The Franchise, Policing, and Race: Evidence from Arrests Data and the Voting Rights Act

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ONLINE APPENDIX

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Theoretical Model

This section develops our main hypotheses in the context of a simple probabilistic voting model. Let p denote police treatment of Blacks, with increases representing harsher treatment. Voters fall into one of two racial groups: Blacks ($J = B$) and Whites ($J = W$), where everyone in a given group has the same bliss point over policies, p^J, with $p^B < p^W$. The difference in policy preferences might reflect both cultural factors, such as racism on the part of Whites, or economic factors, such as an attempt by Whites to artificially hold black wages below marginal product via suppression.[1] Blacks comprise a fraction of the population β, with whites a fraction $1-\beta$. Two candidates ($c = 1$ and $c = 2$) announce credible platforms over policy (p_1 and p_2). Voters care about both policy and the ideology of candidates, and voter i in group J prefers candidate *1* if:

$$V^J\left(p_1\right) > V^J\left(p_2\right) + \sigma^{iJ} + \delta$$

where $\sigma^{iJ} \sim U\left[-\frac{1}{2\phi}, \frac{1}{2\phi}\right]$ with density ϕ denotes ideological bias toward candidate *2*, and δ is the average popularity of candidate *2* in the population and is assumed to follow a normal distribution with mean zero and precision ρ, with F and f representing the standard normal CDF and density, respectively.[2] Voters experience a quadratic loss as the platform of candidate c moves away from their bliss point, so that $V^J\left(p_c\right) = -0.5(p_c - p^J)^2$. Let $\Delta^J = V^J(p_1) - V^J(p_2)$ represent the payoff difference to group J from the platform of candidate 1, relative to candidate 2.

The game starts with two candidates simultaneously announcing their policy platforms: p_1, p_2. They know voter preferences and the distributions of σ^{iJ} and δ. The value of δ is realized and elections are held, with the winning candidate implementing his or her platform. Candidate 1's probability of winning equals

$$Q_1 = Pr(\pi_1 > 0.5) = F[\rho\beta\Delta^B + \rho(1-\beta)\Delta^W]$$

where π_1 represents the vote share for candidate 1.[3]

Candidates are assumed to care about winning the election but are also citizens and have preferences over policy. Candidates, assumed to be white, place weight ω on winning and weight $(1-\omega)$ on policy, and the objective function for candidate 1 is given by:

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[1] Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2011) develop a model in which employers use coercion, labeled as "guns", to limit outside options for workers and discuss the role of law enforcement in the U.S. South in coercing black workers.

[2] While we label σ^{iJ} as ideological bias, other interpretations are possible, and this is relevant since elections for CLEOs are sometimes non-partisan. The key role of σ^{iJ} is that it smooths out candidate vote shares, so that small changes in policies do not lead to discontinuous changes in vote shares. Thompson (2020) measures the degree of partisan behavior in the context of modern sheriff elections.

[3] To derive this, first note that the vote share for candidate 1, conditional on δ, equals $\pi_1 = 0.5 + \beta\phi\Delta^B + (1-\beta)\phi\Delta^W - \phi\delta$. Then, calculating the probability that the vote share exceeds 0.5 and integrating over δ yields the probability of winning.

$$\omega Q_1 - (1-\omega)[Q_1 0.5(p_1 - p^W)^2 + (1-Q_1)0.5(p_2 - p^W)^2]$$

The first term represents the payoff associated with winning the election, and the second term represents the payoff associated with the policy implemented, which equals p_1 with probability Q_1 and p_2 with probability $1-Q$.

Pre-VRA, only Whites can vote, and the probability of candidate 1 winning simplifies to $Q_1 = F[\rho\Delta^W]$. Given that candidates are white and Blacks are disenfranchised, candidates simply cater to the preferences of white voters and set equilibrium policies to those preferred by whites ($p^* = p^W$).[4] Post-VRA, both groups can vote, with Blacks representing a fraction β of the electorate. In this case, white candidates moderate their policies to account for the demands of black voters. This result is summarized in the following Proposition, with a proof in the Appendix.

Proposition 1 *Equilibrium polices can be characterized by a weighted average of black and white bliss points ($p^* = \alpha p^B + (1-\alpha)p^W$), with the weight on the black bliss point (α) increasing in the black share of the population (β).*

Intuitively, equilibrium policies post-VRA account for the preferences of both groups, and the franchise extension effect becomes more pronounced as the black share of the population increases. Thus, the introduction of the VRA improves police treatment of Blacks. Moreover, the post-VRA shift in policy towards the preferences of black voters is more significant in places with a larger share of Blacks.

We next extend the model to compare elected and appointed CLEOs. There are now two policies: police treatment of Blacks (p) and a general policy (g).[5] Voters care about both policies, with separable preferences: $V^J(g_1, p_1) = -0.5(g_1 - g^J)^2 - 0.5(p_1 - p^J)^2$. With elected CLEOs, there are four candidates, two competing over the general policy and two competing over police treatment of Blacks. With an appointed CLEO, two candidates compete over the general policy, and each commits to appointing a CLEO who will implement an announced police treatment of Blacks.[6] We continue to assume that all officials are white, with bliss points g^W and p^W. We also assume that officials can be grouped by parties and that ideology σ^{iJ} applies to parties as a whole and not specific candidates. Candidates continue to receive popularity shocks $\delta(g)$ and $\delta(p)$, which

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[4] To derive this result, note that the electoral effect of making the policy harsher equals $\frac{\partial Q_1}{\partial p_1} = -\rho(p_1 - p^W)f[\frac{\Delta^W}{\sigma}]$. Substituting this into the candidate equilibrium condition and using symmetry ($p_1 = p_2$, $\Delta^W = 0$ and $Q_1 = 0.5$), equilibrium policies (p^*) can be characterized by $\omega\rho(p^W - p^*)f[0] = (1-\omega)0.5(p^* - p^W)$. This can only be satisfied when $p^* = p^W$.

[5] The general policy can be interpreted, for example, as the level of a public good.

[6] We assume that the full menu of policy options is available when appointing officials.

we assume are independent across candidates.[7]

With an elected official as CLEO, candidates compete dimension-by-dimension, given the separability assumption, and the probability of winning for the CLEO from party 1 equals:

$$Q_1 = F[\rho\beta\Delta^B(p) + \rho(1-\beta)\Delta^W(p)],$$

where $\Delta^J(p)$ represents the difference in utility between candidates for group J in the policing dimension and similarly for $\Delta^J(g)$.[8] Given that the probability of winning is identical to that with a single policy dimension, the results are unchanged from above.

With appointed CLEOs, voters must choose a bundle of officials. Importantly, the precision of the combined popularity shock $\delta(g) + \delta(p)$ now equals $\tilde{\rho} = \rho/\sqrt{2}$ and is thus lower than under unbundled elections, meaning that there is more electoral uncertainty under appointed officials than under elected officials. This is due to the fact that voters only have one choice but must consider multiple factors. Given this, candidate 1's probability of winning equals:

$$Q_1 = F\{\tilde{\rho}\beta[\Delta^B(p) + \Delta^B(g)] + \tilde{\rho}(1-\beta)[\Delta^W(p) + \Delta^W(g)]\}.$$

With more electoral uncertainty ($\tilde{\rho} < \rho$), a given shift in policy now translates into a smaller change in the probability of winning. That is, with appointed officials, electoral competition is weakened on a dimension-by-dimension basis, and white candidates are less responsive to the preferences of black voters.[9,10] This leads to the following Proposition, with a proof in the Appendix:

Proposition 2 *An increase in the share of black voters (β) leads to a larger reduction in p^*, or shift towards the preferences of black voters, under elected, rather than appointed, CLEOs.*

To summarize, the model makes two key predictions. First, the treatment of Blacks by police improves following the VRA, and the size of this shift is increasing in the black share of the population. Second, these relationships are more pronounced in jurisdictions with directly elected CLEOs than with appointed CLEOs. We next turn to an empirical investigation of these predictions.

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[7] This independence assumption can be relaxed so long as preferences are not perfectly correlated.

[8] These differences equal $\Delta^J(p) = -0.5(p_1 - p^J)^2 - 0.5(p_2 - p^J)^2$ and $\Delta^J(g) = -0.5(g_1 - g^J)^2 - 0.5(g_2 - g^J)^2$

[9] Besley and Coate (2003) obtain a similar result in a model with citizen candidates. In particular, with a multidimensional policy space, policy is bundled into one option when officials are appointed, leading them to cater to stakeholders. With elected officials, by contrast, policy becomes unbundled and officials have an incentive to run on pro-voter platforms. Thus, voters have more influence with elected officials relative to appointed ones.

[10] Indeed, as the number of officials appointed by a single elected official grows large, the weight placed on black voters goes to zero and officials do not moderate their platforms towards those preferred by black voters even when the size of the group is large.

Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1 Taking p_2 as given, the first-order condition for candidate 1 is given by:

$$\omega \frac{\partial Q_1}{\partial p_1} = (1-\omega)\frac{\partial Q_1}{\partial p_1}[0.5(p_1 - p^W)^2 - 0.5(p_2 - p^W)^2] + (1-\omega)Q_1(p_1 - p^W)$$

Changes in announced platforms by candidate 1 leads to changes in the probability of winning, which has direct effects on candidate payoffs from winning (the left hand size) but also effects on the policies that are implemented and candidate preferences over those policies, as represented by the right-hand side.

Moreover, the effect of making policies harsher on the probability of winning is given by:

$$\frac{\partial Q_1}{\partial p_1} = f[\rho\beta\Delta^B + \rho(1-\beta)\Delta^W][-\rho\beta(p_1 - p^B) - \rho(1-\beta)(p_1 - p^W)]$$

When candidate 1's platform is more harsh than preferred by Blacks but less harsh than preferred by Whites ($p^B < p_1 < p^W$), making policies more harsh leads to more support from white voters but less support from black voters. Putting this back into the candidate equilibrium condition above, using symmetry, and re-arranging, equilibrium polices can be characterized by a weighted average of black and white bliss points:

$$p^* = \alpha p^B + (1-\alpha)p^W$$

where the weight on policy preferences of black voters equals:

$$\alpha = \frac{\omega f(0)\rho\beta}{\omega f(0)\rho\beta + \omega f(0)\rho(1-\beta) + (1-\omega)}$$

Finally, the weight on the policy preferences of black voters is increasing in the black share of the population (β).

Proof of Proposition 2 With an appointed CLEO, the pre-VRA equilibrium is unchanged ($p^* = p^W$) but the post-VRA equilibrium in police treatment of Blacks is given by:

$$p^* = \tilde{\alpha} p^B + (1-\tilde{\alpha})p^W$$

where the weight on black preferences now equals:

$$\tilde{\alpha} = \frac{\omega f(0)\tilde{\rho}\beta}{\omega f(0)\tilde{\rho}\beta + \omega f(0)\tilde{\rho}(1-\beta) + (1-\omega)}$$

A marginal increase in the share of black voters shifts equilibrium policy towards those preferred by Blacks in proportion to the weight placed on black voters by policy makers. That is, $\partial\alpha/\partial\beta = \alpha/\beta$ and $\partial\tilde{\alpha}/\partial\beta = \tilde{\alpha}/\beta$. Moreover, one can show that $\alpha > \tilde{\alpha}$ due to the fact that $\rho > \tilde{\rho}$ and so long as candidates place some weight on both policy and winning ($0 < \omega < 1$). Thus, a marginal increase in the share of black voters leads to a bigger shift in police treatment of Blacks under elected officials than under appointed CLEOs.

Variable definitions and sources

Arrests data.

Arrests executed by local police offices between 1960-1981 have been obtained from the Uniform Crime Reports (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2018) reporting information on arrests by race and local enforcement agency provided by voluntary filing only for agencies that report for 12 months in a calendar year. Since these agencies do not report every year, we have retained only those for which we have information before and after the VRA passage to build a panel of municipal police and sheriff offices that we have subsequently mapped to counties using the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data (2005) crosswalk, obtaining a balanced panel of 484 counties (out of a universe of 1137) for the pre–VRA (1960-1965) and post–VRA (1975-1980) periods. These data have been combined with Census data on population by county to construct the average county arrest rates pre–VRA (1960-1965) and post–VRA (1975-1980) described below.

Arrest rate pre–VRA, black: Black arrests per thousands (1960-1965).

Arrest rate pre–VRA, white: White arrests per thousands (1960-1965).

Arrest rate post–VRA, black: Black arrests per thousands (1975-1980).

Arrest rate post–VRA, white: White arrests per thousands (1975-1980).

Difference in Ln Arrest rate, black: Difference between the natural log of black arrest rates post–VRA and pre–VRA.

Difference in Ln Arrest rate, white: Difference between the natural log of white arrest rates post–VRA and pre–VRA.

Coverage.

Dummy variable equal to one for the counties that were covered under Section 5 of the VRA in 1965 and zero otherwise. All counties of six states (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia) were covered, whereas, of the 100 North Carolina counties, 39 were covered, i.e. Anson, Beaufort, Bertie, Bladen, Camden, Caswell, Chowan, Cleveland, Craven, Cumberland, Edgecombe, Franklin, Gaston, Gates, Granville, Greene, Guilford, Halifax, Harnett, Hertford, Hoke, Jackson, Lee, Martin, Nash, Northampton, Onslow, Pasquotank, Perquimans, Person, Pitt, Robeson, Rockingham, Scotland, Union, Vance, Washington, Wayne, Wilson. All counties of Arkansas, Florida, Tennessee, and Texas were instead not covered. Source: Bernini, Facchini and Testa (2023).

County characteristics.

Anti-black activism, 1960-64: Counts of anti-black events occurred between 1960 and 1964. Source: Bernini, Facchini and Testa (2023).

Black unskilled: Change in the percentage of African Americans 25 years old or more without a high school diploma between 1960 (United States Bureau of the Census, 1963) and 1980 (Manson et al., 2019).

Black unemployed: Change in the county percentage of African Americans unemployed between 1960 (United States Bureau of the Census, 1963) and 1980 (Manson et al., 2019).

Black poor: Change in the percentage of African American families with income less than 3,000 USD in 1960 (United States Bureau of the Census, 1963) and less than 7,499 USD in 1980 (Manson et al., 2019).

Cotton suitability: Maximum potential cotton yield by county (e.g. cotton suitability index). Source: Hornbeck and Naidu (2014).

Cotton yield: Change in cotton yield computed as the difference in the natural log of cotton yields in 1964 and 1954, where the cotton yield is the number of cotton bales per acre of land devoted to the cultivation of cotton by county. Source Haines, Fishback and Rhode (2018).

Education spending: Change in education spending computed as the difference in the natural log of real expenditure per capita (2000 USD) in 1982 and 1957. The data on education spending are from United States Bureau of the Census (2024).

Farm size: Number of farms with 700 acres or more in 1940. Source Haines (2010).

Green book establishments: Number of Establishments in 1950 standardized by black population in 1950. The data on Green book establishments are from Cook et al. (2023).

Judicial division: Divisions of judicial districts. Source: Bernini, Facchini and Testa (2023).

KKK: Change in the counts of Ku Klux Klan organizations (known as Klaverns) by county. Source: Bernini, Facchini and Testa (2023).

Lynching: Change in the number of black lynching standardized by black population. Source:

Bernini, Facchini and Testa (2023).

Migration: Estimated (ln) change in population (total and by race) due to migration between 1980 and 1960. The estimates for the intercensal changes have been obtained from Bowles et al. (2016) and White, Mueser and Tierney (1992).

NAACP: Change in the count of local branches of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), by county. Source: Bernini, Facchini and Testa (2023).

Number of Blacks in the police force: The 1959 data have been digitized from Rudwick (1962) and the 1969 have been digitized from Southern Regional Council (1983). The data for 1987 are from United States Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2012).

Percent black, 1960: Percent of African Americans in the 1960 county population. Source: United States Bureau of the Census (2012).

Percent poor: Percentage of families with income less than 2,000 USD in 1950, 3,000 USD in 1960 and 7,499 in 1980. Source: United States Bureau of the Census (2012) and Manson et al. (2019).

Percent rural, 1960: County percentage of population living in rural farms in 1960. Source: United States Bureau of the Census (2012).

Percent unskilled, 1960: County percentage of 25 years old or more without a high school diploma in 1960. Source: United States Bureau of the Census (2012).

Population, 1960: County population. Source: United States Bureau of the Census (2012).

Presidential turnout: Difference in the natural log of presidential turnout in 1960 and 1940, where presidential turnout is given by the votes cast in the 1960 and 1940 presidential elections divided by population of voting age. The data on votes cast in the presidential elections are from Clubb, Flanigan and Zingale (2006). Missing data for the 1940 election in Texas are from The Dallas Morning News (1941). Missing data for the 1960 presidential elections for Mississippi are from Mississippi Secretary of State (1964). The data on population of voting age are from United States Bureau of the Census (2012).

Pro-black activism, 1960-64: Counts of pro-black events occurred between 1960 and 1964. Source: Bernini, Facchini and Testa (2023).

Republican: Difference in the natural log of vote shares for the Republican candidates in the 1964 and 1940 presidential elections. Sources: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (2013) and Clubb, Flanigan and Zingale (2006).

Unemployment rate: County unemployment rate in 1960 is from United States Bureau of the Census (2012), whereas in 1980 is from United States Bureau of the Census (2008).

Homicides Data

Homicides data are derived from National Center for Health Statistics (2001). Our time period focuses on 1959-1978. We do not focus on the period after 1978 due to the changes in the data.

Homicides are coded using the following cause of death codes in each year: 980-983 (1959-1967), 960-969 (1968-1978).

Force: Homicides caused by police are coded using the following cause of death codes in each year: 984 (1959-1967), 970-977 (1968-1978).

NCHS county codes were converted to FIPS county codes using the NCHS/FIP county crosswalk. County FIPS codes had to be created manually in Virginia due to inconsistent treatment of independent cities over time. All counts were doubled in 1972 given that the NCHS only processed one-half of all death certificates in that year.

Crime Data

Reported violent and property crimes are derived from Kaplan (2021). Crimes counts by agency have been mapped to counties retaining only agencies that report for at least three months in a calendar year. Crime rates for property and violent crimes are then derived by dividing the respective total number of reported crimes by agency in each county by the county population in the closest census year.

Sheriff Incumbency.

To construct the measure of sheriff incumbency, we hand-coded information on sheriffs names between adjacent elections during the period 1956–1980, building an indicator equal to one when a sheriff name does not change after an election (and zero otherwise), and averaging the incumbency indicator over presidential terms to construct the incumbency rate. The information on on electoral cycles (e.g., 2 years, 4 years, staggered) comes from the 1957 Census of Government and the state specific sources listed below, which also report the names of the elected officials. *Alabama*: Alabama Official and Statistical Register. *Arkansas*: Historical Report of the Secretary of State, 2008. *Florida*: until 1962, Biennial Report of the Secretary of State of the State of Florida; after 1962, The Sheriff's Star: Special Yearbook Edition. Official Publication of the Florida Sheriffs Association. *Georgia*: Georgia Official and Statistical Register.*Louisiana*: Louisiana Roster of Officials. *Mississippi*: Mississippi Official and Statistical Register. *North Carolina*: North Carolina Manual. *South Carolina*: until 1973, South Carolina Governmental Guide; after 1973, South Carolina Directory of County Officials. *Texas*: Texas Almanac. *Virginia*: Report of the Secretary of the Commonwealth to the Governor and General Assembly of Virginia.

Black elected officials.

The share of black elected officials by type of office is the number of black elected officials in County Commissions, municipal council and judges as reported by the National Roster of Black Elected Officials, divided by the total number of elected officials for the corresponding offices at county level, as reported by the Census of Governments. Judges belong to courts whose jurisdiction does not exceed the boundaries of a county and include the following courts: city and municipal courts, traffic courts, family courts, juvenile courts, pro- bate courts, general sessions courts, and county courts. When the numerator is zero and the denominator is missing, the share is zero. The total number of black elected officials in each local office in the US South has been obtained by counting the black elected officials by office reported in the National Roster of Black Elected Officials in 1969, 1971, and for the period 1973-1980. These officials have been matched to the counties using the address provided by the Roster. The information on the total number of elected officials by type of office that is used to construct the share of black elected officials is only available from the Census of Governments in 1967 and 1977. Thus, for the period 1964-1972, the total number of elected officials by type of office are taken from the Census of Governments, Volume 1, Governmental Organization, Number 2, Popularly Elected Officials, 1967. For the period 1973-1982, elected officials by type of office are taken from the Census of Governments Volume 1, Governmental Organization, Number 2, Popularly Elected Officials, 1977.

Election rule of county governing bodies and police chiefs.

The information on the system of elections of members of county governing bodies and police chiefs comes from the Census of Governments, Elective Offices of State and Local Governments (1957) and from the National Roster of Black Elected Officials (NRBEO, 1980). We have used the summary information reported by the Census of Government (1957) and the NRBEO (1980) at state level to construct indicators for the system of elections of county governing bodies and police chiefs as detailed below.

Elected Police chiefs: indicator equal to one for counties in states where statutes and local charters allow for the election of police chiefs as reported by the Census of Government. The municipal police chief may also be called marshal in Arkansas, Florida, Mississippi, Texas. In Virginia, *town* police chiefs are called Sargeants. Based on this information, the indicator is equal to one for Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Texas and Virginia.

Single member districts (SMD): indicator equal to one for covered states where members of county governing bodies are elected by single member districts (Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia) and zero otherwise.

Racial composition of police officers

The data for the short run analysis have been digitized from Rudwick (1962) and Southern Regional Council (1983) and span the period 1959-1969. The end period data for the long run analysis have been instead obtained from United States Department of Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice Statistics. (2012), which was administered to all enforcement agencies with at least 100 employees and to a nationally representative sample for smaller entities. As a result, the long run analysis covers a smaller sample. We also attempted to access data from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) but our FOIA request was denied due to a recent elimination of the data sharing program for researchers.

Figure A1: US South

Coverage 1965



Arrest rates, sample 1960-1981



Figure A2: Reporting probability



Note: Linear probability model. Estimated parameter: Black share 1960 x Coverage. Baseline specification including state trends and the following controls interacted with coverage: population, unemployment rate, percent family below the poverty line, percent unskilled, percent rural, cotton suitability, farms with 700 acres or more, pro-black protests, anti-black protests, black police, Green Book establishments, lynching and state trends. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals

Figure A3: Reporting frequency by agency



Figure A4: Change in black arrest rates (1960-1981), by coverage



Note: The two figures are local polynomial non-parametric fits

Figure A5: Homicides: difference in the gradient between covered and non-covered



Note: Linear probability model. Estimated parameter: Black share 1960 x Coverage. Baseline specification including state-year interactions, county fixed effects and the following controls interacted with coverage: population, unemployment rate, percent family below the poverty line, percent unskilled, percent rural, cotton suitability, farms with 700 acres or more, pro-black protests, anti-black protests, black police, Green Book establishments, lynching. Omitted interaction: 1960. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals

Figure A6: Local Discretion to elect Police Chief



Note: Estimated parameter: Black share 1960 x Coverage. Bars represent 90% confidence intervals. Controls: population, unemployment rate, percent family below the poverty line, percent unskilled, percent rural.

Figure A7: Sheriff Incumbency rate: difference in the gradient between covered and non-covered counties



Note: Estimated parameter: Black share 1960 x Coverage. Baseline specification including state-year interactions, county fixed effects and the following controls interacted with coverage: population, unemployment rate, percent family below the poverty line, percent unskilled, percent rural, cotton suitability, farms with 700 acres or more, pro-black protests, anti-black protests, black police, Green Book establishments, lynching. Omitted interaction: 1960. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals .

Figure A8: Crimes reported: difference in the gradient between covered and non-covered counties



Note: Estimated parameter: Black share 1960 x Coverage. Baseline specification including state-year interactions, county fixed effects and the following controls interacted with coverage: population, unemployment rate, percent family below the poverty line, percent unskilled, percent rural, cotton suitability, farms with 700 acres or more, pro-black protests, anti-black protests, black police, Green Book establishments, lynching. Omitted interaction: 1960. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals

Figure A9: Change in Education spending: Police and Sheriff samples



Note: Bars represent 90% confidence intervals. Baseline specification including state trends and the following controls interacted with coverage: population, unemployment rate, percent family below the poverty line, percent unskilled, percent rural, cotton suitability, farms with 700 acres or more, pro-black protests, anti-black protests, black police, Green Book establishments, lynching.

Table A1: Sheriff and Police sample vs. US South sample

	Police and Sheriff sample		US South entire sample	
	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.
County characteristics				
Percent black, 1960	21.50	17.73	23.23	19.89
Unemployment rate, 1960	5.00	1.87	4.92	2.05
Families below poverty line, 1960	41.03	14.10	45.01	15.60
Percent unskilled, 1960	69.98	9.10	72.35	9.27
County population (1,000), 1960	3.36	1.04	2.96	1.04
Percent rural, 1960	17.09	13.90	21.04	15.21
Pro-black activism, 1960-64	1.20	5.57	0.83	4.65
Anti-black activism, 1960-64	0.24	1.95	0.18	1.51
Cotton suitability	0.45	0.40	0.42	0.39
Black police, 1959	1.12	4.72	0.79	6.17
Farms with 700 acres or more	35.06	42.75	32.88	42.72
Counties	590		1137	

Table A2: Summary Statistics

	All		Sheriff		Police	
	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.
County characteristics						
Percent black, 1960	21.50	17.73	20.45	19.04	21.45	16.11
Unemployment rate, 1960	5.00	1.87	4.96	1.97	5.03	1.70
Families below poverty line, 1960	41.03	14.10	42.42	14.40	38.88	13.18
Percent unskilled, 1960	69.98	9.10	71.06	8.87	68.37	8.89
County population (1,000), 1960	3.36	1.04	3.12	1.13	3.68	0.93
Percent rural, 1960	17.09	13.90	19.53	14.59	14.42	12.73
Pro-black activism, 1960-64	1.20	5.57	0.98	5.46	1.59	6.50
Anti-black activism, 1960-64	0.24	1.95	0.23	1.62	0.31	2.28
Cotton suitability	0.45	0.40	0.46	0.42	0.45	0.39
Black police, 1959	1.12	4.72	0.89	3.85	1.43	5.28
Farms with 700 acres or more	35.06	42.75	39.91	48.45	33.91	40.66
Arrest rates						
Arrest rate pre-VRA, black	6.38	14.04	2.63	4.95	7.11	15.71
Arrest rate post-VRA, black	6.70	10.67	3.14	6.79	6.02	11.12
Difference in ln Arrests rates, black	0.32	1.00	0.44	1.34	-0.05	0.70
Difference in ln Arrests rates felony, blacks	0.82	1.25	0.84	1.31	0.90	0.87
Difference in ln Arrests rates non felony, blacks	0.27	1.41	0.33	1.46	-0.26	0.74
Arrest rate pre-VRA, white	1.99	1.95	0.90	0.85	2.22	2.07
Arrest rate post-VRA, white	3.12	2.15	1.55	1.10	2.66	2.28
Difference in ln Arrests rates, white	0.64	0.85	0.71	1.11	0.20	0.63
Difference in ln Arrests rates felony, whites	1.12	1.10	1.14	1.13	1.05	0.80
Difference in ln Arrests rates non felony, whites	0.59	1.14	0.64	1.18	0.10	0.68
Counties	590		302		334	

Table A3: OLS models. Pre-VRA trends in civil right activism, political participation, racial attitudes and crime

	(1) Force	(2) Lynching	(3) KKK	(4) NAACP	(5) Turnout	(6) Republican
Percent black, 1960 x Coverage	–0.0008	0.0067**	–0.0072	0.0014	–0.0021	–0.0003
	(0.0017)	(0.0032)	(0.0093)	(0.0038)	(0.0017)	(0.0046)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-Square	0.00	0.03	0.30	0.17	0.65	0.77
N	590	590	590	590	581	579

Robust standard errors clustered by judicial divisions in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Controls: percent black, population, unemployment rate. All controls are inteacted by coverage

Table A4: OLS models. Pre-VRA trends in demographic and economic characteristics

	(1) Black Share	(2) Population	(3) Rural	(4) Unemp	(5) Unskilled	(6) Poor	(7) Cotton Yield
Percent black, 1960 x Coverage	0.007	0.003**	0.201***	–0.003	0.027	0.032	–0.002
	(0.020)	(0.001)	(0.071)	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.044)	(0.002)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls x Coverage	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-Square	0.14	0.41	0.41	0.40	0.12	0.22	0.19
N	590	586	586	585	590	590	559

Robust standard errors clustered by judicial divisions in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Controls: percent black, population, unemployment rate.

Table A5: OLS models. Dependent Variable: Sheriffs and Police, Long run Difference in ln Arrests rates, by race (1960-1981)

	(1) black	(2) white	(3) black	(4) white
Percent black, 1960 x Coverage	–0.016**	–0.009	–0.017**	–0.005
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Percent black, 1960	0.022***	0.009*	0.024***	0.007
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Unemployment rate, 1960	–0.020	0.011	–0.043	–0.026
	(0.034)	(0.022)	(0.036)	(0.023)
County population (log), 1960	–0.080	–0.087**	0.040	0.005
	(0.053)	(0.042)	(0.088)	(0.065)
Percent family bottom 20, 1960			0.001	–0.001
			(0.009)	(0.006)
Percent unskilled, 1960			0.006	0.015*
			(0.010)	(0.008)
Percent rural, 1960			0.004	–0.001
			(0.007)	(0.005)
Pro-black activism, 1960-64			–0.012***	–0.012***
			(0.004)	(0.004)
Anti-black activism, 1960-64			0.009	0.013
			(0.010)	(0.012)
Cotton suitability			–0.316	–0.197
			(0.196)	(0.161)
Farms with 700 acres or more			0.001	0.000
			(0.002)	(0.001)
Black police, 1959			–0.017***	–0.010
			(0.004)	(0.011)
Green Book: all establishments: 1950 / Black pop. in 1950			0.941	–0.554
			(0.835)	(0.359)
Black Lynchings (per 10,000s), 1950-1964			0.076	–0.517***
			(0.163)	(0.121)
State Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Coverage X Controls	No	No	No	No
Adj. R-Square	0.09	0.01	0.12	0.03
N	551	589	486	521

Robust standard errors clustered by judicial divisions in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Table A6: OLS models. Dependent Variable: Sheriffs and Police, Long run Difference in ln Arrests rates, by race (1960-1981),

	Texas and Florida dropped		Texas and Florida covered		Common Support		Common Support rural			
							Sheriff		Police	
	(1) black	(2) white	(3) black	(4) white	(5) black	(6) white	(7) black	(8) white	(9) black	(10) white
Percent black, 1960 x Coverage	–0.022**	–0.007	–0.023**	–0.003	–0.016*	0.001	–0.035**	–0.013	–0.005	0.006
	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.006)
State Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Coverage X Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-Square	0.14	0.04	0.11	0.03	0.10	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.13	0.18
N	361	379	486	521	482	517	241	272	350	365

Robust standard errors clustered by judicial divisions in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Controls: percent black, coverage, population, unemployment rate, percent family below the poverty line, percent unskilled, percent rural, cotton suitability, farms with 700 acres or more, pro-black protests, anti-black protests, black police, Green Book establishments, lynching.

Table A7: OLS models. Dependent Variable: Long run Difference in ln Arrest rates, by race and age (1960-1981)

	(1) adult black	(2) juvenile black	(3) adult white	(4) juvenile white
Sheriff sample				
Percent black, 1960 x Coverage	–0.034**	0.049	–0.012	0.018
	(0.014)	(0.068)	(0.013)	(0.020)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Coverage X Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-Square	0.05	0.24	0.03	–0.07
N	246	74	278	118
Police sample				
Percent black, 1960 x Coverage	–0.005	–0.007	0.006	0.005
	(0.008)	(0.020)	(0.006)	(0.016)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Coverage X Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adj. R-Square	0.15	0.11	0.18	0.01
N	354	216	369	245

Robust standard errors clustered by judicial divisions in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Controls: percent black, coverage, population, unemployment rate, percent family below the poverty line, percent unskilled, percent rural, cotton suitability, farms with 700 acres or more, pro-black protests, anti-black protests, black police, Green Book establishments, lynching.

Table A8: OLS models. Characteristics of the police force

	Δ number of black police p.c.				Δ collective bargaining	
	1959–1969		1959–1987		1959–1987	
	(1) Sheriff sample	(2) Police sample	(3) Sheriff sample	(4) Police sample	(5) Sheriff sample	(6) Police sample
Percent black, 1960 x Coverage	0.000	0.000	0.003	–0.003	–0.004	–0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Adj. R-Square	0.24	0.03	0.60	0.56	0.42	0.23
N	278	369	95	173	95	173

Robust standard errors clustered by judicial divisions clustered by judicial divisions in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. In all our specifications we include the full set of controls of columns (7)-(8) of Table 1, their interaction with coverage status and state trends.

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