

Supplemental Appendix:
**Release, Detain, or Surveil? The
Effect of Electronic Monitoring on
Defendant Outcomes**

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1 Appendix A: Additional Analyses and Background

1.1 Background

Branch 1 operates every day, though other bond courts in Cook County do not. On weekdays and non-holidays, non-felony cases (e.g., misdemeanor, traffic, and municipal code violations that require the setting of bail) are generally handled in the bond courts determined by the location of arrest (Branch 1 is the bond court for Chicago arrests) or specifically designated courts — for example, murder and violent sex offenses are handled in their own courts. On holidays and weekends, however, all such cases are handled by Branch 1. See Aid (n.d.) for a schedule of the bond courts in Cook County. After their hearing in bond court, defendants are generally processed at Cook County Jail.

I focus on a small sample of highly active judges. Active is defined as having at least 500 cases within a year, excluding days where a judge saw fewer than 40 cases. In the full data, this filter removes 3% of observations but 90% of unique judges, indicating that the vast majority of unique judges were either sporadically working as bond court judges as substitutes but are most likely miscodings or erroneous entries. Between 2010 and 2016, two active judges are recorded working in bond court on the same date on less than 10 days out of over 2,500, about 0.3% of observations.

Judges can also link I and D bonds with supervised release requirements, though the main role of the bond is to determine if they can leave the custody of the Sheriff (i.e., exit jail pretrial). In this sense, EM can also be coupled with D-bonds (D-EM), which required the defendant to stay in jail until they paid 10% of the bond amount and were then released onto EM, which accounted for 16% of D-bonds between 2008 and 2012 (Civic Federation (2017)). However, it is unclear how many defendants were actually released onto EM from D-EMs during the period. Prior to 2012, little data on EM usage in Cook County was available (Dizikes and Lightly, 2015). Figure 1 displays these trends across the sample period.

In 2012, disputes began between the Court and the Sheriff (who runs the jail and most of the EM releases) over the overcrowding of the Cook County Jail and EM usage began. As a result, in November 2012, judges functionally stopped using D-EM bonds which further contributed to jail overcrowding

(Civic Federation (2017)), though they were occasionally used during the period of study. This sparked the introduction of the IEM bond discussed in the paper, though IEM bonds are referred to as “Electronic monitoring with D-bonds” in CGL and Appleseed, 2022. The IEM bond offered an attractive solution to judges: release defendants from jail and avoid overcrowding but have them monitored by the Sheriff, who bears responsibility for any failures. The initial appeal was increased following reforms in September 2013 which urged a reduction in defendants forced to stay in jail due to lack of money (Civic Federation (2017)). A report by the Civic Federation, using different data, also indicates that in September 2013, IEM was about 25% of dispositions (Civic Federation (2017)).

The Sheriff’s EM program is by far the most common form of EM (Green, 2016, Civic Federation 2020). A significantly less common EM program was “Curfew EM” which requires defendants to be in their homes between specified hours, usually 7 pm to 7 am. These programs also co-exist with other monitored release programs by the Chief Judge’s office, GPS home confinement, which is primarily used for domestic violence cases (Civic Federation (2020)). Recently, Cook County has adopted GPS monitoring systems instead, though these GPS ankle or wrist bracelets operate in a similar capacity, simply without a home unit, and tracks all of the subject’s movements (CCSO, 2020b). Yet, this system has run into technical issues due to false alarms (Daston, 2022).

While the domain of EM monitoring is generally one’s home, exceptions can be made in advance for work, school, or other reasons (Civic Federation (2020)), it but requires 2 days prior approval. See CCSO, 2020a for the rules and information sheet for the EM program in 2020. Time spent on EM in the Sheriff’s program counts as days served in jail and thus can reduce one’s time required to be served if found guilty (Civic Federation (2020)). In many jurisdictions, EM can require defendants to pay a fee, but this was not common for pretrial EM during the period of study based on available sources. See Dizikes and Lightly, 2015 for images of the 2013-2017 system.

As with all bond types discussed (IEM, I-bond, D-bond), the defendant is liable to pay the full bond amount if they violate their bond conditions (e.g., they fail to appear in court). While defendants are liable for the bond amount, most defendants cannot pay the large sums, and cash bail has been shown to be ineffective at ensuring court appearances (Ouss and Stevenson, 2023), and the threat of court fines has been shown to be ineffective (Albright, 2021) as the collection of such fines is rare (Pager et al., 2022).

Following the initial plea of guilty or not guilty at the arraignment, the next steps depend on if the case is a misdemeanor or felony case. Felony cases proceed to a hearing which determines if the case can proceed with felony charges (usually a preliminary hearing, grand jury, or an information) and be transferred to the criminal division; otherwise, it is dropped or proceeds with misdemeanor charges. The full evolution of a case involves many events, and a flowchart for felony and misdemeanor cases can be seen in Figures 2 and 3, respectively.

1.2 Data

The court data has large numbers of cases, first starting in 1984, but also contains sporadic records dating back to the 1930s. Linking is done using individual record numbers as well as personally identifiable characteristics, such as name, birth date, race, gender, and home address. As a single booking can result in multiple cases (generally 2 if it is a felony case), cases can be linked within individuals using central booking numbers common to both cases (RD numbers if CBs are missing). For linking jail data to court data, I connect defendant identities using individual record numbers, identifiable information (names), and case/detention information.

The CB and RD numbers associated with cases are used to connect court/jail profiles to Chicago-specific arrests and reported crimes. While I have additional information for Chicago arrestees, I do not require this filter, though 86.68% of the data are reported to have been arrested by the CPD.

Importantly, not all cases can be linked to a reasonable jail spell, which means that the individual follows a quick timeline of beginning a jail spell (i.e., defendant is reported to have entered jail), having a case opened against them, and proceeding to bond court. This lack of linkage is possible due to some individuals never entering the jail system due to immediately going to bond court and being released or due to a linking error — I test the sensitivity of my results to these unlinked cases in Appendix 1.3. Cases with I-bonds or EM-bonds are much more likely to be unlinked to a jail spell (35.19% and 19.58%, respectively) relative to all other bond types (which averages 15.14%), which supports the former case. Interestingly, there is no pattern in missing rates for increasing bond amounts. If this were largely due to immediate release from EM, I would expect higher bonds to imply fewer missing. For instrument construction, I include all cases; for treatment

construction in the main specification, non-I-bond and non-EM cases which are unlinked to jail spells are dropped in the main sample, while unlinked I-bond and EM bond cases are kept. A defendant can also be classified as “detained” if they technically exit jail due to a transfer or are sent to alternative detention (e.g., prison).

For final filters, I exclude cases that did not go to Branch 1 within 2 days of being opened. I also remove a small subset of individual-booking observations with irregular case patterns and those which do not have resolutions within the court system. I remove 2.82% if they contain more than 3 unique cases, if there are multiple cases and the difference between the minimum and maximum case initialization date is more than 120 days, if the defendant had more than 60 past cases, and if there were more than 6 individual-bookings corresponding to that defendant within the 2 year period. I drop cases within this time period that are transferred outside of the regular system (2.75%), have short case histories without resolution (2.4%), or end with a warrant being issued (0.31%). I also drop a few attempted murder charges that were not removed by prior filters, and because I focus on IEM, D-bonds, and I-bonds in the paper, I drop two very rare bond types that appear in the data (A and C bonds).

Some cases do not have final disposition dates but end with the case being dropped and contain a guilty, not guilty, stricken, or dropped disposition code (6.48%), I use the last event date as the final disposition date. Lastly, I remove a small number of cases that had murder or felony sex charges or resulted in bond denial, and I drop cases without a categorizable treatment (which includes missing jail spells for defendants without I or EM bonds). In Appendix 1.3, I test the sensitivity of the results to alternate classifications of the dropped cases due to missing jail information.

In July 2015, the court introduced a public safety assessment system that guided judges on release decisions using a scoring system (Civic Federation (2020)). However, it is not clear in the data if this influenced judge behavior in any way, though larger reforms occurred in late 2017, so my sample ends in May of 2017.

1.3 Additional Robustness

I compare my results against a variety of alternate samples and recompute the 2SLS estimates for each altered sample, as shown in Figure 8. I construct samples: excluding unclassified felony types (‘No Unclassified

Felonies’); dropping 2013 cases to ensure judges had sufficient time to adapt to the changes; and include non-felony (largely misdemeanor) cases in the sample (‘Include Misd. Sample). Overall, these alternate samples produce significantly different conclusions compared with the main sample, with the exception being the inclusion of misdemeanor cases which shifts results away from EM being beneficial compared with detention and suggests EM is more costly compared with release, though this does not control for observable difference between felony and misdemeanor defendants.

I probe the robustness of my results to alternative codings of the treatments in Figures 9 and 10. First, defendants who receive EM bonds may not actually be admitted into the EM system because I do not observe whether or when the defendant has the EM system set up in their home. However, I do observe disposition codes in a defendant’s case which provide more specific information on their EM status, such as explicitly stating a defendant was admitted into the Sheriff’s EM program. To determine if this potential miscoding of treatments will influence the results, I reclassify defendants’ EM status based on disposition codes observed in their case history. I construct 4 alternative codings which allow for additional conditions under which the defendant is classified as on EM based on disposition codes. The results, shown in Figure 9 show that the results are generally consistent with the main estimates. Second, because jail data is unmatched to cases for a subset of the sample, a subset of cases are dropped from the sample. I redo the analysis with 4 additional samples in which cases with missing jail data are kept and D-EM bonds are kept (though other filters are applied) and the entire analysis is redone. The 4 cases are combinations of coding all missing (jail data) EM bonds as EM or release and coding all missing D-bonds as detention or release, with results shown in Figure 10. Most results are similar to the main results.

1.4 Pre-Post IEM

In this section I provide details on the construction of estimates for the pre-post IEM analysis in Section 4 in the main text. As discussed in the main text, I exploit the introduction of IEM in June 2013. I use follow the same filters for the data as the main sample, however I include data prior to June 2013 (2010 - 2013) and I drop defendants with more than 10 cases in the sample (as opposed to 6 for the main sample, since there is more time covered in the pre-post sample).

I assume there are four mutually exclusive types of defendants indexed by k : $k = R \rightarrow R$ are ‘always’ released defendants who are released even if EM is available; similarly $k = D \rightarrow D$ are ‘always’ detained defendants who are detained even if EM is available; $k = R \rightarrow EM$ are release to EM compliers who are released if EM is not available but on EM if it is available; similarly $k = D \rightarrow EM$ are detain to EM compliers who are detained if EM is not available but on EM if it is available.

Let $Y_s(k)$ refer to a defendant of type k ’s potential outcome if assigned to treatment $s \in \{R, EM, D\}$. Let t denote the time period, where $t = 1$ refers to after the introduction of IEM and $t = 0$ refers to before the introduction. I assume that the potential outcomes of defendants in either period is constant in both periods $Y_s \perp t$, that the average outcomes would be the same if not for IEM’s introduction, that the composition of defendants did not change, and that IEM’s introduction only influenced outcomes through defendants being placed on EM, so $\mathbb{E}[Y_s(k)|t = 0] = \mathbb{E}[Y_s(k)|t = 1]$.

The treatment effects of interest are the effect of EM relative to release on $R \rightarrow EM$ compliers:

$$\tau^R = \mathbb{E}[Y_{EM}(k = R \rightarrow EM) - Y_R(k = R \rightarrow EM)]$$

and the effect of EM relative to detention on $D \rightarrow EM$ compliers:

$$\tau^D = \mathbb{E}[Y_{EM}(k = D \rightarrow EM) - Y_D(k = D \rightarrow EM)]$$

I construct estimates of each piece to compute these effects.

Beginning with $\mathbb{E}[Y_{EM}(k = R \rightarrow EM)]$. Prior to IEM:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y|s = R, t = 0] = \omega_R \mathbb{E}[Y_R(k = R \rightarrow R)] + (1 - \omega_R) \mathbb{E}[Y_R(k = R \rightarrow EM)]$$

$$\iff \mathbb{E}[Y_R(k = R \rightarrow EM)] = \frac{1}{(1 - \omega_R)} [\mathbb{E}[Y|s = R, t = 0] - \omega_R \mathbb{E}[Y_R(k = R \rightarrow R)]]$$

where $\omega_R \in [0, 1]$ is the share of $R \rightarrow R$ defendants in the sample of those assigned to release without EM (constant across time periods). In practice, I compute ω_R as the share of released defendants in $t = 1$ over the share in $t = 0$ in order to account for any change in the total number of defendants: $\omega_R = \frac{N(s=R, t=1)}{N(t=1)} / \frac{N(s=R, t=0)}{N(t=0)}$. After IEM, only $R \rightarrow R$ defendants

are on release, so $\mathbb{E}[Y_R(k = R \rightarrow R)] = \mathbb{E}[Y|s = R, t = 1]$. Then we get an expression in terms of observables:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_R(k = R \rightarrow EM)] = \frac{1}{(1 - \omega_R)} [\mathbb{E}[Y|s = R, t = 0] - \omega_R \mathbb{E}[Y|s = R, t = 1]]$$

Similarly, for $\mathbb{E}[Y_D(k = D \rightarrow EM)]$, the same logic returns:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_D(k = D \rightarrow EM)] = \frac{1}{(1 - \omega_D)} [\mathbb{E}[Y|s = D, t = 0] - \omega_D \mathbb{E}[Y|s = D, t = 1]]$$

where $\omega_D \in [0, 1]$ is the share of $D \rightarrow D$ defendants in the sample of those assigned to detention without EM (constant across time periods) and is constructed as $\omega_D = \frac{N(s=D, t=1)}{N(t=1)} / \frac{N(s=D, t=0)}{N(t=0)}$.

Next, I construct estimates of $\mathbb{E}[Y_{EM}(k = R \rightarrow EM)]$ and $\mathbb{E}[Y_{EM}(k = D \rightarrow EM)]$. Post-IEM, the average outcome among defendants on EM is a weighted (by their share of the total $\omega_{EM,R} \in [0, 1]$ and $1 - \omega_{EM,R}$) sum of these two quantities:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y|s = EM, t = 1] = \omega_{EM,R} \times \mathbb{E}[Y_{EM}(k = R \rightarrow EM)] + (1 - \omega_{EM,R}) \times \mathbb{E}[Y_{EM}(k = D \rightarrow EM)]$$

Using pre-IEM data is less useful in this because EM did not exist as a potential treatment. However, the observable equivalent of $\mathbb{E}[Y|s = EM, t = 1]$ is composed of defendant, indexed by i , who are either $k = R \rightarrow EM$ or $k = D \rightarrow EM$ and is the sum over their observed outcomes on EM. Given this, I use individual defendant data to construct estimates of $\mathbb{E}[Y_{EM}(k = R \rightarrow EM)]$ ($\mathbb{E}[Y_{EM}(k = D \rightarrow EM)]$) as the weighted mean of defendant outcomes on EM post-IEM with weights on the individual defendant corresponding to their likelihood of being on release (detention) if EM was not an option (i.e., their probability of being $k = R \rightarrow EM$ or $k = D \rightarrow EM$) (and scaled such that weights sum to 1):

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_{EM}(k = R \rightarrow EM)] \approx \frac{1}{N(s = EM)} \sum_{i|s_i=EM} \frac{P_i(k = R \rightarrow EM)}{\sum_{i|s_i=EM} P_i(k = R \rightarrow EM)} \times Y_i$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_{EM}(k = D \rightarrow EM)] \approx \frac{1}{N(s = EM)} \sum_{i|s_i=EM} \frac{P_i(k = D \rightarrow EM)}{\sum_{i|s_i=EM} P_i(k = D \rightarrow EM)} \times Y_i$$

I construct estimates of $P_i(D \rightarrow EM|EM)$ and $P_i(R \rightarrow EM|EM) = 1 - P_i(D \rightarrow EM)$ using defendant characteristics (race, gender, age, charge types, case history) and fitted with a probit model predicting $s_i = D$ and trained on defendants in the pre-IEM period. Then:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_{EM}(k = R \rightarrow EM)] \approx \frac{1}{N(s = EM)} \sum_{i|s_i=EM} \frac{\hat{P}_i(s_i = R|x_i)}{\sum_{i|s_i=EM} \hat{P}_i(s_i = R|x_i)} \times Y_i$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y_{EM}(k = D \rightarrow EM)] \approx \frac{1}{N(s = EM)} \sum_{i|s_i=EM} \frac{\hat{P}_i(s_i = D|x_i)}{\sum_{i|s_i=EM} \hat{P}_i(s_i = D|x_i)} \times Y_i$$


Putting the pieces together:

$$\begin{aligned} \tau^R &= \frac{1}{N(s = EM)} \sum_{i|s_i=EM} \frac{\hat{P}_i(s_i = R|x_i)}{\sum_{i|s_i=EM} \hat{P}_i(s_i = R|x_i)} \times Y_i \\ &\quad - \frac{1}{(1 - \omega_R)} \left[\frac{1}{N(s = R, t = 0)} \sum_{i|s_i=R, t=0} Y_i - \omega_R \frac{1}{N(s = R, t = 1)} \sum_{i|s_i=R, t=1} Y_i \right] \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \tau^D &= \frac{1}{N(s = EM)} \sum_{i|s_i=EM} \frac{\hat{P}_i(s_i = D|x_i)}{\sum_{i|s_i=EM} \hat{P}_i(s_i = D|x_i)} \times Y_i \\ &\quad - \frac{1}{(1 - \omega_D)} \left[\frac{1}{N(s = D, t = 0)} \sum_{i|s_i=D, t=0} Y_i - \omega_D \frac{1}{N(s = D, t = 1)} \sum_{i|s_i=D, t=1} Y_i \right] \end{aligned}$$

2 Appendix B: Additional Figures and Tables


Figure 1: Bond Time Trends in Cook County Court



Note: Figure displays the composition of bond types within the sample between 2008 and 2015 aggregated by year-month of bond date. D-EM bond refers to D-bonds coupled with EM release, and EM refers to I-bonds coupled with EM (IEM). The first vertical line denotes November 2012, when D-EM bonds stopped being issued temporarily, and the second vertical line denotes the introduction of IEM bonds in June 2013.

Figure 2: Felony Case Flow Chart

Figure 1
Flowchart of the general adult felony criminal process in Illinois




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Note: Figure displays sequence of events for felony cases within Cook County — though document is meant for the entire Illinois criminal justice system more broadly. Source: Afeef et al. (2012), page 2.

Figure 3: Misdemeanor Case Flow Chart


Figure 2
Flowchart of the general adult misdemeanor criminal process in Illinois



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
Note: Figure displays sequence of events for misdemeanor cases within Cook County — though document is meant for the entire Illinois criminal justice system more broadly. Source: Afeef et al. (2012), page 3.

Figure 4: Distribution of Defendants by Treatment, Pre- and Post-IEM



Note: Figures display the distributions of pretrial treatments during the period (Detain, Release) for pre-IEM (2009-2012) and post-IEM (July 2013 - 2015). X-axis is the defendant's predicted likelihood of being detained in the pre-IEM period based on their case observables. Coefficients for predicting likelihood of detention are recovered from regressing detention on defendant observables in the Pre-IEM period, then predicted values are computed using the coefficients on data from the Pre-IEM period (top) and Post-IEM period (bottom).


Figure 5: Flow Chart from Bond Type to Treatment Type



Note: Figure displays classification of bond types to release types using the 7 day cutoff of the main specification for felony cases in the main sample, but including those dropped for having a D-bond and missing days in jail.


The left-most nodes are the bond types assigned by the judge and the right-most node contains the treatment classification. The second nodes indicate the cutoff rule which resulted in the bond type being classified as the treatment with the percent of the bond type falling under that classification (e.g., the top node indicates that 69% of D-bond had case durations of jail/EM durations greater than 7 days). The fourth nodes indicate what share of the treatment is contributed by the second node (e.g., 97% of detained defendants are those which had a D-bond and case and jail/EM duration more than 7 days).

Figure 6: 95% Confidence Intervals under Alternative Clustering




Note: Figure displays the main 2SLS coefficients with 95% confidence intervals using alternative clustering for main outcomes.

Figure 7: Testing for Linearity Between Predicted Treatments




Note: Figure displays scatter plot of observations by values of CJIVE judge propensities for Release and Detention as well as their relationship with a linear fit (solid line) and nonlinear fit (dashed line), Nonlinear fit is computed using local linear regression with bandwidth=0.025.

Figure 8: Treatment Effects for Alternate Samples




Note: Figure displays the 2SLS estimates for various robustness checks for the effect of EM relative to Release (left) and EM relative to Detention (right). 95% confidence intervals are constructed from standard errors clustered at the branch 1 date level.

Figure 9: Treatment Effects for Recoded Treatments using Disposition Codes



Note: Figure displays the 2SLS estimates for various robustness checks for the effect of EM relative to Release (left) and EM relative to Detention (right) under different re-codings of pretrial treatments using disposition codes to determine if a defendant was assigned to EM. "Sheriff Admit" means the defendant was explicitly noted to have been admitted into the sheriff's EM program; "Sheriff or Seen On" allows for if the defendant was explicitly noted to be on EM; "Sheriff, Seen On, or Serving" allows for if the defendant was explicitly noted to be serving a monitoring program; and "Not EM Denied" includes "Sheriff, Seen On, or Serving" defendants but excludes any defendant explicitly noted to not be admitted to EM (with bail set to stand). 95% confidence intervals are constructed from standard errors clustered at the branch 1 date level.

Figure 10: Treatment Effects for Recoded Missing Treatments



Note: Figure displays the 2SLS estimates for various robustness checks for the effect of EM relative to Release (left) and EM relative to Detention (right) under different re-codings of pretrial treatments for cases with missing jail data. 95% confidence intervals are constructed from standard errors clustered at the branch 1 date level.

Table 1: Incidence Cost from Data to Miller et al. (2021) Types and Costs

Coded Charge Type	Applied Weight	Miller et al. (2021) Crime Type	Incidence Cost (\$)								
			Medical	Mental	Productivity	Property	Public Service	Adjudication Sanction	Perpetrator Work Loss	Subtotal Tangible	Quality of Life
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Felony Murder	1.00	Murder	12735	11976	1828638	197	148832	478072	177869	2658319	5150836
Felony Sexual Assault	0.50	Rape Police-reported	3333	6504	7178	176	901	44660	18409	81161	319632
Felony Sexual Assault	0.50	Other sexual assault	706	1580	1760	68	51	328	135	4627	82507
Felony Violent	0.50	Robbery Police-reported	1959	196	4639	1285	1321	13784	5928	29112	14656
Felony Violent	0.50	Assault Police-reported	2090	403	2292	79	4315	6172	2286	17635	21149
Misdemeanor Domestic Violence	1.00	Intimate partner violence	727	193	1336	65	13	269	207	2810	25440
All Property	0.05	Arson	2647	45	3389	19519	4002	2596	505	33008	6430
All Property	0.25	Burglary Police-reported	0	0	39	2882	582	935	931	5369	0
All Property	0.25	Larceny/theft Police-reported	0	0	31	1052	901	2570	226	4780	0
All Property	0.25	Motor vehicle theft Police-reported	0	0	118	7219	715	1964	767	10783	0
All Property	0.05	Fraud	0	0	57	1854	73	52	16	2053	0
All Property	0.15	Vandalism	0	0	0	390	23	688	248	1349	0
All Weapon	1.00	Weapons carrying	0	0	0	0	79	2573	1073	3725	0
Misdemeanor Other	0.16	Prostitution/pandering	0	0	0	0	79	257	108	444	0
All Drug	1.00	Drug possession/sales	0	0	0	0	5046	3599	1502	10147	0
Misdemeanor Other	0.16	Gambling	0	0	0	0	79	257	108	444	0
Misdemeanor Other	0.16	Liquor laws	0	0	0	0	79	1228	512	1819	0
Misdemeanor Other	0.16	Drunkenness	0	0	0	0	79	1228	512	1819	0
Misdemeanor Other	0.20	Disorderly conduct	0	0	0	0	79	1228	512	1819	0
Misdemeanor Other	0.16	Vagrancy	0	0	0	0	79	1228	512	1819	0
All Bond Violations	1.00	Curfew/loitering violations	0	0	0	0	79	1228	512	1819	0
All Traffic	0.20	Impaired driving	1208	140	5527	2548	31	1088	107	10649	17355
All Traffic	0.80	OTHER TRAFFIC	0	0	0	0	79	1228	512	1819	0
All Other	1.00	OTHER GENERAL	0	0	0	0	79	1228	512	1819	0
Felony Murder (Low Cost)	1.00	MURDER RECODED AS Rape Police-reported	3333	6504	7178	176	901	44660	18409	81161	319632
All Escape	1.00	ESCAPE RECODED AS Curfew/loitering violations	0	0	0	0	79	1228	512	1819	0
Felony Attempted Murder	1.00	ATT MURDER RECODED AS Other sexual assault	706	1580	1760	68	51	328	135	4627	82507

Note: Table displays the charge types recovered from the court data (Column (1)) and associated crime types (Column (3)) and costs (Columns (4) - (13)) from Miller et al. (2021) Table 5. Column (2) displays the applied weight to the Miller et al. (2021) crime type in order to map multiple crime types to a single recovered charge type that could be recovered from the court data. Not all charge types had perfect mappings to the incidence costs categories / weights were applied — if no category was available Column (3) contains the crime type used in the form of: [Court data charge] recoded as [crime type].

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