	6.0	9.3	8.9	8.5	8.4
N	1,294	2,227	2,340	660	6,521
Instructional Method: Readings on women and gender issues	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
None	72.7	56.8	59.0	62.7	61.4
Some	16.6	25.4	24.7	22.4	23.1
Most	5.7	9.2	8.6	8.2	8.2
All	5.0	8.5	7.8	6.7	7.4
N	1,299	2,230	2,344	660	6,533

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.9: Research and Teaching Activity among Californian Faculty by Type of College

Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Very heavily in teaching	2.5	26.4	24.4	65.7	24.2
In both, but leaning toward teaching	16.0	33.3	38.2	25.4	30.6
In both, but leaning toward research	62.3	32.9	31.1	7.3	36.2
Very heavily in research	19.2	7.4	6.3	1.6	9.0
N	1,690	2,813	2,697	728	7,928
What is your principal activity in your current position at this institution?	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Administration	10.7	19.2	16.1	20.5	16.5
Teaching	35.5	62.3	70.4	68.1	60.1
Research	47.7	15.3	10.8	0.4	19.1
Services to clients and patients	4.8	1.8	1.2	7.0	2.7
Other	1.3	1.3	1.5	4.0	1.6
N	1,633	2,817	2,683	753	7,886
Publish: Articles in academic or professional journals	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	2.4	18.7	12.7	66.1	17.6
1-2	2.8	15.1	14.7	19.6	12.8
3-4	4.0	13.4	14.8	8.2	11.4
5-10	10.4	15.9	18.1	3.7	14.4
11-20	16.4	11.6	15.1	1.2	12.8
21-50	27.9	11.5	13.5	0.8	14.7
51+	36.2	13.8	11.0	0.3	16.4
N	1,666	2,760	2,663	723	7,812

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.10: Descriptive Statistics on Californian Faculty by Type of College

What is your present academic rank?	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Professor	59.7	41.1	55.4	18.5	47.8
Associate Professor	18.3	21.5	15.1	4.6	17.1
Assistant Professor	18.5	17.1	11.9	1.8	14.2
Lecturer	2.3	8.2	13.5	3.4	8.3
Instructor	0.1	6.1	1.5	54.6	7.8
Other	1.1	5.9	2.6	17.3	4.8
N	1,703	2,846	2,720	742	8,011
Race/Ethnicity Group	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
American Indian	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.3
Asian	8.1	3.8	7.7	4.3	6.0
Black	1.4	1.5	2.6	3.3	2.0
Hispanic	2.7	1.7	5.2	7.2	3.6
White	83.8	88.6	78.7	77.0	83.1
Other	1.6	1.2	2.6	1.5	1.8
Two or more race/ethnicity	2.3	3.0	2.9	6.1	3.1
N	1,675	2,838	2,690	749	7,952
STEM	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Not STEM	55.1	76.4	70.5	82.0	70.4
STEM	44.9	23.6	29.5	18.0	29.6
N	1,717	2,895	2,740	760	8,112

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.11: Political Ideology of American Faculty by Type of College

How would you characterize your political views?	Institution Type			
	University	4-year	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%
Far right	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3
Conservative	13.5	19.2	24.3	16.8
Middle of the road	36.8	39.2	44.8	38.4
Liberal	44.5	37.4	28.2	40.2
Far left	5.0	3.8	2.3	4.3
N	39,220	33,702	6,533	79,455

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among American institutions from 1989 to 1998. "University" refers to research university faculty, "4-year" refers to teaching college faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.12: Career Objectives of American Faculty by Political Views

Objective: Becoming an authority in my field	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	16.3	11.6	10.1	9.8	11.4	10.3
Somewhat important	27.0	25.2	24.7	25.1	24.9	25.0
Very important	25.8	34.5	35.4	35.5	33.1	35.2
Essential	31.0	28.7	29.8	29.6	30.6	29.5
N	252	13,390	30,470	31,818	3,364	79,294
Objective: Influencing the political structure	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	44.8	49.4	46.1	33.2	12.7	40.0
Somewhat important	30.4	37.4	40.2	43.5	32.1	40.7
Very important	14.8	10.9	11.3	18.7	35.2	15.2
Essential	10.0	2.2	2.4	4.6	19.9	4.0
N	250	13,357	30,384	31,752	3,349	79,092
Objective: Influencing social values	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	26.0	22.8	21.2	15.2	7.4	18.5
Somewhat important	31.6	39.5	41.7	38.0	22.5	39.0
Very important	26.8	29.4	29.7	35.4	39.7	32.4
Essential	15.6	8.3	7.4	11.3	30.4	10.1
N	250	13,350	30,383	31,755	3,358	79,096
Objective: Helping to promote racial understanding	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	30.7	11.6	6.2	3.5	2.4	5.9
Somewhat important	39.8	43.3	36.8	27.9	14.7	33.4
Very important	18.7	33.3	39.3	41.0	37.2	38.8
Essential	10.8	11.8	17.7	27.6	45.7	21.9
N	251	13,334	30,314	31,699	3,359	78,957
Objective: Obtaining recognition from my colleagues for contribution to my field	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	20.1	16.1	11.2	8.8	10.4	11.0
Somewhat important	39.4	37.4	35.9	34.2	34.6	35.4
Very important	24.5	32.5	36.6	38.0	34.6	36.3
Essential	16.1	14.0	16.4	19.0	20.4	17.2
N	249	13,364	30,404	31,751	3,352	79,120

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998.

Table K.13: Career Objectives of American Faculty by Research Focus

Objective: Becoming an authority in my field	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	21.7	8.6	3.0	2.7	9.9
Somewhat important	31.9	31.2	15.3	11.2	24.7
Very important	29.4	37.5	38.9	31.1	35.2
Essential	16.9	22.7	42.8	55.0	30.1
N	21,304	25,874	25,227	6,210	78,615
Objective: Influencing the political structure	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	42.8	35.6	40.5	46.8	40.0
Somewhat important	40.0	43.0	39.7	35.8	40.5
Very important	13.8	17.1	15.4	13.1	15.3
Essential	3.4	4.3	4.5	4.2	4.1
N	21,247	25,795	25,119	6,190	78,351
Objective: Influencing social values	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	14.5	14.3	23.4	32.2	18.7
Somewhat important	37.2	38.2	40.9	39.5	38.9
Very important	36.9	35.8	27.4	21.0	32.2
Essential	11.5	11.8	8.4	7.3	10.3
N	21,276	25,797	25,103	6,178	78,354
Objective: Helping to promote racial understanding	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	5.2	4.2	6.9	12.5	6.0
Somewhat important	32.0	29.9	35.8	41.6	33.3
Very important	39.4	40.2	38.2	31.5	38.7
Essential	23.3	25.6	19.1	14.5	22.0
N	21,249	25,773	25,042	6,154	78,218
Objective: Obtaining recognition from my colleagues for contribution to my field	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	21.9	9.1	4.4	4.4	10.7
Somewhat important	43.7	41.0	25.3	21.1	35.1
Very important	26.2	37.0	44.5	39.0	36.6
Essential	8.2	12.9	25.8	35.5	17.5
N	21,272	25,823	25,123	6,183	78,401

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998.

Table K.14: Instructional Goals of American Faculty by Political Views

UG Goal: Develop moral character	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	11.2	5.1	6.6	10.7	17.4	8.4
Somewhat important	24.7	24.3	31.6	39.2	36.2	33.6
Very important	27.5	34.9	36.2	32.9	30.1	34.3
Essential	36.7	35.7	25.6	17.2	16.2	23.6
N	251	13,051	29,552	30,657	3,231	76,742
UG Goal: Help students develop personal values	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	13.3	6.3	6.6	7.8	12.4	7.3
Somewhat important	30.2	26.8	31.1	34.6	32.1	31.8
Very important	30.2	40.8	41.2	39.5	35.8	40.2
Essential	26.2	26.1	21.1	18.1	19.6	20.7
N	248	13,028	29,521	30,644	3,240	76,681
UG Goal: Enhance students' knowledge of and appreciation for other races	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	32.0	14.6	9.6	7.4	4.7	9.5
Somewhat important	38.0	37.4	32.3	25.7	18.0	30.1
Very important	18.0	32.3	35.2	37.4	32.1	35.4
Essential	12.0	15.8	22.9	29.5	45.2	25.1
N	50	3,237	7,389	7,330	701	18,707
UG Goal: Prepare students for responsible citizenship	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	13.2	7.1	7.3	7.7	9.5	7.5
Somewhat important	27.9	28.1	30.3	31.5	28.2	30.3
Very important	36.4	41.6	41.4	40.6	36.6	40.9
Essential	22.5	23.3	21.0	20.2	25.7	21.3
N	129	7,101	16,268	16,945	1,779	42,222
UG Goal: Develop ability to think clearly	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1
Somewhat important	3.2	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5
Very important	11.2	15.7	13.7	10.9	7.2	12.6
Essential	85.2	83.6	85.7	88.6	92.2	86.8
N	250	13,059	29,664	30,823	3,257	77,053

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998.

Table K.15: Instructional Goals of American Faculty by Research Focus

UG Goal: Develop moral character	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	5.0	6.0	12.1	18.3	8.6
Somewhat important	27.1	32.5	39.9	38.1	33.8
Very important	37.1	36.6	31.1	27.4	34.2
Essential	30.9	24.9	16.9	16.2	23.3
N	20,826	24,955	24,272	5,911	75,964
UG Goal: Help students develop personal values	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	4.1	5.0	10.7	17.1	7.5
Somewhat important	25.3	29.3	38.7	40.9	32.1
Very important	43.2	42.7	37.0	30.3	40.0
Essential	27.5	23.0	13.7	11.8	20.4
N	20,828	24,954	24,233	5,876	75,891
UG Goal: Enhance students' knowledge of and appreciation for other races	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	7.2	6.5	13.3	19.0	9.7
Somewhat important	27.2	27.2	33.8	39.3	30.1
Very important	37.4	36.8	33.1	27.4	35.2
Essential	28.2	29.4	19.9	14.2	25.0
N	5,445	6,303	5,648	1,439	18,835
UG Goal: Prepare students for responsible citizenship	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	5.5	5.1	10.2	16.5	7.7
Somewhat important	26.3	27.8	35.7	37.8	30.6
Very important	43.2	42.9	37.7	33.4	40.6
Essential	25.0	24.2	16.4	12.4	21.1
N	11,722	13,715	13,372	3,147	41,956
UG Goal: Develop ability to think clearly	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.1
Somewhat important	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.5
Very important	13.9	12.4	11.7	12.4	12.6
Essential	85.5	87.1	87.7	86.6	86.8
N	20,867	25,042	24,426	5,963	76,298

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998.

Table K.16: Teaching Methods of American Faculty by Political Views

Instructional Method: Class discussions	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
None	10.5	9.3	8.6	6.6	4.3	7.7
Some	26.0	29.3	28.3	23.5	15.9	26.0
Most	16.4	21.6	21.6	20.2	18.5	20.8
All	47.0	39.9	41.5	49.7	61.4	45.4
N	219	10,858	24,391	25,591	2,869	63,928
Instructional Method: Cooperative learning (small groups)	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
None	40.2	33.2	31.1	29.6	27.9	30.8
Some	28.8	37.6	37.6	35.9	35.3	36.8
Most	16.0	14.0	15.1	15.4	14.9	15.0
All	15.1	15.2	16.1	19.1	21.9	17.4
N	219	10,793	24,239	25,414	2,847	63,512
Instructional Method: Experiential learning/Field studies	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
None	54.4	54.3	51.8	51.6	53.6	52.2
Some	23.5	26.6	28.1	26.8	27.1	27.3
Most	10.6	9.9	10.3	10.6	9.1	10.3
All	11.5	9.3	9.7	10.9	10.2	10.2
N	217	10,764	24,129	25,314	2,850	63,274
Instructional Method: Teaching assistants	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
None	77.8	71.8	66.6	61.7	59.9	65.3
Some	12.3	17.8	20.5	23.9	26.6	21.6
Most	4.7	5.4	6.7	7.6	7.6	6.9
All	5.3	5.0	6.2	6.9	5.8	6.3
N	171	7,846	17,141	18,299	1,993	45,450

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998.

Table K.17: Teaching Methods of American Faculty by Political Views

Instructional Method: Group projects	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
None	48.2	43.7	41.7	41.2	39.7	41.8
Some	29.4	35.8	37.6	37.2	38.9	37.2
Most	11.5	11.1	11.4	11.7	11.9	11.5
All	11.0	9.4	9.3	9.9	9.5	9.6
N	218	10,785	24,204	25,340	2,849	63,396
Instructional Method: Extensive lecturing	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
None	13.6	18.5	19.1	20.5	20.6	19.6
Some	22.2	28.0	29.4	30.5	33.6	29.8
Most	29.9	30.4	30.5	28.5	26.3	29.5
All	34.4	23.0	21.0	20.5	19.4	21.1
N	221	10,791	24,240	25,399	2,848	63,499
Instructional Method: Readings on racial and ethnic issues	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
None	74.9	78.6	69.1	54.1	30.7	63.0
Some	19.2	15.9	21.4	26.3	26.0	22.6
Most	3.2	2.8	5.1	9.5	16.6	7.0
All	2.7	2.7	4.4	10.0	26.7	7.4
N	219	10,740	24,135	25,344	2,854	63,292
Instructional Method: Readings on women and gender issues	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
None	77.6	79.9	70.5	54.1	29.7	63.7
Some	16.9	15.6	21.2	26.8	26.9	22.7
Most	2.7	2.4	4.7	9.7	17.4	6.8
All	2.7	2.2	3.7	9.4	26.0	6.7
N	219	10,717	24,111	25,341	2,859	63,247

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998.

Table K.18: Teaching Methods of American Faculty by Research Focus

Instructional Method: Class discussions	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	6.6	5.8	7.7	16.6	7.4
Some	23.5	23.1	30.6	31.3	26.1
Most	20.8	21.7	20.8	18.7	21.0
All	49.1	49.4	41.0	33.4	45.5
N	18,412	21,392	20,622	4,426	64,852
Instructional Method: Cooperative learning (small groups)	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	24.4	24.4	37.4	52.8	30.4
Some	36.3	38.0	38.2	29.4	37.0
Most	16.9	17.3	12.7	8.7	15.1
All	22.5	20.3	11.6	9.0	17.4
N	18,326	21,280	20,454	4,371	64,431
Instructional Method: Experiential learning/Field studies	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	51.4	46.2	55.8	65.5	52.0
Some	25.5	30.5	27.3	21.1	27.4
Most	10.5	12.2	9.2	6.5	10.4
All	12.5	11.2	7.6	6.9	10.1
N	18,225	21,186	20,391	4,366	64,168
Instructional Method: Teaching assistants	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	83.0	70.1	47.1	45.9	65.1
Some	11.5	20.4	31.4	27.9	21.8
Most	2.6	5.1	11.5	13.3	6.9
All	3.0	4.3	10.0	12.9	6.3
N	13,404	15,207	14,438	2,999	46,048

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998.

Table K.19: Teaching Methods of American Faculty by Research Focus

Instructional Method: Group projects	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T %	Lean T %	Lean R %	Heavy R %	Total %
None	41.0	34.8	44.9	59.3	41.5
Some	35.2	40.7	37.8	28.2	37.4
Most	12.3	13.5	9.9	6.9	11.6
All	11.5	11.0	7.3	5.6	9.6
N	18,244	21,234	20,461	4,383	64,322
Instructional Method: Extensive lecturing	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T %	Lean T %	Lean R %	Heavy R %	Total %
None	24.6	22.2	12.4	14.3	19.2
Some	32.9	33.4	26.0	19.0	29.9
Most	25.3	27.8	34.9	32.5	29.7
All	17.2	16.6	26.7	34.2	21.2
N	18,250	21,241	20,533	4,396	64,420
Instructional Method: Readings on racial and ethnic issues	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T %	Lean T %	Lean R %	Heavy R %	Total %
None	62.9	55.4	67.2	76.7	62.7
Some	23.6	27.1	19.4	14.6	22.8
Most	6.5	8.6	6.6	4.1	7.1
All	7.1	8.9	6.8	4.6	7.4
N	18,208	21,208	20,412	4,360	64,188
Instructional Method: Readings on women and gender issues	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T %	Lean T %	Lean R %	Heavy R %	Total %
None	64.2	56.8	66.7	76.7	63.4
Some	23.3	26.8	20.2	14.4	22.9
Most	6.3	8.2	6.7	4.7	6.9
All	6.2	8.3	6.3	4.2	6.8
N	18,179	21,190	20,416	4,363	64,148

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998.