

Online Appendix

Plata y Plomo: How Higher Wages Expose Politicians to Criminal Violence*

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*We wish to thank Martín Castillo Quintana, Gianmarco Daniele, Francesco Drago, José Ramón Enríquez, Claudio Ferraz, Nicolás Idrobo, Simone Ferro, Vincent Pons, Alessio Romarri, Shanker Satyanath, Francesco Sobbrío, Silvia Vannutelli, Hye Young You, and seminar participants at EAFIT University, New York University, Erasmus University, MPSA 79th Annual Meeting, Yale University, AL CAPONE 10th Annual Meeting, Barcelona GSE Summer Forum, RIDGE-LACEA Workshop on Political Economy, WEOC 6, Naples School of Economics PhD and Postdoc Workshop, Italian Parliamentary Antimafia Commission, Northwestern University Kellogg School of Management, Stanford University Graduate School of Business, University of Milan, Universidad Javeriana, Universidad del Rosario, Universidad de los Andes, University of Naples “Federico II”, University of Padua, and the CLEAN Unit for the Economic Analysis of Crime at Bocconi University for helpful comments and suggestions.

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I Additional Details about Italian Public Procurement

We hereby summarize the key features of procurement for public works in Italy during our period of observation (2013-2020).

The first stage of procurement is the call for tender, where the buyer indicates the object of the contract and the reservation value, i.e., the maximum value they would be willing to pay. At the municipal level, the reservation value is estimated by an engineer appointed by the mayor on a contract-by-contract basis, who identifies the types and quantities of inputs needed. The following procurement steps are then managed by a contracting officer, called *Responsabile Unico del Progetto* (RUP). The RUP is selected by the mayor, again on a contract-by-contract basis, and is usually a management-level bureaucrat within the municipal administration (Decarolis et al., 2021, 2023).

On top of the project’s details and the reservation value, the call for tender has to define the selection procedure and indicate whether subcontracting will be allowed. When allowed, subcontracting cannot exceed 30% of the reservation value. There are three possible selection procedures: direct assignments, negotiated procedures, and open procedures. Direct assignment does not require any form of competition, and — absent exceptional conditions — is only allowed for contracts with reservation value below €40,000. Contracts below this value are not actively monitored by ANAC, and the contract’s awardee does not need to be publicly announced.

Contracts above €40,000 can be assigned via either negotiated or open procedures. In negotiated procedures, once the call for tender has been issued, the RUP can choose a set of firms and consult with them to negotiate the terms of the contract. However, the RUP is still required by law to hear from any qualified firm that expresses interest in the contract. Once these one-on-one negotiations are over, the buyer solicits bids from a set

of firms, thus determining both the size and the characteristics of the pool of bidders.

The law restricts the use of certain negotiated procedures to contracts below a given reservation value. For the purposes of the present study, one important such threshold is €200,000, above which the law forbids the use of the *Cottimo Fiduciario*. This negotiated procedure has a more expedited consultation phase and allows the buyer to directly award the contract to one of the firms consulted (Dlgs 163/2006).

In open procedures, interested firms can directly bid for the contract. For both negotiated and open procedures, firms send a sealed bid with their proposed rebate, expressed as a percentage of the reservation value. Before bids are sent, Law 159/2011 requires firms bidding for contracts of value above €150,000 to undergo police screenings checking for links to organized crime. These screenings may result in exclusion from the competition, and in criminal charges to firms' owners and staff (Daniele and Dipoppa, 2023).

The mean reservation value of contracts is €665,555 (median €75,806). Contracts by municipalities around the 5,000 inhabitants cutoff are of lower value: The average and median reservation values are €228,972 and €66,195, respectively. Contracts for public works are 35.8% of the total. The rest are for goods (15.7%) and services (48.5%).

For 204,860 contracts of relatively higher value, ANAC also reports information regarding the competition phase. These are relative to 7,503 unique municipalities, and concentrate in the public works sector (52%). In negotiated procedures, the average number of firms invited to bid is 13. The awardee subcontracts in 10.5% of occurrences (19.2% for public works, only 1.1% for other contracts), i.e., 28.6% of the times it was allowed to do so by the call for tender.

II Literature Validating Our Corruption Proxies

As far as bunching of reservation values is concerned, empirical work has examined the effects of each of the three regulatory thresholds we consider, demonstrating their effects on the behavior of organized criminal groups. For the €40,000 threshold, Tulli (2024) shows that crackdowns on municipal governments colluding with the mafia leads neighboring municipalities to fractionate procurement contracts so as to avoid inspections by regulatory agencies. Focusing on subsidies, Daniele and Dipoppa (2023) show how firms in mafia-ridden areas are significantly more likely to sort below the €150,000 threshold to avoid anti-mafia screenings by the police. Coviello et al. (2022) provide evidence of strategic manipulation of reservation values below the €200,000 threshold, showing that it shrinks the pool of bidders and causes delays and cost overruns.

The size of the pool of bidders in negotiated procedures is examined in detail in Decarolis et al. (2021). Using confidential data on corruption investigations on firms and public officials, they find that inviting less than the required number of bidders increases the probability that public works are assigned to an investigated firm by 11%. Furthermore, negotiated procedures with too few bidders are significantly more common (+2.9%) when the procedure is run by a public official suspected of corruption.

Decarolis et al. (2021) also offer important insights on subcontracting, our third proxy for corruption in procurement. Namely, they show that firms suspected of corruption subcontract more often and – conditional on subcontracting – they are more likely to delegate works to other investigated firms. As explained in Caneppele and Martocchia (2014), subcontracting allows criminal firms to achieve *passive infiltration*, as post-auction transactions are less easy to monitor but allow for the realization of sizable kickbacks.

III Additional Tables

Table A1: Legislative Thresholds for Italian Municipalities, 2014-2020

Municipal Population	Wage Mayor	Wage Cabinet	Fiche Council	Term Limit	Cabinet Size	Council Size	DSP Rules
Below 1,000	1,161	15%	18	3	4	12	No
1,000-3,000	1,305	20%	18	3	4	12	Yes
3,000-5,000	1,953	20%	18	2	4	16	Yes
5,000-10,000	2,511	50%	18	2	4	16	Yes
10,000-30,000	2,790	55%	22	2	6	20	Yes
30,000-50,000	3,114	55%	36	2	6	30	Yes
50,000-100,000	3,717	75%	36	2	6	30	Yes
100,000-250,000	4,509	75%	36	2	10	40	Yes
250,000-500,000	5,202	75%	36	2	12	46	Yes
Above 500,000	7,020	75%	36	2	14-16	50-60	Yes

Notes: Figures for wages and presence fiches are in euros. Population is based on the last available census.

Wage Mayor and *Wage Cabinet* refer to the monthly gross wage of the mayor and the members of the executive committee, respectively; the latter is expressed as a percentage of the former, which refers to 2005. *Fiche Council* is the reimbursement per session paid to councilors and is measured in euros. The wage thresholds at 1,000 and 10,000 were introduced in 2000; all of the others date back to 1960. *Cabinet Size* is the maximum allowed number of aldermen appointed by the mayor. *Council Size* is the number of seats in the City Council. All of the size thresholds were set in 1960. Differences in term limits were introduced in 2014. Since 1993, mayors in towns below 15,000 residents are elected via plurality (with 60% premium), while mayors in towns above 15,000 residents are elected with runoff plurality (with 66% premium). Source: Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013), with our edits.

Table A2: Balance Checks for Relevant Covariates at Cutoff

Dependent Variable	$\hat{\beta}$	(SE)	Dependent Variable	$\hat{\beta}$	(SE)
Mafia Presence (pre-2011)	-.013	(.056)	% Illiterate	.005	(.005)
Mafia Victims (pre-2011)	-.033	(.154)	% Female	.001	(.002)
Mafia Seizures (pre-2011)	.009	(.056)	% Unemployed	.164	(.140)
Mafia Infiltrated (pre-2011)	-.000	(.006)	% Agriculture	.029	(.018)
Log Surface	-.032	(.190)	% Industry	-.023	(.024)
Population in 2011	168	(125)	Average Age	-.402	(.459)
2011 Population $\geq$ 5,000	.069	(.087)	Turnout 2008	-.014	(.012)
Log Longitude	.074	(.050)	% Center-Right 2008	-.012	(.026)
Log Latitude	-.021	(.015)	% Center-Left 2008	-.005	(.020)
Log Kms to Region Capital	-.006	(.127)	Log Tot. Procurement	-.047	(.133)
Log Elevation	.078	(.223)	Log Tot. Procurement PW	-.428	(.256)
Log Slope	.055	(.294)	Log Avg. Procurement	.034	(.155)
Log Population Density	.057	(.203)	Log Avg. Procurement PW	.043	(.122)
Log Foreigners x 100 Inhab.	-.217	(.110)	Log Spending in Police	.697	(.674)
Log NGOs x 1,000 Inhab.	-.030	(.074)	Municipal Union Member	-.098	(.086)
% High School	-.009	(.006)	Municipal Union Head	-.047	(.038)
Avg. Clearance Rate	.018	(.024)	Has Police Station	.008	(.014)
Has Local Media	.021	(.067)	Has Local Newspaper	-.017	(.054)
Has Local Radio	-.004	(.045)	Media x 1,000 Inhab.	-.015	(.017)
Newspapers x 1,000 Inhab.	-.009	(.013)	Radios x 1,000 Inhab.	.005	(.011)

Notes: The coefficients displayed are RD estimates of $\hat{\beta}$ from Equation 1, using a first-order polynomial, with robust variance estimator (Calonico et al., 2014). The outcome variable of each model is listed in each column's title. The abbreviation "PW" stands for "Public Works", and all the outcomes referred to procurement spending are based on the ex-ante reservation values of contracts offered, not on the final prices at which contracts were eventually awarded, which are only published for a subset of contracts. The average clearance rate refers to criminal courts, it is measured at the province level and is computed over the years 2016-2018. All the other outcomes are measured at the municipality level as of 2011 or as of the last available year prior to 2011.

Table A3: Municipal Population and Attacks on Mayors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack	≥ 1 Attack	N. of Attacks	N. of Attacks	Attacks / 5k Inhab.	Attacks / 5k Inhab.
Population	.065 (.027)	.053 (.028)	.131 (.046)	.113 (.046)	.129 (.048)	.106 (.047)
SD Depvar	.177	.171	.199	.2	.229	.245
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	1,263	1,218	1,209	1,150	1,127	983
Effective N	1,024	980	980	923	910	770
N Left	619	589	591	551	542	442
N Right	405	391	389	372	368	328

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The running variable is the number of municipal residents as of the 2011 census, with a cutoff of 5,000 residents determining treatment assignment. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A4: Municipal Population and Attacks on Aldermen and Vice Mayors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack	≥ 1 Attack	N. of Attacks	N. of Attacks	Attacks / 5k Inhab.	Attacks / 5k Inhab.
Population	.020 (.018)	.018 (.019)	.025 (.019)	.020 (.019)	.024 (.019)	.020 (.019)
SD Depvar	.122	.132	.146	.154	.173	.184
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	1,336	1,168	1,228	1,119	1,259	1,131
Effective N	1,082	936	998	895	1,020	903
N Left	658	560	602	532	616	538
N Right	424	376	396	363	404	365

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The running variable is the number of municipal residents as of the 2011 census, with a cutoff of 5,000 residents determining treatment assignment. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A5: Placebo Test - Municipal Population
and Attacks on Municipal Councilors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack	≥ 1 Attack	N. of Attacks	N. of Attacks	Attacks / 5k Inhab.	Attacks / 5k Inhab.
Population	.007 (.012)	.000 (.011)	.006 (.012)	-.001 (.012)	.007 (.012)	-.014 (.012)
SD Depvar	.124	.114	.130	.112	.261	.138
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	1,396	1,369	1,527	1,284	1,558	1,031
Effective N	1,143	1,101	1,241	1,026	1,274	810
N Left	702	674	762	620	784	469
N Right	441	427	479	406	490	341

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The running variable is the number of municipal residents as of the 2011 census, with a cutoff of 5,000 residents determining treatment assignment. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: see footnote 4. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A6: Placebo Test – Municipal Population
and Attacks on Non-Elected Officials

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack	≥ 1 Attack	N. of Attacks	N. of Attacks	Attacks / 5k Inhab.	Attacks / 5k Inhab.
Population ≥ 5000	-.027 (.023)	-.033 (.026)	-.018 (.028)	-.031 (.033)	-.030 (.030)	-.037 (.034)
SD Depvar	.246	.246	.301	.310	.372	.376
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	1,646	1,347	1,499	1,170	1,310	1,094
Effective N	1,354	1,080	1,218	938	1,062	862
N Left	849	657	752	561	645	508
N Right	505	423	466	377	417	354

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The running variable is the number of municipal residents as of the 2011 census, with a cutoff of 5,000 residents determining treatment assignment. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A7: Placebo Test – Municipal Population
and Non-Criminal Attacks on Municipal Executive

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack	≥ 1 Attack	N. of Attacks	N. of Attacks	Attacks / 5k Inhab.	Attacks / 5k Inhab.
Population	-.007 (.015)	.014 (.019)	.011 (.023)	.050 (.030)	.020 (.029)	.033 (.027)
SD Depvar	.141	.157	.167	.196	.201	.198
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	1,924	1,138	1,949	1,082	1,249	1,290
Effective N	1,634	912	1,657	854	1,014	1032
N Left	1,042	545	1,059	501	612	625
N Right	592	367	598	353	402	407

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The running variable is the number of municipal residents as of the 2011 census, with a cutoff of 5,000 residents determining treatment assignment. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A8: Municipal Population and Attacks on
Municipal Executive, Excluding Attacks Denounced by the Victim

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack	≥ 1 Attack	N. of Attacks	N. of Attacks	Attacks / 5k Inhab.	Attacks / 5k Inhab.
Population	.059 (.026)	.071 (.028)	.102 (.042)	.104 (.045)	.113 (.046)	.105 (.047)
SD Depvar	.225	.212	.317	.274	.339	.332
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	1,786	1,474	1,558	1,353	1,337	1,252
Effective N	1,481	1,189	1,273	1,085	1,086	1,004
N Left	940	733	783	661	660	605
N Right	541	456	490	424	426	399

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The running variable is the number of municipal residents as of the 2011 census, with a cutoff of 5,000 residents determining treatment assignment. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A9: Municipal Population and Attacks
on Municipal Executive, Robustness to Quadratic Polynomial

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack	≥ 1 Attack	N. of Attacks	N. of Attacks	Attacks / 5k Inhab.	Attacks / 5k Inhab.
Population	.079 (.045)	.063 (.045)	.160 (.076)	.132 (.073)	.145 (.071)	.117 (.070)
SD Depvar	.233	.232	.337	.337	.457	.451
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd	2nd
Bandwidth	1,754	1,660	1,737	1,715	1,881	1,712
Effective N	1,457	1,352	1,438	1,403	1,588	1,396
N Left	925	847	909	885	1,014	880
N Right	532	505	529	518	574	516

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The running variable is the number of municipal residents as of the 2011 census, with a cutoff of 5,000 residents determining treatment assignment. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A10: Municipal Population and Attacks on Municipal Executive,
Robustness to Maximum Likelihood Estimation

	(1)	(2)
	Poisson	Negative Binomial
Population ≥ 5000	.757 (.276)	.772 (.289)
SD Depvar	.285	.285
Election FEs	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	No
Bandwidth	1,372	1,372
Effective N	1,117	1,117
N Left	684	684
N Right	433	433

Notes: In all models, the dependent variable is the count of the number of criminal attacks against members of the municipal executive of municipality i between 2014 and 2020. Column (1) displays Poisson estimates of the effect of municipality i having more than 5,000 residents as of the 2011 census. Column (2) displays negative binomial estimates of the effect of municipality i having more than 5,000 residents as of the 2011 census. In both columns, the sample is restricted to municipalities within the optimal RDD bandwidth selected by the algorithm for the model of Table 1 column (1). The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth. Controlled specifications for Poisson and Negative Binomial estimators are not shown because of failures of the algorithm in converging.

Table A11: Results on Intensive Margin
Robustness to Controlling for Extensive Margin

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	<i>Count of Attacks</i>	<i>Count of Attacks</i>	<i>Count of Attacks</i>	<i>Attacks / 5k Inhab.</i>	<i>Attacks / 5k Inhab.</i>	<i>Attacks / 5k Inhab.</i>
Population ≥ 5000	.147 (.055)	.125 (.054)	.042 (.029)	.152 (.058)	.126 (.056)	.047 (.031)
SD Depvar ≥ 1 Attack	.287 No	.287 No	.288 Yes	.316 No	.315 No	.320 Yes
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	1,331	1,271	1,387	1,192	1,142	1,076
Effective N	1,078	1,017	1,118	964	914	851
N Left	655	614	687	579	546	499
N Right	423	403	431	385	368	352

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The running variable is the number of municipal residents as of the 2011 census, with a cutoff of 5,000 residents determining treatment assignment. All models control for an indicator for the municipal executive of municipality i being attacked at least once between 2014 and 2020. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A12: Municipal Population and Attacks on the Municipal Executive
Optimal Bandwidth Selection without Standardizing Outcome and Running Variable

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack	≥ 1 Attack	N. of Attacks	N. of Attacks	Attacks / 5k Inhab.	Attacks / 5k Inhab.
Population	.042 (.017)	.044 (.019)	.070 (.030)	.009 (.040)	.110 (.047)	.103 (.042)
SD Depvar	.230	.239	.322	.330	.445	.449
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Election-Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial Order	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	3,498	2,337	3,674	3,501	1,669	1728
Effective N	3,643	2,057	3,974	3,607	1,372	1,411
N Left	2,714	1,359	3,010	2,682	862	889
N Right	929	698	964	925	510	522

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The running variable is the number of municipal residents as of the 2011 census, with a cutoff of 5,000 residents determining treatment assignment. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A13: Municipal Population and Amount of Public Procurement

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log Tot. Value	Log Tot. Value	Log Avg. Value	Log Avg. Value	Log. N. Contracts	Log N. Contracts
Population ≥ 5,000	-.149 (.078)	-.134 (.074)	-.080 (.078)	-.095 (.079)	-.071 (.092)	-.060 (.083)
SD Depvar	.810	.844	.671	.680	.651	.663
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	996	1,103	1,181	1,079	1,035	1257
Effective N	781	863	946	841	813	997
N Left	452	512	570	495	474	602
N Right	329	351	376	346	339	395

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The running variable is the number of municipal residents as of the 2011 census, with a cutoff of 5,000 residents determining treatment assignment. The dependent variables refer to procurement contracts offered by each municipality in the period 2013-2020. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A14: Municipal Population and Attacks on
Municipal Executive, Excluding Members of Unions of Municipalities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack	≥ 1 Attack	N. of Attacks	N. of Attacks	Attacks / 5k Inhab.	Attacks / 5k Inhab.
Population	.102 (.032)	.093 (.032)	.196 (.060)	.178 (.056)	.208 (.063)	.197 (.056)
SD Depvar	.223	.221	.329	.340	.349	.349
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	1,445	1,520	1,561	1,635	1,314	1,314
Effective N	742	777	805	840	673	668
N Left	447	470	486	518	403	401
N Right	295	307	319	322	270	267

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The running variable is the number of municipal residents as of the 2011 census, with a cutoff of 5,000 residents determining treatment assignment. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A15: Municipal Population and Attacks on
Municipal Executive, Only Attacks Before Appointment of New Auditors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack	≥ 1 Attack	N. of Attacks	N. of Attacks	Attacks / 5k Inhab.	Attacks / 5k Inhab.
Population $\geq 5,000$	.013 (.010)	.018 (.010)	.022 (.012)	.019 (.011)	.022 (.011)	.021 (.010)
SD Depvar	.067	.063	.122	.064	.180	.069
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	1,988	1,227	1,828	1,203	1,584	1,369
Effective N	1,404	836	1,269	814	1073	928
N Left	896	499	801	486	659	563
N Right	508	337	468	328	414	365

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). For each municipality, the dependent variable only includes attacks perpetrated before the nomination of the first post-reform cohort of municipal auditors. The running variable is the number of municipal residents as of the 2011 census, with a cutoff of 5,000 residents determining treatment assignment. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A16: Corruption Charges and Proxies for Corruption in Procurement, 2004-2015

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<i>Charges Per 1,000 Inhab.</i>	<i>Charges per Log Expenditures</i>	<i>Charges per Log Capital Exp.</i>	<i>Indicator for ≥ 1 Charge</i>
Log Firms Invited	.003 (.007)	.004 (.007)	.005 (.008)	.008 (.006)
Mean Depvar	.128	.100	.100	.240
SD Depvar	.439	.696	.696	.427
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5,604	5,546	5,546	5,606
	<i>Charges Per 1,000 Inhab.</i>	<i>Charges per Log Expenditures</i>	<i>Charges per Log Capital Exp.</i>	<i>Indicator for ≥ 1 Charge</i>
Probability of Subcontracting	.050 (.029)	.039 (.017)	.041 (.018)	.071 (.020)
Mean Depvar	.153	.100	.100	.255
SD Depvar	.614	.647	.647	.436
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,529	6,626	6,626	6,688

Notes: OLS estimates, regressions at the municipality level. Independent variables refer only to contracts for public works. Regressions in the top panel control for the log of municipal population as of 2001. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.

Table A17: Municipal Population and Procurement for Goods and Services

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Bunching Values	Bunching Values	Inviting Firms	Inviting Firms	Subcontr. Works	Subcontr. Works
Population ≥ 5000	-.011 (.014)	-.006 (.017)	.093 (.107)	.080 (.124)	-.008 (.006)	-.008 (.007)
SD Depvar	.146	.142	.930	.965	.067	.075
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	1,431	984	1,679	1,247	1,370	1,019
Effective N	1,157	763	856	633	971	705
N Left	714	441	511	370	591	412
N Right	443	322	345	263	380	293

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). All the dependent variables refer to procurement contracts for goods and services issued by municipality i between 2013 and 2020. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is $Bunching_i$, as jointly defined by equations 2 and 3. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is the log average number of firms invited to bid in negotiated procedures. In columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is the share of contracts that were subcontracted. In all columns, the running variable is the number of municipal residents as of the 2011 census, with a cutoff of 5,000 residents determining treatment assignment. The standard deviation of the dependent variables is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A18: Municipal Population and Procurement
Bunching of Reservation Values Below €40,000

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All Contracts	All Contracts	Public Works	Public Works	Other Contracts	Other Contracts
Population ≥ 5000	-.005 (.010)	-.005 (.011)	-.044 (.016)	-.043 (.018)	.018 (.010)	.019 (.012)
SD Depvar	.087	.087	.142	.143	.099	.095
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	1,036	947	1,069	983	1,541	1,042
Effective N	815	737	842	761	1,240	810
N Left	475	423	495	440	763	471
N Right	340	314	347	321	477	339

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The dependent variable is the difference in the share of procurement contracts offered by each municipality in the period 2013-2020 with a value between €30,000 and €40,000 and the share of procurement contracts offered by each municipality in the period 2013-2020 with a value between €40,000 and €50,000. The running variable is the number of municipal residents as of the 2011 census, with a cutoff of 5,000 residents determining treatment assignment. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.

Table A19: Municipal Population and Procurement
Bunching of Reservation Values Below €150,000

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All Contracts	All Contracts	Public Works	Public Works	Other Contracts	Other Contracts
Population ≥ 5000	-.011 (.005)	-.012 (.007)	-.003 (.008)	.002 (.008)	-.022 (.010)	-.025 (.009)
SD Depvar	.053	.050	.071	.071	.072	.071
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	1,998	1,143	1,122	1,005	1,103	1,081
Effective N	1,687	905	893	778	872	843
N Left	1,090	543	532	450	518	496
N Right	597	362	361	328	354	347

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The dependent variable is the difference in the share of procurement contracts offered by each municipality in the period 2013-2020 with a value between €140,000 and €150,000 and the share of procurement contracts offered by each municipality in the period 2013-2020 with a value between €150,000 and €160,000. The running variable is the number of municipal residents as of the 2011 census, with a cutoff of 5,000 residents determining treatment assignment. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.

Table A20: Municipal Population and Procurement
Bunching of Reservation Values Below €200,000

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All Contracts	All Contracts	Public Works	Public Works	Other Contracts	Other Contracts
Population ≥ 5000	-.007 (.004)	-.008 (.004)	-.010 (.005)	-.010 (.005)	-.003 (.007)	-.003 (.007)
SD Depvar	.040	.041	.036	.036	.072	.073
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	1,361	1,440	1,037	919	1,196	1,116
Effective N	1,095	1,149	816	710	957	875
N Left	672	709	476	405	577	521
N Right	423	440	340	305	380	354

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The dependent variable is the difference in the share of procurement contracts offered by each municipality in the period 2013-2020 with a value between €190,000 and €200,000 and the share of procurement contracts offered by each municipality in the period 2013-2020 with a value between €200,000 and €210,000. The running variable is the number of municipal residents as of the 2011 census, with a cutoff of 5,000 residents determining treatment assignment. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.

Table A21: Placebo - Municipal Population and
Procurement for Public Works, 2007 to 2011

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Bunching Values	Bunching Values	Invited Firms	Invited Firms	Subcontr. Works	Subcontr. Works
Population ≥ 5000	.009 (.016)	.018 (.019)	-.168 (.144)	-.143 (.147)	.050 (.041)	.067 (.042)
SD Depvar	.124	.126	1.02	1.01	.320	.320
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	1,375	822	1,886	1,829	1,360	1,358
Effective N	1,107	639	715	679	848	835
N Left	679	363	459	436	521	512
N Right	428	276	256	243	327	323

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). Outcomes are measured on contracts for public works offered between 2007 and 2011. The running variable is the number of municipal residents as of the 2011 census, with a cutoff of 5,000 residents determining treatment assignment. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A22: Right-Wing Mayors and Bunching of Reservation Values of Contracts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All Contracts	All Contracts	Public Works	Public Works	Other Contracts	Other Contracts
Right-Wing Mayor	.017 (.018)	.019 (.018)	.062 (.025)	.064 (.023)	.012 (.023)	.011 (.024)
SD Depvar	.179	.178	.223	.222	.202	.201
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	19.20	18.76	16.31	17.50	15.24	14.66
Effective N	1,939	1,876	1,680	1,761	1,596	1,530
N Left	1,107	1,069	955	1,002	910	870
N Right	832	807	725	759	686	660

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The dependent variable is $Bunching_i$, as jointly defined by equations 2 and 3. The running variable is the margin of victory (or loss) of the most voted right-wing mayoral candidate. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A23: Far-Right Mayors and Bunching of Reservation Values of Contracts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All Contracts	All Contracts	Public Works	Public Works	Other Contracts	Other Contracts
Far-Right Mayor	.015 (.019)	.013 (.019)	.064 (.027)	.059 (.025)	.002 (.024)	-.000 (.025)
SD Depvar	.173	.170	.221	.222	.191	.190
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	18.90	16.93	17.78	19.79	14.81	14.01
Effective N	1,668	1,498	1,586	1,704	1,361	1,277
N Left	957	855	909	975	778	722
N Right	711	643	677	729	583	555

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The dependent variable is *Bunching_i*, as jointly defined by equations 2 and 3. The running variable is the margin of victory (or loss) of the most voted far-right mayoral candidate. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.

Table A24: Right-Wing Mayors and Firms Invited to Negotiated Procedures

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All Contracts	All Contracts	Public Works	Public Works	Other Contracts	Other Contracts
Right-Wing Mayor	-.104 (.124)	-.119 (.130)	-.088 (.125)	-.146 (.131)	.087 (.149)	.112 (.150)
SD Depvar	.931	.936	.944	.929	1.03	1.04
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	10.99	9.32	12.67	10.34	15.01	13.39
Effective N	922	779	961	794	816	739
N Left	514	432	546	440	470	425
N Right	408	347	415	354	346	314

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The dependent variable is the log average number of firms invited to the negotiated procurement procedures of municipality i between 2013 and 2020. The running variable is the margin of victory (or loss) of the most voted right-wing mayoral candidate. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A25: Far-Right Mayors and Firms Invited to Negotiated Procedures

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All Contracts	All Contracts	Public Works	Public Works	Other Contracts	Other Contracts
Far-Right Mayor	-.160 (.130)	-.198 (.134)	-.181 (.138)	-.225 (.140)	.027 (.149)	.072 (.157)
SD Depvar	.904	.924	.921	.915	1.07	1.09
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	10.4	8.92	11.12	9.79	16.35	13.5
Effective N	771	655	759	668	763	651
N Left	429	363	432	372	436	374
N Right	342	292	327	296	327	277

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The dependent variable is the log average number of firms invited to the negotiated procurement procedures of municipality i between 2013 and 2020. The running variable is the margin of victory (or loss) of the most voted far-right mayoral candidate. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A26: Right-Wing Mayors and Share of Contracts Subcontracted

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All Contracts	All Contracts	Public Works	Public Works	Other Contracts	Other Contracts
Right-Wing Mayor	-.014 (.021)	-.015 (.022)	-.019 (.030)	-.014 (.030)	.000 (.008)	-.003 (.008)
SD Depvar	.173	.174	.259	.26	.042	.040
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	16.18	14.46	17.38	16.21	15.27	12.75
Effective N	1,514	1,376	1,486	1,390	1,206	1,029
N Left	867	784	845	792	693	585
N Right	647	592	641	598	513	444

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The dependent variable is the share of contracts awarded by municipality i between 2013 and 2020 that were subsequently subcontracted. The running variable is the margin of victory (or loss) of the most voted right-wing mayoral candidate. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A27: Far-Right Mayors and Share of Contracts Subcontracted

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All Contracts	All Contracts	Public Works	Public Works	Other Contracts	Other Contracts
Far-Right Mayor	-.022 (.019)	-.022 (.022)	-.024 (.031)	-.012 (.033)	.001 (.009)	.000 (.008)
SD Depvar	.178	.181	.263	.269	.040	.045
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	17.96	14.01	17.85	13.74	15.35	10.45
Effective N	1,445	1,160	1,321	1,052	1,053	758
N Left	836	665	764	604	609	424
N Right	609	495	557	448	444	334

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The dependent variable is the share of contracts awarded by municipality i between 2013 and 2020 that were subsequently subcontracted. The running variable is the margin of victory (or loss) of the most voted far-right mayoral candidate. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A28: Right-Wing Mayors and Attacks on Municipal Executive

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack	≥ 1 Attack	N. of Attacks	N. of Attacks	Attacks / 5k Inhab.	Attacks / 5k Inhab.
Right-Wing Mayor	.043 (.025)	.040 (.026)	.053 (.038)	.050 (.035)	.017 (.013)	.018 (.013)
SD Depvar	.239	.240	.402	.386	.102	.103
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	14.71	14.30	11.47	13.66	14.07	12.83
Effective N	1,624	1,552	1,286	1,486	1,548	1,415
N Left	918	872	712	832	870	791
N Right	706	680	574	654	678	624

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The running variable is the margin of victory (or loss) of the most voted right-wing mayoral candidate. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

Table A29: Far-Right Mayors and Attacks on Municipal Executive

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	≥ 1 Attack	≥ 1 Attack	N. of Attacks	N. of Attacks	Attacks / 5k Inhab.	Attacks / 5k Inhab.
Far-Right Mayor	.034 (.025)	.031 (.025)	.044 (.043)	.047 (.043)	.019 (.012)	.025 (.012)
SD Depvar	.245	.243	.452	.457	.090	.092
Election FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Polynomial	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st	1st
Bandwidth	14.71	15.71	11.32	11.81	14.40	13.79
Effective N	1,413	1,461	1,109	1,133	1,379	1,305
N Left	799	827	612	627	773	731
N Right	614	634	497	506	606	574

Notes: RDD estimates with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). The running variable is the margin of victory (or loss) of the most voted far-right mayoral candidate. The standard deviation of the dependent variable is measured within the left half of the optimal bandwidth selected by the algorithm for each model. Controls: See footnote 6. Robust standard errors clustered at the province level in parentheses. *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$.

IV Additional Figures

Figure A1: Share of Municipalities with One or More Attacks, by Region, 2014-2020






Figure A2: Attacks by Year, 2014-2020




Notes: For each year, attacks by ordinary citizens are excluded from the count.

Figure A3: Attacks over Years of Term, by Type and Victim




Notes: Data on attacks are from Avviso Pubblico, and refer to years 2014-2020.

Figure A4: Criminal Attacks on Municipal Aldermen, by Policy Area




Notes: Data on attacks are from Avviso Pubblico, and refer to years 2014-2020. The figure only plots the 182 attacks on aldermen whose policy area was specified on the report or could be retrieved via online searches.

Figure A5: Probability of Attacks to Municipal Executive, by Mayor's Wage




Notes: Data on attacks are from Avviso Pubblico, and refer to years 2014-2020. The population brackets determining each mayor's wage, as well as the corresponding remuneration for the municipal executive, are in Table A1.

Figure A6: Tests of No-Sorting Assumption




Notes: In each panel, the curves represent kernel approximations of the density, fitted separately on each side of the cutoff, with the relative 95% confidence intervals. In Panel A, each dot represents the density of the 2011 census population for the corresponding bin. Given the discrete nature of the running variable, the threshold is set to -0.5 to avoid asymmetry bias, as recommended in Eggers et al. (2018). The estimated log difference in height at the threshold is -.209, with a standard error of .177. In Panel B, the height of each bar represents the density of the 2011 census population for the corresponding bin. The t-statistic for the null hypothesis of no difference in density across the cutoff is -1.24. The corresponding p-value is .217.

Figure A7: Balance of Population and Wage Level in 2001 Census




Notes: Each dot represents one RDD estimate from fitting Equation 1 with a first-order polynomial, using the bandwidth of the size indicated on the horizontal axis on each side of the 5,000 residents cutoff. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors clustered at the province level. The black estimate refers to the bandwidth of 1,400, i.e., the round number closest to the one chosen by the data-driven algorithm of (Calonico et al., 2014) in column (1) of Table 1.

Figure A8: Municipal Population and Probability of Attacks on Municipal Executives, by Visibility of Attack




Notes: RDD estimates from Equation (??), with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). In all models, the dependent variable is an indicator for the members of the municipal executive of municipality i being attacked at least once during our period of observation. All the dependent variables are standardized, to enhance the comparability of effects' magnitudes. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors clustered at the province level.

Figure A9: Municipal Population and Probability of Attacks on Municipal Executives, Threats Vs. Violent Attacks




Notes: RDD estimates from Equation (??), with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). In all models, the dependent variable is an indicator for the members of the municipal executive of municipality i being attacked at least once during our period of observation. All the dependent variables are standardized, to enhance the comparability of effects' magnitudes. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors clustered at the province level.

Figure A10: Robustness Test, Choice of Bandwidth Value




Notes: Each dot represents one RDD estimate from fitting Equation (??) with a first-order polynomial, using the bandwidth of the size indicated on the horizontal axis on each side of the 5,000 residents cutoff. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals, based on conventional standard errors clustered at the province level.

Figure A11: Jackknife Tests, by Region




Notes: Each dot represents one RDD estimate from fitting Equation (??) with a first-order polynomial, excluding all municipalities within the region indicated on the horizontal axis. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors clustered at the province level.

Figure A12: Placebo Test, Alternative Cutoffs of Running Variable




Notes: Each cross represents one RDD estimate from fitting Equation (??) without controls employing a first-order polynomial, using the cutoffs for the running variable (population as of 2011 Census) indicated on the horizontal axis. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors clustered at the province level. The black estimate in the middle refers to the real cutoff of 5,000 inhabitants.

Figure A13: Municipal Population and
Probability of Attacks on Municipal Executives, by Area




Notes: RDD estimates from Equation (??), with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). In all models, the dependent variable is an indicator for the members of the municipal executive of municipality i being attacked at least once during our period of observation. All the dependent variables are standardized, to enhance the comparability of effects' magnitudes. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors clustered at the province level.

Figure A14: Municipal Population and Probability of Attacks
on Municipal Executives, by Presence of Local Media




Notes: RDD estimates from Equation (??), with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). In all models, the dependent variable is an indicator for the members of the municipal executive of municipality i being attacked at least once during our period of observation. All the dependent variables are standardized, to enhance the comparability of effects' magnitudes. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors clustered at the province level.

Figure A15: Procurement Expenditures and
Municipal Budget's Size, by Population and Calendar Year




Notes: RDD estimates from Equation (??), with triangular weighting kernel and data-driven optimal bandwidth selection (Calonico et al., 2014). All the dependent variables are standardized, to enhance the comparability of effects' magnitudes. Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors clustered at the province level.

Figure A16: Distribution of Reservation Values for Procurement Contracts, 2013-2020




Notes: Bins group reservation values into intervals of 4,000 euros. The dashed red lines correspond to €40,000, €150,000, and €200,000. Total number of contracts in full sample: 544,828. Total number of contracts for municipalities with 4,000 to 6,000 residents: 44,917.

Figure A17: McCrary Tests of Reservation Value Bunching Below €40,000,
Contracts for Public Works, Full and Effective RDD Sample




Notes: In both panels, densities refer only to contracts for public works drafted between 2013 and 2020. Number of contracts: 194,926. Number of unique municipalities between 4,000 and 6,000 residents: 467. Number of unique municipalities between 5,000 and 6,000 residents: 335.

Figure A18: McCrary Tests of Reservation Value Bunching Below €150,000,
Contracts for Public Works, Full and Effective RDD Sample




Notes: In both panels, densities refer only to contracts for public works drafted between 2013 and 2020. Number of contracts: 194,926. Number of unique municipalities between 4,000 and 6,000 residents: 467. Number of unique municipalities between 5,000 and 6,000 residents: 335.

Figure A19: McCrary Tests of Reservation Value Bunching Below €200,000,
Contracts for Public Works, Full and Effective RDD Sample




Notes: In both panels, densities refer only to contracts for public works drafted between 2013 and 2020. Number of contracts: 194,926. Number of unique municipalities between 4,000 and 6,000 residents: 467. Number of unique municipalities between 5,000 and 6,000 residents: 335.

Figure A20: Municipal Population and Bunching of Contracts' Values, RDD Plots




Notes: In both panels, each dot represents the average level of $Bunching_i$, as jointly defined by equations 2 and 3, for a given binned level of municipal residents. The solid lines are quadratic polynomials, fitted separately on each side of the cutoff. The dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A21: Municipal Population and
Firms Invited to Negotiated Procedures, RDD Plots



Notes: In both panels, each dot represents the average log number of firms invited to bid in the negotiated procurement procedures of municipality i between 2013 and 2020, for a given binned level of municipal residents. The solid lines are quadratic polynomials, fitted separately on each side of the cutoff. The dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A22: Municipal Population and Subcontracting, RDD Plots



Notes: In both panels, each dot represents the average share of contracts between 2013 and 2020 that were subsequently subcontracted, for a given binned level of municipal residents. The solid lines are quadratic polynomials, fitted separately on each side of the cutoff. The dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals.

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