

Supplemental Appendix:

Evaluating the Impact of Urban Transit Infrastructure: Evidence from Bogotá's TransMilenio

Nick Tsivanidis

Contents

A	Additional Tables	2
B	Additional Figures	16
C	Using A Special Case of the Model to Derive Sufficient Statistics for the Impact of Transit Infrastructure on Economic Activity	23
C.1	A Simple Quantitative Urban Model	23
C.2	Estimating the Commute Elasticity θ	25
C.3	First Order vs Equilibrium Effects	26
C.4	Examples of Isomorphic Models in Proposition 1	27
C.5	Reduced Form Coefficients and Residuals	31
D	Additional Model Results	33
D.1	Proofs	33
D.2	Additional Details and Definitions	47
D.3	Bootstrap	48
D.4	Mode Choice Problem	49
D.5	Model Inversion	49
D.6	Calibrating α_{sg}	50
D.7	Model Solution	51
D.8	Benchmarking the Amenity Spillovers	52
E	Model Extensions	53
E.1	Migration	53
E.2	Congestion	53
E.3	Endogenous Floorspace Use with Fixed Housing Supply	58
E.4	Housing Supply Adjustment and Land Value Capture	60
E.5	Employment in Domestic Services	61
E.6	Home Ownership	62
F	Data Appendix	62
F.1	Dataset Description	62
F.2	Computing Commute Times	66
F.3	Constructing the Instruments	68
F.4	Cost-Benefit Calculations	69

G	Supplementary Empirical Results	69
G.1	TransMilenio Trip Characteristics	69
G.2	Impact on Other Mode Speeds	70
G.3	Impact on Housing Supply	70
G.4	Impact on Wages and Sorting	71
G.5	Impact of Both Types of CMA	72
G.6	Main Results: Robustness	72
H	Supplemental Appendix References	73

A Additional Tables

Table A.1: Robustness

	(1) Baseline	(2) Simple Avg Time	(3) Slow	(4) Fast	(5) High θ	(6) Low θ	(7) <3km TM	(8) Sect-Clus SE	(9) Exc. 1km Nodes	(10) TM X CBD
Panel A: Residents										
ln(Res Floorspace Price)	0.410** (0.159)	0.551*** (0.208)	0.385** (0.161)	0.423*** (0.152)	0.248** (0.125)	0.758*** (0.233)	0.484*** (0.170)	0.410* (0.217)	0.369** (0.181)	0.409** (0.185)
N	2,236	2,236	2,236	2,236	2,236	2,236	2,084	2,236	2,041	2,236
R^2	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.40	0.43	0.44	0.43
ln(Res Population)	0.732** (0.318)	0.943** (0.418)	0.670** (0.314)	0.804*** (0.310)	0.576** (0.242)	1.138** (0.504)	0.848*** (0.306)	0.732* (0.384)	0.512 (0.368)	1.009*** (0.363)
N	2,276	2,276	2,276	2,276	2,276	2,276	2,121	2,276	2,079	2,276
R^2	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.35	0.36	0.36	0.36
Panel B: Firms										
ln(Comm Floorspace Price)	0.728*** (0.238)	0.962*** (0.310)	0.720*** (0.248)	0.692*** (0.219)	0.448** (0.191)	1.137*** (0.333)	0.639*** (0.243)	0.728*** (0.260)	0.659*** (0.243)	0.834*** (0.286)
N	2,116	2,116	2,116	2,116	2,116	2,116	1,988	2,116	1,931	2,116
R^2	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.11
Comm Floorspace Share	0.258*** (0.086)	0.311*** (0.111)	0.302*** (0.092)	0.208*** (0.078)	0.281*** (0.070)	0.154 (0.106)	0.294*** (0.087)	0.258** (0.106)	0.238*** (0.088)	0.263*** (0.100)
N	2,270	2,270	2,270	2,270	2,270	2,270	2,117	2,270	2,075	2,270
R^2	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.15	0.14	0.16	0.15	0.17	0.15
ln(Establishments)	1.508* (0.788)	2.180** (1.018)	1.221 (0.832)	1.629** (0.716)	0.419 (0.657)	3.750*** (1.022)	1.340* (0.802)	1.508** (0.739)	1.642** (0.797)	1.551 (0.954)
N	2,026	2,026	2,026	2,026	2,026	2,026	1,913	2,026	1,987	2,026
R^2	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.25	0.67	0.67

Note: Specification includes same controls as baseline in column 3 of Table 2, repeated in column (1). Column (2) uses a simple arithmetic average for times across car owners and non-car owners as described in Appendix D.4. Column (3) uses slower commute times that best match average speeds in the post-period. Column (4) uses faster ones that do the same for the pre-period. The baseline specification uses an average of the two. Column (5) uses a larger value of θ equal to 1.5 times its baseline estimate, while column (6) scales it down by the same factor. Column (7) considers only census tracts closer than 3km from a TransMilenio station. Column (8) clusters standard errors by sector (560 administrative units above census tract). Column (9) excludes tracts within 1km of a portal (compared with 500m in the main table). Column (10) controls for log distance to CBD interacted with a dummy for whether a tract is closer than 500m to a TM station as of 2013 to examine whether all the CMA effect is simply due to heterogeneity of the distance effect at different distances from the CBD. Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors (Conley (1999)) with a 0.5km bandwidth reported in parentheses in columns other than (8).

Table A.2: Aggregate Welfare Effects: Robustness

	No Migration	Migration
Panel A: Alt. Estimated Params		
Baseline	2.34	0.69
IV	2.33	0.43
IV-Loc	2.36	0.62
Alternative Times	2.18	0.20
θ OLS	2.66	0.83
θ IV	1.17	0.31
Panel B: Alt. Calibrated Params		
$\sigma = 4$	2.60	1.60
$\sigma = 8$	2.23	0.54
$\beta = 0.8$	2.57	0.83
$\beta = 0.7$	2.26	0.64
$\rho = 6$	2.34	1.69

Note: Table shows the percentage change in average welfare (as defined in Table 6) under alternative parameter values using the sufficient statistics approach. Panel A examines sensitivity to alternative values of estimated parameters. The first row recreates the baseline results. The second row uses the CMA elasticities from the second column of Table 5 which instrument for the realized change in CMA (i.e. the term that does not hold residential population and employment fixed at their initial value in the post-period) using the baseline measure. The third row uses the CMA elasticities from the third column of Table 5 when instrumenting for the realized change in CMA using the LCP and Tram instrument. The fourth row uses the coefficients from column 6 of Table 2, using an alternative method to aggregate mode-specific commute times. The fifth row uses an alternative value for $\theta = 3.97$ estimated via OLS in column 3 of Table A.6. The sixth row uses a value for $\theta = 6.15$ estimated via IV using the LCP and Tram instrument in column 4 of Table A.6. Panel B varies the value of calibrated parameters.

Table A.3: List of Parameters and Sources of Identifying Variation

Panel A: Externally Calibrated Parameters

Parameter	Description	Identification Source
σ	Elasticity of substitution between labor types	Card (2009)
σ_D	Elasticity of demand	Feenstra et al. (2018)

Panel B: Internally Calibrated Parameters

Parameter	Description	Identification Source
α_s	Cost Share of Commercial Floorspace	Same as description
β	Long-run housing expenditure share	Expenditure share on housing at high income levels
α_{sg}	Skill-specific labor demand shifters	Share of industry wage bill paid to high-skill workers
$\bar{h}$	Subsistence housing requirement	Average expenditure on housing
p_a	Cost of cars	Average expenditure on cars
T_g	Location parameter of worker productivity distribution	College wage premium

Panel C: Estimated Parameters

Parameter	Description	Identification Source
b_m	Travel mode preference shifter	Mode choice shares conditional on travel times
κ	Dependence of commute costs on travel times	Sensitivity of mode choices (within commutes) to travel times
λ	Correlation of preference shocks in public mode nest	Differential sensitivity of mode choices to travel times amongst public modes
θ_g	Commuting elasticity	Sensitivity of commute choices to travel times (in changes)
η_g	Resident supply elasticity	Sensitivity of residential populations to instruments for RCMA
$\mu_{U,g}$	Amenity externality	Sensitivity of residential populations to shifts in the share of high-skilled residents induced by instruments*
μ_A	Productivity externality	Sensitivity of model productivity residual to shifts in labor supply induced by instruments for FCMA

*Note: Instruments are the differential growth in instrumented RCMA for high-skill vs low-skill, and the growth of instrumented RCMA for high-skill interacted with initial house prices (controls allowing for a separate effect of initial house prices on population growth also included).

Table A.4: Multigroup Model: Robustness

Panel A: Main Robustness				
	Avg Welfare	Inequality	Output	Rents
Baseline	1.197	0.585	2.136	2.316
Migration	0.176	0.049	5.239	6.010
$\sigma_L = 2.5$	1.479	0.497	2.093	2.323
Census Employment	1.199	0.584	2.137	2.322
$\sigma = 4$	1.088	0.626	2.190	2.192
$\sigma = 9$	1.282	0.554	2.096	2.396
θ PPML	2.838	0.469	3.052	3.300
θ PPML Diff	0.982	0.858	1.944	2.050
θ OLS	2.079	0.231	2.773	3.047
Joint Pref. Shock	0.716	1.115	0.513	0.730

Panel B: Net Benefit Under Multigroup Model		
	No Migration	Migration
% Net Increase GDP	1.52	4.62

Notes: Panel A shows main results (constructed in the same way as Table 9. Row 1 reproduces the main results. Row 2 uses the open city model with migration elasticity of $\rho = 3$ for both groups. Row 3 uses a larger value of the elasticity of substitution between skill groups in production, using the value of 2.5 from Card (2009) estimated at the MSA-level in the US. Row 4 uses census employment measured in 2005 instead of the CCB employment measured in 2015 as the measure of employment in the baseline equilibrium. Rows 5 and 6 use alternative values for the elasticity of demand. Rows 7, 8 and 9 use alternative values of θ_g estimated in columns 1, 3 and 5 of Table 7 respectively. Row 10 has a joint decision over residence and workplace location (with workers having an idiosyncratic preference for each pair). Panel B recreates the net increase in GDP from Panel B of Table 6 for the multigroup model.

Table A.5: Alternative Weighting

	ln(Establishments)	ln(Res Pop)
Weighted	1.508* (0.788)	0.450* (0.235)
<i>N</i>	2,026	2,276
Unweighted	0.864 (0.588)	0.732** (0.318)
<i>N</i>	2,026	2,276

Note: Table reports the main specification (column 3 of Table 2) for weighted and unweighted regressions with different outcomes. The first column uses the log change in establishments from 2000 to 2015. The first row reports the specification from Table 2, where observations are weighted by the share of establishments in a tract in the initial period. The second row reports the same specification unweighted. The second column reports the same set of specifications as the main table using the log change in residential population from 1993 to 2018 as the outcome, where the first row uses initial population shares as weights. The second row corresponds to the unweighted specification in the main table. Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors (Conley (1999)) with a 0.5km bandwidth reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.6: Gravity Equation: Single Group, Full Estimates

Panel A: Main Regression				
	PPML	PPML	OLS	IV
In Commute Cost	-0.036** (0.017)	-0.039** (0.016)	-0.035* (0.020)	-0.071*** (0.024)
<i>N</i>	710	710	576	576
Controls X Year FE		X	X	X

Panel B: Alternative Clustering			
	PPML	PPML	PPML
In Commute Cost	-0.039** (0.016)	-0.039** (0.018)	-0.039* (0.023)
<i>N</i>	710	710	710
Clusters	355	38	19
Clustering	O-D	O- <i>t</i> & D- <i>t</i>	O & D

Note: Panel A Outcome is the commute shares in levels (PPML) or logs (OLS). Observation is an origin-destination-year cell. Only trips to work during rush hour (hour of departure 5-8am) by individuals 18-65 are included. Data is from 1995 and 2015 mobility surveys. Columns 1-2 estimate PPML models, 3 and 4 OLS and IV models respectively. The last column instruments for travel times in the post-period using the average change in times across the LCP and tram instruments. Route-level controls are (i) the average number of crimes per year from 2007-2014, (ii) the average log house price in 2012 and (iii) the share of the trip that takes place along a primary road along the least-cost routes between origin and destination. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Panel B repeats the baseline specification (column 2 of Panel A) with alternative levels of clustering (origin-destination pair; origin-year and destination-year; origin and destination). * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.7: Costs and Benefits

	No Migration	Migration
NPV Increase GDP (mm)	45376.46	244407.13
Capital Costs (mm)	1449.75	1449.75
NPV Operating Costs (mm)	7180.53	7180.53
NPV Total Costs (mm)	8630.28	8630.28
NPV Net Increase GDP (mm)	36746.17	235776.85
% Net Increase GDP	2.63	16.87

Note: Table shows the costs and net benefits, computing net present values (NPV) over a 50-year time horizon with a 5% interest rate. All numbers are in millions of 2016 USD. The NPV of the increase in GDP is simply the NPV of the change in Bogotá's GDP in dollar values. Capital costs are the one-time infrastructure costs of building the network. Total costs are the one-time capital costs associated with building the network combined with the NPV of operating costs. The NPV net increase in GDP nets this out from the gross gains in the first row, while the final row converts this back into a fraction of 2016 GDP.

Table A.8: α_{Hs} Across Industries

Industry	α_{Hs}	Relative HS Wage Bill
Domestic Services	0.160	0.055
Hotels & Restaurants	0.420	0.376
Social & Health Services	0.508	0.623
Transport & Storage	0.515	0.647
Construction	0.552	0.802
Wholesale, Retail, Repair	0.583	0.959
Manufacturing	0.599	1.056
Real Estate	0.601	1.066
Agriculture	0.628	1.254
Arts, Entertainment & Recreation	0.639	1.342
Other Services	0.701	2.016
Water Treatment and Distribution	0.729	2.441
Public Administration	0.769	3.322
Foreign Orgs	0.773	3.430
Elec, Gas	0.800	4.303
Social & Health Services	0.801	4.343
Information & Communication	0.804	4.458
Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities	0.837	6.154
Mining	0.846	6.761
Education	0.854	7.436
Financial Brokerage	0.865	8.455

Note: See Section D.6 for details.

Table A.9: Employment Data Summary Statistics

Year	N Est.	Mean Emp.	p10	p50	p90
Panel A: Census					
1990	219,812	5.41	1	2	7
2005	625,852	4.93	1	2	6
Panel B: Chamber of Commerce					
2000	34,322				
2015	126,867	2.37	1	1	4

Note: The first column provides the number of establishments in each dataset, column (2) provides the average employment while columns (3)-(5) report percentiles of the firm size distribution. Employment is not reported in the raw 2000 Chamber of Commerce establishment data.

Table A.10: Trip Characteristics in 2015

	Bus	Car	Walk	TM
Share of all trips	0.343	0.137	0.360	0.161
Mean Distance (km)	6.536	6.105	1.461	10.091
Share of (trip purpose)				
To work	0.478	0.150	0.158	0.214
Business trips	0.289	0.333	0.184	0.193
To school	0.292	0.042	0.502	0.164
Private matters	0.267	0.163	0.450	0.120
Shopping	0.149	0.121	0.678	0.052

Note: Table created using data from the 2015 Mobility Survey.

Table A.11: Commute Characteristics over Time

Mode	Bus	Car	Walk	TM
Panel A: Commute Shares				
1995	0.74	0.17	0.09	
2005	0.66	0.17	0.07	0.11
2011	0.46	0.16	0.19	0.19
2015	0.48	0.15	0.16	0.21
Panel B: Commute Speeds (km/h)				
1995	16.31	25.69	8.20	
2005	12.88	15.69	6.53	16.88
2011	10.49	14.12	7.95	13.08
2015	10.37	13.00	6.36	13.04
Panel C: Ownership shares				
1995		0.29		
2005		0.28		
2011		0.25		
2015		0.25		

Note: Only trips to work included in trip-level data (car ownership is at the household level).

Table A.12: Effect of TransMilenio on other Mode Speeds

Outcome: $\ln(\text{Speed})$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Car Trips				
TM Route X Post	0.007 (0.151)	0.027 (0.150)	-0.056 (0.122)	-0.050 (0.124)
R^2	0.83	0.83	0.83	0.83
N	9,525	9,525	9,525	9,525
Panel B: Bus Trips				
TM Route X Post	-0.047 (0.060)	0.076 (0.059)	-0.029 (0.047)	0.011 (0.046)
R^2	0.72	0.73	0.72	0.73
N	35,882	35,882	35,882	35,882
Route Measure	Share TM	Share TM	TM>75%	TM>75%
Baseline Controls	X	X	X	X
Locality Origin X Post FE	X	X	X	X
Locality Destination X Post FE	X	X	X	X
Log Distance X Post FE		X		X

Note: Observation is an Origin UPZ-Destination UPZ-Year. Outcome is log reported speed from the 1995 and 2015 Mobility Surveys. Share TM is the share of a car trip's least cost route that lies along a TM line. TM>75% is a dummy equal to one if the share is greater than 75%. Baseline controls are a gender dummy, hour of departure dummies and age quantile dummies, each interacted with year dummies. Only trips to work included during rush hours included. Panel A includes only trips by car, while panel B includes only those by bus. Standard errors clustered at the origin-destination pair-level. $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.13: Relationship between Predicted and Observed Times Over Time

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ln(Predicted Time)	0.705*** (0.034)	0.511*** (0.020)	0.746*** (0.024)	0.697*** (0.023)
Post	0.317* (0.190)	-0.662*** (0.126)	0.521*** (0.198)	
ln(Predicted Time) X Post	0.018 (0.051)	0.187*** (0.030)	-0.046 (0.047)	
Car				-0.037 (0.167)
TM				0.020 (0.193)
ln(Predicted Time) X Car				0.026 (0.044)
ln(Predicted Time) X TM				0.003 (0.047)
R^2	0.42	0.34	0.41	0.42
N	2,219	6,671	2,757	5,005
Mode	Car	Bus	TM	All
Post Only				X

Note: Observation is a UPZ Origin-UPZ Destination-Year. Outcome is log reported time from Mobility Survey. Post is a dummy equal to one in 2015 and zero in 1995 (2005 for TM). Trips include journeys to and from work during rush hour (hour of departure between 5 and 8 am, hour of return between 4 and 6pm). Individual observations averaged to the trip-year level, and regressions weighted by number of individual observations in each trip-year-mode. Columns (1)-(3) include observations for pre- and post-years and consider only one mode; column (4) includes only observations from the post period and includes all modes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.14: Effect of TransMilenio on Growth in Floorspace

Outcome: Floorspace Growth	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta \ln \text{RCMA}$	0.044 (0.193)			
$\Delta \ln \text{FCMA}$		-0.073 (0.265)		
$\ln \text{Distance F1}$			0.013 (0.013)	0.014 (0.018)
$\ln \text{Distance F2}$			0.016 (0.015)	0.014 (0.019)
$\ln \text{Distance F3}$			-0.001 (0.027)	-0.006 (0.029)
$\ln \text{Distance F1 X Far CBD}$				0.005 (0.025)
$\ln \text{Distance F2 X Far CBD}$				0.006 (0.025)
$\ln \text{Distance F3 X Far CBD}$				-0.001 (0.037)
N	2,271	2,271	2,206	2,206
R^2	0.52	0.52	0.51	0.51

Note: Specification is baseline specification from main table with full controls (column (3)), but outcome is growth in floorspace between 2018 and 2000 using the Davis-Haltiwanger measure. In column 3 the coefficients report the log distance from the closest station in each phase of TransMilenio. Column 4 interacts this with a dummy for whether the tract is above the median distance from the CBD (Far CBD). The full interaction is included. Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors (Conley (1999)) with a 0.5km bandwidth reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.15: TransMilenio's Effect on Income

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Clustered by UPZ X Post			
ln(RCMA)	0.982*** (0.349)	0.510** (0.224)	0.522** (0.224)
<i>N</i>	87,674	87,673	87,673
<i>R</i> ²	0.48	0.56	0.1563
P-val Coef = 1/ θ			0.31
Panel B: Clustered by UPZ			
ln(RCMA)	0.982** (0.451)	0.510* (0.288)	0.522* (0.287)
<i>N</i>	87,674	87,673	87,673
<i>R</i> ²	0.48	0.56	0.1563
P-val Coef = 1/ θ			0.43
UPZ FE	X	X	X
Region X Year FE	X	X	X
Log Dist CBD X Region X Year FE	X	X	X
Basic Tract Controls X Year FE	X	X	X
Historical Controls X Year FE	X	X	X
Land Market Controls X Year FE	X	X	X
Basic Worker Demographics X Year FE	X	X	X
Education X Year FE		X	X
Hours Worked X Year FE			X

Note: Outcome variable is the log average weekly labor income for full-time, working age (18-65) individuals reporting more than 40 hours worked per week. Data covers 2000-2005 in the pre-period and 2015-2019 in the post period and comes from the ECH and GEIH. Post is a dummy for the post period. RCMA is measured at the UPZ-level using the pre-TM network in the pre-period, and using the 2013 network in the post-period, and at the UPZ-level. Region are dummies for the North, West and South of the city. Controls present are the same as in the main specification (interacted with year dummies), other than basic worker demographics which contain dummies for age (in ten year bins) and gender. Columns 2 and 3 contain dummies for each category of highest education level attained. Column 3 contains dummies for hours worked per week in 10 hour bins. Standard errors are clustered by UPZ and period. The p-value tests the null that the coefficient on log RCMA equals $1/\theta$ as predicted by the model, with $\theta = 3.39$. Standard errors are clustered by UPZ and Post in Panel A, and by UPZ in Panel B. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.16: TransMilenio's Effect on the College Share of Residents

	(1)	(2)
$\Delta \ln \text{RCMA}$	0.139*** (0.037)	0.139*** (0.033)
<i>N</i>	2,276	2,276
<i>R</i> ²	0.12	0.26
Init. Coll Share		X

Note: Outcome is the change in the share of college educated residents in a tract between 1993 and 2018. Specification includes all controls from baseline specification, excluding the initial college share in column 1 but including it in column 2. HAC standard errors are reported with a 500m bandwidth. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.17: Impacts of Both Types of CMA

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Residents			
	$\Delta \ln(\text{Res Price})$	$\Delta \ln(\text{Res Pop})$	
$\Delta \ln \text{RCMA}$	0.147 (0.188)	1.069*** (0.398)	
$\Delta \ln \text{FCMA}$	0.594** (0.266)	-1.157* (0.685)	
N	2,236	2,276	
R^2	0.43	0.36	
Panel B: Firms, Floorspace			
	$\Delta \ln(\text{Comm Price})$	$\Delta \text{Comm Share}$	
$\Delta \ln \text{FCMA}$	0.589* (0.307)	0.449*** (0.104)	
$\Delta \ln \text{RCMA}$	0.179 (0.268)	-0.243*** (0.070)	
N	2,116	2,270	
R^2	0.11	0.16	
Panel C: Firms, Employment			
	$\Delta \ln(\text{Est, CCB})$	$\Delta \ln(\text{Emp, Census})$	$\Delta \ln(\text{Emp Formal, Census})$
$\Delta \ln \text{FCMA}$	-0.500 (1.009)	1.799* (1.084)	2.248 (1.378)
$\Delta \ln \text{RCMA}$	3.424*** (0.800)	-0.103 (0.511)	-0.596 (0.737)
N	2,026	2,012	1,701
R^2	0.68	0.19	0.12

Note: Table repeats the baseline specification i.e. column (3) from Table 2 and columns (1) and (3) from Table 4 for census employment, including both the change in RCMA and FCMA in the same regression. Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors (Conley (1999)) with a 0.5km bandwidth reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.18: Robustness to Outliers

	(1)	(2)
	$\Delta \ln(\text{Emp, Census})$	$\Delta \ln(\text{Emp Formal, Census})$
Panel A: Table 4, Employment		
$\ln(\text{FCMA})$	2.262** (1.071)	2.199* (1.294)
$\ln(\text{FCMA})$ Later Phase	2.734 (2.477)	2.416 (3.392)
Panel B: Table A17, Res Price		
	$\Delta \ln(\text{Res Price})$	
$\ln(\text{RCMA})$	0.356* (0.205)	
$\ln(\text{FCMA})$	0.178 (0.280)	

Note: Table repeats select specifications, dropping 1% tails of change in log CMA variables. Panel A repeats columns (2) and (4) of Table 4, dropping 1% tails of the log change in FCMA terms. Panel B repeats the specification in column 1 of Table A.17 (panel A), dropping the 1% tails of both CMA terms. Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors (Conley (1999)) with a 0.5km bandwidth reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.19: Commuting in 1995

	$\ln \text{Speed}$	$\ln \text{Speed}$	Bus	Bus
Bus	-0.359*** (0.020)	-0.317*** (0.017)		
Low-Skill			0.229*** (0.011)	0.134*** (0.011)
R^2	0.06	0.75	0.15	0.47
N	14,868	12,903	14,859	12,894
UPZ O-D FE		X		X
Time of day Controls	X	X	X	X
Demographic Controls	X	X	X	X

Note: Data is from 1995 Mobility Survey. Low-Skill is a dummy for having no post-secondary education. Bus is a dummy for whether bus is used during a commute, relative to the omitted category of car. Time of day controls are dummies for hour of departure, and demographics are log age and a gender dummy. UPZ O-D FE are fixed effects for each UPZ origin-destination. Only trips to work during rush hour (hour of departure between 5-8am) included. Standard errors clustered at UPZ origin-destination pair. * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

B Additional Figures

Figure A.1: TransMilenio Network and Bogotá




Figure A.2: TransMilenio Routes: Before and After

(a) Previous bus lanes, Avenida Caracas (Sur)



(b) TransMilenio Station, Avenida Caracas (Norte)



Sources: Panel A: Fig 6.29, Wright and Hook (2007). Panel B: Diaz (2008)

Figure A.3: Planned Networks From Previous Studies


(a) Ineco-Sofretug, 1981



(b) Intermetro-SPA, 1987



(c) JICA, 1996




(d) Bechtel-Systra-Ingetec, 1997



Note: Each panel corresponds to the plan by a different consortium of consultants, in the corresponding year. The colored lines are the proposed networks (dashes sometimes indicating different lines), the black dashed line is the limit of the city in that year. Network maps obtained from


<https://www.metrodebogota.gov.co/sites/default/files/documentos/Producto%2015.%20Tomo%201.%20Formulaci3n%20y%20caracterizaci3n%20de%20las>

Figure A.4: Change in Residential Floorspace Share: Model vs Data




Note: Graph plots a binscatter (50 bins) the observed change in the share of floorspace used for residential purposes in the data (y-axis) vs the model (x-axis). Both are normalized to have unit mean on the plot. The caption reports results from regression of the change in the share of floorspace used for residential purposes in the data on that from the model.

Figure A.5: College Share in Observed vs Counterfactual Equilibrium with Faster TM



Note: Graph shows share of high-skill residents in tracts in 100m cells from their nearest TransMilenio station. 1500m cell includes all tracts 1500m or more from their nearest station. Red bars show the observed shares in the post-period, blue bars show those from a counterfactual where TransMilenio runs at 35 km/h.

Figure A.6: Event Study on Floorspace Area



Note: Figure plots event study similar to Figure 3 but using log floorspace area as the outcome.

Figure A.7: Employment in Chamber of Commerce vs Census





Figure A.8: Cadastral vs Reported Property Values



Note: Reported value is the reported purchase price per room as observed in the Multipurpose survey in 2014, for properties bought after 2005 (both the purchase price and year are reported). The cadastral value is the average residential property value per m2 in the locality in that year. Prices are averaged over the period, and normalized so that each variable has mean one.

Figure A.9: Engel Curves for Car Ownership and Housing






Figure A.10: Computed vs Observed Commute Times



Note: Figures plot the average reported trip time between pairs of UPZs in the Mobility Survey versus the times computed in ArcMap using the pre speeds for 1995 and post speeds for 2015. Only trips to and from work during rush hour included. Marker size is proportional to the number of commuters in each pairwise combination (reported coefficients from regressions weighted by this number).

Figure A.11: Instruments

(a) Raw Land Use Map 1980




(b) Cost Raster




(c) LCP Instrument

— Least Cost Paths
— TransMilenio System 2006



(d) Tram Instrument

— Tram Route 1921
— Tram Route 1921 Extended
— TransMilenio System 2006



C Using A Special Case of the Model to Derive Sufficient Statistics for the Impact of Transit Infrastructure on Economic Activity

This section considers a special case of the model where there is one type of worker and firm, no fixed element of expenditure or income and a fixed allocation of floorspace to residential and commercial use. For simplicity, I assume workers make a joint decision over home and workplace, but this is later relaxed to have separate decisions as in the main model. This special case is shared by a wider class of quantitative urban models. Section C.1 sets up and characterizes this simple model from scratch, and shows it admits a reduced form representation where changes in endogenous variables can be written as log-linear functions of changes in CMA. Section A shows that (i) the change in CMA and elasticities of economic activity to CMA turn out to be sufficient statistics that speak to the impact of transit infrastructure on aggregate outcomes (such as house prices, output and welfare) as well as the reorganization of activity across space. Section C.3 derives a relationship between first order welfare effects in this class of general equilibrium models and the value of time savings approach typically used to evaluate gains from transit infrastructure. Section D.1 provides proofs for the results in this section.

C.1 A Simple Quantitative Urban Model

Setup. I consider a simple quantitative model of a city in the spirit of Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) and Allen et al. (2015). There are $i \in I$ locations that differ in their exogenous amenities $\bar{u}_i$, productivities $\bar{A}_i$, residential and commercial floorspace supplies H_{Ri}, H_{Fi} and the time t_{ij} it takes to commute to any other location.³⁸ A continuum of workers with mass $\bar{L}$ choose where to live and work and have Cobb-Douglas preferences over a freely-traded numeraire good and housing. Commuting reduces effective labor supply at workplace so that an individual living in i and working in j receives income w_j/d_{ij} , where $d_{ij} = \exp(\kappa t_{ij})$ converts average commute times into commute costs. These average commute times t_{ij} aggregate times across all modes as defined in Appendix C.2. In each location, a representative firm produces a freely traded variety under perfect competition that are aggregated by consumers in CES fashion to form the final numeraire good.

Individuals. Indirect utility across pairs of residential and employment locations (i, j) is given by

$$U_{ij}(\omega) = \frac{u_i w_j r_{Ri}^{\beta-1}}{d_{ij}} \epsilon_{ij}(\omega), \quad (21)$$

where $\epsilon_{ij}(\omega)$ is an idiosyncratic productivity for worker ω on commute (i, j) , $1 - \beta$ is the expenditure share on housing, and u_i is the amenity enjoyed by residents who live in i . To allow for the possibility of local spillovers, amenities depend on both exogenous location characteristics $\bar{u}_i$ and the number of residents through $u_i = \bar{u}_i L_{Ri}^{\mu_U}$. Workers choose the commute pair that maximizes their utility. Assuming these are drawn iid from a Fréchet distribution with shape parameter θ yields a simple expression for the number of commuters for each live-work pair

$$L_{ij} = \bar{L} \bar{U}^{-\theta} \left(\frac{u_i w_j r_{Ri}^{\beta-1}}{d_{ij}} \right)^{\theta}, \quad (22)$$

³⁸ Appendix G shown housing supply was unaffected by TransMilenio, so I consider these as fixed location characteristics. This assumption is relaxed in Section 5.3. Appendix G also shows that there were no significant relative changes in car and bus speeds along routes most affected by TransMilenio, so I assume those travel times are fixed in the baseline model. This is relaxed in Panel C of Table 6.

where $\bar{U} = \gamma \left[\sum_{ij} (u_i w_j r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} / d_{ij})^\theta \right]^{1/\theta}$ is average utility, $\gamma = \Gamma(\frac{\theta-1}{\theta})$ and $\Gamma(\cdot)$ is the Gamma function. The supply of residents and workers to each location can be computed by summing these flows over all destinations and origins respectively to get

$$L_{Ri} = \bar{L} \bar{U}^{-\theta} \left(u_i r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} \right)^\theta \Phi_{Ri} \quad (23)$$

$$L_{Fj} = \bar{L} \bar{U}^{-\theta} w_j^\theta \Phi_{Fj}. \quad (24)$$

The Φ_{Ri} and Φ_{Fj} terms are what I refer to as commuter market access terms. Residential commuter market access (RCMA) $\Phi_{Ri} = \sum_j (w_j / d_{ij})^\theta$ reflects residents' access to well-paid jobs from location i . Firm commuter market access (FCMA) $\Phi_{Fj} = \sum_i (u_i r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} / d_{ij})^\theta$ reflects firms' access to workers from location j (i.e. being close to locations with high amenities or low rents). The resident supply curve (23) therefore tells us that more residents will move to locations with high amenities, low house prices, and better access to well-paid jobs through the commuting network. The labor supply curve (24) tells us that firms will attract more workers to locations with high wages and better access to workers via the commuting network.

The supply of effective labor units to a location can be computed by leveraging that, under the Fréchet distribution, the average productivity of workers who have chosen (i, j) is inversely related to the share of workers choosing that pair $\bar{\epsilon}_{ij} \propto \pi_{ij}^{-1/\theta}$ where $\pi_{ij} = L_{ij} / \bar{L}$. Total effective labor supply is simply $\tilde{L}_{Fj} = \bar{L} \sum_i \pi_{ij}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} / d_{ij}$, which simplifies to

$$\tilde{L}_{Fj} = \bar{L} \bar{U}^{-(\theta-1)} w_j^{\theta-1} \tilde{\Phi}_{Fj} \quad (25)$$

where $\tilde{\Phi}_{Fj} = \sum_i (u_i r_{Ri}^{\beta-1})^{\theta-1} d_{ij}^{-\theta}$ is adjusted FCMA capturing access to effective units of labor.

Consumers spend a constant fraction $1 - \beta$ on housing, so that residential floorspace (inverse) demand is given by

$$r_{Ri} = \frac{1 - \beta}{H_{Ri}} \bar{y}_i L_{Ri}, \quad (26)$$

where $\bar{y}_i \equiv \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} \pi_{Ri}^{-1/\theta}$ is average income of residents in i , and $\pi_{Ri} = \sum_j \pi_{ij}$.³⁹

Firms. The production side of the model assumes an Armington structure with no trade costs. In each location, a representative firm produces a differentiated variety using the Cobb-Douglas technology $Y_i = A_i \tilde{L}_{Fi}^\alpha H_{Fi}^{1-\alpha}$. As for amenities, I allow for the possibility of productivity externalities of the form $A_i = \bar{A}_i \tilde{L}_{Fi}^{\mu_A}$.⁴⁰ Solving firms' profit maximization problem delivers labor demand

$$\tilde{L}_{Fi} = \alpha w_i^{\alpha(1-\sigma_D)-1} A_i^{\sigma_D-1} r_{Fi}^{(1-\sigma_D)(1-\alpha)} E \quad (27)$$

where $E = \sum_i \bar{y}_i L_{Ri}$ is aggregate expenditure and σ_D is the elasticity of demand across varieties. Firm (inverse)

³⁹In the model with separate residential and employment location decisions covered in Appendix C.4, average income has the more familiar form $\bar{y}_i \equiv \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta}$.

⁴⁰Given evidence on highly localized spatial spillovers (Rossi-Hansberg et al. 2010; Ahlfeldt et al. 2015), I do not allow for spillovers across locations given the size of census tracts. Previous versions of the paper show how the regression framework in that model still holds but outcomes depend both on a location's own CMA and those nearby.

demand for commercial floorspace is given by

$$r_{Fi} = \left(\frac{A_i^{\sigma_D-1} w_i^{-\alpha(\sigma_D-1)} (1-\alpha)E}{H_{Fi}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+(\sigma_D-1)(1-\alpha)}} \quad (28)$$

Equilibrium. Given model parameters $\{\alpha, \beta, \sigma_D, \theta, \kappa, \mu_U, \mu_A\}$ and location characteristics $\{H_{Ri}, H_{Fi}, t_{ij}, \bar{u}_i, \bar{A}_i\}$, an equilibrium of the model is a vector $\{L_{Ri}, \tilde{L}_{Fj}, w_j, r_{Ri}, r_{Fj}, \bar{U}\}$ such that (i) the supply of residents and labor is consistent with worker optimality (23) and (25), (ii) the demand for labor is consistent with firm optimality (27), (iii) demand for floorspace is consistent with firm and worker optimal and equals supply (26) and (28) and (iv) the population of the city $\bar{L}$ is fixed, and welfare $\bar{U}$ is given by $\bar{U} = \gamma \left[\sum_{ij} (u_i w_j r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} / d_{ij})^\theta \right]^{1/\theta}$.⁴¹

C.2 Estimating the Commute Elasticity θ

Taking logs and first differences of the expression for commute flows (22) yields a gravity equation relating the change in commute flows to changes in commute times

$$\ln L_{ijt} = \alpha_{ij} + \gamma_{it} + \delta_{jt} - \theta \kappa t_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}, \quad (29)$$

where α_{ij} , γ_{it} and δ_{jt} are origin-destination, origin-year and destination-year fixed effects. While other estimation approaches typically leverage cross-sectional variation, this paper uses the change in commute times induced by TransMilenio to difference out time-invariant characteristics potentially correlated with commute times. Changes in origin- or destination- specific unobservables—such as amenities and productivities—are absorbed in the fixed effects.

Commute times t_{ijt} are formed using the same mode choice model as in the full model in Section 3.1, but incorporating car ownership according to an exogenous probability rather than an endogenous decision. Workers become car owners according to a Bernoulli distribution with parameter ρ_{car} . Expected utility conditional on car ownership is

$$U_{ijm|a}(\omega) = \frac{u_i w_j r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} \epsilon_{ij}(\omega)}{\exp(\kappa t_{ijm} + v_{ijm}(\omega))}.$$

Expected utility prior to drawing the mode-specific preference shocks is given by

$$\begin{aligned} E_a \left[\max_m \{U_{ijm|a}(\omega)\} \right] &= u_i w_j r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} \epsilon_{ij}(\omega) \times \left[\rho_{car} E \left[\max_{m \in \mathcal{M}_1} \{1/d_{ijm}(\omega)\} \right] + (1 - \rho_{car}) E \left[\max_{m \in \mathcal{M}_0} \{1/d_{ijm}(\omega)\} \right] \right] \\ &= \frac{u_i w_j r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} \epsilon_{ij}(\omega)}{\exp(\kappa \bar{t}_{ij})} \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} t_{ij} &= -\frac{1}{\kappa} \ln [\rho_{car} \exp(-\kappa \bar{t}_{ij1}) + (1 - \rho_{car}) \exp(-\kappa \bar{t}_{ij0})] \\ \text{where } \bar{t}_{ij0} &= -\frac{\lambda}{\kappa} \ln \sum_{m \in B_{pub}} \exp \left(b_m - \frac{\kappa}{\lambda} t_{ijm} \right) \\ \bar{t}_{ij1} &= -\frac{1}{\kappa} \ln (\exp(b_{car} - \kappa t_{ijCar}) + \exp(\kappa \bar{t}_{ij0})). \end{aligned}$$

⁴¹Existence of the equilibrium and conditions for uniqueness were established in a previous version of the paper. Alternative assumptions over population mobility between Bogotá and the rest of the country are covered in Proposition 1.

The expressions $\bar{t}_{ij0}, \bar{t}_{ij1}$ are exactly the same car-ownership-specific commute time indices as in the baseline model. The only difference is that they are averaged using the parameter ρ_{car} which reflects the probability of owning a car. I then compute $\bar{t}_{ijt}$ for different years, where variation over time is induced by the changes in the TransMilenio network. I set $\rho_{car} = 0.181$ equal to the share of car owners in 2015.

The estimates for (29) are presented in Table A.6. Columns 1 and 2 run PPML regressions to account for the presence of zeros in the data. Controlling for route observables interacted with year fixed effects implies a value of $\theta = 3.398$ reported in Table 1. Column 3 runs the same regression via OLS which do not account for pairs with zero commute flows, finding similar but mildly smaller estimates. The last column instruments for the change in travel times using the instrument from Section 5 for travel times in the post-period, delivering a larger estimate.

C.3 First Order vs Equilibrium Effects

The standard approach to evaluate the gains from transit infrastructure is based on the Value of Travel Time Savings (e.g. Small and Verhoef 2007), in which its benefits are given by minutes saved times the value of time. The following proposition shows that, under certain conditions, this is precisely the first order welfare impact from a change in infrastructure in the full general equilibrium model.

Proposition 2. *In a version of the baseline model with (i) no amenity or productivity spillovers, (ii) preference shocks over residential locations, (iii) workers owning an equal share of all floorspace and (iv) a labor income tax $1/(1 + \theta)$ redistributed lump sum, the elasticity of welfare to a change in commute costs is*

$$d \ln \bar{U} = -\alpha\beta\kappa \sum_{ij} \frac{w_{ij}L_{ij}}{\sum_{rs} w_{rs}L_{rs}} dt_{ij}, \quad (30)$$

where w_{ij} is average labor income of commuters along pair (i, j) .

The proof of the proposition first establishes that under these conditions the equilibrium is efficient. An application of the envelope theorem then shows that—to a first order—only the time savings from new infrastructure matter for welfare. This is simply proportional to a labor income-weighted average of the commute time reductions, scaled by κ and $\alpha\beta$. The former converts commute times to commute costs, while the latter reflects that a share of the gains go to floorspace owners rather than directly to workers.⁴² Lastly, as explained in the proof of the proposition, technical reasons require the restrictions (ii)-(iv) to be imposed to derive this result. However, simulations of small shocks in the model from Section C.1 with only condition (i) imposed confirm this expression correctly captures the first order welfare effects in that model as well.⁴³

⁴²While these gains ultimately make their way back to workers who own the housing stock, these equilibrium price effects do not matter to a first order.

⁴³A previous version of the paper showed that the welfare elasticity in the full model is

$$d \ln \bar{U}_g = -\alpha\beta\kappa \sum_{ija} \frac{w_{ijga}L_{ijga}}{\sum_{rs} w_{rs}L_{rs}} dt_{ija},$$

where w_{ijga} is average labor income of type- g commuters along (i, j) with car ownership status a . The average welfare elasticity in the full model is therefore proportional to a population-weighted average of group-specific average reductions in time costs i.e. $d \ln \bar{U} = \sum_g \frac{\bar{L}_g}{L} d \ln \bar{U}_g$. This highlights the similarity in first order welfare effects between the two approaches.

C.4 Examples of Isomorphic Models in Proposition 1

Endogenous Housing Supply. Consider an extension of the model in which housing floorspace for each type of floorspace is produced using land T_i and capital K_i according to a Cobb-Douglas production function $H_i = T_i^{1-\eta} K_i^\eta$. Capital is freely traded across the city with price p_K . Each unit of land is owned by an atomistic developer who chooses $h_i = k_i^\eta$ units of housing to construct per unit of land, where k_i units of capital are used per unit of land. Profit maximization by developers yields a density of development $h_i = (\eta r_i / p_K)^{1/(1-\eta)}$. Total housing supply is therefore

$$H_{Ri} = T_i \left(\frac{\eta r_{Ri}}{p_K} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \quad \text{and} \quad H_{Fi} = T_i \left(\frac{\eta r_{Fi}}{p_K} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}$$

All that changes in the model is that H_{Ri}, H_{Fi} are now endogenous since they depend on floorspace prices. Adding these equations into the system and rearranging yields

$$\begin{aligned} L_{Ri}^{1-\theta\mu_U} r_{Ri}^{\theta(1-\beta)} &= \bar{L}\bar{U}^{-\theta} \Phi_{Ri} \bar{u}_i^\theta \\ L_{Ri}^{-\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} r_{Ri}^{1+\frac{1}{1-\eta}} &= (1-\beta)(p_K/\eta)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} T_i^{-1} \\ r_{Fi}^{1+(\sigma_D-1)(1-\alpha)+\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \bar{L}_{Fi}^{\frac{(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha-\mu_A(\theta-1))}{\theta-1}} &= (1-\alpha)(p_K/\eta)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} \bar{A}_i^{\sigma_D-1} \left((\bar{L}\bar{U}^{-(\theta-1)}) \tilde{\Phi}_{Fj} \right)^{\frac{\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta-1}} T_i^{-1} E \\ r_{Fi}^{(\sigma_D-1)(1-\alpha)} \tilde{L}_{Fi}^{\frac{\theta+(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha-\mu_A(\theta-1))}{\theta-1}} &= \alpha \left((\bar{L}\bar{U}^{-(\theta-1)}) \tilde{\Phi}_{Fj} \right)^{\frac{1+\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta-1}} \bar{A}_i^{\sigma_D-1} E \end{aligned}$$

This is of the same parametric form as the system (51). Writing the system in log changes yields

$$\begin{aligned} &\begin{bmatrix} 1-\theta\mu_U & \theta(1-\beta) & 0 & 0 \\ -\frac{\theta-1}{\theta} & 1+\frac{1}{1-\eta} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1+(\sigma_D-1)(1-\alpha)+\frac{1}{1-\eta} & \frac{(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha-\mu_A(\theta-1))}{\theta-1} \\ 0 & 0 & (\sigma_D-1)(1-\alpha) & \frac{\theta+(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha-\mu_A(\theta-1))}{\theta-1} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \ln \hat{L}_{Ri} \\ \ln \hat{r}_{Ri} \\ \ln \hat{r}_{Fi} \\ \ln \hat{L}_{Fi} \end{bmatrix} \\ &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ \frac{1}{\theta} \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Ri} + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ \frac{\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta-1} \\ \frac{1+\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta-1} \end{bmatrix} \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} + \begin{bmatrix} \theta \ln \hat{u}_i + \ln \hat{L} - \theta \ln \hat{U} \\ -\ln \hat{T}_i \\ (\sigma_D-1) \ln \hat{A}_i - \ln \hat{H}_{Fi} + \frac{\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta-1} (\ln \hat{L} - (\theta-1) \ln \hat{U}) + \ln \hat{E} \\ (\sigma_D-1) \ln \hat{A}_i + \frac{1+\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta-1} (\ln \hat{L} - (\theta-1) \ln \hat{U}) + \ln \hat{E} \end{bmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

assuming the cost of capital p_K is unaffected by the system. This model admits exactly the same parametric form of regression equations as the baseline model, and so the results of part 4 apply.

This model allows the share of floorspace used for commercial purposes in a census tract to respond to a change in commute costs. This would occur if the price of commercial floorspace changed relative to that of residential floorspace, since

$$\hat{\vartheta}_i = \frac{\hat{r}_{Fi}^{1/(1-\eta)}}{\vartheta_i \hat{r}_{Fi}^{1/(1-\eta)} + (1-\vartheta_i) \hat{r}_{Ri}^{1/(1-\eta)}}$$

where $\vartheta_i \equiv H_{Fi}/(H_{Fi} + H_{Ri})$ is the share of floorspace allocated to commercial use in the initial equilibrium.

Sorting of Individual Entrepreneurs. Consider a production side where each variety is produced by a monopolist who can choose where to locate in the city. The entrepreneur has the same Cobb-Douglas production function over labor and commercial floorspace, so profits are a fraction $1/\sigma_D$ of sales. Entrepreneurs have idiosyncratic

preferences for producing in each block so that the return from locating in j is given by

$$V_j(\omega) = \pi_j \epsilon_j(\omega)$$

$$\text{where } \pi_j = \bar{\sigma}_D \left(w_j^\alpha r_{Fj}^{1-\alpha} / A_j \right)^{1-\sigma_D} E$$

where $\bar{\sigma}_D \equiv \sigma_D^{-\sigma_D} (\sigma_D - 1)^{-(\sigma_D-1)}$ and $\epsilon_j(\omega)$ is the preference of entrepreneur ω in to produce in j . If these preferences are drawn from a Fréchet distribution with shape $\theta_F > 1$, then (normalizing the mass of firms to 1) the number of firms producing in j is

$$N_j = \frac{\left(A_j / w_j^\alpha r_{Fj}^{1-\alpha} \right)^{\theta_F(\sigma_D-1)}}{\sum_s \left(A_s / w_s^\alpha r_{Fs}^{1-\alpha} \right)^{\theta_F(\sigma_D-1)}}$$

The wage bill is a fraction $\alpha \frac{\sigma_D-1}{\sigma_D}$ of sales so $w_j \ell_j = \alpha (\sigma_D / (\sigma_D - 1))^{-\sigma_D} \left(w_j^\alpha r_{Fj}^{1-\alpha} / A_j \right)^{1-\sigma_D} E$. Since total labor demand is simply $\tilde{L}_{Fj} = N_j \ell_j$,

$$\tilde{L}_{Fj} = \alpha (\sigma_D / (\sigma_D - 1))^{-\sigma_D} \bar{U}_F^{-1/\theta_F(\sigma_D-1)} \times A_j^{(1+\theta_F)(\sigma_D-1)} w_j^{-(1+(1+\theta_F)\alpha(\sigma_D-1))} r_{Fi}^{-(\sigma_D-1)(1-\alpha)(1+\theta_F)} E$$

where $\bar{U}_F = \left[\sum_s \left(A_s / w_s^\alpha r_{Fs}^{1-\alpha} \right)^{\theta_F(\sigma_D-1)} \right]^{1/\theta_F(\sigma_D-1)}$. Using the same logic as for labor, demand for commercial floorspace is

$$H_{Fj} = (1 - \alpha) (\sigma_D / (\sigma_D - 1))^{-\sigma_D} \bar{U}_F^{-1/\theta_F(\sigma_D-1)} \times A_j^{(1+\theta_F)(\sigma_D-1)} w_j^{-(1+\theta_F)\alpha(\sigma_D-1)} r_{Fi}^{-(\sigma_D-1)(1-\alpha)(1+\theta_F)-1} E.$$

Since floorspace is fixed, this is the commercial floorspace clearing condition.

Only the labor demand and commercial floorspace market clearing conditions have changed. Since they have the same log-linear parametric structure, the same reduced form representation as in the baseline model will hold. To see how, the equilibrium system becomes

$$L_{Ri} = \bar{L} \bar{U}^{-\theta} \left(u_i r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} \right)^\theta \Phi_{Ri}$$

$$L_{Fj} = \bar{L} \bar{U}^{-\theta} w_j^\theta \Phi_{Fj}$$

$$\tilde{L}_{Fj} = (\bar{L} \bar{U}^{-\theta})^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} w_j^{\theta-1} \tilde{\Phi}_{Fj}$$

$$\tilde{L}_{Fj} = \alpha (\sigma_D / (\sigma_D - 1))^{-\sigma_D} \bar{U}_F^{-1/\theta_F(\sigma_D-1)} w_j^{(1+\theta_F)\alpha(1-\sigma_D)-1} A_j^{(1+\theta_F)(\sigma_D-1)} r_{Fi}^{(1-\alpha)(1-\sigma_D)(1+\theta_F)} E$$

$$r_{Ri} = \frac{1-\beta}{H_{Ri}} \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} L_{Ri}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}$$

$$r_{Fi} = \left((1 - \alpha) (\sigma_D / (\sigma_D - 1))^{-\sigma_D} \bar{U}_F^{-1/\theta_F(\sigma_D-1)} \frac{A_j^{(1+\theta_F)(\sigma_D-1)} w_j^{-(1+\theta_F)\alpha(\sigma_D-1)} E}{H_{Fi}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+(\sigma_D-1)(1-\alpha)(1+\theta_F)}}$$

where the CMA definitions are unchanged. Using the third line to substitute out for wages and ignoring the second line (which pins down L_{Fj} given the other variables of the model), one arrives at a system of 4 equations in $\{L_{Ri}, \tilde{L}_{Fi}, r_{Ri}, r_{Fi}\}$ given $\{\Phi_{Ri}, \tilde{\Phi}_{Fi}\}$

$$L_{Ri}^{1-\theta\mu_U} r_{Ri}^{\theta(1-\beta)} = \lambda_1 \Phi_{Ri} \bar{u}_i^\theta$$

$$L_{Ri}^{-\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} r_{Ri} = \lambda_2 \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} H_{Ri}^{-1}$$

$$r_{Fi}^{1+(\sigma_D-1)(1-\alpha)(1+\theta_F)} \tilde{L}_{Fi}^{(\sigma_D-1)\left(\frac{\alpha-\mu_A(\theta-1)}{\theta-1}\right)(1+\theta_F)} = \lambda_3 \frac{\bar{A}_i^{(\sigma_D-1)(1+\theta_F)} \tilde{\Phi}_{Fj}^{\frac{\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta-1}(1+\theta_F)}}{H_{Fi}}$$

$$r_{Fi}^{(\sigma_D-1)(1-\alpha)(1+\theta_F)} \tilde{L}_{Fj}^{\frac{\theta+(1+\theta_F)(\sigma_D-1)[\alpha-\mu_U(\theta-1)]}{\theta-1}} = \lambda_4 \bar{A}_j^{(1+\theta_F)(\sigma_D-1)} \tilde{\Phi}_{Fi}^{\frac{1+(1+\theta_F)\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta-1}}$$

where the (endogenous) constants are given by $\lambda_1 \equiv \bar{L}\bar{U}^{-\theta}$, $\lambda_2 = 1 - \beta$, $\lambda_3 \equiv (1 - \alpha)(\sigma_D/(\sigma_D - 1))^{-\sigma_D} \bar{U}_F^{-1/\theta_F(\sigma_D-1)} (\bar{L}\bar{U}^{-\theta})^{-\frac{\alpha(\sigma_D-1)(1+\theta_F)}{\theta}} E$, and $\lambda_4 \equiv \alpha(\sigma_D/(\sigma_D - 1))^{-\sigma_D} \bar{U}_F^{-1/\theta_F(\sigma_D-1)} (\bar{L}\bar{U}^{-\theta})^{-\frac{1+(1+\theta_F)\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta}} E$. This is of the same parametric form as the system (51), and thus admits the same reduced form as the baseline model. To see this explicitly for this example, write the system in changes and take logs to get

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 - \theta\mu_U & \theta(1 - \beta) & 0 & 0 \\ -\frac{\theta-1}{\theta} & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 + (\sigma_D - 1)(1 - \alpha)(1 + \theta_F) & (\sigma_D - 1)\left(\frac{\alpha - \mu_A(\theta - 1)}{\theta - 1}\right)(1 + \theta_F) \\ 0 & 0 & (\sigma_D - 1)(1 - \alpha)(1 + \theta_F) & \frac{\theta + (1 + \theta_F)(\sigma_D - 1)[\alpha - \mu_U(\theta - 1)]}{\theta - 1} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \ln \hat{L}_{Ri} \\ \ln \hat{r}_{Ri} \\ \ln \hat{r}_{Fi} \\ \ln \hat{L}_{Fi} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$= \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ \frac{1}{\theta} \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Ri} + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ \frac{\alpha(\sigma_D-1)(1+\theta_F)}{\theta-1} \\ \frac{1+(1+\theta_F)\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta-1} \end{bmatrix} \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} + \begin{bmatrix} \theta \ln \hat{u} + \ln \hat{\bar{L}}\hat{\bar{U}}^{-\theta} \\ -\ln \hat{H}_{Ri} \\ (\sigma_D - 1)(1 + \theta_F) \ln \hat{A}_i - \ln \hat{H}_{Fi} - \frac{\alpha(\sigma_D-1)(1+\theta_F)}{\theta} \ln \hat{\bar{L}}\hat{\bar{U}}^{-\theta} + \ln \hat{E} - \frac{1}{\theta_F(\sigma_D-1)} \ln \hat{U}_F \\ (\sigma_D - 1)(1 + \theta_F) \ln \hat{A}_i - \frac{1+(1+\theta_F)\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta} \ln \hat{\bar{L}}\hat{\bar{U}}^{-\theta} + \ln \hat{E} - \frac{1}{\theta_F(\sigma_D-1)} \ln \hat{U}_F \end{bmatrix}$$

By the results of part (iv), the relative impacts of changes in the commuting network are the same in this model as the baseline model given estimates of θ and the reduced form elasticities. (Note the reduced form elasticities have the same parametric form in this model as the baseline, since β_F, β_R have zero entries in the first and last two entries respectively.) The level effects would differ, however, since these depend on the structural parameters that appear in the A matrix and the error term e .

Eaton and Kortum. In the Eaton and Kortum (2002) setup, there is a continuum of goods $\omega \in [0, 1]$. Each location has an idiosyncratic draw for each good from a Fréchet distribution with location parameter $A_j > 0$ and shape $\theta_F > 1$. There is perfect competition so that $p_j(\omega) = w_j/z_j(\omega)$. Goods market clearing implies that sales are given by

$$X_j = \sum_i \frac{(w_j^\alpha r_{Fj}^{1-\alpha}/A_j)^{-\theta_F}}{\sum_s (w_s^\alpha r_{Fs}^{1-\alpha}/A_s)^{-\theta_F}} E_i = (w_j^\alpha r_{Fj}^{1-\alpha})^{-\theta_F} A_j^{\theta_F} P^{\theta_F} E$$

This yields the same system of equations as in the baseline model, with $\sigma_D - 1$ replaced with θ_F , and thus the results of part 4 apply.

Capital. Consider an extension of the model in which firms can invest in capital to respond to changes in transit networks. Suppose firms use the production function $Y_i = A_i \tilde{L}_{Fi}^{\alpha_L} H_{Fi}^{\alpha_H} K_{Fi}^{\alpha_K}$. Capital is freely traded across the city and available at price p_K . Profit maximization implies firms spend constant fractions of sales on each factor, with factor demands given by

$$w_i \tilde{L}_{Fi} = \frac{1}{\alpha_L} \left(\frac{w_i^{\alpha_L} r_{Ri}^{\alpha_H} p_K^{\alpha_K}}{A_i} \right)^{1-\sigma_D} E$$

$$r_{Fi} H_{Fi} = \frac{1}{\alpha_H} \left(\frac{w_i^{\alpha_L} r_{Ri}^{\alpha_H} p_K^{\alpha_K}}{A_i} \right)^{1-\sigma_D} E$$

$$p_K K_{Fi} = \frac{1}{\alpha_K} \left(\frac{w_i^{\alpha_L} r_{Ri}^{\alpha_H} p_K^{\alpha_K}}{A_i} \right)^{1-\sigma_D} E.$$

I assume Colombia is a small open economy so that the price of capital is pinned down in international capital markets, i.e. p_K is a constant exogenous to the model. Only the condition for labor demand and commercial floorspace market clearing change. The equilibrium system is given by a system of $6 \times I$ equations in as many unknowns (given $\{\Phi_{Ri}, \Phi_{Fi}, \tilde{\Phi}_{Fi}\}$, themselves auxiliary variables of these same unknowns in the same system as the baseline model)

$$\begin{aligned} L_{Ri} &= \bar{L} \bar{U}^{-\theta} \left(u_i r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} \right)^\theta \Phi_{Ri} \\ L_{Fj} &= \bar{L} \bar{U}^{-\theta} w_j^\theta \Phi_{Fj} \\ \tilde{L}_{Fj} &= \left(\bar{L} \bar{U}^{-\theta} \right)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} w_j^{\theta-1} \tilde{\Phi}_{Fj} \\ \tilde{L}_{Fi} &= \frac{1}{\alpha_L} w_i^{\alpha_L(1-\sigma_D)-1} A_i^{\sigma_D-1} r_{Fi}^{\alpha_H(1-\sigma_D)} p_K^{\alpha_K(1-\sigma_D)} E \\ r_{Ri} &= \frac{1-\beta}{H_{Ri}} \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} L_{Ri}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \\ r_{Fi} &= \left(\frac{A_i^{\sigma_D-1} w_i^{-\alpha_L(\sigma_D-1)} p_K^{\alpha_K(1-\sigma_D)} E}{\alpha_H H_{Fi}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+\alpha_H(\sigma_D-1)}} \end{aligned}$$

Note that with these solved for, capital demand can be recovered using the demand equation above. This is of the same parametric form as the system (51). Writing in relative changes and taking logs yields

$$\begin{aligned} & \begin{bmatrix} 1 - \theta \mu_U & \theta(1 - \beta) & 0 & 0 \\ -\frac{\theta-1}{\theta} & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 + \alpha_H(\sigma_D - 1) & \frac{(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha_L - \mu_A(\theta-1))}{\theta-1} \\ 0 & 0 & \alpha_H(\sigma_D - 1) & \frac{\theta + (\sigma_D-1)(\alpha_L - \mu_A(\theta-1))}{\theta-1} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \ln \hat{L}_{Ri} \\ \ln \hat{r}_{Ri} \\ \ln \hat{r}_{Fi} \\ \ln \hat{L}_{Fi} \end{bmatrix} \\ &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ \frac{1}{\theta} \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Ri} + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ \frac{\alpha_L(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta-1} \\ \frac{1+\alpha_L(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta-1} \end{bmatrix} \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} + \begin{bmatrix} \theta \ln \hat{u}_i + \ln \hat{L} - \theta \ln \hat{U} \\ -\ln \hat{H}_{Ri} \\ (\sigma_D - 1) \ln \hat{A}_i - \ln \hat{H}_{Fi} - \frac{\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta} (\ln \hat{L} - \theta \ln \hat{U}) - \alpha_K(\sigma_D - 1) \ln \hat{p}_K + \ln \hat{E} \\ (\sigma_D - 1) \ln \hat{A}_i - \frac{\alpha(\sigma_D-1)+1}{\theta} (\ln \hat{L} - \theta \ln \hat{U}) - \alpha_K(\sigma_D - 1) \ln \hat{p}_K + \ln \hat{E} \end{bmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

The only changes from the baseline model are that the labor and housing elasticities have been relabeled, and the change in the price of capital has entered the residual. The results of part 4 apply.

Leisure. I consider an extension of the model where consumers derive utility over goods, housing and leisure. When preferences are Cobb-Douglas, the individual's problem is

$$\max_{C,H,L} u_i C^\alpha H^\beta L^\gamma \epsilon_{ij}(\omega) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad C + r_{Ri}H + w_jL = w_j(1 - t_{ij})$$

Solving for commute flows yields

$$L_{ij} = \left(u_i w_j^{1-\gamma} r_{Ri}^{-\beta} / d_{ij} \right)^\theta$$

where $d_{ij} \equiv \frac{1}{1-t_{ij}}$. This has the same parametric form as the baseline model, but with alternative exponents on wages and house prices in the resident and labor supply terms and CMA definitions. The equilibrium can once again be written in the parametric form as the system (51), and the results of part 4 apply.

Preference Shocks. I consider an extension of the model in which consumers have preference rather than productivity shocks over each commute. Average income becomes $\bar{y}_i = \sum_j \pi_{j|i} w_j$ where $\pi_{j|i} = (w_j/d_{ij})^\theta / \sum_s (w_s/d_{is})^\theta$ is the probability of commuting to j conditional on living in i . Effective labor supply is simply L_{Fj} . The remaining equations of the model are unchanged. The equilibrium system becomes

$$\begin{aligned} L_{Ri} &= \bar{L}\bar{U}^{-\theta} \left(u_i r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} \right)^\theta \Phi_{Ri} \\ L_{Fj} &= \bar{L}\bar{U}^{-\theta} w_j^\theta \Phi_{Fj} \\ L_{Fi} &= \frac{1}{\alpha} w_i^{\alpha(1-\sigma_D)-1} A_i^{\sigma_D-1} r_{Fi}^{(1-\sigma_D)(1-\alpha)} E \\ r_{Ri} &= \frac{1-\beta}{H_{Ri}} \bar{y}_i L_{Ri} \\ r_{Fi} &= \left(\frac{A_i^{\sigma_D-1} w_i^{-\alpha(\sigma_D-1)} E}{(1-\alpha)H_{Fi}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+(\sigma_D-1)(1-\alpha)}} \end{aligned}$$

Approximating $\bar{y}_i$ around the point $d_{ij}^{-\theta} = 0$ yields $\hat{\bar{y}}_i \approx \hat{\Phi}_{Ri}^{1/\theta}$, so the endogenous variables can again be expressed as log-linear functions of CMA and structural residuals. In particular, taking changes and logs yields a system exactly the same as the baseline model, but with the second entry in the first column of the A matrix changing from $-\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}$ to -1 . The equilibrium can once again be written in the parametric form as the system (51), and the results of part 4 apply.

Alternative Labor and Residential Supply Elasticities and Timing Assumptions. I consider an extension of the model where commuters draw separate shocks over workplace and residence locations. Indirect utility across pairs of residential and employment locations (i, j) is given by

$$U_{ij}(\omega) = \frac{u_i w_j r_{Ri}^{\beta-1}}{d_{ij}} \epsilon_j(\omega) \nu_i(\omega),$$

where $\epsilon_j(\omega)$ is a productivity shock for employment in location j drawn from a Fréchet distribution with shape θ and $\nu_i(\omega)$ is a preference shock for living in location i drawn from a Fréchet distribution with shape η . Whichever choice is made first, the supply and residents and workers to locations is given by

$$\begin{aligned} L_{Ri} &= \bar{L}\bar{U}^{-\theta} \left(u_i r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} \right)^\eta \\ L_{Fj} &= \bar{L}\bar{U}^{-\theta} w_j^\theta \Phi_{Fj} \end{aligned}$$

where $\Phi_{Ri} = \sum_j (w_j/d_{ij})^\theta$ as before, but now $\Phi_{Fj} = \sum_i (u_i r_{Ri}^{\beta-1})^\eta d_{ij}^{-\theta} \Phi_{Ri}^{\frac{\eta}{\theta}-1}$. While these CMA terms look different from those in the original model, substituting the resident and labor supply curves back into them yield the same system of equations (18)-(19) defining CMA. The remaining model equations remain log-linear in endogenous variables and Φ_{Ri} and Φ_{Fi} (noting that now expected income is simply $\bar{y}_i = \gamma \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta}$). These results are independent of whether employment or residential locations are chosen first. The equilibrium can once again be written in the parametric form as the system (51), and the results of part 4 apply.

C.5 Reduced Form Coefficients and Residuals

This section makes explicit the structural content of the reduced form elasticities and residuals.

Residuals. As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, the residuals are given by $\mathbf{e}_i = A^{-1}\tilde{\mathbf{e}}_i$. Applying

$$A^{-1} = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{1}{\beta+\theta(1-\beta-\mu_U)} & -\frac{\theta(1-\beta)}{\beta+\theta(1-\beta-\mu_U)} & 0 & 0 \\ \frac{\theta-1}{\theta} \frac{1}{\beta+\theta(1-\beta-\mu_U)} & \frac{\theta(1-\mu_U)}{\beta+\theta(1-\beta-\mu_U)} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \frac{\theta+(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha-(\theta-1)\mu_A)}{\theta\sigma_D-(\theta-1)(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha+\mu_A)} & -\frac{(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha-(\theta-1)\mu_A)}{\theta\sigma_D-(\theta-1)(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha+\mu_A)} \\ 0 & 0 & -\frac{(1-\alpha)(\theta-1)(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta\sigma_D-(\theta-1)(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha+\mu_A)} & \frac{(\theta-1)(\sigma_D(1-\alpha)+\alpha)}{\theta\sigma_D-(\theta-1)(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha+\mu_A)} \end{pmatrix}$$

to the residual vector $\tilde{\mathbf{e}}_i$ yields

$$\mathbf{e}_i = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{\beta+\theta(1-\beta-\mu_U)} \left[\theta \ln \hat{u}_i + \ln \hat{\tilde{L}} - \theta \ln \hat{U} \right] + \frac{\theta(1-\beta)}{\beta+\theta(1-\beta-\mu_U)} \ln \hat{H}_{Ri} \\ \frac{\theta-1}{\theta} \frac{1}{\beta+\theta(1-\beta-\mu_U)} \left[\theta \ln \hat{u}_i + \ln \hat{\tilde{L}} - \theta \ln \hat{U} \right] - \frac{\theta(1-\mu_U)}{\beta+\theta(1-\beta-\mu_U)} \ln \hat{H}_{Ri} \\ \frac{\theta}{\theta\sigma_D-(\theta-1)(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha+\mu_A)} \left[(\sigma_D-1) \ln \hat{A}_i - \frac{\theta+(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha-(\theta-1)\mu_A)}{\theta} \ln \hat{H}_{Fi} + \frac{(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha+\mu_A)}{\theta} \left(\ln \hat{L} - (\theta-1) \ln \hat{U} \right) + \ln \hat{E} \right] \\ \frac{\theta-1}{\theta\sigma_D-(\theta-1)(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha+\mu_A)} \left[(\sigma_D-1) \ln \hat{A}_i + \frac{(1-\alpha)(\theta-1)(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta-1} \ln \hat{H}_{Fi} + \frac{\sigma_D}{\theta-1} \left(\ln \hat{L} - (\theta-1) \ln \hat{U} \right) + \ln \hat{E} \right] \end{bmatrix}$$

where each entry corresponds to the residual for the specification with $L_{Ri}, r_{Ri}, r_{Fi}, \tilde{L}_{Fi}$ as the outcome, respectively. Residuals that vary across observations contain weighted sums of changes in (i) unobserved amenities and residential floorspace supplies for residential outcomes and (ii) unobserved productivities and commercial floorspace supplies for commercial outcomes.

CMA Elasticities. Computing $\beta_R = A^{-1}b_R$ and $\beta_F = A^{-1}b_F$ yields

$$\begin{pmatrix} \beta_{L_R} \\ \beta_{r_R} \\ \beta_{r_F} \\ \beta_{L_F} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\beta}{\beta+\theta(1-\beta-\mu_U)} \\ \frac{1-\mu_U}{\beta+\theta(1-\beta-\mu_U)} \\ \frac{1}{1+\theta\left(\frac{\sigma_D}{\sigma_D-1} \frac{1}{\alpha+\mu_A} - 1\right)} \\ \frac{\sigma_D}{(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha+\mu_A)} \frac{1}{1+\theta\left(\frac{\sigma_D}{\sigma_D-1} \frac{1}{\alpha+\mu_A} - 1\right)} \end{pmatrix}$$

Rearranging these expressions yields $\mu_A = \frac{\sigma_D}{\sigma_D-1} / \frac{\beta_{L_F}}{\beta_{r_F}} - \alpha$ and $\mu_U = 1 - \beta / \frac{\beta_{L_R}}{\beta_{r_R}}$ as referenced in the text. Given the reduced form estimates and the estimate of θ from the gravity equation, this is a system of four equations in five parameters $\beta, \mu_U, \sigma_D, \alpha, \mu_A$. However, even if one additional parameter is calibrated, these equations cannot be inverted for the remaining structural parameters. Consider first the system of equations determining β, μ_U in the first two lines. This can be rearranged into

$$\begin{aligned} \beta &= \frac{\theta}{\theta-1 + \frac{1}{\beta_{L_R}}} (1 - \mu_U) \\ \beta &= \frac{\theta - \frac{1}{\beta_{r_R}}}{\theta-1} (1 - \mu_U). \end{aligned}$$

These are two straight lines in the $(\beta, 1 - \mu_U)$ space with the same intercept (at zero) but different slopes, other than the knife-edge case where $\frac{\theta}{\theta-1 + \frac{1}{\beta_{L_R}}} = \frac{\theta - \frac{1}{\beta_{r_R}}}{\theta-1}$ in which case there are an infinite number of solutions. For the second two equations, if α is calibrated to an external value then the system of equations is

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_A &= \frac{\sigma_D}{\sigma_D-1} / \left(1 + \frac{1 - \beta_{r_F}}{\theta} \right) - \alpha \\ \mu_A &= \frac{\sigma_D}{\sigma_D-1} / \left(\frac{\beta_{L_F}(\theta-1)}{\beta_{L_F}\theta-1} \right) - \alpha. \end{aligned}$$

These are two straight lines in the $(\mu_A, \sigma_D/(\sigma_D - 1))$ space with the same intercept but different slopes, other than the knife-edge case where $1 + \frac{1-\beta_{r_F}}{\theta} = \frac{\beta_{L_F}(\theta-1)}{\beta_{L_F}\theta-1}$ in which case there are an infinite number of solutions. Given that these equations cannot be inverted, one could try to calibrate one parameter (such as α) and jointly estimate the remaining five (including θ) to most closely match the CMA elasticities and the commuting semi-elasticity in the gravity equation. However, the match will not be exact given the results above. The sufficient statistics approach has the advantage that the researcher does not need to specify the value of all structural parameters and can conduct analysis using the commuting semi-elasticity, the CMA elasticities (and σ_D, β to obtain the overall level of changes). The researcher also does not need to take a stance on the particular model generating the data, i.e. what the specific cluster of structural parameters are that determine β_R, β_F .

D Additional Model Results

D.1 Proofs

D.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1

Part 1: Reduced Form. Stacking the equilibrium conditions delivers

$$\begin{aligned} L_{Ri} &= \bar{L}\bar{U}^{-\theta} \left(u_i r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} \right)^\theta \Phi_{Ri} \\ \tilde{L}_{Fj} &= \bar{L}\bar{U}^{-(\theta-1)} w_j^{\theta-1} \tilde{\Phi}_{Fj} \\ \tilde{L}_{Fi} &= \alpha w_i^{\alpha(1-\sigma_D)-1} A_i^{\sigma_D-1} r_{Fi}^{(1-\sigma_D)(1-\alpha)} E \\ r_{Ri} &= \frac{1-\beta}{H_{Ri}} \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} L_{Ri}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \\ r_{Fi} &= \left((1-\alpha) \frac{A_i^{\sigma_D-1} w_i^{-\alpha(\sigma_D-1)} E}{H_{Fi}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1+(\sigma_D-1)(1-\alpha)}} \\ \bar{U} &= \left[\sum_i \left(u_i \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} \right)^\theta \right]^{1/\theta} \end{aligned}$$

where $E = \beta \sum_i \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} L_{Ri}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}$ is total expenditure, and the CMA equations are

$$\Phi_{Ri} = (\bar{L}\bar{U}^{-\theta})^{-1} \sum_j d_{ij}^{-\theta} \frac{L_{Fj}}{\Phi_{Fj}} \quad (31)$$

$$\Phi_{Fj} = (\bar{L}\bar{U}^{-\theta})^{-1} \sum_i d_{ij}^{-\theta} \frac{L_{Ri}}{\Phi_{Ri}} \quad (32)$$

$$\tilde{\Phi}_{Fj} = (\bar{L}\bar{U}^{-\theta})^{-\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \sum_i d_{ij}^{-\theta} \left(\frac{L_{Ri}}{\Phi_{Ri}} \right)^{(\theta-1)/\theta} \quad (33)$$

Using the second line to substitute out for wages delivers a system of four equations in $\{L_{Ri}, \tilde{L}_{Fi}, r_{Ri}, r_{Fi}\}$ given $\{\Phi_{Ri}, \tilde{\Phi}_{Fi}\}$

$$\begin{aligned} L_{Ri}^{1-\theta\mu_U} r_{Ri}^{\theta(1-\beta)} &= \bar{L}\bar{U}^{-\theta} \Phi_{Ri} \bar{u}_i^\theta \\ L_{Ri}^{-\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} r_{Ri} &= (1-\beta) \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} H_{Ri}^{-1} \end{aligned}$$

$$r_{Fi}^{1+(\sigma_D-1)(1-\alpha)} \tilde{L}_{Fi}^{\frac{(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha-\mu_A(\theta-1))}{\theta-1}} = (1-\alpha) \bar{A}_i^{\sigma_D-1} \left((\bar{L}\bar{U}^{-(\theta-1)}) \tilde{\Phi}_{Fj} \right)^{\frac{\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta-1}} H_{Fi}^{-1} E$$

$$r_{Fi}^{(\sigma_D-1)(1-\alpha)} \tilde{L}_{Fi}^{\frac{\theta+(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha-\mu_A(\theta-1))}{\theta-1}} = \alpha \left((\bar{L}\bar{U}^{-(\theta-1)}) \tilde{\Phi}_{Fj} \right)^{\frac{1+\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta-1}} \bar{A}_i^{\sigma_D-1} E$$

Letting $\hat{x} = x'/x$ denote relative changes across two equilibria, one can take logs and rearrange to get

$$\underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 1-\theta\mu_U & \theta(1-\beta) & 0 & 0 \\ -\frac{\theta-1}{\theta} & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1+(\sigma_D-1)(1-\alpha) & \frac{(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha-\mu_A(\theta-1))}{\theta-1} \\ 0 & 0 & (\sigma_D-1)(1-\alpha) & \frac{\theta+(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha-\mu_A(\theta-1))}{\theta-1} \end{bmatrix}}_A \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} \ln \hat{L}_{Ri} \\ \ln \hat{r}_{Ri} \\ \ln \hat{r}_{Fi} \\ \ln \hat{\tilde{L}}_{Fi} \end{bmatrix}}_{\ln \hat{y}_i}$$

$$= \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ \frac{1}{\theta} \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}}_{b_R} \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Ri} + \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ \frac{\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta-1} \\ \frac{1+\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta-1} \end{bmatrix}}_{b_F} \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} + \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} \theta \ln \hat{u}_i + \ln \hat{\tilde{L}} - \theta \ln \hat{\tilde{U}} \\ -\ln \hat{H}_{Ri} \\ (\sigma_D-1) \ln \hat{A}_i - \ln \hat{H}_{Fi} + \frac{\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta-1} (\ln \hat{L} - (\theta-1) \ln \hat{\tilde{U}}) + \ln \hat{E} \\ (\sigma_D-1) \ln \hat{A}_i + \frac{1+\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta-1} (\ln \hat{L} - (\theta-1) \ln \hat{\tilde{U}}) + \ln \hat{E} \end{bmatrix}}_{\mathbf{\hat{e}}_i} \quad (34)$$

Premultiplying by A^{-1} delivers the system

$$\ln \hat{y}_i = \beta_R \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Ri} + \beta_F \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} + \mathbf{e}_i$$

where $\beta_R = A^{-1}b_R$, $\beta_F = A^{-1}b_F$ and $\mathbf{e}_i = A^{-1}\mathbf{\hat{e}}_i$. Note that the last two elements of β_R are zero, as are the first two elements of β_F .⁴⁴ Since A^{-1} is block diagonal, the first two elements of $\mathbf{e}_i$ (determining residential outcomes) depend only on $\hat{u}_i, \hat{H}_{Ri}, \hat{\tilde{L}}, \hat{\tilde{U}}$ while the second two elements (determining commercial outcomes) depend only on $\hat{A}_i, \hat{H}_{Fi}, \hat{\tilde{L}}, \hat{\tilde{U}}, \hat{E}$. The exact reduced form (34) is the one which is used to conduct counterfactuals in parts 2 and 3.

However, in the data L_{Fi} is observed rather than $\tilde{L}_{Fi}$. Combining $L_{Fj} = \bar{L}\bar{U}^{-\theta}w_j^\theta\Phi_{Fj}$ and $\tilde{L}_{Fj} = (\bar{L}\bar{U}^{-(\theta-1)})w_j^{\theta-1}\tilde{\Phi}_{Fj}$ yields the following relationship between the two

$$\hat{\tilde{L}}_{Fj} = \left(\frac{\hat{L}_{Fj}}{\hat{\Phi}_{Fj}} \right)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \hat{\tilde{\Phi}}_{Fj}.$$

⁴⁴Note that solving these expressions yields

$$\begin{pmatrix} \beta_{L_R} \\ \beta_{r_R} \\ \beta_{r_F} \\ \beta_{L_F} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{\beta}{\beta+\theta(1-\beta-\mu_U)} \\ \frac{\beta}{\beta+\theta(1-\beta-\mu_U)} \\ \frac{1+\theta\left(\frac{\sigma_D}{\sigma_D-1}\frac{1}{\alpha+\mu_A}-1\right)}{\frac{\sigma_D}{(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha+\mu_A)}\frac{1}{1+\theta\left(\frac{\sigma_D}{\sigma_D-1}\frac{1}{\alpha+\mu_A}-1\right)}} \\ \frac{\sigma_D}{(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha+\mu_A)}\frac{1}{1+\theta\left(\frac{\sigma_D}{\sigma_D-1}\frac{1}{\alpha+\mu_A}-1\right)} \end{pmatrix}$$

Manipulating these expressions yields $\mu_A = \frac{\sigma_D}{\sigma_D-1} / \frac{\beta_{L_F}}{\beta_{r_F}} - \alpha$ and $\mu_U = 1 - \beta / \frac{\beta_{L_R}}{\beta_{r_R}}$ as referenced in the text.

Substituting this in delivers

$$\begin{aligned}
\underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 1 - \theta\mu_U & \theta(1 - \beta) & 0 & 0 \\ -\frac{\theta-1}{\theta} & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 + (\sigma_D - 1)(1 - \alpha) & \frac{(\sigma_D - 1)(\alpha - \mu_A(\theta - 1))}{\theta} \\ 0 & 0 & (\sigma_D - 1)(1 - \alpha) & \frac{\theta + (\sigma_D - 1)(\alpha - \mu_A(\theta - 1))}{\theta} \end{bmatrix}}_A \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} \ln \hat{L}_{Ri} \\ \ln \hat{r}_{Ri} \\ \ln \hat{r}_{Fi} \\ \ln \hat{L}_{Fi} \end{bmatrix}}_{\ln \hat{\mathbf{y}}_i} &= \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ \frac{1}{\theta} \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}}_{b_R} \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Ri} + \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ \frac{(\sigma_D - 1)(\alpha - \mu_A(\theta - 1))}{\theta} \\ \frac{\theta + (\sigma_D - 1)(\alpha - \mu_A(\theta - 1))}{\theta} \end{bmatrix}}_{b_F} \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} \\
+ \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ \mu_A(\sigma_D - 1) \\ \mu_A(\theta - 1)(\sigma_D - 1) - 1 \end{bmatrix}}_{\tilde{b}_F} \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} + \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} \theta \ln \hat{u}_i + \ln \hat{L} - \theta \ln \hat{U} \\ -\ln \hat{H}_{Ri} \\ (\sigma_D - 1) \ln \hat{A}_i - \ln \hat{H}_{Fi} + \frac{\alpha(\sigma_D - 1)}{\theta - 1} (\ln \hat{L} - (\theta - 1) \ln \hat{U}) + \ln \hat{E} \\ (\sigma_D - 1) \ln \hat{A}_i + \frac{1 + \alpha(\sigma_D - 1)}{\theta - 1} (\ln \hat{L} - (\theta - 1) \ln \hat{U}) + \ln \hat{E} \end{bmatrix}}_{\tilde{\mathbf{e}}_i} & \quad (35)
\end{aligned}$$

or, after premultiplying by A^{-1} ,

$$\ln \hat{\mathbf{y}}_i = \beta_R \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Ri} + \beta_F \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} + \tilde{\beta}_F \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} + \mathbf{e}_i$$

This reduced form (35) along with the CMA definitions (31)-(33) hold globally to define a change in endogenous variables $\{\hat{L}_{Ri}, \hat{r}_{Ri}, \hat{r}_{Fi}, \hat{L}_{Fi}, \hat{\Phi}_{Ri}, \hat{\Phi}_{Fi}, \hat{\Phi}_{Fi}\}$ (and analogously the auxiliary variables $\hat{U}, \hat{E}$ defined as a function of these variables above) given a change in exogenous (or “forcing”) variables $\{\hat{u}_i, \hat{A}_i, \hat{H}_{Ri}, \hat{H}_{Fi}, \hat{L}, \hat{d}_{ij}\}$. Note that in counterfactuals, all exogenous variables other than commute costs d_{ij} will be held constant.

However, the two FCMA terms, defined in (32) and (33), are very highly correlated in the data (correlation coefficient of 0.98). To make this regression simpler and to allow for enough residual variation to identify the coefficients on each term, I take a first order approximation of $\tilde{\Phi}_{Fi}$ around the point $d_{ij}^{-\theta} = 0$ which yields $\tilde{\Phi}_{Fj} \approx \Phi_{Fj}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}$. Substituting this in simplifies the system to

$$\begin{aligned}
\underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 1 - \theta\mu_U & \theta(1 - \beta) & 0 & 0 \\ -\frac{\theta-1}{\theta} & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 + (\sigma_D - 1)(1 - \alpha) & \frac{(\sigma_D - 1)(\alpha - \mu_A(\theta - 1))}{\theta} \\ 0 & 0 & (\sigma_D - 1)(1 - \alpha) & \frac{\theta + (\sigma_D - 1)(\alpha - \mu_A(\theta - 1))}{\theta} \end{bmatrix}}_A \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} \ln \hat{L}_{Ri} \\ \ln \hat{r}_{Ri} \\ \ln \hat{r}_{Fi} \\ \ln \hat{L}_{Fi} \end{bmatrix}}_{\ln \hat{\mathbf{y}}_i} \\
= \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ \frac{1}{\theta} \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}}_{b_R} \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Ri} + \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ \frac{\alpha(\sigma_D - 1)}{\theta} \\ \frac{1 + \alpha(\sigma_D - 1)}{\theta} \end{bmatrix}}_{\tilde{b}_F} \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} + \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} \theta \ln \hat{u}_i + \ln \hat{L} - \theta \ln \hat{U} \\ -\ln \hat{H}_{Ri} \\ (\sigma_D - 1) \ln \hat{A}_i - \ln \hat{H}_{Fi} + \frac{\alpha(\sigma_D - 1)}{\theta - 1} (\ln \hat{L} - (\theta - 1) \ln \hat{U}) + \ln \hat{E} \\ (\sigma_D - 1) \ln \hat{A}_i + \frac{1 + \alpha(\sigma_D - 1)}{\theta - 1} (\ln \hat{L} - (\theta - 1) \ln \hat{U}) + \ln \hat{E} \end{bmatrix}}_{\tilde{\mathbf{e}}_i} \quad (36)
\end{aligned}$$

or, after premultiplying by A^{-1} ,

$$\ln \hat{\mathbf{y}}_i = \beta_R \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Ri} + \beta_F \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} + \mathbf{e}_i$$

for $\mathbf{y}_i = [L_{Ri}, r_{Ri}, r_{Fi}, L_{Fi}]$. Compared with the unapproximated model, all that has happened is to approximate $\ln \hat{\Phi}_{Fj} \approx \frac{\theta-1}{\theta} \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Fj}$ to collapse the two FCMA terms into one.

Lastly, since I will use the system (34) to conduct counterfactuals with the estimated parameters, I need to relate

the coefficients I will estimate in (36) to those in (34). The only difference is that the last two elements of the 4th column of A and b_F have θ rather than $\theta - 1$ in the numerator. Computing $A^{-1}b_R$ after this adjustment yields the same coefficient as in the unapproximated model, but the commercial variable elasticities change to

$$A^{-1}b_F = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ \frac{\theta-1}{\theta} \frac{1}{1+\theta \left(\frac{\sigma_D}{\sigma_D-1} \frac{1}{\alpha+\mu_A} - 1 \right)} \\ \frac{\sigma_D}{(\sigma_D-1)(\alpha+\mu_A)} \frac{1}{1+\theta \left(\frac{\sigma_D}{\sigma_D-1} \frac{1}{\alpha+\mu_A} - 1 \right)} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ \frac{\theta-1}{\theta} \beta_{r_F} \\ \beta_{L_F} \end{pmatrix}. \text{ So the only change needed is to replace } \beta_{r_F} \text{ with } \frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \beta_{r_F} \text{ in the unapproximated model equations (where } \beta_{r_F} \text{ is the elasticity estimated in the data).}$$

Lastly, I show that unique (to-scale) values of CMA can be recovered given d_{ij} , L_{Ri} , L_{Fi} , θ . Equations (31) and (32) can be written in the form

$$\begin{aligned} \Phi_{Ri} &= \sum_j K_{ij}^R \Phi_{Fj}^{-1} \\ \Phi_{Fj} &= \sum_i K_{ij}^F \Phi_{Ri}^{-1} \end{aligned}$$

where $K_{ij}^R \equiv d_{ij}^{-\theta} L_{Fj}$ and $K_{ij}^F \equiv d_{ij}^{-\theta} L_{Ri}$. This satisfies the structure of the equations in theorem 1 in Allen et al. (2014). In the notation of that theorem, $\Gamma = I$ and $B = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & -1 \\ -1 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$. The spectral radius of the matrix $|B\Gamma^{-1}|$ (where $|\cdot|$ denotes the element-wise absolute value) is one. Parts (i) and (ii) of theorem 1 then imply that there exists a unique (to-scale) solution Φ_{Ri} , Φ_{Fi} .⁴⁵

Part 2: Relative Impacts of Transit Infrastructure. I now show that this system of equations can be used to compute changes in economic activity relative to the citywide average in response to a transit shock using estimates of θ and the reduced form elasticities β_{L_R} , β_{r_R} , β_{r_F} , β_{L_F} , in addition to data on the initial equilibrium d_{ij} , L_{Ri} , L_{Fi} and the change in transit infrastructure $\hat{d}_{ij}$. Assuming unobservables are constant across equilibria, exponentiating the (unapproximated) system (34) and letting A_{ij}^{-1} denote the ij -th entry of A^{-1} yields

$$\hat{L}_{Ri} = \hat{\Phi}_{Ri}^{\beta_{L_R}} \left(\hat{\hat{L}}\hat{\hat{U}}^{-\theta} \right)^{A_{11}^{-1}} \quad (37)$$

$$\hat{r}_{Ri} = \hat{\Phi}_{Ri}^{\beta_{r_R}} \left(\hat{\hat{L}}\hat{\hat{U}}^{-\theta} \right)^{A_{21}^{-1}} \quad (38)$$

$$\hat{r}_{Fi} = \hat{\Phi}_{Fi}^{\beta_{r_F}} \left(\hat{\hat{L}}\hat{\hat{U}}^{-(\theta-1)} \right)^{\left(A_{33}^{-1} \frac{\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta} + A_{34}^{-1} \frac{\alpha(\sigma_D-1)+1}{\theta} \right)} \hat{E}^{A_{33}^{-1} + A_{34}^{-1}} \quad (39)$$

$$\hat{\hat{L}}_{Fi} = \hat{\Phi}_{Fi}^{\beta_{L_F}} \left(\hat{\hat{L}}\hat{\hat{U}}^{-(\theta-1)} \right)^{\left(A_{43}^{-1} \frac{\alpha(\sigma_D-1)}{\theta} + A_{44}^{-1} \frac{\alpha(\sigma_D-1)+1}{\theta} \right)} \hat{E}^{A_{43}^{-1} + A_{44}^{-1}} \quad (40)$$

where $\hat{\Phi}_{Ri}$, $\hat{\Phi}_{Fi}$, $\hat{\hat{\Phi}}_{Fi}$, $\hat{\hat{L}}_{Fi}$ are given by

$$\hat{\Phi}_{Ri} = \left(\hat{\hat{L}}\hat{\hat{U}}^{-\theta} \right)^{-1} \sum_j \pi_{ij}^R \hat{d}_{ij}^{-\theta} \frac{\hat{L}_{Fj}}{\hat{\Phi}_{Fj}} \quad (41)$$

$$\hat{\Phi}_{Fj} = \left(\hat{\hat{L}}\hat{\hat{U}}^{-\theta} \right)^{-1} \sum_i \pi_{ij}^F \hat{d}_{ij}^{-\theta} \frac{\hat{L}_{Ri}}{\hat{\Phi}_{Ri}} \quad (42)$$

⁴⁵Once these are recovered, a unique to-scale solution for $\tilde{\Phi}_{Fi}$ is simply recovered from (33).

$$\hat{\Phi}_{Fj} = \left(\hat{L}\hat{U}^{-\theta} \right)^{-\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \sum_i \tilde{\pi}_{ij}^F \hat{d}_{ij}^{-(\theta-1)} \left(\frac{\hat{L}_{Ri}}{\hat{\Phi}_{Ri}} \right)^{(\theta-1)/\theta} \quad (43)$$

$$\hat{L}_{Fj} = \left(\hat{L}_{Fj} / \hat{\Phi}_{Fj} \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \hat{\Phi}_{Fj}. \quad (44)$$

Note that I am using that β_F and β_R have zeros in the first and last two entries respectively, otherwise both CMA terms would appear in each line. Here $\pi_{ij}^R = \frac{d_{ij}^{-\theta} \frac{L_{Fj}}{\Phi_{Fj}}}{\sum_j d_{ij}^{-\theta} \frac{L_{Fj}}{\Phi_{Fj}}}$, $\pi_{ij}^F = \frac{d_{ji}^{-\theta} \frac{L_{Rj}}{\Phi_{Rj}}}{\sum_j d_{ji}^{-\theta} \frac{L_{Rj}}{\Phi_{Rj}}}$ and $\tilde{\pi}_{ij}^F = \frac{d_{ji}^{-\theta} \left(\frac{L_{Rj}}{\Phi_{Rj}} \right)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}}{\sum_j d_{ji}^{-\theta} \left(\frac{L_{Rj}}{\Phi_{Rj}} \right)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}}$. Since these shares are homogeneous of degree zero in Φ_{Ri} , Φ_{Fi} , their unique values are identified using values for d_{ij} , L_{Ri} , L_{Fi} , θ (since these determine unique to-scale solutions for the CMA terms). In my particular model, computing the terms in the A^{-1} matrix yields the system

$$\hat{L}_{Ri} = \hat{\Phi}_{Ri}^{\beta_{LR}} \hat{L}^{\beta_{LR}} \hat{U}^{-\frac{\beta_{LR}\theta}{\beta}} \quad (45)$$

$$\hat{r}_{Ri} = \hat{\Phi}_{Ri}^{\beta_{rR}} \hat{L}^{\beta_{rR}} \hat{U}^{-\frac{\beta_{rR}(\theta-1)}{\beta}} \quad (46)$$

$$\hat{r}_{Fi} = \hat{\Phi}_{Fi}^{\beta_{rF}} \left(\hat{L}\hat{U}^{-(\theta-1)} \right)^{\beta_{rF}} \hat{E}^{\frac{\beta_{rF}\theta}{\sigma_D}} \quad (47)$$

$$\hat{L}_{Fi} = \hat{\Phi}_{Fi}^{\beta_{LF}} \left(\hat{L}\hat{U}^{-(\theta-1)} \right)^{\beta_{LF}} \hat{E}^{\beta_{LF} \frac{\theta-1}{\sigma_D}} \quad (48)$$

The change in constants are given by

$$\hat{U} = \hat{L}^{(\beta_{LR}-1) \frac{\beta}{\theta\beta_{LR}}} \left[\sum_i \pi_{Ri} \hat{\Phi}_{Ri}^{\beta_{LR}} \right]^{\frac{\beta}{\theta\beta_{LR}}} \quad (49)$$

$$\hat{E} = \sum_i \pi_i^E \hat{\Phi}_{Ri}^{1/\theta} \hat{L}_{Ri}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} \quad (50)$$

where $\pi_i^{LR} = \frac{L_{Ri}}{\sum_r L_{Rs}}$ and $\pi_i^E = \frac{\Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} L_{Ri}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}}{\sum_r \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} L_{Ri}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}}$ are residential and expenditure shares from the initial equilibrium, where the expression for $\hat{U}$ comes from summing up (45).

Now define $\hat{y}_i = \hat{y}_i / (\prod_i \hat{y}_i)^{1/I}$ as the double-differenced change in y_i between two periods relative to the geometric average change across the whole city. Then this system becomes

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{L}_{Ri} &= \hat{\Phi}_{Ri}^{\beta_{LR}} \\ \hat{r}_{Ri} &= \hat{\Phi}_{Ri}^{\beta_{rR}} \\ \hat{r}_{Fi} &= \hat{\Phi}_{Fi}^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1} \beta_{rF}} \\ \hat{L}_{Fi} &= \hat{\Phi}_{Fi}^{\beta_{LF}} \\ \hat{\Phi}_{Ri} &= \lambda_R \sum_j \pi_{ij}^R \hat{d}_{ij}^{-\theta} \frac{\hat{L}_{Fj}}{\hat{\Phi}_{Fj}} \\ \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} &= \lambda_F \sum_j \pi_{ij}^F \hat{d}_{ji}^{-\theta} \frac{\hat{L}_{Rj}}{\hat{\Phi}_{Rj}} \\ \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} &= \tilde{\lambda}_F \sum_j \tilde{\pi}_{ij}^F \hat{d}_{ji}^{-(\theta-1)} \left(\frac{\hat{L}_{Rj}}{\hat{\Phi}_{Rj}} \right)^{(\theta-1)/\theta} \end{aligned}$$

$$\hat{L}_{Fj} = \left(\hat{L}_{Fj} / \hat{\Phi}_{Fj} \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} \hat{\Phi}_{Fj}$$

where $\lambda_R = \left[\prod_i \sum_j \pi_{ij}^R \hat{d}_{ij}^{-\theta} \frac{\hat{L}_{Fj}}{\hat{\Phi}_{Fj}} \right]^{-1/N}$, $\lambda_F = \left[\prod_i \sum_j \pi_{ij}^F \hat{d}_{ji}^{-\theta} \frac{\hat{L}_{Ri}}{\hat{\Phi}_{Ri}} \right]^{-1/N}$ and

$\tilde{\lambda}_F = \left[\prod_i \sum_i \tilde{\pi}_{ij}^F \hat{d}_{ij}^{\theta-1} \left(\frac{\hat{L}_{Ri}}{\hat{\Phi}_{Ri}} \right)^{(\theta-1)/\theta} \right]^{-1/N}$. To solve this system, one can begin by solving for Φ_{Ri}, Φ_{Fi} using $\{\theta, d_{ij}, L_{Ri}, L_{Fi}\}$ following the procedure outlined in part 1. With these in hand, $\pi_{ij}^R, \pi_{ij}^F, \tilde{\pi}_{ij}^F$ can be computed.

Then, a change in the transit network $\hat{\mathbf{d}}$ can be fed into the system above. This constitutes a system of $8N$ equations in as many unknowns $\{\hat{L}_{Ri}, \hat{L}_{Fi}, \hat{\tilde{L}}_{Fi}, \hat{r}_{Ri}, \hat{r}_{Fi}, \hat{\Phi}_{Ri}, \hat{\Phi}_{Fi}, \hat{\tilde{\Phi}}_{Fi}\}$ given data $\{L_{Fj}, L_{Ri}, d_{ij}\}$ and parameters $(\theta, \beta_{LR}, \beta_{rR}, \beta_{rF}, \beta_{LF})$. Any model with a gravity equation for commuting with commute costs d_{ij} , commuting elasticity θ , and the reduced form $\ln \hat{y}_i = \beta_R \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Ri} + \beta_F \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} + e_i$ will deliver the same distribution of relative changes to the shock across the city.

Part 3: Level Impact of Transit Infrastructure. Solving for the level effect of a counterfactual change in transit infrastructure requires solving for (i) the scale of each relative change variable from part 2 and (ii) the three endogenous scalars $\hat{U}, \hat{L}, \hat{E}$ until the system of equations (41)-(50) holds. This is a system of $8N + 2$ equations in as many unknowns, if the value of either $\hat{U}$ or $\hat{L}$ is known. This last condition is realized by alternative assumptions on population mobility. In the closed city case, city population is fixed so that $\hat{L} = 1$. In the case with migration into the city, two equations in $\hat{U}$ or $\hat{L}$ are provided in Appendix E.1. The additional data requirements to solve this system are the shares π_i^{LR} and π_i^E (which can be solved using $\{L_{Fj}, L_{Ri}, d_{ij}, \theta\}$). The additional parameters required are β, σ_D , as can be seen from the exponents on the scalars in (45)-(48).

Part 4: Isomorphisms. Consider a model where the supply of commuters is determined by a gravity equation $L_{ij} = c \delta_j \gamma_i \kappa_{ij}$. Then the supply of residents and labor are given by $L_{Ri} = \gamma_i \Phi_{Ri}$ and $L_{Fi} = \delta_i \Phi_{Fi}$ where

$$\begin{aligned} \Phi_{Ri} &= c \sum_j \frac{L_{Fj}}{\Phi_{Fj}} \kappa_{ij} \\ \Phi_{Fi} &= c \sum_j \frac{L_{Rj}}{\Phi_{Rj}} \kappa_{ji} \end{aligned}$$

Following the results in part 1, this solution has a unique to-scale solution.

Now suppose that in addition to these two equations pinning down CMA, the equilibrium can be written as a system of K equations in K endogenous variables $\{y_{1i}, \dots, y_{ki}\}_{i=1}^I$ of the form

$$\prod_{k=1}^K y_{ki}^{\alpha_{kh}} = \lambda_h \Phi_{Ri}^{b_{Ri}^R} \Phi_{Fi}^{b_{Fi}^F} e_{ih} \quad \text{for } h = 1, \dots, K \quad (51)$$

Then this system can be written of the form

$$\begin{aligned} \begin{bmatrix} \alpha_{11} & \cdots & \alpha_{K1} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \alpha_{K1} & \cdots & \alpha_{KK} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \ln \hat{y}_{1i} \\ \vdots \\ \ln \hat{y}_{Ki} \end{bmatrix} &= \begin{bmatrix} b_1^R \\ \vdots \\ b_K^R \end{bmatrix} \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Ri} + \begin{bmatrix} b_1^F \\ \vdots \\ b_K^F \end{bmatrix} \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} + \begin{bmatrix} \ln \hat{e}_{1i} + \ln \hat{\lambda}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \ln \hat{e}_{Ki} + \ln \hat{\lambda}_K \end{bmatrix} \\ \Leftrightarrow A \ln \hat{\mathbf{y}}_i &= b^R \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Ri} + b^F \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} + \ln \hat{\mathbf{e}}_i \\ \Leftrightarrow \ln \hat{\mathbf{y}}_i &= \beta_R \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Ri} + \beta_F \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} + A^{-1} \ln \hat{\mathbf{e}}_i \end{aligned}$$

Exponentiating the system and assuming unobservables are constant across equilibria yields⁴⁶

$$\hat{y}_{ih} = \hat{\Phi}_{Ri}^{\beta_{R,h}} \hat{\Phi}_{Fi}^{\beta_{F,h}} \left[A^{-1} \hat{\lambda} \right]_h \text{ for } h = 1, \dots, K$$

Relative changes across the city are given by

$$\hat{y}_{ih} = \hat{\Phi}_{Ri}^{\beta_{R,h}} \hat{\Phi}_{Fi}^{\beta_{F,h}}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\Phi}_{Ri} &= \rho_R \sum_j \pi_{ij}^R \frac{\hat{L}_{Fj}}{\hat{\Phi}_{Fj}} \hat{\kappa}_{ij} \\ \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} &= \rho_F \sum_j \pi_{ij}^F \frac{\hat{L}_{Rj}}{\hat{\Phi}_{Rj}} \hat{\kappa}_{ji} \end{aligned}$$

where $\rho_R = \left[\prod_i \sum_j \pi_{ij}^R \hat{\kappa}_{ij} \frac{\hat{L}_{Fj}}{\hat{\Phi}_{Fj}} \right]^{-1/N}$, $\rho_F = \left[\prod_i \sum_j \pi_{ij}^F \hat{\kappa}_{ji} \frac{\hat{L}_{Rj}}{\hat{\Phi}_{Rj}} \right]^{-1/N}$, and $\pi_{ij}^R = \frac{\kappa_{ij} \frac{L_{Fj}}{\Phi_{Fj}}}{\sum_j \kappa_{ij} \frac{L_{Fj}}{\Phi_{Fj}}}$, $\pi_{ij}^F = \frac{\kappa_{ji} \frac{L_{Rj}}{\Phi_{Rj}}}{\sum_j \kappa_{ji} \frac{L_{Rj}}{\Phi_{Rj}}}$ can be solved using the to-scale versions of the CMA terms. Taken together, this is $K + 2$ equations in the $K + 2$ unknowns $\{\hat{y}_{ih}\}_{h=1}^K, \hat{\Phi}_{Ri}, \hat{\Phi}_{Fi}$. Thus, I have shown that parts (i) and (ii) apply to any model of this class. Appendix C.4 provides explicit examples of models that fall under it. ■

D.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2

This proof considers a slight modification of the baseline model, in which individuals (i) have separate productivity shocks over workplace locations and preference shocks over residential locations, (ii) own an equal share of the housing stock and (iii) face a labor income tax of $t_{ij} = 1/(1 + \theta)$.

The reason for these changes is that efficiency requires lump sum redistribution to workers (i.e. part of income that does not depend on workplace location). In the decentralized equilibrium of the model in Section C.1, income always depends on workplace location. Even if total income is $y_j = w_j + e$ for some lump sum transfer e and productivity shocks are over pairs ij , then total income is $y_j/d_{ij} \times E[\epsilon_{ij} | \text{Choose } ij]$. Since this average productivity term depends on the choice of workplace location, there is no longer a location-independent portion of income. Despite the slight difference between the model used in this proof and the baseline model, simulations that feed in a very small shock (a constant $d \ln d_{ij} = 0.00001 \forall ij$) into an efficient version of the baseline model (i.e. where $\mu_U = \mu_A = 0$) confirmed the expression for the welfare elasticity derived in the proof holds in the baseline model too.

⁴⁶Note that

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\Phi}_{Ri} &= \hat{c} \sum_j \pi_{ij}^R \hat{\kappa}_{ij} \frac{\hat{L}_{Fj}}{\hat{\Phi}_{Fj}} \\ \hat{\Phi}_{Fj} &= \hat{c} \sum_i \pi_{ij}^F \hat{\kappa}_{ji} \frac{\hat{L}_{Ri}}{\hat{\Phi}_{Ri}} \end{aligned}$$

where $\pi_{ij}^R = \frac{\kappa_{ij} \frac{L_{Fj}}{\Phi_{Fj}}}{\sum_j \kappa_{ij} \frac{L_{Fj}}{\Phi_{Fj}}}$, $\pi_{ij}^F = \frac{\kappa_{ji} \frac{L_{Rj}}{\Phi_{Rj}}}{\sum_j \kappa_{ji} \frac{L_{Rj}}{\Phi_{Rj}}}$ can be solved using the to-scale versions of the CMA terms. So unique to-scale values for the changes in CMA terms are pinned down given values $\hat{L}_{Ri}, \hat{L}_{Fi}$, yielding the full system of equations that characterizes the equilibrium. Uniqueness (to-scale) of this solution in changes follows the same argument as for the solution in levels, given they have the same functional form.

Equilibrium Equations. The equilibrium equations in this model are

$$\begin{aligned}
L_{Ri} &= \bar{L} \left(\frac{u_i \bar{y}_i r_{Ri}^{\beta-1}}{\bar{U} d_{ij}} \right)^\theta \\
L_{ij} &= L_{Ri} \frac{((1 - t_{ij}) w_j / d_{ij})^\theta}{\Phi_{Ri}} \\
\tilde{L}_{Fj} &= \sum_i L_{ij} \bar{\epsilon}_{ij} \\
w_i \tilde{L}_{Fi} &= \alpha p_i^{1-\sigma_D} \beta Y \\
p_i &= \tilde{\alpha} \frac{w_i^\alpha r_{Fi}^{1-\alpha}}{A_i} \\
r_{Ri} &= \frac{1-\beta}{H_{Ri}} L_{Ri} \bar{y}_i \\
r_{Fi} H_{Fi} &= (1-\alpha) p_i^{1-\sigma_D} \beta Y \\
\bar{U} &= \left[\sum_i \left(u_i \bar{y}_i r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} / d_{ij} \right)^\theta \right]^{1/\theta} \\
\bar{y}_i &= \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} + e \\
\Phi_{Ri} &= \sum_j ((1 - t_{ij}) w_j / d_{ij})^\theta \\
e &= \frac{1}{\bar{L}} \left[(1 - \alpha\beta) Y + \sum_{ij} t_{ij} L_{ij} \bar{w}_{ij} \right] \\
\bar{w}_{ij} &= \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta}
\end{aligned}$$

where $Y = \sum_i Y_i$ is aggregate expenditure, $\tilde{\alpha} \equiv \alpha^{-\alpha} (1 - \alpha)^{-(1-\alpha)}$ is a constant, and $(1 - \alpha\beta)Y = (1 - \beta)Y + \beta(1 - \alpha)Y$ is total expenditure on residential and commercial floorspace. Note that the preference draw $\nu_i(\omega)$ and productivity draw $\epsilon_j(\omega)$ are both drawn from a Fréchet distribution with unit scale and shape $\theta > 1$, and workers choose their residential location before deciding where to work.

Planner Problem. The planner knows the distribution of individual heterogeneity, but not their specific draws. She announces a policy where workers receive some amount of the consumption and housing good per unit of effective labor supply based on where they work, as well as an amount based on where they live. In particular, the policy for someone who chooses to live in i and work in j with productivity ϵ is

$$\begin{aligned}
c_{ij}(\epsilon) &= \tilde{c}_{ij} \frac{\epsilon}{d_{ij}} + \bar{c}_i \\
h_{ij}(\epsilon) &= \tilde{h}_{ij} \frac{\epsilon}{d_{ij}} + \bar{h}_i.
\end{aligned}$$

Given these policies, individuals make free decisions about where to live and work. Utility from each choice is $U_{ij}(\epsilon, \nu) = u_i \left(\frac{\tilde{c}_{ij}}{d_{ij}} \epsilon + \bar{c}_i \right)^\beta \left(\frac{\tilde{h}_{ij}}{d_{ij}} \epsilon + \bar{h}_i \right)^{1-\beta} \nu$. Since this is non-linear in ϵ , I constrain the planner to policies that make the two transfers proportional to one another (with a constant of proportionality that can vary by residential location), i.e. $\tilde{h}_{ij} = \iota_i \tilde{c}_{ij}$ and $\bar{c}_i = \iota_i \bar{h}_i$. Then $U_{ij}(\epsilon, \nu) = u_i \iota_i^{1-\beta} c_{ij}(\epsilon) \nu$.

The planner then chooses the consumption policies and supply of residents and workers to maximize utility

subject to the following technological constraints

- Goods Feasibility: $\left(\sum_k c_{kij}^{\frac{\sigma_D-1}{\sigma_D}}\right)^{\frac{\sigma_D}{\sigma_D-1}} = L_{ij}(\tilde{c}_{ij}\epsilon_{ij} + \bar{c})$, where c_{kij} is the amount of variety k consumed by individuals choosing ij . (Each variety is a freely traded good from a particular location, i.e. Armington without trade costs).
- Residential Housing Feasibility: $H_{Ri} = \sum_j L_{ij}\iota_i(\tilde{c}_{ij}\epsilon_{ij} + \bar{c})$
- Commercial Floorspace Feasibility: $\tilde{H}_{Fi} = H_{Fi}$
- Production Technology: $A_i \tilde{L}_i^\alpha \tilde{H}_{Fi}^{1-\alpha} = \sum_{rs} c_{irs}$
- Effective Labor Feasibility: $\tilde{L}_j = \sum_i L_{ij}\epsilon_{ij}$
- Worker Mobility: $L_{Ri} = \bar{L} \left(\frac{u_i \iota_i^{1-\beta} (\Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} + \bar{c})}{\bar{U}} \right)^\theta$
- Commuting Mobility: $L_{ij} = \frac{(w_j/d_{ij})^\theta}{\Phi_{Ri}} L_{Ri}$
- Residential Feasibility: $\bar{L} = \sum_i L_{Ri}$
- Effective Labor Technology: $\bar{\epsilon}_{ij} = \frac{\Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} d_{ij}}{w_j}$
- CMA Definition: $\Phi_{Ri} = \sum_j (\tilde{c}_{ij}/d_{ij})^\theta$

The Lagrangian is

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{L} = & \bar{U} \\
& + \sum_{ij} v_{ij} \left(\left(\sum_k c_{kij}^{\frac{\sigma_D-1}{\sigma_D}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma_D}{\sigma_D-1}} - L_{ij}(\tilde{c}_{ij}\epsilon_{ij} + \bar{c}_i) \right) + \sum_i \kappa_i \left(H_{Ri} - \sum_j L_{ij}\iota_i(\tilde{c}_{ij}\epsilon_{ij} + \bar{c}_i) \right) \\
& + \sum_i \lambda_i \left(A_i \tilde{L}_i^\alpha \tilde{H}_{Fi}^{1-\alpha} - \sum_{rs} c_{irs} \right) + \sum_j \xi_j \left(\sum_i \bar{\epsilon}_{ij} L_{ij} - \tilde{L}_j \right) \\
& + \sum_i \delta_i (H_{Fi} - \tilde{H}_{Fi}) \\
& + \sum_i \rho_i \left(\left(\frac{L_{Ri}}{\bar{L}} \right)^{-1/\theta} u_i \iota_i^{1-\beta} (\Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} + \bar{c}_i) - \bar{U} \right) \\
& + \sum_{ij} \psi_{ij} \left(\frac{(\tilde{c}_{ij}/d_{ij})^\theta}{\Phi_{Ri}} L_{Ri} - L_{ij} \right) \\
& + \sum_i \tau_i \left(\sum_j (\tilde{c}_{ij}/d_{ij})^\theta - \Phi_{Ri} \right) \\
& + \sum_{ij} \phi_{ij} \left(\frac{\Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} d_{ij}}{\tilde{c}_{ij}} \frac{1}{d_{ij}} - \bar{\epsilon}_{ij} \right) + \mu \left(\bar{L} - \sum_i L_{Ri} \right)
\end{aligned}$$

The first order conditions with respect to the choice variables $\{\bar{U}, \tilde{c}_{ij}, \iota_i, \bar{c}_i, c_{kij}, L_{ij}, L_{Ri}, \tilde{L}_i, \tilde{H}_{Fi}, \bar{\epsilon}_{ij}, \Phi_{Ri}\}$ are

$$(v_{ij} + \kappa_i \iota_i) \tilde{c}_{ij} \bar{\epsilon}_{ij} L_{ij} = L_{ij} \left(\theta \psi_{ij} + \theta \tau_i \frac{\Phi_{Ri}}{L_{Ri}} - \frac{\phi_{ij} \bar{\epsilon}_{ij}}{L_{ij}} \right) \quad (\tilde{c}_{ij})$$

$$\sum_j (\tilde{c}_{ij} \epsilon_{ij} + \bar{c}_i) \kappa_i L_{ij} = (1 - \beta) \frac{\rho_i \bar{U}}{\iota_i} \quad (\iota_i)$$

$$\sum_j L_{ij} (v_{ij} + \kappa_i \iota_i) = \rho_i \frac{\bar{U}}{\Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} + \bar{c}_i} \quad (\bar{c}_i)$$

$$\lambda_k = \nu_{ij} \left(\frac{c_{kij}}{C_{ij}} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\sigma_D}} \quad (c_{kij})$$

$$\delta_i = (1 - \alpha) \lambda_i A_i \left(\frac{\tilde{L}_i}{\tilde{H}_{Fi}} \right)^\alpha \quad (H_{Fi})$$

$$\xi_j \bar{\epsilon}_{ij} = (v_{ij} + \kappa_i \iota_i) (\tilde{c}_{ij} \bar{\epsilon}_{ij} + \bar{c}) + \psi_{ij} \quad (L_{ij})$$

$$\sum_j \psi_{ij} \frac{L_{ij}}{L_{Ri}} = \frac{1}{\theta} \frac{\rho_i \bar{U}}{L_{Ri}} + \mu \quad (L_{Ri})$$

$$\phi_{ij} + L_{ij} \tilde{c}_{ij} (\nu_{ij} + \kappa_i \iota_i) = \xi_j L_{ij} \quad (\bar{\epsilon}_{ij})$$

$$\tau_i = \frac{1}{\theta} \frac{\bar{U}}{\Phi_{Ri}} \frac{\Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta}}{\Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} + \bar{c}} - \sum_j \psi_{ij} \frac{L_{ij}}{\Phi_{Ri}} + \sum_j \frac{1}{\theta} \phi_{ij} \frac{\epsilon_{ij}}{\Phi_{Ri}} \quad (\Phi_{Ri})$$

$$\xi_i = \alpha \lambda_i A_i \left(\frac{H_{Fi}}{\tilde{L}_i} \right)^{1-\alpha} \quad (\tilde{L}_i)$$

$$1 = \sum_i \rho_i \quad (\bar{U})$$

and each of the constraint holds (to provide a condition for each multiplier).

Consumption and Housing. Define $\tilde{x}_{ij} = v \tilde{c}_{ij} + \kappa_i \tilde{h}_{ij} = \tilde{c}_{ij} (v + \kappa_i \iota_i)$ to be expenditure per unit of effective labor (as shown below, $v_{ij} = v \forall ij$). Likewise, define $\bar{x}_i = \bar{c}_i (v + \kappa_i \iota_i)$ to be the expenditure on the fixed good so that $\bar{c}_i = \bar{x}_i / (v + \kappa_i \iota_i)$. Putting these into the mobility condition yield

$$\bar{U} = \left(\frac{L_{Ri}}{\bar{L}} \right)^{-1/\theta} u_i \frac{\iota_i^{1-\beta}}{(v + \kappa_i \iota_i)} \left(\tilde{\Phi}_{Ri}^{1/\theta} + \bar{x}_i \right),$$

where $\tilde{\Phi}_{Ri}^{1/\theta} \equiv [\sum_s (\tilde{x}_{is}/d_{ij})^\theta]^{1/\theta}$. To solve for ι_i , from its first order condition (FOC) I obtain

$$\frac{\kappa_i \iota_i}{v + \kappa_i \iota_i} = (1 - \beta) \frac{\rho_i \bar{U}}{\sum_j (x_{ij} \bar{\epsilon}_{ij} + \bar{x}_i) L_{ij}}.$$

To solve this, I need a value for ρ_i . From the FOC for $\bar{c}_i$,

$$L_{Ri} = \rho_i \frac{\bar{U}}{\tilde{\Phi}_{Ri}^{1/\theta} + \bar{x}_i}.$$

The definition of $\bar{\epsilon}_{ij}$ yields $\tilde{x}_{ij} \bar{\epsilon}_{ij} = \tilde{\Phi}_{Ri}^{1/\theta}$ so that average income is constant across workplace locations within a residence location. Using this to simplify the denominator in the FOC for ι_i , combining these two conditions gives $v + \kappa_i \iota_i = v/\beta$. Substituting this into $\tilde{c}_{ij} = \tilde{x}_{ij} / (v + \kappa_i \iota_i)$, $\bar{c}_i = \bar{x}_i / (v + \kappa_i \iota_i)$, $\tilde{h}_{ij} = \iota_i \tilde{c}_{ij}$ and $\bar{h}_i = \iota_i \bar{c}_i$ yields

$$\tilde{c}_{ij} = \beta \tilde{x}_{ij} / v$$

$$\tilde{h}_{ij} = (1 - \beta) \tilde{x}_{ij} / \kappa_i$$

$$\bar{c}_i = \beta \bar{x}_i / v$$

$$\bar{h}_i = (1 - \beta)\bar{x}_i/\kappa_i.$$

Plugging this into the expression for utility gives residential supply

$$L_{Ri} \propto \bar{L} \left(\frac{u_i \bar{y}_i \kappa_i^{\beta-1}}{\bar{U}} \right)^\theta$$

where $\bar{y}_i = \tilde{x}_{ij} \bar{\epsilon}_{ij} + \bar{x}_i = \tilde{\Phi}_{Ri}^{1/\theta} + \bar{x}_i$ is average income of residents in i . Substituting this into the expression for residential feasibility provides an alternative expression for average welfare

$$\bar{U} \propto \left[\sum_i \left(u_i \bar{y}_i \kappa_i^{\beta-1} \right)^\theta \right]^{1/\theta}$$

Residential Floorspace. Using these results, the floorspace market clearing condition implies

$$H_{Ri} = (1 - \beta) \frac{L_{Ri} \bar{y}_i}{\kappa_i}.$$

Production. The FOC for c_{kij} implies $c_{kij} = \left(\frac{\lambda_k}{v_{ij}} \right)^{-\sigma_D} C_{ij}$, which plugged into the definition of

$C_{ij} = \left(\sum_k c_{kij}^{\frac{\sigma_D-1}{\sigma_D}} \right)^{\frac{\sigma_D}{\sigma_D-1}}$ yields $v_{ij} = v = \left(\sum_k \lambda_k^{1-\sigma_D} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_D}} \forall i, j$. The market clearing condition for goods implies

$$A_i \tilde{L}_i^\alpha H_{Fi}^{1-\alpha} = \lambda_i^{-\sigma_D} v^{\sigma_D-1} \beta Y$$

where $Y \equiv \sum_i L_{Ri} \bar{y}_i$ is aggregate expenditure. Combining the FOC for labor and commercial floorspace gives $H_{Fi} = \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{\xi_i}{\delta_i} \tilde{L}_i$, and substituting this back into the FOC yields both factor demands and an expression for λ_i

$$\begin{aligned} \xi_i \tilde{L}_i &= \alpha \lambda_i^{1-\sigma_D} v^{\sigma_D-1} \beta Y \\ \delta_i H_{Fi} &= (1 - \alpha) \lambda_i^{1-\sigma_D} v^{\sigma_D-1} \beta Y \\ \lambda_i &= \tilde{\alpha} \frac{\xi_i^\alpha \delta_i^{1-\alpha}}{A_i}. \end{aligned}$$

Labor Supply. Finally, one needs to solve the spatial mobility condition, i.e. the FOC for L_{ij} . First, note the condition for L_{Ri} implies $\psi_{ij} = \psi_i$. The FOC for L_{Ri} and L_{ij} can then be combined to get

$$\xi_j \bar{\epsilon}_{ij} = \tilde{x}_{ij} \bar{\epsilon}_{ij} + \bar{x}_i + \frac{1}{\theta} \frac{\rho_i \bar{U}}{L_{Ri}} + \mu.$$

Substituting in the value for ρ_i from above gives

$$\tilde{x}_{ij} \bar{\epsilon}_{ij} + \bar{x}_i = \frac{\theta}{\theta+1} \xi_j \bar{\epsilon}_{ij} - \frac{\theta}{\theta+1} \mu.$$

Note that this implies that expenditure per effective unit of labor depends only on workplace location

($\tilde{x}_{ij} = \frac{\theta}{\theta+1} \xi_j$), and expenditure per worker is constant across residential locations ($\bar{x}_i = -\frac{\theta}{\theta+1} \mu$). Substituting the

expression for $\tilde{c}_{ij}$ into the commuting constraint gives

$$L_{ij} = L_{Ri} \frac{(\xi_j/d_{ij})^\theta}{\sum_s (\xi_s/d_{is})^\theta}.$$

Taking Stock. The solution to the planner's problem is the vector $(\bar{U}, \kappa_i, v, \xi_i, \delta_i, \lambda_i, L_{ij}, L_{Ri})$ that satisfies

$$\begin{aligned} L_{Ri} &\propto \bar{L} \left(\frac{u_i \bar{y}_i \kappa_i^{\beta-1}}{\bar{U} d_{ij}} \right)^\theta \\ L_{ij} &= L_{Ri} \frac{(\xi_j/d_{ij})^\theta}{\sum_s (\xi_s/d_{is})^\theta} \\ \tilde{L}_{Fj} &= \sum_i L_{ij} \bar{e}_{ij} \\ \xi_i \tilde{L}_i &= \alpha \lambda_i^{1-\sigma_D} v^{\sigma_D-1} \beta Y \\ \lambda_i &= \tilde{\alpha} \frac{\xi_i^\alpha \delta_i^{1-\alpha}}{A_i}. \\ H_{Ri} &= (1-\beta) \frac{L_{Ri} \bar{y}_i}{\kappa_i} \\ \delta_i H_{Fi} &= (1-\alpha) \lambda_i^{1-\sigma_D} v^{\sigma_D-1} \beta Y \\ \bar{U} &\propto \left[\sum_i \left(\frac{u_i \bar{y}_i \kappa_i^{\beta-1}}{\bar{U} d_{ij}} \right)^\theta \right]^{1/\theta} \\ \bar{y}_i &= \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} - \frac{\theta}{\theta+1} \mu \\ \Phi_{Ri} &= \sum_j \left(\frac{\theta}{\theta+1} \xi_j/d_{ij} \right)^\theta \end{aligned}$$

where $\bar{y}_i = \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} - \frac{\theta}{\theta+1} \mu$ and $\Phi_{Ri} = \sum_j \left(\frac{\theta}{\theta+1} \xi_j/d_{ij} \right)^\theta$ are functions of these variables and the planner's multiplier on the residential feasibility constraint μ . This is the same set of equations as the decentralized equilibrium with $(\kappa_i, v, \xi_i, \delta_i, \lambda_i, \tilde{x}_{ij}, \mu) = (r_{Ri}, P, w_i, r_{Fi}, p_i, \frac{\theta}{1+\theta} w_j, -\frac{\theta}{1+\theta} e)$, i.e. when $t_{ij} = 1/(1+\theta)$. Therefore, under this condition, any competitive equilibrium also solves the social planner's solution and is efficient.

Welfare Elasticity. Using the envelope theorem, the change in welfare to a change in commute costs is

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \bar{U}}{\partial d_{ij}} &= -\frac{\theta \psi_{ij} L_{ij}}{d_{ij}} - \theta \frac{\tau_i \Phi_{Ri}}{d_{ij}} \frac{L_{ij}}{L_{Ri}} \\ \Rightarrow \frac{\partial \ln \bar{U}}{\partial \ln d_{ij}} &= -\frac{L_{ij} \left(\theta \psi_{ij} + \theta \frac{\tau_i \Phi_{Ri}}{L_{Ri}} \right)}{\bar{U}} \end{aligned}$$

Combining the FOC for $\tilde{c}_{ij}$ and $\bar{e}_{ij}$ give $\xi_j \bar{e}_{ij} = \theta \psi_{ij} + \theta \tau_i \frac{\Phi_{Ri}}{L_{Ri}}$. Defining $w_{ij} \equiv \xi_j \bar{e}_{ij}$ to be average labor income for commuters along ij , this simplifies to

$$\frac{\partial \ln \bar{U}}{\partial \ln d_{ij}} = -\frac{w_{ij} L_{ij}}{\bar{U}}.$$

Substituting the expression for ρ_i into the FOC for $\bar{U}$ implies $\bar{U} = \sum_i L_{Ri} \bar{y}_i$. From the adding up condition it must

be that

$$\underbrace{\sum_{ij} L_{ij} \bar{y}_i}_{\text{Total Income}} = \underbrace{\sum_{ij} L_{ij} w_{ij}}_{\text{Labor Income}} + \underbrace{(1 - \beta) \sum_{ij} L_{ij} \bar{y}_i}_{\text{Income from Res Floorspace}} + \underbrace{\beta(1 - \alpha) \sum_{ij} L_{ij} \bar{y}_i}_{\text{Income from Comm Floorspace}} = \frac{1}{\alpha\beta} \sum_{ij} L_{ij} w_{ij}$$

Thus $\bar{U} = \frac{1}{\alpha\beta} \sum_{ij} L_{ij} w_{ij}$ and

$$\frac{\partial \ln \bar{U}}{\partial \ln d_{ij}} = -\alpha\beta \frac{w_{ij} L_{ij}}{\sum_{rs} w_{rs} L_{rs}}.$$

Adding up to compute the change in utility $d \ln \bar{U}$ to a vector of changes in commute costs $\{d \ln d_{ij}\}_{ij}$ gives the result in the proposition. Note that the parameters α, β account for the fact that some of the gains go to factors other than labor, but these equilibrium price effects do not matter to an infinitesimal change in commute costs and thus do not impact welfare. ■

D.1.3 Proof of Proposition 3

Part 1: Wages

To construct the system of equations used for solving for wages, I collect the expressions for supply and demand for workers. Labor supply $L_{Fjg} = w_{jg}^{\theta_g} \Phi_{Fjg}$ can be rearranged as

$$w_{jg} = L_{Fjg}^{\frac{1}{\theta_g}} \left[\sum_{i,a} \frac{L_{Riag}}{\sum_k w_{kg}^{\theta_g} d_{ika}^{-\theta_g}} d_{ija}^{-\theta_g} \right]^{-\frac{1}{\theta_g}}$$

This is a system of equations in w_{jg} given parameters and data $\{L_{Riag}, d_{ija}, L_{Fjg}\}$. The problem is that I do not observe employment by group, but only employment by industry L_{Fjs} . However, I can combine this data with the structure of the model to find employment by group for each location.

From CES demand for each group's labor, the share of any industry's (effective) employment by any group g is given by

$$\frac{\tilde{L}_{Fjgs}}{\tilde{L}_{Fjs}} = \frac{(w_{jg}/\alpha_{sg})^{-\sigma}}{\sum_h (w_{jh}/\alpha_{sh})^{-\sigma}}.$$

Summing this over industries yields total employment by group in a location

$$\tilde{L}_{Fjg} = \sum_s \frac{(w_{jg}/\alpha_{sg})^{-\sigma}}{\sum_h (w_{jh}/\alpha_{sh})^{-\sigma}} \tilde{L}_{Fjs}$$

It remains to express effective units of labor supply in terms of observed data and wages.

Start by decomposing $\tilde{L}_{Fjs}$ in terms of data and wages as follows. First, compute the average productivity of workers in j

$$\bar{\epsilon}_{jg} = E[\epsilon|g, \text{Choose } j] = \sum_{i,o} E[\epsilon|g, \text{Choose } j \text{ from } (i, o)] \Pr(i, o|j, g) = \sum_{i,o} \gamma_g \left(\frac{\tilde{T}_g}{\pi_{j|iog}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta_g}} \frac{1}{d_{ijo}} \Pr(i, o|j, g)$$

Next, break down the probability as

$$\Pr(i, o|j, g) = \pi_{io|jg} = \frac{\pi_{j|iog} \pi_{iog}}{\sum_{r,u} \pi_{j|rug} \pi_{rug}} = \frac{\pi_{j|iog} L_{Riog}}{\sum_{r,u} \pi_{j|rug} L_{Rrug}}$$

So

$$\bar{\epsilon}_{jg} = T_g \sum_{i,o} \pi_{j|iog}^{-\frac{1}{\theta_g}} \frac{1}{d_{ijo}} \frac{\pi_{j|iog} L_{Riog}}{\sum_{r,u} \pi_{j|rug} L_{Rrug}}$$

Next, note that

$$\bar{\epsilon}_{js} = \sum_g \bar{\epsilon}_{jg} \pi_{g|js} = \sum_g \bar{\epsilon}_{jg} \frac{L_{Fjgs}}{L_{Fjs}} = \sum_g \bar{\epsilon}_{jg} \frac{(w_{jg}/\alpha_{sg})^{-\sigma} / \bar{\epsilon}_{jg}}{\sum_h (w_{jh}/\alpha_{sh})^{-\sigma} / \bar{\epsilon}_{jh}}$$

Putting these results together, one gets

$$L_{Fjg} = \frac{\tilde{L}_{Fjg}}{\bar{\epsilon}_{jg}} = \sum_s \frac{(w_{jg}/\alpha_{sg})^{-\sigma}}{\sum_h (w_{jh}/\alpha_{sh})^{-\sigma}} \frac{\bar{\epsilon}_{js}}{\bar{\epsilon}_{jg}} L_{Fjs}$$

Substituting this result back into the expression for labor supply, I find that wages are the fixed point of the system $w_g = F_{wg}(w_g; L_{Rg}, L_{Fs})$ where the operator F_{wg} is defined to have the j -th element

$$\begin{aligned} F_{wg}(w_g; L_{Fs}, L_{Rg})_j &= \left[\sum_s \frac{(w_{jg}/\alpha_{sg})^{-\sigma}}{\sum_h (w_{jh}/\alpha_{sh})^{-\sigma}} \frac{\bar{\epsilon}_{js}}{\bar{\epsilon}_{jg}} L_{Fjs} \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta_g}} \left[\sum_{i,o} \frac{L_{Riog}}{\sum_k w_{kg}^{\theta_g} d_{iko}^{-\theta_g}} d_{ijo}^{-\theta_g} \right]^{-\frac{1}{\theta_g}} \\ &= F_{1wg}(w_g; L_{Fs}, L_{Rg})_j F_{2wg}(w_g; L_{Rg})_j \\ \text{where } \bar{\epsilon}_{jg} &= T_g \sum_{i,o} \pi_{j|iog}^{-\frac{1}{\theta_g}} \frac{1}{d_{ijo}} \frac{\pi_{j|iog} L_{Riog}}{\sum_{r,u} \pi_{j|rug} L_{Rrug}} \\ \bar{\epsilon}_{js} &= \sum_g \bar{\epsilon}_{jg} \frac{(w_{jg}/\alpha_{sg})^{-\sigma} / \bar{\epsilon}_{jg}}{\sum_h (w_{jh}/\alpha_{sh})^{-\sigma} / \bar{\epsilon}_{jh}} \end{aligned}$$

Note that the operator F_{wg} has the following properties:

- **Monotonicity.** Transform the system into log-space. From Euler's theorem, since F_1 is homogenous of degree zero, for any vector $d \ln w$

$$\sum_{k,h} \frac{\partial F_{1g}}{\partial \ln w_{kh}} = 0$$

so the total differential of F_{1g} to a vector of wage changes is zero. The second term is monotonic in w , which is a positive transformation of $\ln w$. Thus, the operator F_{wg} is a strictly increasing function of $\ln w$. By the chain rule, F_{wg} is a strictly increasing function of w .

- **Homogeneity.** Consider first F_{1wg} . The first part $\frac{(w_{jg}/\alpha_{sg})^{-\sigma}}{\sum_h (w_{jh}/\alpha_{sh})^{-\sigma}}$ is homogenous of degree zero in wages. From the definition of $\bar{\epsilon}_{js}$ and $\bar{\epsilon}_{jg}$ these too are homogenous of degree zero in wages. Therefore, F_{1wg} is homogenous of degree zero in wages. Next, note that F_{2wg} is homogenous of degree one in wages, so that F_{wg} is homogenous of degree one.

Therefore, by the results in Fujimoto and Krause (1985) there exists a unique (to-scale) solution to the system

$$w_g = F_{wg}(w_g; L_{Fs}, L_{Rg}).$$

Part 2: Remaining Unobservables

Given wages, Φ_{Riag} , W_{is} can be computed. The total wage bill is obtained from

$$\begin{aligned} W_{js}N_{js} &= \sum_g w_{jg} \tilde{L}_{Fjgs} \\ &= \sum_g w_{jg} \frac{(w_{jg}/\alpha_{sg})^{-\sigma}}{\sum_h (w_{jh}/\alpha_{sh})^{-\sigma}} L_{Fjs} \bar{c}_{js} \end{aligned}$$

This allows me to obtain sales from $\alpha_s X_{js} = W_{js}N_{js}$. With this in hand, productivity comes from

$$X_{js} = \left(\frac{W_{js}^{\alpha_s} r_{Fj}^{1-\alpha_s}}{A_{js}} \right)^{1-\varsigma} X$$

since X is also observed using Φ_{Riag} .

Lump sum income from the housing stock is recovered directly from $\pi = \bar{L}^{-1} \sum_i (r_{Ri} H_{Ri} + r_{Fi} H_{Fi})$. Amenities are retrieved from the resident supply condition

$$\begin{aligned} L_{Riag} &= \lambda_{Lg} \left(u_{iag} (T_g \Phi_{Riag}^{1/\theta} - \bar{h} r_{Ri} - p_{car} a + \pi) r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} \right)^{\eta_g} \\ \Rightarrow u_{iag} &= \frac{(L_{Riag}/\lambda_{Lg})^{1/\eta_g} r_{Ri}^{1-\beta}}{(T_g \Phi_{Riag}^{1/\theta} - \bar{h} r_{Ri} - p_{car} a + \pi)} \end{aligned}$$

To solve for unobservables in the housing side of the model, I need to introduce a new pair of location characteristics omitted in the main paper for notational brevity. In particular, the floorspace market clearing condition $r_{Ri} = \frac{E_i}{H_{Ri}}$ will not necessarily hold at the values for data and estimated wages (where E_i is total expenditure on housing from residents of i). I therefore introduce an additional unobservable so that $H_{Ri} = \tilde{H}_{Ri} \xi_{Ri}$, where $\tilde{H}_{Ri}$ are physical units of floorspace and ξ_{Ri} are effective units (or housing quality). These unobservables can be solved for from the housing market clearing condition $\xi_{Ri} = \frac{E_i}{\tilde{H}_{Ri} r_{Ri}}$. Similar residuals for effective units of commercial floorspace ξ_{Fi} are obtained from the commercial floorspace market clearing condition $\xi_{Fi} = \frac{\sum_s (1-\alpha_s) X_{is}}{\tilde{H}_{Fi} r_{Fi}}$, and total floorspace supplies are given by $H_{Ri} = \tilde{H}_{Ri} \xi_{Ri}$ and $H_{Fi} = \tilde{H}_{Fi} \xi_{Fi}$. Finally, it remains to solve for the land use restrictions τ_i . These can be identified from

$$(1 - \tau_i) = \frac{r_{Ri} \xi_{Ri}}{r_{Fi} \xi_{Fi}}$$

for locations with mixed land use. For locations with single land use, the wedges are not identified but are rationalized by zero productivities (for all sectors) or zero amenities (for all worker groups) and thus will remain single use across counterfactuals.⁴⁷ ■

D.2 Additional Details and Definitions

In Section 3.1, the constants defined are $T_g \equiv \gamma_{\theta,g} \tilde{T}_g^{1/\theta_g}$, $\gamma_{\theta,g} = \Gamma\left(1 - \frac{1}{\theta_g}\right)$, $\lambda_{U,g} = \bar{L}_g (\gamma_{\eta,g}/\bar{U}_g)^{\eta_g}$ and $\gamma_{\eta,g} = \Gamma\left(1 - \frac{1}{\eta_g}\right)$ where $\Gamma(\cdot)$ is the gamma function. Expected utility prior to learning match productivities is

⁴⁷These solutions are unique to scale. In practice, as discussed in Section D.7, I normalize the geometric mean of wages and floorspace prices to one. This affects the scale of unobservables such as productivities and amenities, but has no impact on relative differences in exogenous characteristics or endogenous variables across locations or counterfactuals.

$$U_{iag}(\omega) = u_{iag}(\bar{y}_{iag} - p_{car}a - r_{Ri}\bar{h}) r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} \nu_{ia}(\omega).$$

Average productivity of type- g workers who work in j is given by $\bar{\epsilon}_{jg} = T_g \sum_{i,a} \frac{\pi_{j|iag}^{-1/\theta_g}}{d_{ija}} \frac{\pi_{j|iag} L_{Riag}}{\sum_{r,o} \pi_{j|rog} L_{Rrog}}$.

Firm sales are given by $X_{js} = p_{js}^{1-\sigma_D} X$ where $X = \sum_i \beta(E_i - \bar{h}r_{Ri}L_{Ri})$ is total spending on goods in the city and $E_i = \sum_{g,a} (\bar{y}_{iag} - p_{car}a + \pi)L_{Riag}$ is total spending on goods and housing from residents in i .

The shifters are normalized so that $t_{iaa} = 0 \forall i, a$. This is equivalent to always taking a weighted average travel time of available modes, where the weights are the preference shifters b_m .

TransMilenio may directly impact productivities $\bar{A}_{js}$ and amenities $\bar{u}_{iag}$ (e.g. through street improvements, crime, pollution). My empirical results which control for distance to station (which captures such effects) show little effect on CMA coefficients, motivating their exclusion from the model. Since Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) find amenity and productivity spillovers decay rapidly across a few blocks, and the median tract contains fourteen blocks, I omit cross-tract effects.

The model requires that $\pi > p_{car}a + r_{Ri}\bar{h} \forall i$ such that $\bar{u}_{iag} > 0$, since the Fréchet distribution implies there will always be a positive mass of individuals with income arbitrarily close to zero. This is satisfied when the model is taken to the data.

Estimation Details Section 5.1.2 refers to adjusted RCMA which captures net income growth. Letting $t-1$ and t reference the pre- and post-TM periods, adjusted RCMA is $\tilde{\Phi}_{Riag,t-1} \equiv T_{g,t-1} \Phi_{Riag,t-1}^{1/\theta_g} - p_{car,t-1}a + \pi_{t-1}$ and $\tilde{\Phi}_{Riag,t}^{IV} \equiv T_{g,t} (\Phi_{Riag,t}^{IV})^{1/\theta_g} - p_{car,t}a + \pi_t$. The change is simply $\Delta \ln \tilde{\Phi}_{Riag}^{IV,k} = \ln \tilde{\Phi}_{Riag,t}^{IV,k} - \ln \tilde{\Phi}_{Riag,t-1}$ for $k \in \{LCP, Tram\}$. Then $\Delta \ln \tilde{\Phi}_{Riag}^{IV} = E_k [\Delta \ln \tilde{\Phi}_{Riag}^{IV,k}]$.

The section also mentions that log-linearizing the expression for residential population shows that tracts with expensive housing where CMA improves should see a greater rise in the college share. Performing the log-linearization or (6) yields

$$\Delta \ln L_{Riag} \approx \mu_{iag}^L \frac{\eta_g}{\theta_g} \Delta \ln \Phi_{Riag} - \eta_g (1 - \beta + \mu_{iag}^R) \Delta \ln r_{Ri} + \epsilon_{iag}$$

where $\epsilon_{iag} \equiv a\mu_{iag}^a \Delta \ln p_{car} + \mu_{iag}^\pi \Delta \ln \pi + \eta_g \Delta \ln u_{iag}$. Here $\mu_{iag}^L \equiv T_g \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta_g} / \bar{y}_{iag}$ and $\mu_{iag}^R = r_{Ri}\bar{h} / \bar{y}_{iag}$ are the share of labor income and fixed housing expenditure of total net income. Note that μ_{iag}^R is greater for poor individuals since they spend a greater fraction of income on housing. Thus, poor low-skilled workers are more sensitive to house price appreciation and are less willing to pay for improved CMA than the high-skilled.

D.3 Bootstrap

To incorporate uncertainty from the parameter estimates into the welfare estimates, I bootstrap the quantification procedure 200 times.

For the single group sufficient statistics model, I draw values for the 10 estimated parameters

$(\kappa, b_{Bus}, b_{Car}, b_{TM}, \lambda, \theta\kappa, \beta_{LR}, \beta_{rR}, \beta_{rF}, \beta_{LF})$ from normal distributions with means equal to the point estimates and standard deviations equal to the standard error of the estimates. I consider only draws which have non-negative commuting elasticities and reduced form elasticities, otherwise the model has issues converging.

This represents 95% of all drawn parameter vectors. I also disregard a small number of draws with an implausibly large value for the agglomeration elasticity ($\mu_A > 1$) since this can lead to nonsensical negative welfare estimates.⁴⁸

I then compute confidence intervals across the 200 bootstrap estimates. In Table 6 the estimated parameters are

⁴⁸Including these simulations widens the 90% and 95% confidence intervals to (0.332,6.610) and [-0.064,10.677] respectively.

used for welfare estimates in the first two columns so confidence intervals are reported, and the non-parametric p-value for whether the fraction of welfare gains accounted for by VTTS is less than one is simply the fraction of the 200 draws for which this is not true.

For the multigroup model I repeat the same procedure for the ten estimated parameters

$$(\kappa, b_{Bus}, b_{Car}, b_{TM}, \lambda, \theta_g \kappa, \eta_g, \mu_A, \mu_U^g)$$

D.4 Mode Choice Problem

After making their commute pair and car ownership choice, workers choose which mode of transport to commute with. From (1), the problem is

$$\min_{m \in \mathcal{M}_a} \left\{ \exp \left(\kappa t_{ijm} - \tilde{b}_m + v_{ijm}(\omega) \right) \right\}.$$

When $v_{ijm}(\omega)$ is drawn from the GEV distribution F defined in the text, choice probabilities are

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_{m|ija} &= \pi_{k|ija} \times \pi_{m|ijk a} \\ &= \frac{\left(\sum_{n \in \mathcal{B}_k} \exp \left(b_n - \frac{\kappa}{\lambda_k} t_{ijn} \right) \right)^{\lambda_k}}{\sum_{k'} \left(\sum_{n \in \mathcal{B}_{k'}} \exp \left(b_n - \frac{\kappa}{\lambda_{k'}} t_{ijn} \right) \right)^{\lambda_{k'}}} \times \frac{\exp \left(b_m - \frac{\kappa}{\lambda_k} t_{ijm} \right)}{\sum_{n \in \mathcal{B}_k} \exp \left(b_n - \frac{\kappa}{\lambda_k} t_{ijn} \right)} \end{aligned}$$

where $b_m \equiv \tilde{b}_m / \lambda_k(m)$. That is, the probability a worker chooses mode m can be decomposed into the probability they choose the nest containing m and the probability they choose the mode from the options available in that nest. This is commonly known as the nested logit model. This is estimated via maximum likelihood as described in the main text.

Standard results imply that the expected minimum cost

$$E \left[\max_{m \in \mathcal{M}_a} \left\{ 1 / \exp \left(\kappa t_{ijm} - \tilde{b}_m + v_{ijm}(\omega) \right) \right\} \right] = \exp(-\kappa t_{ija})$$

is related to the denominator of these expressions through the expected travel cost index t_{ija} as defined by (2) and (3) in the text. Note these estimating equations are the same for the multi-group and single group model (see Appendix C.2).

D.5 Model Inversion

The model contains unobserved location characteristics, such as wages, productivities, amenities and land use wedges. While the presence of agglomeration forces allows for the possibility of multiple equilibria, I am able to recover unique values of composite productivities and amenities that rationalize the observed data as a model equilibrium.

There is a key difference in this process compared to recent quantitative urban models (e.g. Ahlfeldt et al. 2015). In those models, there is one group of workers. It is straightforward to combine data on residence and employment with the model structure provided by the gravity equation in commuting to solve for the unique vector of wages that rationalize the data. To replicate this in a model with multiple skill groups requires data on residence and employment by skill group. While the former are typically available in censuses, I am unaware of datasets that provide employment by skill group across small spatial units within cities. This is where the model's multiple

industries become useful. The data contain employment by industry. Intuitively, given the differential demand for skills across industries, the relative employment by industries in a location should be informative about the relative employment across skill groups. The following proposition formalizes this intuition, and shows that a unique vector of group-specific wages can be recovered using data on residence by skill and employment by industry. Obtaining the remaining unobservables is straightforward.

Proposition 3. (i) Wages *Given data on residence by skill group L_{Rig} , employment by industries L_{Fjs} , commute costs d_{ija} and car ownership shares $\lambda_{a|ig}$ in addition to model parameters, there exists a unique vector of wages (to scale) that rationalizes the observed data as an equilibrium of the model.*

(ii) Remaining Unobservables *Given model parameters, wages and data $\{L_{Rig}, \pi_{a|ig}, L_{Fjs}, H_i, \vartheta_i, r_{Ri}, r_{Fi}\}$ there exists a unique vector of unobservables $\{u_{iag}, A_{js}, X_{js}, \tau_i, \pi\}$ (to scale) that rationalizes the observed data as an equilibrium of the model.*

The procedure to estimate the parameters of the model proceeds in four steps. First, a subset of parameters is calibrated and estimated without solving the full model. Second, wages are recovered using parameters from the first step. Third, the remaining elasticities are estimated via GMM using moments similar to those in the reduced form analysis. Fourth, with all parameters in hand the model is inverted to recover the remaining unobservables.

D.6 Calibrating α_{sg}

Under the CES aggregator for labor, the relative wage bill paid by firms to high-skill workers in location j and sector s defined as $\lambda_{jsH} \equiv w_{jH} \tilde{L}_{FjHs} / w_{jL} \tilde{L}_{FjLs}$ is

$$\lambda_{jsH} = \left(\frac{w_{jH}}{w_{jL}} \right)^{1-\sigma} \left(\frac{\alpha_{sH}}{\alpha_{sL}} \right)^{\sigma}.$$

Taking a double difference of this ratio in sector s relative to a reference sector s' gives

$$\lambda_{jsH} / \lambda_{js'H} = \left(\frac{\alpha_{sH}}{\alpha_{sL}} \right)^{\sigma} \bigg/ \left(\frac{\alpha_{s'H}}{\alpha_{s'L}} \right)^{\sigma}$$

which holds for all workplace locations j . Using that $\alpha_{sL} = 1 - \alpha_{sH}$ yields

$$\alpha_{sH} = \frac{\frac{\alpha_{s'H}}{1-\alpha_{s'H}} E[\lambda_{jsH} / \lambda_{js'H}]^{1/\sigma}}{1 + \frac{\alpha_{s'H}}{1-\alpha_{s'H}} E[\lambda_{jsH} / \lambda_{js'H}]^{1/\sigma}},$$

where $E[\lambda_{jsH} / \lambda_{js'H}]$ are observed at the city-level in the ECH data. This allows identification of α_{sH} to scale (relative to the value of $\alpha_{s'H}$ in the reference sector). Using the manufacturing sector as the reference sector $s' = M$, I pin down α_{MH} with a departure from the spatial aspect of the model and use that under the CES aggregator the share of the wage bill paid to high-types is

$$\text{Share of Wage Bill to } H_M = \frac{w_H^{1-\sigma} \alpha_{MH}^{\sigma}}{w_H^{1-\sigma} \alpha_{MH}^{\sigma} + w_L^{1-\sigma} (1 - \alpha_{MH})^{\sigma}}.$$

Plugging in the left-hand side (observed at the city-level in the ECH data) along with the average wages w_H, w_L observed in the manufacturing sector in that data allows me to recover a value for α_{MH} .

The results are shown in Table A.8. The first column shows α_{Hs} while the second shows the relative wage bill of high-skill workers. The table shows a sensible and monotonic relationship, where industries such as Education and Financial Services have the highest weight on high-types and Domestic Services and Hotels & Restaurants have the lowest.

D.7 Model Solution

Calibrating $T_H, \bar{h}, p_{car}$ Given the parameter estimates in the previous section, for any value of T_g it is possible to solve for the full distribution of wages across the city. Since the vector T_g is not identified to scale, I normalize $T_L = 1$ and calibrate T_H so that the aggregate wage skill premium in the model matches that observed in the data. This involves jointly solving the system of equations for $\{T_H, w_{jg}\}$

$$\widehat{WP} = \frac{T_H \sum_{ia} \Phi_{RiaH}^{1/\theta_H} \lambda_{iaH}}{\sum_{ia} \Phi_{RiaL}^{1/\theta_L} \lambda_{iaL}}$$

$$w_g = F_g(w_g; L_{Fs}, L_{Rg}, T_H)$$

where $\widehat{WP} = 1.713$ is the wage premium observed in the data, the term next to it is the wage premium as predicted by the model (where λ_{ia} is the share of type- g workers in cell (i, a)), and the operator F_g is the system of equations used to solve for wages as a function of observables as given in Section D.1.3.

Having solved for wages, the parameters $\bar{h}, p_{car}$ are set to exactly match the average expenditure share on housing and cars. In particular, they solve

$$1 - \beta + \bar{h} \sum_{i,a,g} \frac{r_{Ri} L_{Ria} \lambda_{ia}}{E_{ia}} = \hat{\omega}_H$$

$$\sum_{i,g} \lambda_{ig}^C \frac{p_{car} P}{T_g \Phi_{Ria}^{1/\theta_g}} = \hat{\omega}_C$$

where P is the aggregate price index,⁴⁹ $\hat{\omega}_H = 0.3075$ and $\hat{\omega}_C = 0.1513$ are the aggregate expenditure shares on housing and cars respectively from the GEIH, and λ_{ia} and λ_{ig}^C are the share of all individuals in cell (i, a, g) and the share of car owners in cell (i, g) respectively.

I solve for these parameters to exactly match the observed data in each period. For example, for the post period I obtain $T_H = 2.016$, $\bar{h} = 1.2097$ and $p_{car} = 117.37$ (with 7).

Algorithm for Solving the Model The system of equations to be solved are provided in the proof of proposition 1. In this section, I outline the iterative algorithm used to solve for the equilibrium of the model

1. Guess a vector $w^0, \vartheta^0, r^0, u^0, A^0$
2. Given a wage vector $w^t, \vartheta^t, r^t, u^t, A^t$

- (a) Compute $H_{Ri}^t = \vartheta_i^t H_i$, $H_{Fi}^t = (1 - \vartheta_i^t) H_i$, $\Phi_{Ria}^t = \sum_j (w_{jg}^t / d_{ija})^{\theta_g}$ and $W_{is}^t = (\sum_h \alpha_{sh}^{\sigma_L} (w_{ih}^t)^{1-\sigma_L})^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_L}}$.
- (b) Compute $P_t = \left(\sum_{j,s} ((W_{js}^t)^\alpha (r_{Fj}^t)^{1-\alpha} / A_{js})^{1-\sigma} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}}$, where $r_{Fj}^t = (1 - \tau_i) r_i^t$

⁴⁹This can be computed given calibrated wages and productivities, as well as observed commercial floorspace prices.

(c) Compute L_R^t from

$$L_{Riag}^t = \bar{L}_g \frac{\left(u_{iag}^t (T_g \Phi_{Riag}^{1/\theta} - \bar{h} r_{Ri}^t - p_{car}^t a + \pi^t) r_{Ri}^{\beta-1}\right)^{\eta_g}}{\sum_{r,o} \left(u_{rog}^t (T_g \Phi_{Rrog}^{1/\theta} - \bar{h} r_{Rr}^t - p_o^t o + \pi^t) r_{Rr}^{\beta-1}\right)^{\eta_g}}$$

where $p_{car}^t = p_{car} P^t$ and $\pi^t = \bar{L}^{-1} (\sum_i H_{Ri} r_{Ri}^t + H_{Fi} r_{Fi}^t)$.

(d) Compute labor supply $\tilde{L}_{Fig}^t = (w_{jg}^t)^{\theta_g-1} \Psi_{jg}^t$, where $\Psi_{jg}^t \equiv T_g \sum_{r,o} (\Phi_{Riog}^t)^{-\frac{\theta_g-1}{\theta_g}} d_{rjo}^{-\theta_g} L_{Rrog}^t$.

(e) Update the main variables

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{w}_{jg} &= \left[\frac{(P^t)^{\sigma-1} X^t \sum_s B_{isg} A_{is}^{\sigma-1} (W_{is}^t)^{\sigma_L - (1+\alpha_s(\sigma-1))} (r_{Fi}^t)^{-(1-\alpha_s)(\sigma-1)}}{\Psi_{jg}^t} \right]^{\frac{1}{\theta_g + \sigma_L - 1}} \\ \tilde{r}_i &= \frac{E_i^t + (1-\alpha) Y_i^t}{H_i} \\ \tilde{\vartheta}_i &= \begin{cases} 1 & i \in \mathcal{D}_R \setminus \mathcal{D}_F \\ 0 & i \in \mathcal{D}_F \setminus \mathcal{D}_R \\ \frac{E_i^t}{\bar{E}_i^t + (1-\alpha) Y_i^t} & i \in \mathcal{D}_F \cap \mathcal{D}_R \end{cases} \\ \tilde{A}_{js} &= \bar{A}_{js} (\tilde{L}_{Fj}^t / T_j)^{\mu_A} \\ \tilde{u}_{iag} &= \bar{u}_{iag} (L_{RiH}^t / L_{Ri}^t)^{\mu_U} \end{aligned}$$

where $X^t = \beta \sum_{i,g,a} (T_g (\Phi_{Riag}^t)^{1/\theta_g} - p_{car}^t a - r_i^t \bar{h} + \pi^t) L_{Riag}^t$ is aggregate expenditure on goods,

$Y_i^t = \sum_s (p_{is}^t)^{1-\sigma} (A_{js} P^t)^{\sigma-1} X^t$ is firm sales in i and

$E_i^t = r_i^t \bar{h} L_{Ri}^t + (1-\beta) \sum_{a,g} (T_g (\Phi_{Riag}^t)^{1/\theta_g} - p_{car}^t a - r_i^t \bar{h} + \pi^t) L_{Riag}^t$ is expenditure on housing.

3. $\|(\tilde{w}, \tilde{\vartheta}, \tilde{r}, \tilde{u}, \tilde{A}) - (w^t, \vartheta^t, r^t, u^t, A^t)\|_\infty < \epsilon_{tol}$ then stop. Otherwise, set

$(w^{t+1}, \vartheta^{t+1}, r^{t+1}, u^{t+1}, A^{t+1}) = \zeta(w^t, \vartheta^t, r^t, u^t, A^t) + (1-\zeta)(\tilde{w}, \tilde{\vartheta}, \tilde{r}, \tilde{u}, \tilde{A})$ for some $\zeta \in (0, 1)$ and return to step 2.

Since the equilibrium system is only defined to scale (it is homogeneous of degree zero), I normalize the geometric mean of wages to one. In order to keep the scale of different variables on the same order of magnitude, I also normalize the geometric mean of floorspace prices to one prior to solving for the model's unobservables. This affects the scale of unobservables such as productivities and amenities, but has no impact on relative differences in exogenous characteristics or endogenous variables across locations or counterfactuals.

D.8 Benchmarking the Amenity Spillovers

The estimated amenity spillovers can be benchmarked to Diamond (2016) who estimates a spillover of the form $u_{ig} = \bar{u}_{ig} (L_{Hi}/L_{Li})^{\mu_{U,g}}$ finds on average $\mu_U \approx 2.62$. To a first order, in this paper $u_{kig} \approx \bar{u}_{ikg} (L_{Hi}/L_{Li})^{\mu_{U,g}(1-\pi_H)}$ where π_H is the share of high-skill workers. Using $\pi_H = 0.3$ from 2005 (the midpoint of the period in question), the average estimate of 0.818 gives $E[\mu_{U,g}](1-\pi_H) = 0.572$, about one quarter of Diamond (2016).

E Model Extensions

E.1 Migration

The baseline model considers a closed city with a fixed population. This section relaxes this to allow for migration into the city from the rest of the country.

I assume that workers in Colombia face a choice to live in Bogotá or the rest of the country. Workers make their migration choice based on expected utility in the destination; their expected utility is $\bar{U}$ in Bogotá and $\bar{U}^{Rest}$ in the rest of the country. This latter term is an exogenous model parameter. Letting individuals have a multiplicative preference $\eta(\omega)$ for each choice distributed Fréchet with shape parameter $\rho > 0$, the number of workers choosing to live in Bogotá is

$$\bar{L} = \bar{L}^{Col} \left(\frac{\bar{U}}{\bar{U}^{Rest}} \right)^\rho,$$

where $\bar{L}^{Col}$ is the (exogenous) population of the entire country. In changes this yields

$$\hat{\bar{L}} = \frac{\hat{\bar{U}}^\rho}{\pi^{Bog} \hat{\bar{U}}^\rho + \pi^{Rest}},$$

where I have assumed that $\hat{\bar{U}}^{rest} = 1$ (i.e. average utility in the rest of Colombia is unaffected by TransMilenio), and π^{Bog}, π^{Rest} denote the share of Colombians living in Bogotá and the rest of Colombia respectively in the initial period. The remaining equations of the model are unchanged, this simply turns $\hat{\bar{L}}$ from a model parameter into an endogenous variable.

The change in welfare of Bogotá residents is now $E [\bar{U} \eta(\omega) | \omega \text{ chose Bogotá}] = \left[\pi^{Bog} \hat{\bar{U}}^\rho + \pi^{Rest} \right]^{1/\rho}$.

E.2 Congestion

Overview. This section develops an extension of the model that incorporates congestion. While the same system of equations will determine the equilibrium of economic activity in the city given a matrix of commute times, a separate system of equations will be added that determines commute times as a function of economic activity (through the number of commuters). These will then be solved jointly to quantify the response of the equilibrium to a change in infrastructure allowing for congestion.

The extension blends elements from Allen and Arkolakis (2021) and Gaduh et al. (2022). Commuters travel along a network where census tracts are nodes and adjacent census tracts (in the network sense) are connected by edges. They choose a route between an origin and destination, and for each edge in that route they pick a mode. This extension inherits elements from the nested logit model in the paper. If an individual travels using the public nest, they can choose between any mode in that nest (walking, bus, TransMilenio) for each node. However, if they travel by the private nest (i.e. car), they travel by car along each edge. Individuals have route-specific Fréchet shocks, yielding convenient expressions for d_{ij} as the expected cost over all the routes they might take between i and j . Travel time on roads by car is subject to within-mode congestion through a power function of the volume of car travel along that edge.

Congestion is incorporated by building off the working paper version of Allen and Arkolakis (2021).⁵⁰ Unlike the published version, I allow the elasticity with which commuters choose origin-destination pairs to differ from the

⁵⁰This version is Allen and Arkolakis (2019).

elasticity with which they choose the particular route to get there. This choice is made for two reasons. First, it is restrictive to require commuters to have the same heterogeneity in idiosyncratic preferences across pairs of neighborhoods to live and work as they do across potential routes to get between home and work. For example, commuters may largely choose the fastest route between home and work (low dispersion in preferences over routes) but tend to choose quite different home and work locations all else equal (high dispersion in preferences over live-work pairs). Second, this choice keeps the economic and traffic modules of the model separate. In so doing, the reduced form elasticities β_R, β_F from the baseline model continue to determine the response of economic activity to changes in travel times. The difference is that now, the change in travel times with respect to changes in infrastructure will depend on commuting choices through congestion. The extension borrows the idea from Gaduh et al. (2022) to incorporate multiple travel modes by allowing commuters to choose routes between origins and destinations across alternative link-mode combinations, but allows for differential substitution patterns across modes when using public transit as opposed to driving.

Traffic Module. To construct a tractable way of incorporating congestion, I model the routing choice of commuters using the discrete choice framework from Allen and Arkolakis (2021). Between each pair of locations is an infrastructure matrix $\mathbf{T}(m) = [t_{kl}(m)]$ for mode $m \in \{\text{Walk}, \text{Bus}, \text{TransMilenio}, \text{Car}\}$, where $t_{kl}(m) \geq 0$ is the minutes of travel between location k and l on mode m . If no direct link exists between k and l on the network of mode m , I set $t_{kl}(m) = \infty$. I also set $t_{kk}(m) = \infty$ to exclude self-loops.

The disutility of travel over link kl using mode m is simply $\exp(\kappa t_{kl}(m) + \tilde{b}(m))$, where $\tilde{b}(m)$ is an amenity associated with each mode as in the baseline model. I assume these costs are multiplicative, so that if a commuter chooses a route $r = \{i = r_0, r_1, \dots, r_K = j\}$ of length K between i and j , the total cost is $\exp(\kappa t_{ijr} + \tilde{b}_r)$ where $t_{ijr} = \sum_{k=1}^K t_{r_{k-1}, r_k}(m_{r_{k-1}, r_k})$ and $\tilde{b}_r = \sum_{k=1}^K \tilde{b}(m_{r_{k-1}, r_k})$. Note here that m_{r_{k-1}, r_k} is the mode chosen on link r_{k-1}, r_k of the route. Lastly, I allow commuters to have an idiosyncratic multiplicative preference for a particular route $\exp(\nu_r(\omega))$, where $\nu_r(\omega)$ is distributed T1EV for minima with shape parameter $\lambda > 0$. Under the same structure of preferences from the baseline model, indirect utility from choice (i, j, r) is

$$U_{ijr}(\omega) = \frac{u_i w_j r_{Ri}^{\beta-1}}{\exp(\kappa t_{ijr} + \tilde{b}_r + \nu_r(\omega))} \epsilon_{ij}(\omega).$$

Assuming that workers first choose where to live and work and then choose which route to commute with and solving this via backward induction, the route choice problem is simply

$$\min_{r \in P_K, K \geq 0} \left\{ \exp(\kappa t_{ijr} + \tilde{b}_r + \nu_r(\omega)) \right\}.$$

Workers become car owners with probability ρ^{Car} . If they do not own a car, they choose between public modes only. Properties of the T1EV distribution imply that

$$E \left[\min_{r \in P_K^{Pub}, K \geq 0} \left\{ \exp(\kappa t_{ijr} + \nu_r(\omega)) \right\} \right] = \exp(-\kappa \bar{t}_{ij})$$

where $\bar{t}_{ij}^{Pub} = -\frac{1}{\kappa \lambda} \ln \sum_{K=0}^{\infty} \sum_{r \in P_K^{Pub}} \exp \left(-\kappa \lambda \sum_{k=1}^K [t_{r_{k-1}, r_k}(m_{r_{k-1}, r_k}) + \tilde{b}(m_{r_{k-1}, r_k})] \right),$

where P_K^{Pub} are all paths of length K using the public transit network consisting of $m \in \{\text{Walk}, \text{Bus}, \text{TransMilenio}\}$.

If a worker does own a car, they can also choose to travel using the car alone with

$$\bar{t}_{ijCar} = -\frac{1}{\kappa\lambda} \ln \sum_{K=0}^{\infty} \sum_{r \in P_K^{Car}} \exp \left(-\kappa\lambda \sum_{k=1}^K \left[t_{r_{k-1}, r_k}(m_{r_{k-1}, r_k}) + \tilde{b}(m_{r_{k-1}, r_k}) \right] \right),$$

where P_K^{Car} are all paths of length K using the car network. If a worker owns a car, they decide whether to use it to commute and solve $\max \{\bar{t}_{ijPub} + \epsilon_{Pub}, \bar{t}_{ijCar} + \epsilon_{Car}\}$. Assuming the idiosyncratic preference draws $\epsilon_{Pub}, \epsilon_{Car}$ are drawn iid from a TIEV distribution, the probability of choosing to travel using the car conditional on owning a car is

$$P_{ijCar|Car} = \frac{\exp(-\kappa\bar{t}_{ijCar})}{\exp(-\kappa\bar{t}_{ijCar}) + \exp(-\kappa\bar{t}_{ijPub})}.$$

Note that overall expected utility is

$$\begin{aligned} E_a \left[\max_m \{U_{ijm|a}(\omega)\} \right] &= u_i w_j r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} \epsilon_{ij}(\omega) \times \left[\rho_{car} \left(E \left[\min_{r \in P_K^{Pub}, K \geq 0} \{ \exp(\kappa t_{ijr} + \nu_r(\omega)) \} + \epsilon_{Pub}, \min_{r \in P_K^{Car}, K \geq 0} \{ \exp(\kappa t_{ijr} + \nu_r(\omega)) \} \right) \right. \right. \\ &= u_i w_j r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} \epsilon_{ij}(\omega) \times [\rho_{car} (E \max \{ \exp(\kappa \bar{t}_{ijPub} + \epsilon^{Pub}), \exp(\kappa \bar{t}_{ijCar} + \epsilon^{Car}) \}) + (1 - \rho_{car}) \exp(\kappa \bar{t}_{ijCar})] \\ &= u_i w_j r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} \epsilon_{ij}(\omega) \times [\rho_{car} (\exp(\kappa \bar{t}_{ijOwnCar})) + (1 - \rho_{car}) \exp(\kappa \bar{t}_{ijPub})] \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\bar{t}_{ijOwnCar} \equiv -\frac{1}{\kappa} \ln [\exp(-\kappa \bar{t}_{ijPub}) + \exp(-\kappa \bar{t}_{ijCar})].$$

So altogether

$$\begin{aligned} E_a \left[\max_m \{U_{ijm|a}(\omega)\} \right] &= \frac{u_i w_j r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} \epsilon_{ij}(\omega)}{\exp(\kappa \bar{t}_{ij})} \\ \text{where } \bar{t}_{ij} &= -\frac{1}{\kappa} \ln [\rho_{car} \exp(-\kappa \bar{t}_{ijOwnCar}) + (1 - \rho_{car}) \exp(-\kappa \bar{t}_{ijPub})] \end{aligned}$$

are average commute times. This therefore is nested within the simple model of Appendix C.1, with a different formulation of commute costs d_{ij} .

Define $\mathbf{A}(m) \equiv [a_{kl}(m) \equiv \exp(t_{kl}(m) + \tilde{b}(m))^{-\kappa\lambda}]$. As in Gaduh et al. (2022), one can show via induction for the public transit network that

$$\begin{aligned} \exp(\bar{t}_{ij})^{-\kappa\lambda} &= \sum_{K=0}^{\infty} \mathbf{A}_{ijPub}^K \\ \text{where } \mathbf{A}_{Pub} &= \sum_{m \in \mathcal{B}^{Pub}} \mathbf{A}(m) \end{aligned}$$

where $\mathbf{A}_{ijPub}^K$ is the ij element of the K matrix power of the matrix $\mathbf{A}_{Pub}$.⁵¹ So long as the spectral radius of $\mathbf{A}_{Pub}$

⁵¹For $K = 1$,

$$\exp(\bar{t}_{ij,1})^{-\kappa\rho} = \sum_m \exp(-\kappa\rho t_{ij}(m)) = \left[\sum_{m \in \mathcal{B}^{Pub}} \mathbf{A}(m) \right]_{ij} = \mathbf{A}_{ijPub}.$$

Now suppose that $\exp(\bar{t}_{ij,K})^{-\kappa\rho} = [\mathbf{A}_{Pub}^K]_{ij}$. This is the sum of all weights along all paths between ij of length K . To compute the same for paths of length $K + 1$, one simply multiplies by the adjacency matrix and sum across all modes that could be taken

is less than one, $\sum_{K=0}^{\infty} \mathbf{A}_{ij}^K = (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A})^{-1} \equiv \mathbf{B}_{Pub}$ and

$$\bar{t}_{ij}^{Pub} = -\frac{1}{\kappa\lambda} \ln b_{ij}^{Pub},$$

where b_{ij}^{Pub} is the ij element of $\mathbf{B}_{Pub}$. For the car network, as in Allen and Arkolakis (2021)

$$\bar{t}_{ij}^{Car} = -\frac{1}{\kappa\lambda} \ln b_{ij}^{Car},$$

where $\mathbf{B}_{Car} \equiv (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A}(car))^{-1}$.

To close this module, I need to define how travel costs on each link $t_{kl}(m)$ are determined. I allow these to depend on exogenous characteristics $e_{kl}(m)$ and, for the car network, the traffic using the link $\Xi_{kl}(m)$ ⁵² through the log-linear functional form

$$t_{kl}(m) = e_{kl}(m) \Xi_{kl}(m)^{\phi_m},$$

where $\phi_{Car} > 0$ and otherwise is zero. There are $L_{ij}^{Car} = P_{ij}^{Car|Car} \rho^{Car} L_{ij}$ commuters using the car network, and so the number of car trips using a link is therefore

$$\Xi_{kl}(Car) = \sum_{ij} \pi_{ij}^{kl}(Car) L_{ij}^{Car}.$$

where $\pi_{ij}^{kl}(Car)$ is the number of times the average driver between i and j uses link kl . The results from Allen and Arkolakis (2021) imply

$$\pi_{ij}^{kl}(Car) = \frac{b_{ik}^{Car} a_{kl}(m) b_{lj}^{Car}}{b_{ij}^{Car}}.$$

Letting $\mathbf{L}_{Car} \equiv [L_{ij}^{Car}]$ denote the matrix of commute flows on the car network, this system can be written in matrix form as

$$\Xi(Car) = \mathbf{A}(Car) \odot [\mathbf{B}'_{Car} (\mathbf{L}_{Car} \oslash \mathbf{B}_{Car}) \mathbf{B}'_{Car}]$$

where $\odot$ and $\oslash$ are Hadamard product and division operators respectively. This formulation reduces the size of the matrices that need to be stored, since $\mathbf{A}(Car)$, $\mathbf{B}_{Car}$, $\mathbf{L}_{Car}$ are all $I \times I$ rather than $\{\pi_{ij}^{kl}(Car)\}$ which is $I^2 \times I^2$. Lastly, I define the exogenous portion of travel costs in the same way as Allen and Arkolakis (2021). Assuming travel time is given by $t_{kl}(m) = (distance_{kl} \times speed_{kl}^{-1}(m))^{\delta_0}$ and inverse speed is given by $speed_{kl}^{-1}(m) = \gamma(m) \times \left(\frac{\Xi_{kl}(m)}{lanes_{kl}(m)} \right)^{\delta_1(m)} \times \epsilon_{kl}(m)$ where $\gamma(m)$ is a mode-specific shifter and $\epsilon_{kl}(m)$ is a link-mode-specific idiosyncratic term, then

$$t_{kl}(m) = \underbrace{\left[\frac{distance_{kl} \times \gamma(m) \times \epsilon_{kl}(m)}{lanes_{kl}(m)^{\delta_1(m)}} \right]^{\delta_0}}_{e_{kl}(m)} \times \Xi_{kl}(m)^{\phi_m},$$

next

$$\exp(\bar{t}_{ij,K+1})^{-\kappa\rho} = \sum_{m \in \mathcal{B}^{Pub}} \left[\mathbf{A}_{Pub}^K \mathbf{A}(m) \right]_{ij} = \left[\mathbf{A}_{Pub}^K \sum_{m \in \mathcal{B}^{Pub}} \mathbf{A}(m) \right]_{ij} = \left[\mathbf{A}_{Pub}^K \mathbf{A}_{Pub} \right]_{ij} = \left[\mathbf{A}_{Pub}^{K+1} \right]_{ij}.$$

This proves the conjecture.

⁵²A previous version of the paper allowed for congestion on the bus and TransMilenio network too.

where $\phi_m \equiv \delta_0 \delta_1(m)$.

Traffic Equilibrium. Collecting the previous results, a traffic equilibrium is a vector $\{t_{kl}(m), \Xi_{kl}(m), \bar{t}_{ij}\}$ that given commute flows L_{ij} and parameters $\delta_0, \delta_1(m), \tilde{b}(m), \gamma(m), lanes_{kl}(m), distance_{kl}, \rho_{Car}$ satisfies the system

$$\begin{aligned}
t_{kl}(m) &= e_{kl}(m) \Xi_{kl}(m)^{\phi_m} \\
\Xi(Car) &= \mathbf{A}(Car) \odot [\mathbf{B}'_{Car}(\mathbf{L}_{Car} \oslash \mathbf{B}_{Car}) \mathbf{B}'_{Car}] \\
\bar{t}_{ij} &= -\frac{1}{\kappa} \ln [\rho_{Car} \exp(-\kappa \bar{t}_{ij} OwnCar) + (1 - \rho_{Car}) \exp(-\kappa \bar{t}_{ij} Pub)] \\
\bar{t}_{ij} Pub &= -\frac{1}{\kappa \lambda} \ln b_{ij} Pub \\
\bar{t}_{ij} Car &= -\frac{1}{\kappa \lambda} \ln b_{ij} Car \\
\mathbf{A}(m) &= \left[\exp \left(t_{kl}(m) + \tilde{b}(m) \right)^{-\kappa \lambda} \right]_{kl} \\
\mathbf{A}_{Pub} &= \sum_{m \in \mathcal{B}^{Pub}} \mathbf{A}(m) \\
\mathbf{A}_{Car} &= \mathbf{A}(Car) \\
\mathbf{B}_{Pub} &= (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A}_{Pub})^{-1} \\
\mathbf{B}_{Car} &= (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A}_{Car})^{-1} \\
L_{ij} Car &= P_{ij Car | Car} \rho^{Car} L_{ij} \\
P_{ij Car | Car} &= \frac{\exp(-\kappa \bar{t}_{ij} Car)}{\exp(-\kappa \bar{t}_{ij} Car) + \exp(-\kappa \bar{t}_{ij} Pub)}
\end{aligned}$$

The first three rows are a system of as many equations as unknowns, while the remaining rows define the auxiliary variables of that system.

I refer to this as the traffic module of the model: it determines travel times $\bar{t}_{ij}$ given a matrix of commute flows $\mathbf{L}$. Recall that the baseline model pins down changes in economic activity $\{\hat{L}_{Ri}, \hat{L}_{Fi}, \hat{r}_{Ri}, \hat{r}_{Fi}, \hat{\Phi}_{Ri}, \hat{\Phi}_{Fi}, \hat{\hat{\Phi}}_{Fi}, \hat{\hat{L}}_{Fi}, \hat{\hat{U}}, \hat{\hat{E}}\}$ given a change in travel costs $\{\hat{d}_{ij}\}$, which depends on changes in travel times. I therefore also need to express the change in travel times as a function of the change in commute flows. I will model changes in transit infrastructure as a change in the number of lanes on the mode in question, $\widehat{lanes}_{kl}(m)$. In particular, when simulating the removal of TransMilenio I will set $\widehat{lanes}_{kl}(m)$ to a very small number $\forall kl, m = TransMilenio$ so that $\hat{t}_{kl}(m) \rightarrow \infty$.⁵³ In response to this change in model parameters, the change in traffic equilibrium can be written as

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{t}_{kl}(m) &= \widehat{lanes}_{kl}^{-\phi_m}(m) \hat{\Xi}_{kl}^{\phi_m}(m) \\
\hat{\Xi}_{kl}(Car) \Xi_{kl}(Car) &= \left[\mathbf{A}'(Car) \odot (\mathbf{B}'_{Car})' (\mathbf{L}'_{Car} \oslash \mathbf{B}'_{Car}) (\mathbf{B}'_{Car})' \right] \\
\bar{t}'_{ijk} - \bar{t}_{ijk} &= -\frac{1}{\kappa \lambda} \ln (b'_{ijk} / b_{ijk}) \quad k \in \{Pub, Car\} \\
\mathbf{A}'(m) &= \left[\exp \left(\hat{t}_{kl}(m) t_{kl}(m) + \tilde{b}(m) \right)^{-\kappa \lambda} \right]_{kl} \\
\mathbf{A}'_{Pub} &= \sum_{m \in \mathcal{B}^{Pub}} \mathbf{A}'(m) \\
\mathbf{B}'_{Pub} &= (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A}'_{Pub})^{-1}
\end{aligned}$$

⁵³Since $\hat{e}_{kl}(m) = \widehat{lanes}_{kl}^{-\phi_m}(m)$, setting lanes equal to zero in the counterfactual would leave $\hat{e}_{kl}(m) = \infty$ and the new equilibrium would be undefined.

$$\mathbf{B}'_{Car} = (\mathbf{I} - \mathbf{A}'(Car))^{-1}$$

This provides a system that pins down $\{\hat{t}_{kl}(m), \hat{\Xi}_{kl}(Car), \bar{t}_{ijk} - \bar{t}_{ijk}\}$ given data from the initial equilibrium $\{\Xi_{kl}(Car),$

$(m), t_{kl}\}$ and commute flows in the counterfactual equilibrium $\mathbf{L}' = \hat{\mathbf{L}} \odot \mathbf{L}$. Since $\hat{d}_{ij} = \exp(\kappa(\bar{t}_{ij}' - \bar{t}_{ij}))$ with $\bar{t}_{ij}$ as defined above, this pins down the change in commute costs given the shock to infrastructure $\widehat{lanes_{kl}(m)}$ and the change in commute flows $\hat{\mathbf{L}}$. Combining the economic module of the model with the traffic module provides one large system of equations that jointly finds the distribution of changes in economic activity and traffic that is consistent with equilibrium in both modules of the model.

Calibrating the Model. To solve the model in changes, I require values for the parameters $\delta, \delta_1(m), \lambda, \tilde{b}(m), \gamma(m)$ and data $t_{kl}(m), \Xi_{kl}(m)$. Note that link-level traffic and travel times are unobserved, so these need to be calibrated along with the deep model parameters.⁵⁴

Given a value for the parameters $\delta, \delta_1(m), \lambda$, I need to solve for the preference shifters $b(m)$ and speed shifters $\gamma(m)$. I estimate these to match average speed and choice shares for each mode. With these in hand, I can solve for $t_{kl}(m), \Xi_{kl}(m)$ which are consistent with the model and observed data given deep parameters $\delta, \delta_1(m), \lambda$.

Lastly, I calibrate these deep traffic parameters $\delta, \delta_1(m), \lambda$ to existing values from the literature. First, I set the routing elasticity $\lambda = 175$ from Allen and Arkolakis (2019). This implies highly elastic routing choices, so that commuters take close to the least cost route between origins and destinations. Second, as in Allen and Arkolakis (2021) I set $\delta_0 = 1/\theta$ to match a unit distance elasticity. Lastly, I calibrate $\delta_1(Car)$ to give a congestion elasticity $\phi_{Car} = \delta_0 \delta_1(Car) = 0.06$, the average congestion elasticity estimated for Bogotá by Duranton and Akbar (2017). $\phi_m = 0$ for all other modes.

E.3 Endogenous Floorspace Use with Fixed Housing Supply

This section considers an extension of the simple model in which total floorspace supply is fixed but the share used for commercial purpose ϑ_i is endogenous. To rationalize differences in commercial and residential floorspace prices, I allow for a tax equivalent of zoning regulations which mean that floorspace owners receive $(1 - \tau_i)r_{Fi}$ for each unit of floorspace allocated to commercial use. Denoting $r_i = r_{Ri}$, no arbitrage across floorspace use implies $r_{Fi} = (1 - \tau_i)r_i$. This implies that the share of floorspace used for commercial purpose and the floorspace price is pinned down by

$$\vartheta_i = \frac{H_{Fi}}{H_{Ri} + H_{Fi}} = \frac{(1 - \alpha) \left(w_i^\alpha ((1 - \tau_i)r_i)^{1-\alpha} \right)^{1-\sigma_D} A_i^{\sigma_D-1} E}{(1 - \beta) \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} L_{Ri}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} + (1 - \alpha) \left(w_i^\alpha ((1 - \tau_i)r_i)^{1-\alpha} \right)^{1-\sigma_D} A_i^{\sigma_D-1} E}$$

⁵⁴To construct these, I need values for $distance_{kl}$ and $lanes_{kl}(m)$. For walk, car and bus networks these are computed between adjacent census tracts. $distance_{kl}$ is the minimum distance on each mode's network between adjacent tract centroids along the network. For non-adjacent tracts or adjacent tracts not connected by a network, $distance_{kl} = \infty$. For the TransMilenio network, $distance_{kl}$ is finite for two census tracts that are directly connected via the network, i.e. there is no stop between them. The number of lanes is equal to one for any pair of connected tracts for the walk, bus and TransMilenio network. For the car network, I first construct dummies for whether a pair is connected via primary, secondary and tertiary connections (which are not mutually exclusive; a pair can be connected via multiple road types). I then assign five lanes to primary connections, two to secondary connections and one to tertiary connections to approximate the road widths documented in Google Earth, and then compute the total number of lanes between a pair as the sum all road type connections (i.e. the maximum number of lanes is eight).

$$r_i = \frac{(1 - \alpha) \left(w_i^\alpha ((1 - \tau_i) r_i)^{1 - \alpha} \right)^{1 - \sigma_D} A_i^{\sigma_D - 1} E + (1 - \beta) \Phi_{Ri}^{1/\theta} L_{Ri}^{\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta}}}{H_i}.$$

These equations hold for mixed use locations with $\vartheta_i \in (0, 1)$, which one can show to be locations where $\bar{u}_i > 0$ and $\bar{A}_i > 0$. If either exogenous amenities or productivities are zero in a location, that location becomes completely specialized in that type of floorspace.

Extending the equilibrium system to incorporate these new equations, and writing in changes assuming unobservables are constant across periods yields the system

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{L}_{Ri}^{1 - \theta \mu_U} \hat{r}_i^{\theta(1 - \beta)} &= \hat{\bar{L}} \hat{U}^{-\theta} \hat{\Phi}_{Ri} \\ \hat{r}_i &= \frac{\vartheta_i (\hat{w}_i^\alpha \hat{r}_i^{1 - \alpha})^{1 - \sigma_D} \hat{\bar{L}}_{Fi}^{\mu_A(\sigma_D - 1)} \hat{E} + (1 - \vartheta_i) \hat{\Phi}_{Ri}^{1/\theta} \hat{L}_{Ri}^{\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta}}}{\hat{H}_i} \\ \hat{r}_i^{(\sigma_D - 1)(1 - \alpha)} \hat{\bar{L}}_{Fi}^{\frac{\theta + (\sigma_D - 1)(\alpha - \mu_A(\theta - 1))}{\theta - 1}} &= \left(\hat{\bar{L}} \hat{U}^{-(\theta - 1)} \right)^{-\frac{\alpha(\sigma_D - 1) + 1}{\theta - 1}} \hat{E} \hat{\Phi}_{Fi}^{\frac{\alpha(\sigma_D - 1) + 1}{\theta - 1}} \\ \hat{\vartheta}_i &= \frac{(\hat{w}_i^\alpha \hat{r}_i^{1 - \alpha})^{1 - \sigma_D} \hat{\bar{L}}_{Fi}^{\mu_A(\sigma_D - 1)} \hat{E}}{(1 - \vartheta_i) \hat{\Phi}_{Ri}^{1/\theta} \hat{L}_{Ri}^{\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta}} + \vartheta_i (\hat{w}_i^\alpha \hat{r}_i^{1 - \alpha})^{1 - \sigma_D} \hat{\bar{L}}_{Fi}^{\mu_A(\sigma_D - 1)} \hat{E}} \\ \hat{w}_j &= \left(\left(\hat{\bar{L}} \hat{U}^{-\theta} \right)^{\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta}} \frac{\hat{L}_{Fj}}{\hat{\Phi}_{Fj}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta - 1}} \end{aligned}$$

The two equations for $\hat{r}_i$ and ϑ_i are no longer log-linear. However, taking logs, differentiating the original system and substituting out for wages yields the following first order approximation of the system

$$\begin{aligned} &\begin{bmatrix} 1 - \theta \mu_U & \theta(1 - \beta) & 0 & 0 \\ -(1 - \vartheta_i) \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} & (1 + \vartheta_i(\sigma_D - 1)(1 - \alpha)) & \vartheta_i(\sigma_D - 1) \left(\frac{\alpha}{\theta - 1} - \mu_A \right) & 0 \\ 0 & (\sigma_D - 1)(1 - \alpha) & \frac{\theta + (\sigma_D - 1)(\alpha - \mu_A(\theta - 1))}{\theta - 1} & 0 \\ \frac{(1 - \vartheta_i)(\theta - 1)}{\theta} & (\sigma_D - 1)(1 - \alpha)(1 + \vartheta_i) & -(1 - \vartheta_i)(\sigma_D - 1) \left[\mu_A - \frac{\alpha}{\theta - 1} \right] & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \ln \hat{L}_{Ri} \\ \ln \hat{r}_i \\ \ln \hat{\bar{L}}_{Fi} \\ \ln \hat{\vartheta}_i \end{bmatrix} = \\ &\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ (1 - \vartheta_i) \frac{1}{\theta} \\ 0 \\ -(1 - \vartheta_i) \frac{1}{\theta} \end{bmatrix} \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Ri} + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ \frac{\vartheta_i (\frac{\sigma_D - 1}{\theta - 1} \alpha)}{1 + \alpha(\sigma_D - 1)} \\ \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta - 1} \\ \frac{\alpha(\sigma_D - 1)(1 - \vartheta_i)}{\theta - 1} \end{bmatrix} \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} \\ &+ \begin{bmatrix} \theta \ln \hat{\bar{u}} + \ln \hat{\bar{L}} - \theta \ln \hat{\bar{U}} \\ -\vartheta_i(\sigma_D - 1) \alpha \left(\frac{1}{\theta} \ln \hat{\bar{L}} - \ln \hat{\bar{U}} \right) - \vartheta_i \alpha (\sigma_D - 1) \ln \hat{E} - \ln \hat{H}_i - \vartheta_i (1 - \alpha) (\sigma_D - 1) \ln(\widehat{1 - \tau_i}) \\ (\sigma_D - 1) \ln \hat{A}_i - \frac{\alpha(\sigma_D - 1) + 1}{\theta} \left(\ln \hat{L} - \theta \ln \hat{\bar{U}} \right) + \ln \hat{E} \\ (\sigma_D - 1)(1 - \vartheta_i) \ln \hat{A}_i - \vartheta_i \ln \hat{E} - \vartheta_i (1 - \alpha) (\sigma_D - 1) \ln(\widehat{1 - \tau_i}) - \alpha(\sigma_D - 1)(1 - \vartheta_i) \left[\frac{1}{\theta} \ln \hat{\bar{L}} - \ln \hat{\bar{U}} \right] \end{bmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

Now the A, b_R, b_F terms have data in them through the initial floorspace share terms ϑ_i . This system can once again be written as

$$\ln \hat{y}_i = A^{-1} b_R \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Ri} + A^{-1} b_F \ln \hat{\Phi}_{Fi} + \mathbf{e}_i$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{where } A &= \begin{bmatrix} (1 - \theta\mu_U)I & \theta(1 - \beta)I & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} \\ -(1 - \text{diag}(\vartheta_i))\frac{\theta-1}{\theta} & (1 + \text{diag}(\vartheta_i)(\sigma_D - 1)(1 - \alpha)) & \text{diag}(\vartheta_i)(\sigma_D - 1)\left(\frac{\alpha}{\theta-1} - \mu_A\right) & \mathbf{0} \\ \mathbf{0} & (\sigma_D - 1)(1 - \alpha)I & \frac{\theta + (\sigma_D - 1)(\alpha - \mu_A(\theta - 1))}{\theta - 1}I & \mathbf{0} \\ \frac{(1 - \text{diag}(\vartheta_i))(\theta - 1)}{\theta} & (\sigma_D - 1)(1 - \alpha)(1 + \text{diag}(\vartheta_i)) & -(1 - \text{diag}(\vartheta_i))(\sigma_D - 1)\left[\mu_A - \frac{\alpha}{\theta - 1}\right] & I \end{bmatrix}_{4I \times 4I} \\
b_R &= \begin{bmatrix} I \\ \frac{1}{\theta}I \\ \mathbf{0} \\ -(I - \text{diag}(\vartheta_i))\frac{1}{\theta} \end{bmatrix}_{4I \times I} \\
b_F &= \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{0} \\ \frac{\alpha(\sigma_D - 1)}{\theta - 1}I \\ \frac{1 + \alpha(\sigma_D - 1)}{\theta - 1}I \\ \frac{\alpha(\sigma_D - 1)}{\theta - 1}(I - \text{diag}(\vartheta_i)) \end{bmatrix}_{4I \times I}
\end{aligned}$$

Two insights follow from comparing this system to the equilibrium in the baseline model. First, there are now heterogeneous elasticities across locations since the A^{-1} matrix contains data on initial land shares which differ by location. Second, since A is no longer block diagonal, each outcome now depends on both RCMA and FCMA.

E.4 Housing Supply Adjustment and Land Value Capture

Housing Supply. This section outlines the extension of the model allowing for a housing supply response to the transit infrastructure. First, I consider a model where housing supply can freely adjust in each location, and floorspace use is endogenous as in Section E.3. Housing is produced according to the Cobb-Douglas technology $H_i = T_i^{1-\eta} K_i^\eta$. The price of capital is normalized to one. Defining the production function on one unit of land as $h_i = k_i^\eta$ where $k_i \equiv K_i/T_i$, developers solve the problem

$$\max_{k_i} k_i^\eta r_i - k_i - p_i$$

where p_i is the price of land in i . This yields the density of construction per unit of land of $k_i = (\eta r_i)^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}$ and profits $\tilde{\eta} r_i^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}} - p_i$ where $\tilde{\eta} \equiv \eta^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}$. The price of land adjusts so that developers earn zero profits $p_i = \tilde{\eta} r_i^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}$. Total housing supply is then given by $H_i = T_i(\eta r_i)^{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}}$. The share of floorspace allocated to commercial use ϑ_i is determined as in Section E.3. The remainder of the model equations are unchanged; this housing supply condition is simply added to them. To ensure this fits the data in the initial period, a residual $\zeta_i = H_i/T_i(\eta r_i)^{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}}$ is introduced so that the effective units of land are actually $T_i\zeta_i$. This wedge can be interpreted as the quality of land.

Land Value Capture. In the Land Value Capture scheme, only a subset of locations are allowed to have floorspace adjust.

Under the distance-based scheme, locations $i \in \mathcal{I}$ within 500m from a station are allocated a 30% increase in floorspace. Their floorspace is allowed to increase up to a maximum of 30%, but not decrease (which is the relevant case for a relatively short 16 year time horizon). That is,

$$\hat{H}_i = \begin{cases} \max\{1, (\hat{r}_i)^{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}}\} & \text{if } i \in \mathcal{I} \text{ and } \max\{1, (\hat{r}_i)^{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}}\} < 1.3 \\ 1.3 & \text{if } i \in \mathcal{I} \text{ and } \max\{1, (\hat{r}_i)^{\frac{\eta}{1-\eta}}\} > 1.3 \\ 1 & \text{if } i \notin \mathcal{I}. \end{cases}$$

Perfect competition ensures the price of the permits adjust so that that developers earn zero profits, so income from the scheme is $(H' - H_i)r'_i$ where prices are evaluated in the new equilibrium.

Under the CMA-based scheme, locations are allocated permits proportional to their change in CMA

$\vartheta_i \Delta \ln \Phi_{Ri} + (1 - \vartheta_i) \Delta \ln \Phi_{Fi}$ so that the number of potential new permits (or, equivalently, the maximum amount of new floorspace created) is the same as under the distance-based scheme. Here ϑ_i is the commercial floorspace share in the initial equilibrium and the CMA changes are those using the baseline measure that hold population and employment fixed at their initial levels, so this is all information which the policy maker would have at the time of the intervention.

Parameterization. In the quantitative exercises, a conservative choice for the housing elasticity is made so that $\eta/(1 - \eta) = 0.7$ to match the most inelastic cities in the US from Saiz (2010). This value corresponds to his value for Oakland, CA which is ranked the 6th most inelastic city, one position behind San Francisco and San Diego (3rd and 4th) and a couple ahead of New York and Chicago (9th and 12th). I also shut down spillovers for a conservative estimate, especially in the open city case where a large value for the amenity spillover can lead to larger changes in population than in the baseline model.

E.5 Employment in Domestic Services

This section outlines the extension of the model that incorporates employment in domestic services. I begin by noting the following facts. First, between 2000-2014 in the GEIH 7.3% of non-college educated Bogotanos worked as domestic helpers while almost no college educated workers did. Second, in the 2014 Multipurpose Survey I observe that 30.3% of college-educated households employ domestic services, compared to only 3.6% of non-college households. Third, conditional on employing domestic workers households spend on average 0.15 of their income on their wages, a fraction that remains constant with income. Unfortunately, employment in domestic services by employment location is reported neither in the census nor in the CCB. Therefore, given that 90% of domestic workers are employed in college educated households, I impute domestic employment by assigning each worker equally to high skilled households and scaling up until the total matches the number observed in the GEIH.

These observations motivate the following extension of the model. I assume that only high-skilled households consume domestic services while only low-skilled workers are used in its production. I also assume domestic services enter the utility of the high skilled according to Cobb-Douglas preferences with an expenditure share of 0.045 (=0.303*0.15). That is, I assume the common component of utility is given by

$$U_H = C^{1-\beta_H-\beta_D} (H - \bar{h})^{\beta_H} D^{\beta_D}$$

In each location, a perfectly competitive firm produces domestic services under the linear technology $Y_{iD} = \tilde{L}_{FiL}$. The cost is therefore equal to the low-skill wage $p_i^D = w_{Li}$. Market clearing for domestic services therefore requires that

$$\beta_D E_{iH} = p_i^D D_i = \frac{w_{Li} \tilde{L}_{FiL}}{\bar{A}_{Di}}$$

where $\bar{A}_{Di}$ is a residual that ensures this condition holds and reflects factors that make i more or less easy to work in as a domestic worker.

The equilibrium equations of the model remain the same, apart from the labor demand equation which becomes

$$\tilde{L}_{Fig} = w_{ig}^{-\sigma} P^{\sigma_D-1} E \sum_s B_{isg} A_{is}^{\sigma_D-1} W_{is}^{\sigma_D-(1+\alpha_s(\sigma_D-1))} r_{Fi}^{-(1-\alpha_s)(\sigma_D-1)} + \mathbb{I}_{gL} \frac{\beta_H^D E_{iH}}{w_{Li}}$$

and the expression for residential populations for high skilled which becomes

$$L_{Riag} = \bar{L}_g \frac{\left(u_{iag} (T_g \Phi_{Riag}^{1/\theta} - \bar{h} r_{Ri} - p_{car} a) r_{Ri}^{\beta-1} w_{Li}^{\beta_D} \right)^{\eta_g}}{\sum_{r,o} \left(u_{rog} (T_g \Phi_{Rrog}^{1/\theta} - \bar{h} r_{Rr} - p_o o) r_{Rr}^{\beta-1} w_{Lr}^{\beta_D} \right)^{\eta_g}}, g = H.$$

The other ingredients of the model are unchanged. The procedure to solve the model and unobservables is unchanged, other than for wages. The system of equations is extended to include the domestic service sector:

$$D_{ig}(w) = w_{ig}^{\theta_g} \left[\sum_s \frac{L_{Rsg}}{\sum_k w_{kg}^{\theta_g} d_{sk}^{-\theta_g}} d_{si}^{-\theta_g} \right] - \left[\sum_s \frac{(w_{ig}/\alpha_{sg})^{-\sigma}}{\sum_h (w_{ih}/\alpha_{sh})^{-\sigma}} \frac{\bar{\epsilon}_{is}}{\bar{\epsilon}_{ig}} L_{Fis} + L_{FiD} \mathbb{I}_{gL} \right]$$

where $\mathbb{I}_{gL}$ is a dummy for whether g is L , and L_{FiD} is employment in domestic services as described above.

E.6 Home Ownership

This section outlines the extension of the model that allows for local homeownership across worker groups to match the ownership rates observed in the data. In the data, homeownership rates are 0.603 and 0.457 for college and non-college individuals respectively in 2015. Letting o_L and o_H be the shares of homeowners in the data, I therefore assume that total income is given by

$$\frac{w_{jg} \epsilon_j(\omega)}{d_{ija}} + o_g \frac{E_i}{L_{Ri}}$$

where $E_i = \sum_{g,a} (r_{Ri} \bar{h} + (1 - \beta)(\bar{y}_{iag} - p_{car} a - r_{Ri} \bar{h} + \pi_{ig})) L_{Riag}$ is total expenditure on housing by residents of i , L_{Ri} are total residents in i and $\pi_{ig} \equiv o_g \frac{E_i}{L_{Ri}}$ is income from homeownership. That is, the model is the same with one replacement of π with π_{ig} . The remaining equilibrium equations and procedure to solve for unobservables are easily extended to incorporate this change.

F Data Appendix

This section provides supplementary information on the data used in this paper.

F.1 Dataset Description

Population

The primary source of population data is DANE's General Census of 1993, 2005 and 2018. This contains the population in each block by education-level. I define "college" educated workers to be those with more than post-secondary education (defined by the level achieved during their last complete year of study). This contains both conventional universities and technical colleges, but the small size of the latter means the results are not

sensitive to this grouping. My main results include adults twenty years of age and older; the results are robust to including individuals of all ages.⁵⁵

Commuting

Commuting data comes from the city's Mobility Survey administered by the Department of Mobility and overseen by DANE. Conducted in 2005, 2011 and 2015, these are household surveys in which each member was asked to complete a travel diary for the previous day. For 1995, I obtained the Mobility Survey undertaken by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to similar specifications as the DANE surveys. The sample sizes are similar across years, including 141,316 trips for 73,830 individuals in 20,002 households per round on average.⁵⁶ I include only trips that originate or end in municipal Bogotá in the analysis.⁵⁷ Sampling weights are also provided. The survey reports the demographic information of each traveler and household, including age, education, gender, industry of occupation, car ownership and in some years income.⁵⁸ For each trip, the data report the departure time, arrival time, purpose of the trip, mode, as well as origin and destination UPZ.⁵⁹ Since all trips are reported, these include commutes (trips to work) as well as for other purposes (e.g. shopping, seeing friends). Reported modes are often quite detailed (e.g. twenty five options in 2011); I often aggregate into car, bus, TransMilenio, and others (walking, bicycle, motorbike). Trips on TransMilenio trunk and feeder buses are reported separately, so I consider TransMilenio trips to be those involving at least one stage on a trunk bus (multiple modes can be reported in a single trip).

Housing

As described in the main text, the mission of the cadastre is to keep the city's geographical information up to date and thus 98.6% of the city's more than 2 million properties are included.⁶⁰ The city is recognized as a pioneer on the continent for the quality of its cadastre (Anselin and Lozano-Gracia 2012). In addition to having an updated record of the city's layout, the cadastre is important for the government due to its importance in city revenues: in 2008, for example, property taxes accounted for 19.8% of Bogotá's tax revenues (Uribe Sanchez 2010). These taxes depend on assessed property values. In developed countries, property valuations are typically determined using data on market transactions. However, Bogotá, like most developing cities, lacks comprehensive records of such data. The city circumvents this by assessing property prices as follows. First, they collect available data on transactions through outreach to the real estate sector (Uribe Sanchez 2010). Second, through a census-like process officials collect information on property sales announced through signs and local newspapers, survey these properties and then contact the owners pretending to be potential buyers. They negotiate to get as close as possible to an actual sales price and record the final value, under the premise of a cash payment (Anselin and Lozano-Gracia 2012). Third, the city hires teams of professional assessors to value at least one property in one of

⁵⁵The data provided to me by DANE provided population totals by education level and age across 10 year age bins.

⁵⁶Minima-maxima across years are (i) 117,217-169,766 trips, (ii) 58,313-91,765 individuals and (iii) 15,519-28,213 households.

⁵⁷Municipal Bogotá accounts for 85% of the residents of the Bogotá metropolitan area, and only 5% of employment in municipal Bogotá comes from outside the municipality (Akbar and Duranton 2017)

⁵⁸The 1995 survey reports raw income, while in 2011 and 2015 eight income bin dummies are reported.

⁵⁹In certain years more precise spatial information is reported, such as address of origin and destination in 2011, but UPZ are consistently reported across all years.

⁶⁰I confirmed this comprehensive coverage by overlaying the shapefile of plots with data over satellite images.

each of the city's "homogeneous zones", which currently exceed 16,000 (Ruiz and Vallejo 2010).⁶¹ The net effect of these efforts should be that a comprehensive record of property values which are less prone to under-reporting for tax avoidance.

The city then combines this data on actual and assessed valuations with building characteristics to construct assessed values for each property. By law, during every updating process each parcel must be surveyed by enumerators using a "parcel form" that contains more than 60 questions about the property.

One concern is whether property surveys and assessments are made very infrequently, with annual changes based solely on an aggregate inflation rate. While assessments are indeed inflated on a yearly basis, information for individual properties is frequently updated through visits: between 2000 and 2006 over 1,036,000 properties were updated, while a large push in 2008-2009 updated all of the city's 2 million properties (Ruiz and Vallejo 2010).⁶² My primary focus on long-differences in housing market outcomes ensures that data for essentially all properties was updated.

To validate the valuations in the cadastre, I compare these assessed values per m² in 2014 with purchase prices per room reported in DANE's 2014 Multipurpose Survey. This survey is a slightly more detailed version of the household survey discussed below. One question asks respondents to report the purchase price and year for their current home. I keep the 5,497 observations for which the purchase was made in the past 10 years,⁶³ and compute the average price per room within each locality (the smallest geographical unit in the survey). I merge these year-locality observations with the average price per m² of residential floorspace in the cadastral database, and take weighted averages of both cadastral and reported unit prices across years where I weight by the number of observations in each year. Figure A.8 plots the average cadastral price against the reported purchase price, normalizing each variable to have unit mean. The measures have a high correlation coefficient of 0.947, with the majority of observations lying along the 45-degree line. Importantly, there appears to be no deviation of the relationship for expensive neighborhoods, which one would expect if cadastral values were systematically over- or under-valuing these properties.⁶⁴ Consistent with the city's efforts, it appears that property values in the cadastral data are fairly accurate representations of actual property prices throughout the city.

Finally, to construct comparable measures of floorspace prices by census tract I purge property prices driven by differences in building composition by regressing log floorspace prices per m² on property characteristics (age bins, point bins) and a set of census tract fixed effects, and recover these fixed effects.

Employment (Firms)

The employment data used in this paper comes from two sources. The first is a census of the universe of establishments from DANE's 2005 General Census and 1990 Economic Census. Panel A of Table A.9 presents some summary statistics. There are many small firms in both years: while average firm size is close to five employees,

⁶¹These zones are determined by employees of the cadastral office who physically walk around the city and classify each neighborhood into a zone of similar attributes based on observation and their knowledge of the city. Criteria used to define "homogeneity" include categories for main activities, access to public services, and dominant land use. This process is extremely cost intensive, representing around 73% of the total costs of estimating cadastral values (Anselin and Lozano-Gracia 2012).

⁶²Updated assessments and property transaction records were conducted throughout, with assessments for each homogeneous zone being updated during the 2008-2009 comprehensive update.

⁶³The results are not sensitive to this choice.

⁶⁴Of course, while it is possible that values in the Multipurpose survey themselves are biased, there is no strong reason to think this would be the case since DANE enumerators are well-trained in making clear that responses are anonymous and for statistical purposes only.

the median firm only has two employees while firm size at the 90th percentile is between six and seven. The second source is a database of all registered establishments from Bogotá's Chamber of Commerce (CCB by its Spanish acronym) in 2000 and 2015. The 2015 dataset contains the block of each establishment, its industry and, in many cases, the number of employees. Keeping only observations with non-missing values for all three variables leaves around 126,867 observations as reported in Panel B. In 2000 neither the number of employees nor the block are reported, but it does provide the address. Bogotá's clear grid system made it straightforward to geolocate the vast majority of these.⁶⁵ Retaining establishments with non-missing industry codes left 34,332 observations. Two aspects of the CCB data need addressing. First, there is the absence of employment data for 2000. I therefore rely on establishment counts as a measure of employment when using the CCB in the main analysis. In the 2015 data, I compute the number of establishments in a locality as well as the mean employment and find a correlation of 0.033. In the 2005 census, the correlation is 0.09. Since average establishment size is fairly constant across the city, this suggests establishment counts are a fairly good proxy for employment. Second, the coverage of establishments is much lower than in the census. While aggregate coverage gaps will not matter for the analysis, relative differences across the city will pose a problem since relative changes in employment in the CCB data may not be representative of actual changes (for example, if informal employment is more likely to be located in certain areas than others).⁶⁶ I diagnose the representativeness of the CCB dataset by comparing its spatial distribution of establishments with that reported in the 2005 census. Panels (a) and (b) Figure A.7 plots the density of establishments in each locality in the CCB dataset in each year on the y-axis against the density of establishments in the 2005 census on the x-axis, normalizing both variables to have unit geometric mean. Both figures show a reassuringly tight relationship, with correlations of 0.948 and 0.949 respectively. Importantly, the majority of localities lie along the 45-degree line regardless of whether they are poor (Ciudad Bolívar, Kennedy, Bosa, Tunjuelito) or rich (Chapinero, Usaquén), implying that the coverage is fairly uniform across different types of neighborhoods. Panel (c) confirms that the uniform coverage holds across smaller spatial units, by comparing establishment counts across 631 sectors.

Employment (Workers)

Worker-level employment data comes from DANE's Continuing Household Survey (ECH) between 2000 and 2005, and its extension into the Integrated Household Survey (GEIH) for the 2008-2014. These are monthly labor market surveys covering approximately 10,000 households in Bogotá each year. In the external processing room of DANE's offices in Bogotá, I was able to access versions of these datasets with the block of each household provided.⁶⁷ The sampling scheme is a repeated cross-section, and so while it is possible to document changes within geographic areas it is not possible to track individuals over time. The survey includes questions pertaining to individual and household characteristics, as well details on employment such as income, hours worked and industry of occupation across primary and secondary jobs.

⁶⁵The success rate was around 95%. Addresses in Bogotá are of the form C26#52-18 which stands for the 26th street (Calle in Spanish) and 52nd avenue, eighteen meters from the intersection.

⁶⁶Note that I also require the coverage of the CCB to be representative of overall employment across 1-digit industries used in the analysis, too. I find this indeed to be the case, the correlation between the share of establishments in each 1 digit industry in the CCB data vs the 2005 census is 0.991 in 2015 and 0.984 in 2000.

⁶⁷Public versions provide no additional geographic information within the city.

Maps and other Datasets

The city provides a geodatabase for use in ArcMap containing spatial datasets on the features of Bogotá. From the road layer I extract shapefiles for primary, secondary and tertiary roads. Walk routes consist of the union of the road network in addition to some smaller pedestrian-only paths. The routes of the official bus system (which was integrated towards the end of 2012) are also provided. Given that the aim of the government was to bring the provision of existing routes under one integrated system, I use these current routes to measure the location of the bus network throughout the period.⁶⁸ Since buses tended to ignore posted bus stops, I create random bus stops every 250m along each route. The database also includes TransMilenio stations and routes, as well as the routes of feeder buses (which I create stops for in the same way as for normal buses). Finally, I use the topographical layer to compute the slope of land across the city in the computation of the least cost construction path instrument.

In all datasets above, the spatial units are either defined through the Cadastre or DANE's classification. The city's geodatabase provides a map of the geography used by the Cadastre (down to the property-level), while DANE provides a shapefile for their map at the block-level. Luckily, these spatial units remained essentially constant during my period of study.⁶⁹ I merge the Cadastre's map to DANE's to use as consistently across analyses, and compute the distance from each tract centroid to particular features (CBD, nearest main road, nearest TransMilenio station in each year) in ArcMap. I place the central business district at the center of the high employment density area in the center-east of the city. This is the historical center of the city cited in the literature; when including this variable in regressions I will allow for a different coefficient depending on whether a tract is in the North, West or South of the city in order to account for the different types of neighborhoods in each axis of the city.

Geographic units referred to in the paper consist of localities (19), UPZs (113), sectors (631), census tracts or sections (2,799) and blocks (43,672).

Lastly, data on crime come from the Bogotá police department, and report the GPS location of all reported violent, property and sexual crimes between 2007 and 2013.

F.2 Computing Commute Times

I compute commute times using the Network Analyst toolbox in ArcMap. This accepts as inputs a set of points to be used as origins and destinations (census tract centroids in my setting), as well as a network consisting of a set of edges and nodes at which these edges can be traversed. Each edge of the network is assigned a cost to travel along it; the toolbox then uses Dijkstra's algorithm to compute the least cost paths connecting any origin-destination pair. In my setting, the networks are defined separately for each mode of transit. The walk network consists of single layer of pedestrian paths. The car network consists of the union of primary, secondary and tertiary roads, that can be joined at any intersection, each of which is associated with a different speed. The bus network comprises bus routes described above as well as the walk network; the two intersect only at bus stops which are placed randomly every 250m. The TransMilenio network consists of the trunk network (which can only be entered at stations), the feeder bus network (which can be entered at stops placed in the same way as for buses), and the walk network.⁷⁰ In

⁶⁸While I acknowledge that this might introduce measurement error in the bus network location for early years, the strong association between predicted times and those observed in the 1995 Mobility Survey suggests this is a fairly good approximation.

⁶⁹For the cadastre, while old properties were partitioned and new ones created, the underlying block structure and "barrios" remained unchanged (up to new ones being added as the city grew). Similarly, existing blocks and census tracts DANE's map were kept in almost all instances unchanged, again up to new blocks being added between 2005 and 1993.

⁷⁰From the commuting data, I observe that the majority of trips taken by TransMilenio do not involve other buses (other than feeders). Therefore, I exclude the bus network in the construction of the baseline TransMilenio.

order to compute the time cost to traverse each edge of these networks, it remains to assign a speed to each mode. While Section G provided evidence that speeds were not changing on routes affected by TransMilenio relative to other locations, Table A.11 shows that aggregate speeds were not quite constant over the period. There was a significant reduction in speeds between 1995 and 2005 (a period of city expansion), which remained relatively constant thereafter. I therefore seek to assign two sets of speeds to match the distribution of observed commute times in the “pre” and “post” periods. In the main results, I use the average of both but provide evidence in robustness checks that the results are similar if either set of times is used separately. Finally, note that average speeds reflect the net effect of traveling on different road types (for cars), modes (for buses and TransMilenio) as well as wait times incurred at transfers.

I set speeds to match travel times observed in the data for commutes to and from work during rush hours in the Mobility Surveys (departing between 5-8am and 4-6pm). I set walk speeds to 5km/h in all years (Ahlfeldt et al. 2015). Car speeds were reportedly as high as 27 km/h (Steiner and Vallejo 2010) in early years, while the Department of Mobility reports average speeds along main roads of 24 km/h from 2010-2015. To allow for additional time spent parking and slower speeds during rush hours, I set speeds of 20 km/h, 14 km/h and 10 km/h on primary, secondary and tertiary roads respectively for the pre-period, and 14 km/h, 10 km/h and 8km/h for each type during the post-period. Buses were reported to travel at 10 km/h during rush hour before TransMilenio, with some estimates as low as 5 km/h (ESMAP 2009; Muller 2014). I set bus speeds of 13 km/h and 11 km/h for the pre- and post-period respectively, and set transfer times of four minutes to enter or exit the network by foot implying a total of eight minutes spent waiting on each trip. Finally, most reports cite system speeds of 26.2km/h for trunk service on TransMilenio routes (Cracknell 2003; Transportation Research Board 2003). However, this was for earlier years and reports suggest speeds may have slowed later on. I therefore set speeds of 26 km/h for the pre-period and 20 km/h for the post-period. I set the speed of feeder buses equal to those of regular buses, and again impose a four minute transfer time to enter or exit each network.⁷¹

Figure A.10 explores how these predicted times compare with those observed in the data. I construct observed times for each mode using those reported in the Mobility survey for rush hour trips to and from work, and create an average for each origin-destination UPZ pair. I construct the predicted time for the same trip by taking an area-weighted average of the commute times calculated in Arc between each census tract pair within the UPZ pair. I use 1995 as the pre-period for each mode other than TransMilenio for which I use 2005, and 2015 as the post-period. For each mode, the times are highly correlated with the majority of observations lying close to the 45-degree line.

In the main results, I use the average of the pre- and post-period calibrated commute times from ArcMap. In columns (1)-(3) of Table A.13, I run difference in difference specifications to formally test whether the coefficient from a regression of log observed times on log (average) predicted times changes over time. The difference in slopes in the third row are insignificant for cars and TransMilenio, but is positive for the case of buses. However, inspection of Figure A.10 suggests this is driven by a drop in the intercept for 2015 caused by movements in the left tail: overall the majority of points lie along the 45-degree line in both years.⁷² Finally, the last column examines whether the relationship between predicted and observed times is constant across modes within a year. The

⁷¹I decided on these times to balance the reported speeds in the literature and matching those in the data. Unfortunately, there was not a simple way to automate the procedure to choose speeds that matched the fit with the data since each creation of a Network dataset in ArcMap must be done manually.

⁷²Attempts to shift the intercept by varying the fixed time cost within reasonable bounds had negligible effects on this specification.

insignificant coefficients in rows 4-8 confirm this to be the case.

F.3 Constructing the Instruments

Least Cost Construction Path From Transportation Research Board (2007), I obtain engineering estimates for building BRT on different types of land. Their estimates suggest it costs \$4mn to build a mile of BRT by converting a median arterial busway, \$25mn to build a new bus lane on vacant land, \$50mn to build an elevated lane and \$200mn to build a tunnel.⁷³ The maximum grade of BRT is 10% for short runs (Barr et al. 2010), so I assume tunnels are built on land steeper than that. I assume that building over developed land costs twice as much as vacant land.⁷⁴ I then digitize a land use map of the city in 1980 produced by the United States Defense Mapping Agency (Figure A.11, panel (a)) and clean the image into vacant, arterial road, water and developed land use categories. I infill the medians that can be seen in between a handful of large main roads throughout the city, so that these are also coded as arterial. I then compute the share of each land use category in each 20m by 20m pixel, and use a topographical shapefile to compute the average slope in each pixel. Multiplying the share of each land use type by the prior cost estimates yields a cost to build BRT on each pixel. Panel (b) of Figure A.11 shows the results, with lighter shades representing higher cost.

I read this cost raster into Matlab, and use the Fast Marching Method to compute the least cost routes between portals and the CBD. Panel (c) of Figure A.11 shows the resulting paths. I find that for the majority of cases, the actual lines follow the least cost routes suggesting that conditional on the locations of origin and destinations the costs were a large driver of actual placement. To construct the final input for ArcMap, I create stops every 700m to match the spacing of TransMilenio stations. I add instruments for the Feeder routes by placing a 2km radius disk around each portal connecting the two with eight “spokes”, and create stops every 250m.

Tram System From Morrison (2007), I obtained an image of the city’s tram system that was last placed in 1921 and stopped operating in 1951.⁷⁵ Since the city was far smaller at that time, I digitize the shapefile and extend the routes to the edge of the city in present day. This might reduce concerns about the direct effects of the tram instrument, since the large portions of it were not built. Panel (d) of Figure A.11 shows the extended lines (as well as the originals). As before, I create stops every 700m and construct the least cost commute times in ArcMap using the same speed of travel as trunk lines.

Instrument Construction These procedures provide counterfactual TransMilenio networks. To construct the pairwise travel times under each instrument, I take the modern street and transit network and then replace the TransMilenio with the networks implied by the two instruments. I then recalculate travel times for each pair over the counterfactual networks.

⁷³These numbers are close to the costs of \$8mn per mile in 2003 USD reported by the first phase of TransMilenio (Transportation Research Board 2003).

⁷⁴All figures are in 2004 USD and are per mile of construction. Since I have less guidance over the cost of building on developed land, I experimented with higher values and found the routes were unchanged.

⁷⁵The chief of the Liberal Party was assassinated during an international conference in Bogotá in 1948, after which riots led to the destruction of one quarter of the city’s trams. Combined with the demand for higher capacity transit, this led to the retiring of the trams and their replacement with buses. While trams operated on rail lines, the buses that followed shared roads with cars.

F.4 Cost-Benefit Calculations

This section presents some of the calculations behind the cost figures in Table A.7. Phase 1 of the system cost \$5.85mm per km to build in 2003 dollars.⁷⁶ This was financed through local fuel taxes (46%), national government grants (20%), a World Bank loan (6%) and other local funds (28%). Phase 2 was more expensive at \$13.29mm per km in 2003 dollars, with funding coming from the national government (66%) and a local fuel surcharge (34%). The higher costs were due to road widening, increased investment in public space and associated infrastructure improvements. Phase 3 continued the trend costing \$20mm per km in 2014 dollars. Averaging over the 41km of lines in phase 1 and 2 and 21km of lines in phase 3, the average construction cost for the whole 103km network as of phase 3 was \$14.08mm in 2016 dollars.

Operating costs are recovered at the farebox by private operators; the cost to transport a passenger is close to the fare (Transportation Research Board 2003). Using the figure of 565mm rides in 2013 from BRT Data (2017) and the fare of \$0.66 in 2016 dollars yields an operational cost of \$372.97mm per year.

GDP in Bogotá in 2016 from DANE⁷⁷ is equal to 221,456 bn 2016 Colombian Pesos, equivalent to \$72.57bn in 2016 dollars.

G Supplementary Empirical Results

G.1 TransMilenio Trip Characteristics

Table A.10 presents some descriptives of trips taken in Bogotá in 2015. Three points are worth emphasizing. First, TransMilenio is an important mode of transit constituting 16% of all trips, exceeding the 13.7% taken by cars but less than the roughly 34% taken by bus and walking. Second, the average TransMilenio trip is 10.1km, far longer than the 6.5km and 6.1km average trips taken by other motorized transport. The fixed costs involved in reaching and entering stations make the benefits of BRT pronounced for longer journeys. Third, when compared to other modes I find that TransMilenio is primarily used for trips to work and business. These constitute around 40% of trips on the system. For private matters or shopping, walking is by far the dominant mode, reflecting that these trips tend to be shorter and closer to home. TransMilenio's outsized role in commuting motivates the focus on its effects on access to jobs emphasized in this paper.

Table A.11 examines how each mode's role in commuting has evolved over time. Panel A shows the changes in each mode's share of commutes to work. TransMilenio's rise has been primarily at the expense of a reduction in bus trips. Panel B shows that TransMilenio is on average 25.7% faster than buses and roughly the same speed as trips taken by cars.⁷⁸ TransMilenio speeds have fallen over time as the system has become congested with greater use over time. Changes in aggregate speeds on cars and buses appears not so correlated with TransMilenio ridership: speeds fall significantly between 1995 and 2005 (a period of significant population growth of over 29%)

⁷⁶All figures from Baltes et al. (2006), except the cost per km for phase 3 which is from <https://www.esci-ksp.org/archives/project/bogota-brt-colombia>.

⁷⁷Source: <https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/cuentas-nacionales/cuentas-nacionales-departamentales/cuentas-nacionales-departamentales-pib-trimestral-bogota-d-c>

⁷⁸Note that these are observed door-to-door speeds rather than system speeds: TransMilenio buses are reported to operate faster than the results in Table A.11 suggest, but queuing at stations and time taken to walk between stations and final destinations decrease average observed speeds. Average speeds are also conflated by the different nature of trips taken across modes (such as TransMilenio being used for longer trips, which are typically faster). Section F.2 compares speeds across modes controlling for trip characteristics and composition, and reports that while the relative performance of TransMilenio is more muted, it remains a substantive improvement over existing buses.

while stabilizing between 2005 and 2015. This highlights the role of external aggregate shocks, such as urbanization lead by the country’s civil war, that motivates the more local analysis pursued in this paper. Panel C reports a mild fall in the share of car owners, consistent with its decreased role in commuting. However, the persistently higher proportion of car owners vs car commuters reflects the importance of cars for other trip purposes.

G.2 Impact on Other Mode Speeds

BRT may affect equilibrium speeds through impacts on travel mode and route choices, and the number of lanes available for other traffic. In Bogotá, the number of lanes available for other traffic was left unchanged: one might then expect TransMilenio to have reduced congestion faced by cars and other buses. To examine the impact of TransMilenio on car and bus speeds, I run regressions of the form

$$\ln \text{Speed}_{ijkt} = \alpha_{ij} + \beta \text{TM Route}_{ij} \times \text{Post}_t + \gamma'_t X_{ijkt} + \epsilon_{ijt}$$

separately for each mode. Here (i, j) indexes a UPZ origin-destination pair, k indexes an individual, Post_t is a dummy equal to one in 2015 and zero in 1995,⁷⁹ and X_{ijkt} is a vector of control variables containing individual and trip characteristics, which are allowed to have time-varying effects on speeds. All specifications include a gender dummy, hour of departure dummies and age quantile dummies, origin and destination locality fixed effects, each interacted with the Post dummy. Certain specifications additionally control for log trip distance interacted with the Post dummy.

The variable TM Route_{ij} captures whether the trip from i to j has been “treated” by TransMilenio. To define this measure, I compute the routes for the least cost commutes between each pair of UPZ origin and destination in ArcGIS separately for cars and buses. I then intersect this route with the TransMilenio network (within a 100m tolerance) to compute the share of a trip that lies along a TransMilenio line. With this in hand, I create two treatment measures. The first is simply the share of a trip that lies along a TransMilenio line. The second is a dummy for whether more than 75% of the trip is adjacent to TransMilenio, allowing for a non-linear effect on speed.

Table A.12 presents the results. TransMilenio has no impact on neither car nor bus speeds, and this is robust to controlling for trip distance in even columns. Note that this only identifies relative changes in speeds: any aggregate effect TransMilenio had on the overall level of speeds would be absorbed into the intercept. Consistent with a small congestion elasticity, Akbar and Duranton (2017) find the elasticity of speed with respect to the number of travelers is only 0.06 during peak hours in Bogotá, while Akbar et al. (2021) find that only 15% of differences in driving speeds in Indian cities are due to congestion.

G.3 Impact on Housing Supply

Table A.14 provides evidence that TransMilenio had no significant impact on housing development. The outcome variable is the growth of total floorspace in a census tract between 2000 and 2018.⁸⁰ The specification is otherwise the same as from the baseline specification. Columns 1 and 2 show no significant impact of either CMA term on

⁷⁹Results are similar when intermediate years are included, and are omitted for clarity.

⁸⁰I use the Davis-Haltiwanger growth rate $g_i = (X_{it} - X_{it-1}) / (0.5 \times (X_{it} + X_{it-1}))$ which allows me to incorporate tracts with no development in 2000.

floorspace supply. Column 3 provides a robustness check regressing floorspace supply on log distance to each phase of the system, confirming the previous results. It does appear more development may be happening around the third phase (the negative coefficient on $\ln \text{Distance F3}$), but the effect is insignificant. Column 4 interacts distance to each phase with a dummy for whether a tract is above the median tract distance from the CBD, to test if more development is occurring near TransMilenio at the periphery. This does not appear to be the case, as all the interactions are insignificant.

Figure A.6 repeats the main event study from Figure 3 with floorspace area as the outcome, and shows no significant effect either before or after on property development. While there is a noisy increase in development in 8 to 4 years before line opening, this is neither significant nor enough to show up in the aggregate numbers in Table A.14.

Overall, there was no significant new development close to TransMilenio stations. Reports suggest that constraints to re-development restricted the supply response (Cervero et al. 2013), in large part due to no significant change in zoning regulations that remained unchanged over the period.

G.4 Impact on Wages and Sorting

Table A.15 examines the impact of market access on income by place of residence. It runs a difference-in-difference specification similar to (16) to examine the effect of improved RCMA on log average weekly labor income reported by full-time workers between 18 and 65 across UPZs. Since the survey is a sample survey, there are not many observations in each census tract in each period, so the variation in RCMA is aggregated to the UPZ-level. Standard errors are clustered by UPZ and Post-period pair in Panel A, and by UPZ in Panel B.

Column (1) shows a strong association between improved access to jobs and incomes over the period. However, column (2) controls for the changing educational composition of workers and shows that about half of the relationship is explained by re-sorting of workers by skill. The result is qualitatively unchanged when controlling for hours worked in column (3) (i.e. when looking at the wage). While my cross-sectional data do not allow me to control for individual fixed effects, that wages rise even when controlling for changing worker characteristics supports the idea that CMA reflects accessibility to high-paid jobs. The last row also reports the results from a test of whether the coefficient on log RCMA equals $1/\theta$, and in both panels this cannot be rejected.

Table A.16 examines TransMilenio's impact on the educational composition of residents. The outcome is the change in a tract's share of college-educated residents between 2018 and 1993. In 1993 this is measured within all adults eighteen or older, and in 2018 this is measured within adults forty and older. This is to try to look within a cohort, since the overall college share grew substantially over this period. Results are not sensitive to this choice. Column 1 shows a semi-elasticity of 0.14 of the change in the college share to the change in RCMA. Column 2 examines whether this is mechanical: if the change in RCMA is correlated with the initial college share there may be mechanically more or less room for the share to increase in exposed locations. Controlling for the initial college share has no effect on the coefficient. These results suggest the college educated tended to move into neighborhoods with improved accessibility due to TransMilenio. This is consistent both with the results in Table A.15, and the sorting channel in the model whereby the rich are more likely to move into neighborhoods with appreciating house prices since they spend a smaller fraction of income on housing.

G.5 Impact of Both Types of CMA

The baseline model predicts no effect of FCMA on residential outcomes and no effect of RCMA on commercial outcomes (see proof of Proposition 1). Table A.17 extends the baseline specification by including both types of CMA separately in the regressions. Overall, the results are noisy: conditional on the controls, there is little residual variation in RCMA given FCMA within a locality, and vice versa. Still, for five of seven outcomes—residential population, commercial prices, commercial floorspace share, and overall and formal census employment—the model’s prediction that RCMA affects residential outcomes and FCMA affects commercial outcomes is borne out in the data, albeit imprecisely. For residential floorspace prices, FCMA has the larger effect, but Panel B of Table A.18 shows this is driven by outliers; once these are dropped, only RCMA significantly affects residential floorspace price growth. For establishment counts in the CCB (Panel C), the significant effect is from RCMA rather than FCMA. Taken together, six of the seven outcomes respond to the different CMA variables in line with the model’s predictions.

Even the fact that floorspace shares are observed to change to TransMilenio already suggests some basic assumptions from the simple model are not borne out in the data, since it assumes floorspace use shares are fixed. Appendix E.3 extends the model to include this, and shows that a weighted average of CMA types will now matter for outcomes in each location, where the weights depend on the initial floorspace shares across residential and commercial uses. In fact, this would be the correct regression framework to use to fully test the model given that changes in floorspace use shares are observed in the data. However, the log-linear reduced form no longer holds and the constant CMA elasticities are replaced with a more complex matrix of elasticities (where a location’s weight on each change in CMA depends on its initial floorspace use share). Given the parsimony of the basic model, I focus on this for the main results. The full model allows for endogenous floorspace use.

G.6 Main Results: Robustness

Table A.1 assesses the robustness of the main results to a number of alternative specifications. First, I use alternative ways to aggregate mode-specific commute times and alternative travel speeds on each mode (columns 2 to 4). Second, I vary the commute elasticity θ to 1.5 and 0.5 times its estimated value (columns 5 and 6). Third, I consider only tracts within 3km of a TransMilenio station to ensure the results are not driven by outliers at implausible distances from the network (column 7). Fourth, I use heteroscedasticity robust standard errors and standard errors clustered at the sector level (560 administrative units above the census tract) in columns 8 and 9. Fifth, I exclude tracts within 1km of a portal (compared to the 500m exclusion in Table 2) to further ensure the results are not driven by the targeting of these neighborhoods (column 10). Sixth, I control for distance to a tract’s closest TransMilenio station interacted with distance to the CBD (column 11). This assesses whether the CMA effect is simply due to heterogeneity of the distance effect at different distances from the CBD (a possibility given the trends in Figure 1). Reassuringly, the results are robust to this, highlighting how the key source of identifying variation is local changes in RCMA within localities.

Seventh, I run an unweighted regression for the change in establishments, which is weighted by the initial share of establishments in a tract in the main results. This is repeated in row 1 of Table A.5. The second row runs an unweighted regression, and the coefficient becomes insignificant (p-value of 0.14). I use the weighted regressions in the main results for two reasons. First, one might expect noise in the CCB data which is a database of establishments registered with the city’s chamber of commerce rather than a census. Weighting by initial shares

places more weights on tracts where establishment growth is more precisely estimated. Second, I document sharp positive impacts of CMA on the share of floorspace used for commercial purposes (another measure of the changing allocation of real production activity). Taken together, these suggest employment is indeed responding to TransMilenio. The table also reported weighted and unweighted regressions for residential population in column 2, to show all quantity outcomes in the main results are robust to alternative weightings.

H Supplemental Appendix References

- AKBAR, P., COUTURE, V., DURANTON, G., AND A. STOREYGARD (2023), "Accessibility and Mobility in Urban India," *American Economic Review*, 113(4): 1083–111.
- ALLEN, T., AND C. ARKOLAKIS (2019), "The Welfare Effects of Transportation Infrastructure Improvements," NBER Working Paper 25487.
- BARR, J., BEVERIDGE, J., CLAYTON, C., DANAHAR, A., GONSALVES, J., KOZIOL, B., AND S. RATHWELL (2010), "Designing Bus Rapid Transit Running Ways," American Public Transportation Association APTA-BTS-BRT-RP-003-10.
- CAIN, A., DARIDO, G., BALTES, M.R., RODRIGUEZ, P., AND J.C. BARRIOS (2006), "Applicability of Bogotá's TransMilenio BRT System to the United States," Federal Transit Administration FTA-FL-26-7104-01.
- DIAZ, O. (2008), *TransMilenio Bus Rapid Transit, Bogotá*. Photograph. Urban Age.
<https://urbanage.lsecities.net/photographs/transmilenio-bus-rapid-transit-bogota>.
- FUJIMOTO, T., AND U. KRAUSE (1985), "Strong Ergodicity for Strictly Increasing Nonlinear Operators," *Linear Algebra and Its Applications*, 71: 101–12.
- MORRISON, A. (2007), "The Tramways of Bogotá, Colombia," <http://www.tramz.com/co/bg/tte.html>.
- MÜLLER, J.M. (2014), "Bus Rapid Transit: The Answer to Transport Problems in Megacities? The Example of TransMilenio (Bogotá, Colombia)," In *Megacities*, edited by F. Kraas, S. Aggarwal, M. Coy, and G. Mertins, 179–92. Springer.
- ROSSI-HANSBERG, E., SARTE, P.-D., AND R. OWENS III (2010), "Housing Externalities," *Journal of Political Economy*, 118(3): 485–535.
- STEINER, R., AND H. VALLEJO (2010), "The Economy," In *Colombia: A Country Study*, edited by R.A. Hudson, 141–212. Library of Congress.