

# Online Appendix for Paper: *Terrorism and Voting: The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Germany*

Navid Sabet

Marius Liebold

Guido Friebe

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## A. Terrorism in Germany

Table A.1 provides detailed statistics related to the targets, weapons and attack types used in each of the 232 attacks in Germany between 2010 and 2020 while Figure A.1 illustrates the frequency and intensity—in terms of deaths and injuries—of these attacks.

As shown in Table A.1, the overall success rate of attacks in Germany stands at 86 percent. The majority of attacks are facility or infrastructure attacks. They constitute 62 percent of all attacks and have a very high success rate of 94 percent. The next most common type of attack is armed assault. These make up 21 percent of all attacks and have a success rate of around 80 percent. The next most common attack type are bombings and explosions; they make up 10 percent of the attacks but have a success rate of just 54 percent, the lowest among all attack types. Fifty percent of the attacks target private citizens and their property.

Panel A in Figure A.1 demonstrates that, with the exception of 2013, attacks occur in Germany in every year, though there is great variation across years with 2015 experiencing many attacks and 2010 and 2012 experiencing relatively few attacks. In Panel B we see that most attacks involve very little deaths and injuries.




Figure A.1  
Frequency and intensity of attacks

Table A.2 provides examples of attacks from our sample that helps illustrate how success and defined are according to attack type.

Table A.1  
Terrorism summary statistics for Germany (2010 - 2020)

|                                   |              |            |                | If success (mean) |        |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|------------|----------------|-------------------|--------|
|                                   | Observations | Percentage | Attack success | Wounded           | Killed |
| <i>Attack Type</i>                |              |            |                |                   |        |
| Armed Assault                     | 48           | 0.21       | 0.79           | 2.32              | 0.87   |
| Bombing/Explosion                 | 24           | 0.10       | 0.54           | 1.54              | 0.08   |
| Facility/Infrastructure Attack    | 143          | 0.62       | 0.94           | 0.24              | 0.00   |
| Hijacking                         | 1            | 0.00       | 1.00           | 0.00              | 1.00   |
| Hostage Taking Barricade Incident | 1            | 0.00       | 1.00           | 4.00              | 0.00   |
| Unarmed Assault                   | 13           | 0.06       | 0.77           | 7.44              | 1.20   |
| Unknown                           | 2            | 0.01       | 1.00           | 2.50              | 0.00   |
| <i>Target Type</i>                |              |            |                |                   |        |
| Business                          | 26           | 0.11       | 0.92           | 1.54              | 0.50   |
| Educational Institution           | 1            | 0.00       | 1.00           | 0.00              | 0.00   |
| Government Diplomatic             | 9            | 0.04       | 0.89           | 0.00              | 0.00   |
| Government General                | 20           | 0.09       | 0.75           | 0.20              | 0.07   |
| Journalists & Media               | 2            | 0.01       | 1.00           | 2.00              | 0.00   |
| Military                          | 2            | 0.01       | 1.00           | 1.00              | 1.00   |
| Police                            | 10           | 0.04       | 0.90           | 0.22              | 0.11   |
| Private Citizens & Property       | 116          | 0.50       | 0.87           | 1.65              | 0.30   |
| Religious Figures/Institutions    | 22           | 0.09       | 0.86           | 0.16              | 0.05   |
| Telecommunication                 | 2            | 0.01       | 1.00           | 0.00              | 0.00   |
| Transportation                    | 20           | 0.09       | 0.75           | 0.00              | 0.00   |
| Utilities                         | 1            | 0.00       | 1.00           | 0.00              | 0.00   |
| Violent Political Party           | 1            | 0.00       | 1.00           | 0.00              | 0.00   |
| <i>Weapon Type</i>                |              |            |                |                   |        |
| Explosives/Incendiary             | 178          | 0.77       | 0.85           | 0.48              | 0.02   |
| Firearms                          | 15           | 0.06       | 0.93           | 3.00              | 1.79   |
| Melee                             | 20           | 0.09       | 0.90           | 2.18              | 0.39   |
| Other                             | 2            | 0.01       | 0.50           | 1.00              | 0.00   |
| Sabotage Equipment                | 3            | 0.01       | 1.00           | 0.00              | 0.00   |
| Unknown                           | 8            | 0.03       | 1.00           | 0.62              | 0.00   |
| Vehicle                           | 6            | 0.03       | 0.67           | 14.50             | 3.00   |
| <i>Attack Motivation</i>          |              |            |                |                   |        |
| Islamist                          | 24           | 0.10       | 0.75           | 5.67              | 1.17   |
| Left-wing                         | 44           | 0.19       | 0.86           | 0.05              | 0.00   |
| Others                            | 27           | 0.12       | 0.93           | 0.20              | 0.04   |
| Right-wing                        | 116          | 0.50       | 0.87           | 0.70              | 0.13   |
| Unknown                           | 21           | 0.09       | 0.86           | 2.06              | 0.67   |
| Total Attacks                     | 232          |            | 0.86           | 1.09              | 0.23   |

**Table A.2**  
**Examples of Successful and Failed Attacks**

| Attack Type                            | N   | Definition                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Examples                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
|----------------------------------------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                        |     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Success                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | Failure                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
| Armed Assault                          | 48  | An armed assault is determined to be successful if the assault takes place and if a target is hit (including people and/or property). Unsuccessful armed assaults are those in which the perpetrators attack and do not hit the target. An armed assault is also unsuccessful if the perpetrators are apprehended on their way to commit the assault. To make this determination, however, there must be information to indicate that an actual assault was imminent. | 201509070062: Assaults set fire to a refugee shelter in Rottenburg town, Baden-Württemberg state, Germany. Five civilians were injured in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         | 201910040009: An assailant armed with a knife attempted to enter a synagogue in Berlin city, Berlin, Germany. Security guards apprehended and injured the assailant and there were no other reported casualties in the attack. An Anti-Semitic extremist claimed responsibility for the incident and shouted "F*** Israel" during the attack.                                                                   |
| Bombing/<br>Explosion                  | 24  | A bombing is successful if the bomb or explosive device detonates. Bombings are considered unsuccessful if they do not detonate. The success or failure of the bombing is not based on whether it hit the intended target.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | 201607240002: An assailant detonated an explosive device outside a music festival in Ansbach, Bavaria, Germany. The assailant was killed and at least 15 people were injured in the blast. The assailant, identified as Muhammad Daleel, had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also claimed responsibility for the incident; however, Daleel's connection to ISIL could not be confirmed.                                                                                                                                  | 201212100015: Assaults planted an explosive device at the main railway station in Bonn city, North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. The device ignited but failed to detonate; it was later defused by experts. No group claimed responsibility for the incident; however, sources attributed the attack to Muslim extremists.                                                                                        |
| Hijacking                              | 1   | A hijacking is successful if the hijackers assume control of the vehicle at any point, whereas a hijacking is unsuccessful if the hijackers fail to assume control of the vehicle. The success or failure of the hijacking is not based on whether the vehicle reached the intended destination of the hijackers.                                                                                                                                                     | 201612190003: An assailant hijacked a truck and later killed the driver in northwest Berlin, Germany. This was one of two attacks carried out on the same day; in a later event, the assailant drove the hijacked vehicle into a market, killing and injuring a number of people. The assailant, identified as Anis Amri, had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In addition, ISIL claimed responsibility for the incident; however, the assailant's connection to the group could not be confirmed. Amri was killed several days later by police officers in Milan, Italy. | -                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| Hostage Taking<br>(Barricade Incident) | 1   | A barricade incident is successful if the hostage takers assume control of the individuals at any point, whereas a barricade incident is unsuccessful if the hostage takers fail to assume control of the individuals.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | 201810150005: An assailant set fire to a McDonald's restaurant in the main railway station in Cologne, North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. The assailant then went into an adjacent pharmacy, took a civilian hostage, and covered them in petrol. Police were able to free the hostage on site. Four people, including the assailant, were injured during the attack. An unaffiliated individual claimed responsibility for the incident and "demanded to be allowed to leave Germany for Islamic State in Syria."                                                                                                | -                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| Facility/<br>Infrastructure Attack     | 143 | A facility attack is determined to be successful if the facility is damaged. If the facility has not been damaged, then the attack is unsuccessful.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   | 201508240130: Assaults set fire to a planned asylum accommodation center in Weissach im Tal, Baden-Württemberg, Germany. There were no reported casualties in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the incident.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | 201503230050: An assailant threw an incendiary device that landed near Paul-Loebe-Haus and failed to ignite in Tiergarten neighborhood, Berlin, Germany. Ralph K., a member of the German Resistance Movement, claimed responsibility for the incident and expressed anti-immigrant sentiments.                                                                                                                 |
| Unarmed Assault                        | 13  | An unarmed assault is determined to be successful there is a victim that who has been injured. Unarmed assaults that are unsuccessful are those in which the perpetrators do not injure anyone. An unarmed assault is also unsuccessful if the perpetrators are apprehended when on their way to commit the assault. To make this determination, however, there must be information to indicate that an assault was imminent.                                         | 201510310057: Assaults armed with baseball bats attacked Syrian refugees in Magdeburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Germany. Three refugees were injured in the attack. No group claimed responsibility for the attack.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       | 201901010051: An assailant attempted to drive his vehicle into a pedestrian in Bottrop, North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. There were no reported casualties in the attack. This was one of three related attacks in the area on this date. An Anti-Immigrant extremist, identified as Andreas N., claimed responsibility for the incidents and told police that he intended to target foreigners in the attacks. |

*Note:* This table provides the definitions (Column 3) of each attack type (Column 1) from our sample, as stated in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Columns 4 and 5 include summaries from the GTD of successful and failed attacks for each attack type in our sample. "-" indicates that our sample does not include a corresponding attack. Note that our sample includes two attacks whose attack type label is "Unknown". The table does not include these two attacks.

## B. The AfD in Germany

In this Online Appendix, we present descriptive statistics that show the AfD's rapid rise in German politics since its inception in 2013. Figure B.1 plots the average vote share for the AfD party across all elections since its establishment in 2013. As shown, the AfD has experienced a marked increase in the years since it was founded in every election, increasing its average vote share from less than 5 percent to some 15 percent.




Figure B.1  
Average AfD Vote Share Across All Elections in Germany

Figure B.2 overlays the distribution of the AfD vote share across German municipalities targeted with terror attacks for both Federal and state elections. As shown, the AfD has performed better in state elections compared to Federal ones. A  $t$ -test of equality of means reveals that the AfD vote share is 3.1 points higher in state elections than in Federal elections ( $p$ -value of 0.002).




Figure B.2  
Distribution of AfD Vote Share in Federal and State Elections in Targeted Municipalities

### C. Targeted v. Untargeted Municipalities

In our main paper, we established that the success or failure of an attack is unrelated to municipality characteristics. In this Online Appendix, we demonstrate that municipalities targeted with attacks are not just a random subset drawn from the universe of municipalities in Germany. This is shown in Figure C.1. In Panel (b), for example, we see that targeted municipalities are systematically different to untargeted ones while in Panels (c) and (d), respectively, we see that these differences hold for municipalities targeted with *both* successful and failed attacks. In Panel (a), however, we see no differences in characteristics between municipalities that experienced successful attacks compared to those that experienced failed attacks.




Figure C.1  
Characteristics in Targeted and Untargeted Municipalities

**Note:** This figure presents regression coefficients from balance tests that compare characteristics for different types of municipalities. In Panel (a) successfully targeted municipalities are compared to those hit with failed attacks. In panels (b) to (d), untargeted municipalities are compared, respectively, to: targeted (i.e., successful and failed attacks) municipalities; successfully targeted municipalities; and failed municipalities. All outcomes are standardized.

## D. Terrorism and Differential Trends

### D.1 Terrorism and Municipality Characteristics

In this Online Appendix, we present event studies for each municipality characteristic,  $X_i$ , presented in our balance table from the main paper (except for geographical characteristics). Specifically, for each municipality characteristic,  $X_i$  (which we standardize), we estimate the parameters of the following econometric specification:

$$X_i = \sum_{j=-4, j \neq -1}^3 \beta_j (SUCCESS_i \times D_j^t) + \delta_i + \alpha_j + \epsilon_i \quad (5)$$

The specification include municipality fixed effects,  $\delta_i$ , as well as time period fixed effects,  $\alpha_j$ .  $SUCCESS_i$  is defined as before and is now interacted with a time period dummies which run from four years prior to an attack until 3 years after an attack. The omitted category is  $j = -1$ , the year immediately prior to the attack. Our estimation command — `xtevent` developed by Freyaldenhoven et al. (2021) — accounts for staggered treatment and uses the interaction weighted estimator proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021) which is suitable in setting with heterogeneous effects.

The results are shown in Figure D.1. As shown, there are little to no significant post-attack effects on any of the socio-economic variables in our study. What is more, there is very little evidence of pre-trends, indicating that successful terror is not selected with respect to a wide range of socio-economic characteristics.




Figure D.1  
Trends in Socio-Economic Characteristics Successful v. Failed Municipalities

**Note:** This figure plots event study estimates for various socio-economic characteristics of municipalities targeted with successful v. failed terror attacks. The outcomes have all been standardized. The regressions include municipality and time period fixed effects and are estimated using the interaction weighted estimator proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021). Standard errors are clustered at the municipality and confidence intervals are drawn at 95%. The numbers in parentheses at  $y = 0$  are the mean of the dependent variable at  $t = -1$ .

### D.2 Power Calculations for Pre-Trends Tests

In this subsection, we produce a figure that helps illustrate the power needed to detect relevant violations of parallel trends using methods and approaches developed by Roth (2022). We present the result below in Figure D.2. It plots event study coefficients of successful v. failed terror on the AfD vote share. It also superimposes, shown in red, the hypothesized violation of parallel trends which the data would detect in 90 percent of cases. The dashed blue line illustrates the pattern the coefficients would take conditional on not finding a significant pre-trend, if in fact the hypothesized violation (shown in red) were true. Because the red line crosses the confidence intervals in 4 of the 7 coefficients, the result suggests that this violation of parallel trends does not well explain the pattern of our event study coefficients.




Figure D.2  
Pretrends Testing

**Note:** This figure plots event study coefficients of the effect of successful v. failed terror on the AfD vote share. The hypothesized violation of parallel trends is superimposed in red which the data would detect in 90 percent of cases. The dashed blue line illustrates the pattern the coefficients would be expected to take conditional on not finding a significant pre-trend, if in fact the hypothesized violation (shown in red) were true.

### D.3 Successful and Failed Terror and AfD Vote Share

We next present two event studies, both shown in Figure D.3 and both estimated using the specification of model 5. In panel (a), we examine only municipalities targeted with successful attacks whereas in panel (b), we examine only municipalities hit with failed attacks. To identify effects, we rely on variation in the timing of an attack (i.e, comparing municipalities hit with successful (failed) attacks early in the sample to those hit with successful (failed) attacks later

in the sample). As shown, neither figure shows evidence of pre-trends and positive, precisely estimated effects only appear in the sample of municipalities hit with successful attacks. While the post-treatment coefficients for failed attacks are positive, they are not distinguishable from zero. This confirms that our effects are driven primarily by successful attacks and not by failed attacks.




Figure D.3  
Trends in AfD Vote Share for Successful and Failed Attacks

**Note:** This figure plots event study estimates for the AfD vote share in municipalities targeted with successful terror attacks (panel (a)) and failed terror attacks (panel (b)), relying on variation in the timing of an attack to identify effects. The regressions include municipality and time period fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality and confidence intervals are drawn at 95%. The  $p$ -value of joint significance of all pre-period coefficients is 0.13 and 0.57 for panels (a) and (b), respectively.

### E. Baseline Estimates by Election Type

In this Online Appendix, we present the results of our baseline analysis when separating the AfD vote share in Federal, European and State elections. As such, we estimate a model in which the coefficient of interest is  $SUCCESS \times POST$  and which includes municipality and year fixed effects. The results are shown in Table E.1. As shown, they are virtually identical to studying the three election types in a single model but with additional fixed effects (municipality  $\times$  election type and year  $\times$  election type).

Table E.1  
Baseline Estimates by Election Type

| Outcome: AfD Vote Share            |                          |                              |                       |                               |                                |                         |                         |                            |                        |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|
|                                    | (1)<br>Baseline<br>Model | (2)<br>East<br>$\times$ Year | (3)<br>Omit<br>Berlin | (4)<br>Urban<br>$\times$ Year | (5)<br>Weapon<br>$\times$ Year | (6)<br>Attack<br>Timing | (7)<br>Omit<br>Multiple | (8)<br>Omit<br>Coordinated | (9)<br>All<br>Controls |
| <i>Panel A. State Elections</i>    |                          |                              |                       |                               |                                |                         |                         |                            |                        |
| Success $\times$ Post              | 0.0446***<br>(0.0114)    | 0.0416***<br>(0.0133)        | 0.0493***<br>(0.0124) | 0.0574***<br>(0.0115)         | 0.0460***<br>(0.0126)          | 0.0497***<br>(0.0138)   | 0.0587***<br>(0.0156)   | 0.0472***<br>(0.0140)      | 0.0945***<br>(0.0133)  |
| <i>N</i>                           | 118                      | 118                          | 98                    | 118                           | 110                            | 118                     | 82                      | 108                        | 92                     |
| Clusters                           | 59                       | 59                           | 49                    | 59                            | 55                             | 59                      | 41                      | 54                         | 46                     |
| $\bar{Y}$                          | .17                      | .17                          | .19                   | .17                           | .18                            | .17                     | .19                     | .17                        | .19                    |
| <i>Panel B. Federal Elections</i>  |                          |                              |                       |                               |                                |                         |                         |                            |                        |
| Success $\times$ Post              | 0.000536<br>(0.0198)     | 0.0225<br>(0.0144)           | 0.00707<br>(0.0212)   | -0.00679<br>(0.0168)          | -0.00664<br>(0.0206)           | 0.000536<br>(0.0198)    | 0.00500<br>(0.0216)     | 0.00303<br>(0.0199)        | 0.0176<br>(0.0182)     |
| <i>N</i>                           | 370                      | 370                          | 340                   | 370                           | 367                            | 370                     | 272                     | 334                        | 282                    |
| Clusters                           | 124                      | 124                          | 114                   | 124                           | 123                            | 124                     | 91                      | 112                        | 94                     |
| $\bar{Y}$                          | .12                      | .12                          | .12                   | .12                           | .12                            | .12                     | .12                     | .12                        | .11                    |
| <i>Panel C. European Elections</i> |                          |                              |                       |                               |                                |                         |                         |                            |                        |
| Success $\times$ Post              | -0.0116<br>(0.0251)      | 0.0209<br>(0.0171)           | -0.0102<br>(0.0289)   | -0.0159<br>(0.0213)           | -0.0102<br>(0.0269)            | -0.0116<br>(0.0251)     | -0.0113<br>(0.0287)     | -0.0104<br>(0.0253)        | 0.00732<br>(0.0197)    |
| <i>N</i>                           | 246                      | 246                          | 226                   | 246                           | 244                            | 246                     | 180                     | 222                        | 188                    |
| Clusters                           | 123                      | 123                          | 113                   | 123                           | 122                            | 123                     | 90                      | 111                        | 94                     |
| $\bar{Y}$                          | .11                      | .11                          | .11                   | .11                           | .11                            | .11                     | .11                     | .11                        | .1                     |

Notes: This table reports the coefficient of  $SUCCESS \times POST$  separately for State, Federal and European elections. See notes of Table 2 for details on what each specification includes. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## F. Prolific Survey: Voters' Knowledge of the German Political System

### F.1 Main Survey Results

We find that successful terror differentially increases the AfD vote share in *state* elections. In Section 6.2, we argue that this is attributable to voter awareness of the differing competencies between state and federal governments regarding internal security and migration. To examine this hypothesis, we conducted two surveys via the *Prolific* platform. The first survey focused on internal security, while the second one explored public knowledge on migration. For both surveys we gathered responses from 250 participants, totaling 500 responses.

These surveys contained two central questions that validated our hypothesis regarding public knowledge of governmental powers. The first asked participants which level of government is responsible for internal security and policing within Germany. The second asked participants which level of government was responsible for the geographic distribution of asylum seekers among cities and counties. The results are shown in Figure F.1. As shown, nearly 80 and 65 percent, respectively, correctly identified *state* governments as the correct institution for managing internal security and asylum. What is particularly striking is that just 60 percent of participants across both waves could correctly identify the head of state in Germany. This indicates that voters, regardless of their general political knowledge, are aware of the distribution of competencies between federal and state governments concerning internal security and asylum.




Figure F.1  
Survey Key Results

**Note:** This figure displays the responses to the central questions from the surveys. The left panel reveals that 78.8% of respondents correctly identified state governments as primarily responsible for internal security matters in Germany, while 21.2% mistakenly believed this fell under the federal government's obligation. Notably, only 58.4% of respondents could accurately identify the German head of state. The right panel presents analogous findings regarding the assignment of responsibility for the geographic distribution of asylum seekers within German counties and cities. In this case, 64.4% correctly attributed this responsibility to state governments, while only 60.4% could name the head of state.

## F.2 Details on Survey Construction and Execution

Participant selection was based on nationality, as only German citizens can vote in federal elections. Despite this criterion, the survey respondents demonstrated a wide range of demographics, as depicted in Figure F.3. For instance, participants' ages ranged from 18 to 71 years. Additionally, the majority of respondents were White (approximately 90%), lived in various countries, and had diverse educational backgrounds (with about 50% holding a university degree). Roughly 6% were unemployed, and about a third of the respondents were female.

The surveys comprised various questions aimed at assessing the respondents' knowledge on the political issues of internal security and migration. Table F.1 provides a summary of these questions, including their English translations (Column 2), the type of question (Column 3), and the range of possible answers (Column 4). It is important to note that the order of the answers was randomized to enhance the reliability of the results. Notably, questions 2 and 8 were crucial for validating our hypothesis regarding public knowledge of governmental powers. As discussed above, a majority of participants could correctly identify state governments as responsible for internal security and asylum, more than could identify the head of state in Germany. Moreover, compared to other questions, the respondents' knowledge of the distribution of powers between different levels of government was notably high, as indicated by the green shaded areas in Figure

**F.2** representing the proportion of correct answers for each question.

Besides randomizing the answer choices, we also conduct a sanity check to ensure the reliability of the responses. This check is based on two key factors: first, the majority of respondents completed both surveys (242 out of 258 distinct participants); second, questions related to demographic information and political preferences (Questions 10 to 15) were asked separately in each survey. Accordingly, by comparing a participant's answers to identical questions in both surveys, we can evaluate the responses' reliability. This approach leads us to conclude that approximately 84% of the responses are reliable. Furthermore, the inconsistencies among the remaining 16% of responses were not systematic, with typically only one out of the six questions showing a variation. This pattern further enhances confidence in the survey's results.




Figure F.2  
All Survey Results

**Note:** This figure displays the distribution of answers for Questions 1-9, as detailed in Table **F.1**. The numbers along the left edge match the question numbers in Table **F.1**. The green shaded areas indicate the share of correct answers, while the gray shaded areas emphasize the fraction of incorrect answers.

Table F.1  
Survey Questions

| No.                        | Question/Statement                                                                                                                             | Type | Answers                                                                               |
|----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Internal Security          |                                                                                                                                                |      |                                                                                       |
| 1                          | Trust in the police among the German population compared to other countries is...                                                              | MC   | particularly high; particularly low; approximately equal                              |
| 2                          | In Germany, the police and internal security primarily lie within the area of responsibility of which level?                                   | MC   | European Union; Federal government; State government(s)                               |
| 3                          | The vast majority of German police officers are civil servants.                                                                                | MC   | True; False                                                                           |
| 4                          | The total number of police officers in state police forces compared to the Federal police force is...                                          | MC   | Higher; lower; approximately equal                                                    |
| Migration                  |                                                                                                                                                |      |                                                                                       |
| 5                          | Compared to the EU average, the proportion of people in Germany who were born in another country is...                                         | MC   | Higher; lower; approximately equal                                                    |
| 6                          | The unemployment rate of people without German citizenship living in Germany is higher than that of people with German citizenship . . .       | MC   | Higher; lower; approximately equal                                                    |
| 7                          | The proportion of people with a migration background in western German states (including Berlin) is higher than in eastern German states . . . | MC   | Higher; lower; approximately equal                                                    |
| 8                          | The distribution of asylum seekers among cities and counties within Germany is the responsibility of the...                                    | MC   | European Commission; Federal government; State government(s)                          |
| Consistency Check          |                                                                                                                                                |      |                                                                                       |
| 9                          | The Head of State of the Federal Republic of Germany is                                                                                        | MC   | Angela Merkel; Joachim Gauck; Frank-Walter Steinmeier; Olaf Scholz                    |
| Demographics & Preferences |                                                                                                                                                |      |                                                                                       |
| 10                         | What is your nationality?                                                                                                                      | MC   | German; Other                                                                         |
| 11                         | In which Federal state do you live?                                                                                                            | DD   | 16 choices given the 16 German Federal states                                         |
| 12                         | Which political party can you identify with the most?                                                                                          | DD   | Die Linke; Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW); Bündnis 90/Die Grünen; SPD; FDP; CDU; AfD |
| 13                         | Which political party can you identify with the least?                                                                                         | DD   | Die Linke; Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW); Bündnis 90/Die Grünen; SPD; FDP; CDU; AfD |
| 14                         | What is your highest level of education?                                                                                                       | MC   | Hauptschule; Realschule; Abitur; currently in school; high school dropout             |
| 15                         | You have a university degree?                                                                                                                  | MC   | True; False                                                                           |

*Notes:* This table summarizes the questions asked in the two surveys conducted. Column 1 states the survey topic (Internal Security or Migration) and assigns a number to each question. Moreover, note that the questions and statements from the sections *Consistency Check* and *Demographics & Preferences* were included in each survey separately. Column 2 provides the English translations of the survey questions, while Column 3 specifies the question type, whether Multiple-Choice (MC) or Dropdown menu (DD). Column 4 details the range of possible answers available to the respondents.




Figure F.3  
Demographics of Respondents

**Note:** This figure offers a view into the distribution of demographic information and political preferences among the survey participants. The data were either sourced directly from Prolific or collected through the surveys. Each panel depicts a distinct variable. Given that we conducted two separate surveys, the distributions for both are showcased. Red bars correspond to the survey focused on internal security matters, whereas blue bars represent participants from the survey concerning migration issues. For example, in the internal security survey, 19.2% of respondents were part-time workers, compared to an exact 20% in the migration survey.

## G. AfD Election Manifestos

We find that successful terror differentially increases the AfD vote share in *state* elections. In Section 6.2, we argue that this is attributable to voter awareness of the differing competencies between state and federal governments (discussed in Online Appendix F) and because the AfD campaigns issues differently at the state level compared to the Federal level. To examine this latter hypothesis, we digitize the table of contents for all the election manifestos for the AfD in state, European and Federal elections and generate a distribution of topics and their ranking in the table of contents. For state elections, we also distinguish manifestos in states with above and below median attacks. The idea is that topics rank higher in the election manifesto (i.e., topic #1 in the table of contents) are more important whereas those that rank lower are of less importance. We report three main results.

First, in Figure G.1, we plot the frequency of topics that appear in the table of contents (regardless of their rank in the table) of AfD election manifestos in state, European and Federal elections between 2013 and 2021. As shown, migration and internal security are prominent issues for the AfD: They are the third and fourth most frequently covered issues in the table of contents of the AfD manifestos in this time period.




Figure G.1

Universe of topics in Federal, European and State election manifestos of the AfD

**Note:** This Figure the frequency topics that appear in the table of contents (regardless of their rank in the table) of AfD election manifestos in state, European and Federal elections between 2013 and 2021.

Second, we examine the *rank* of internal security and migration as they appear in the

table of contents and compare this rank between state, European and Federal elections. The results are shown in Figure G.2. There are two noteworthy observations. First, internal security and migration appear frequently in high ranking positions (i.e., in positions #1 to #4) in state elections. By contrast, the highest rank that either topic appears in Federal or European election manifestos is fourth. Second, there is one European and one Federal election where internal security do not appear at all in the table of contents of the election manifesto. This further reinforces the view that this issue is predominantly a state issue.




Figure G.2  
Ranking of issues across Federal, European and State Election Manifestos of the AfD

**Note:** This figure plots the ranking of internal security and migration as they appear in the table of contents of AfD election manifestos in state, European and Federal elections between 2013 and 2021. In those cases where bars are stacked, the total height of the bar indicates the total frequency with which a topic appears in a given position across different elections; the individual frequency for a specific election is given by the total height of the respective colored bar. For example, internal security appears in 7<sup>th</sup> place four times: twice in state elections, once in Federal elections and once in European elections.

Finally, we examine the rank of internal security and migration only within state election manifestos for the AfD, but compare states with above- and below-median terror attacks. The result is shown in Figure G.3. As shown, these issues appear prominently in all states. What is particularly noteworthy, however, is that internal security almost always features in positions #1 through #3 in states with above median number of terror attacks. While low-attacked states also discuss the issue with some prominence, there is much more variation in the rank of this particular issue in these states. Similar patterns, though not as striking, hold for migration.




Figure G.3  
Ranking of issues of State Election Manifestos of the AfD, by Terror Attacks

**Note:** This figure plots the ranking of internal security and migration as they appear in the table of contents of AfD election manifestos only in state elections between 2013 and 2021, by states with above and below median number of terror attacks.

## H. Additional Robustness

In this Online Appendix we present our baseline results using estimators that are robust to two-way fixed effects with staggered treatment. We also present our baseline estimate using a rolling window approach to incorporate a larger number of attacks into the analysis and not just the first attack in a given municipality. Additionally, we demonstrate that our baseline estimation is robust to alternative methods of statistical inference and to dropping one municipality at a time. Finally, we show that our findings are not driven by post-attack changes in municipality characteristics.

### H.1 Heterogeneity Robust DiD with Staggered Treatment

In recent years, there has been a fast growing literature addressing the issues related to difference-in-differences estimations using two-way fixed effects (TWFE), in particular when treatment effects are heterogeneous and/or when treatment is staggered (De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille [2022](#); De Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille [2020](#); Goodman-Bacon [2021](#); Borusyak, Jaravel, and Spiess [2021](#)).

In our setting, the issue of a staggered, binary treatment takes on relevance. Because different municipalities are hit with attacks at different points in time, our baseline estimate may, in fact, be the result of “forbidden comparisons” (De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille [2022](#); Borusyak, Jaravel, and Spiess [2021](#)), whereby groups that are treated early are compared to those that are treated later but receive different weights which might affect of overall estimate.<sup>51</sup> In particular, those municipalities hit with attacks very early may receive negative weights compared to those who were attacked later. To the extent that the short- and long-run effects of terror are different, this may give rise to a biased estimator as more weight is given to the short-run effects of terror and a negative weight assigned to its long run effects.

This literature has not only identified the nature of the problem, but has also developed a range of heterogeneity-robust DID estimators (for a summary, see De Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille [\(2022\)](#)). In this Online Appendix, we repeat our baseline model using one of these alternative estimators, `did_imputation`, put forward by Borusyak, Jaravel, and Spiess [\(2021\)](#). This estimator estimates the effects of a binary treatment with staggered rollout allowing for arbitrary heterogeneity and dynamics of causal effects in manner that is more efficient to those proposed by other researchers.<sup>52</sup>

Our results are shown in Table [H.1](#). In Column 1, we report our baseline estimate as a marginal effect (rather than a total marginal effect) so as to make estimation with `did_imputation` comparable. As shown, successful attacks increase the AfD vote share by some 6 points in state elections compared to European elections. In Column 2, we report the results when using `did_imputation`. As explained in Borusyak, Jaravel, and Spiess [\(2021\)](#), this estimation is carried out in three steps. First, municipality and year fixed effects are fitted on a model that uses only untreated observations (i.e. those that were hit with failed attacks or successfully attacked municipalities prior to the attack). Second, these estimations are used to predict the untreated *potential outcomes* for treated units, including imputing non-treated potential outcomes where necessary. This enables the command to estimate the treatment effect

51. Goodman-Bacon [\(2021\)](#) provides an exposition of the various comparisons that make up an overall difference-in-difference estimator when treatment is staggered while Borusyak and Jaravel [\(2017\)](#) provide an intuitive explanation of “forbidden” comparisons or extrapolations involved in such cases.

52. The only difference is that using this alternative command, we report the marginal effect of successful terror on state elections compared to European elections rather than the *total* marginal effect of successful terror on state elections.

$\tau = Y_{it,observed} - Y_{it,potential}$ . Finally, the command calculates a weighted average of these different treatment effects with weights corresponding to the estimation target.<sup>53</sup>

As shown, the differences, both in magnitude and precision, between Columns 1 and 2 are small and, if anything, the effect size using a heterogeneity robust DiD estimator is larger. This increases confidence that our baseline estimation using linear difference-in-difference is, in fact, unbiased.

Table H.1  
Heterogeneity Robust DiD Estimation

|           | Coefficient on $SUCCESS \times POST \times STATE$ Election |                       |
|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|
|           | (1)<br>Baseline                                            | (2)<br>DiD Imputation |
| $\beta$   | 0.0562**<br>(0.0282)                                       |                       |
| $\tau$    |                                                            | 0.0938***<br>(0.0022) |
| $N$       | 734                                                        | 623                   |
| Estimator | reghdfe                                                    | DID imputation        |

*Notes:* This table reports the coefficient of  $SUCCESS \times POST \times STATE$  in a model that includes municipality and year fixed effects as well as municipality-by-election-type fixed effects. In Column 1, the coefficient,  $\beta$ , is estimated via using `reghdfe`. In Column 2, the coefficient,  $\tau$ , is estimated using the imputation estimator of Borusyak, Jaravel, and Spiess (2021). In both models, we report the marginal effect of successful terror on state elections relative to European elections. . \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## H.2 Rolling Window Approach

In our baseline analysis, we use the first attack in a given municipality as a reference from which we determine the variables *SUCCESS* and *POST*. In this Online Appendix, we reproduce Table 2, our baseline results, using a larger number of attacks in the sample and not just the first attack. For the 91 municipalities that received only one attack, the coding of *SUCCESS* and *POST* remain unchanged. For the 33 municipalities that received more than one attack, however, we now create a “rolling window” of time around each municipality-attack (or groups of attacks if there are no elections between them). *SUCCESS* is now coded according to the attack in the window and *POST* is coded for each election in the window depending on whether the election was before or after the attack. This analysis has the disadvantage, however, of making interpretation more complicated because of overlapping time-periods: the “post” period of one attack in a given municipality is the “pre” period for the subsequent attack in

53. With municipality fixed effects included in the model, imputation is not possible for units treated in all periods in the sample; this is the case for 63 municipality-years in our sample and this explains the difference in observations between Columns 1 and 2 of Table H.1

that same municipality. For this reason, we use only the first attack in our baseline analysis. Nevertheless, we present the results using a rolling window approach in Table [H.2](#) and, as shown, the results are rather similar to our baseline, alleviating concerns that municipalities hit with multiple attacks adversely affect our results.

Table H.2  
Terror Attacks and AfD Vote Share Using a Rolling Window

|                           | (1)<br>Baseline       | (2)<br>East × Year    | (3)<br>Omit Berlin    | (4)<br>Urban × Year   | (5)<br>Weapon × Year  | (6)<br>Attack Timing  | (7)<br>Omit Multiple Hits | (8)<br>Omit Coordinated Hits | (9)<br>All controls   |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Success × Post × Federal  | 0.0019<br>(0.0159)    | 0.0106<br>(0.0126)    | 0.0118<br>(0.0181)    | -0.0053<br>(0.0139)   | -0.0031<br>(0.0167)   | 0.0054<br>(0.0162)    | 0.0050<br>(0.0218)        | 0.0039<br>(0.0163)           | 0.0122<br>(0.0173)    |
| Success × Post × European | -0.0111<br>(0.0217)   | 0.0044<br>(0.0159)    | -0.0089<br>(0.0292)   | -0.0178<br>(0.0183)   | -0.0098<br>(0.0230)   | -0.0086<br>(0.0219)   | -0.0113<br>(0.0289)       | -0.0095<br>(0.0220)          | 0.0093<br>(0.0205)    |
| Success × Post × State    | 0.0379***<br>(0.0090) | 0.0355***<br>(0.0102) | 0.0477***<br>(0.0096) | 0.0440***<br>(0.0109) | 0.0361***<br>(0.0090) | 0.0480***<br>(0.0098) | 0.0587***<br>(0.0151)     | 0.0388***<br>(0.0093)        | 0.0533***<br>(0.0125) |
| <i>N</i>                  | 787                   | 787                   | 693                   | 787                   | 776                   | 787                   | 534                       | 711                          | 549                   |
| Clusters                  | 124                   | 124                   | 114                   | 124                   | 123                   | 124                   | 91                        | 112                          | 92                    |
| $\bar{Y}_{State}$         | .16                   | .16                   | .18                   | .16                   | .17                   | .16                   | .19                       | .16                          | .18                   |
| [ <i>S.D</i> ]            | [.099]                | [.099]                | [.1]                  | [.099]                | [.1]                  | [.099]                | [.11]                     | [.1]                         | [.1]                  |

Notes: See notes of Table 2. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

### H.3 Alternative Inference

Our estimating sample involves 124 unique municipalities of which around 15 percent experienced a failed attack. Given this relatively small sample, we present our baseline estimate using an alternative methods of statistical inference. Our results are shown in Table H.3. The table reports the coefficient on the triple interaction for state elections from our baseline model. It then presents  $p$ -values from two different methods of inference: First,  $p$ -values based on analytically derived standard errors using clustered standard errors (as in our baseline approach). Second,  $p$ -values calculated using wild cluster bootstrapping as suggested by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) and implemented via their `boottest` command in Stata with 10,000 replications. As shown, across all three methods of inference, the baseline estimate of successful terror is significantly distinguishable from zero.

Table H.3  
Alternative inference

|                                               | (1)    |
|-----------------------------------------------|--------|
| Success $\times$ Post $\times$ State Election | 0.0446 |
| $N$                                           | 734    |
| Clusters                                      | 124    |
| $p$ -values:                                  |        |
| 1. Analytical                                 | .0001  |
| 2. Wild Cluster Bootstrap                     | .0042  |

Notes: 1.  $p$ -values are based on analytically derived standard errors using Stata's `vce(cluster)` command. 2.  $p$ -values are calculated as the two-tailed symmetric  $p$ -value using wild cluster bootstrapping following Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) and implemented via their `boottest` command in Stata with 10,000 replications.

### H.4 Dropping one Municipality at a Time

In this robustness exercise, we run our baseline model 124 times, each time omitting one municipality from the analysis so as to ensure no one municipality is adversely affecting our results. As shown in Figure H.1, the results are stable to this robustness check.




Figure H.1  
Baseline model for  $SUCCESS \times POST \times STATE$

**Note:** This Figure plots  $\beta_1$  from our baseline estimating model 124 times, each time when a different municipality is dropped from the sample. The thick horizontal gray line is the baseline coefficient, with corresponding confidence intervals shown in thick dashed gray lines.

### H.5 Terror, AfD and Municipality Covariates

Figure [D.1](#) we presented event studies for each municipality characteristic. That figure showed some positive post-attack coefficients for two characteristics: tax revenue per capita and the share men in a municipality. In this Online Appendix, we regress AfD support on our indicator for attack success/failure and include *contemporaneous* values of these two characteristics. The aim is to understand to what extent, if any, these demographic and economic characteristics also drive support for the far-right. The result is presented below in Table [H.4](#). Column 1 repeats the baseline, for reference, while Column 2 includes contemporaneous measures of taxes per capita and the share of men (expressed as a percent) at the municipality level, each interacted with post. The coefficient increases by some 18 percent in Column 2 relative to Column 1, but remains comparable. The coefficients on the demographic and economic characteristics suggest that these do not drive AfD support ( $p$ -value of .203 and .755 for share men and taxes, respectively).

Table H.4  
 Terror, the AfD and Demographic Change

|                                      | Outcome: AfD Vote Share  |                                    |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|
|                                      | (1)<br>Baseline<br>Model | (2)<br>Contemporaneous<br>Controls |
| Success × Post × Federal             | 0.0005<br>(0.0199)       | -0.0172<br>(0.0245)                |
| Success × Post × European            | -0.0116<br>(0.0252)      | -0.0116<br>(0.0252)                |
| Success × Post × State               | 0.0446***<br>(0.0112)    | 0.0530***<br>(0.0133)              |
| Share Men × Post                     |                          | -0.2600<br>(0.2033)                |
| Taxes × Post                         |                          | 0.2019<br>(0.6463)                 |
| <i>N</i>                             | 734                      | 564                                |
| Clusters                             | 124                      | 124                                |
| $\bar{Y}_{State}$<br>[ <i>S.D.</i> ] | .17<br>[.1]              | .17<br>[.11]                       |

*Notes:* The dependent variable is the vote share for the Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) party at the municipality level. Success is one if a municipality experienced a successful terror attack anytime after 2010 and 0 if it experienced a failed attack but not a successful attack in that same time period. Post is 1 if the first attack in a municipality occurred prior to an election and zero if it occurred after an election. Column 2 includes (linearly interpolated) contemporaneous values of the share men (expressed in percent) and tax revenue (per capita) at the municipality level, each interacted with post. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

## I. Propensity Score Matching

In this Online Appendix, we present details concerning our propensity score matching which we use to generate a counterfactual set of “placebo fail” municipalities. As mentioned in the main text, we use all the municipality covariates presented in our balance table in order to match untargeted counties to successfully targeted ones on the basis of propensity scores. We use nearest neighbor matching in order to identify each successfully targeted municipalities two nearest neighbors. We generate our propensity scores from the following probit regression, the results of which are presented in Table [I.1](#)

$$Pr(SUCCESS_i|X) = \Phi(\gamma_0 + \gamma X_i) \quad (6)$$

Table I.1  
Propensity Score Matching Results

|                                      | (1)<br>PrTr=1         |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| placebo_attack                       |                       |
| Per capita Income (000s)             | 1.2821***<br>(0.0459) |
| Employed (000s)                      | 0.9879<br>(0.0154)    |
| Unemployed (000s)                    | 1.1048**<br>(0.0349)  |
| Tax revenue (pc)                     | 0.3591***<br>(0.0495) |
| Population (000s)                    | 0.9998<br>(0.0067)    |
| Average age                          | 1.0340*<br>(0.0176)   |
| Share men                            | 0.0000***<br>(0.0000) |
| In-migration (Log)                   | 1.4896*<br>(0.2714)   |
| Out-migration (Log)                  | 1.1064<br>(0.2079)    |
| Asylum seekers                       | 1.0001<br>(0.0000)    |
| Asylum seekers Syria                 | 0.9999<br>(0.0001)    |
| University eligible                  | 0.9999<br>(0.0001)    |
| No secondary education               | 0.9988*<br>(0.0006)   |
| Welfare recipients (pc)              | 1.1774<br>(0.1072)    |
| Welfare recipients (foreigners),(pc) | 0.0000<br>(0.0001)    |
| Traffic accidents                    | 1.0010**<br>(0.0003)  |
| Deadly accidents                     | 1.0249<br>(0.0177)    |
| Surface area (km <sup>2</sup> )      | 0.9908**<br>(0.0032)  |
| Agricultural area (km <sup>2</sup> ) | 1.0079*<br>(0.0039)   |
| Forest area (ha)                     | 1.0087*<br>(0.0037)   |
| Number of hotels                     | 0.9865***<br>(0.0033) |
| Tourists (000s)                      | 1.0005*<br>(0.0002)   |
| Number of hospitals                  | 0.9774<br>(0.0118)    |
| Hospitals beds                       | 1.2222**<br>(0.0805)  |
| East Germany                         | 1.6322***<br>(0.1515) |
| N                                    | 19,635                |

Notes: See notes of Table [2](#) \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

### J. Attack Heterogeneity Using Only First Attacks

In our main paper, we demonstrated that successful terror has the largest effects on state elections when those attacks are motivated by right-wing extremists. In this Online Appendix we reproduce Figure 5 using only the first attacks in a given municipality. The reason is that municipalities that received more than one attack might complicate the interpretation of Figure 5: A municipality, for example, targeted with several attacks of mixed motivations — say, a right-wing attack followed by a left-wing attack — would make it difficult to cleanly identify the effect of an attack's motive on the AfD vote share. To alleviate this concern, we re-generate Figure 5 in a sample of municipalities that were attacked only once (i.e. dropping the 33 municipalities hit more than once), enabling us to cleanly identify effects according to motives. The revised plot is shown in Figure J.1. As shown, the baseline effect in this sample is about 25 percent smaller than the overall baseline (.0477 v. .0625). However, in this sample, the baseline effect is amplified for right-wing attacks.<sup>54</sup> This confirms that right-wing terror has the strongest impacts on the AfD vote share.




Figure J.1  
Heterogeneous effects according to attack type or target

**Note:** This Figure plots  $\beta_1$  from our baseline estimating model in samples split by attack type or attack target. All samples omit the 33 municipalities targeted by more than 1 terror attack. Confidence intervals are drawn at 95 percent.

54. There are not even a sufficient number of non-right wing attacks in this sample to estimate an effect.

## K. Geographic Spillovers

In Figure [K.1](#) we investigate spillover effects. Specifically, we code untargeted municipalities within a radius of up to 80 kilometers of targeted municipalities as either success or failed depending on their distance to the nearest successful or failed attack. We then re-run our baseline estimating equation in samples of municipalities according to their distance to an actual attack and plot the coefficient of interest for state elections. Distance 0 shows our baseline effect and the coefficients for all other municipalities are plotted according to their distance to the targeted municipality (so, for example, the coefficient at 35 km is the effect for all municipalities located 35 km away from successful or failed attacks and not the difference in the effect between municipalities located 30 km and 35 km away). As shown, there are clear, local spillover effects: the coefficient is around 50 percent smaller than the baseline but statistically significant for municipalities located between 25 and 50 kilometers from an attack. The qualitative effects persist beyond 50 kilometers, but are even smaller and are mostly indistinguishable from zero. For municipalities located 80 kilometers away, the effect diminishes to zero.




Figure K.1  
Geographic Spillovers of Successful Terror

**Note:** This figure plots the coefficient on  $SUCCESS \times POST \times STATE$  from our baseline estimating equation for all municipalities in Germany as a function of total distance to a successful or failed attack. Untargeted municipalities are coded as having either a successful or failed attack according to their distance to the nearest successful or failed attack. The regressions all include municipality and year fixed effects as well as municipality by election-type fixed effects and include all lower order terms. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality and confidence intervals are drawn at 95%.

## L. Terror and Vote Share for SPD and CDU

In this Online Appendix, we present our full baseline results using the vote share for the SPD and the CDU as the outcome. As shown in Table [L.1](#), terror does lead to positive and significant increases for the SPD at the state level though the results are not nearly as large (relative to the mean) or as strong (losing precision in three of the nine specifications) as the baseline effects of terror on the AfD. By contrast, terror appears to have little to no relationship for the vote share of the CDU. At the Federal and European level, there is a weak negative effect of terror on the vote share for the CDU, but at the state level there are no clear or consistent patterns.

Table L.1  
Terror Attacks and SPD and CDU Vote Share

|                                | (1)<br>Baseline<br>Model | (2)<br>East<br>× Year  | (3)<br>Omit<br>Berlin | (4)<br>Urban<br>× Year | (5)<br>Weapon<br>× Year | (6)<br>Attack<br>Timing | (7)<br>Omit<br>Multiple | (8)<br>Omit<br>Coordinated | (9)<br>All<br>Controls |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|
| <i>Panel A. SPD Vote Share</i> |                          |                        |                       |                        |                         |                         |                         |                            |                        |
| Success × Post × Federal       | -0.000524<br>(0.0146)    | 0.00462<br>(0.0102)    | 0.00358<br>(0.0155)   | -0.00732<br>(0.0117)   | -0.00816<br>(0.0135)    | -0.000524<br>(0.0146)   | -0.00211<br>(0.0155)    | -0.00123<br>(0.0145)       | 0.0111<br>(0.0142)     |
| Success × Post × European      | 0.00701<br>(0.0139)      | 0.0198<br>(0.0131)     | 0.0124<br>(0.0149)    | 0.00368<br>(0.0145)    | 0.00921<br>(0.0144)     | 0.00701<br>(0.0139)     | 0.00962<br>(0.0163)     | 0.00777<br>(0.0140)        | 0.00586<br>(0.0140)    |
| Success × Post × State         | 0.0167*<br>(0.00889)     | 0.0106<br>(0.0128)     | 0.0207**<br>(0.00893) | 0.00657<br>(0.0196)    | 0.00712<br>(0.0165)     | 0.0244***<br>(0.00889)  | 0.0284***<br>(0.00492)  | 0.0201**<br>(0.00789)      | 0.0341***<br>(0.0112)  |
| $\bar{Y}_{Pre}$<br>[S.D.]      | 0.20<br>[0.11]           | 0.20<br>[0.11]         | 0.20<br>[0.12]        | 0.20<br>[0.11]         | 0.20<br>[0.11]          | 0.20<br>[0.11]          | 0.21<br>[0.12]          | 0.21<br>[0.11]             | 0.21<br>[0.12]         |
| <i>Panel B. CDU Vote Share</i> |                          |                        |                       |                        |                         |                         |                         |                            |                        |
| Success × Post × Federal       | -0.0363*<br>(0.0189)     | -0.0469***<br>(0.0179) | -0.0351*<br>(0.0206)  | -0.0314*<br>(0.0184)   | -0.0264<br>(0.0176)     | -0.0363*<br>(0.0189)    | -0.0381*<br>(0.0210)    | -0.0370*<br>(0.0191)       | -0.0409**<br>(0.0198)  |
| Success × Post × European      | -0.0211**<br>(0.00986)   | -0.0290**<br>(0.0145)  | -0.0198*<br>(0.0111)  | -0.0198*<br>(0.0111)   | -0.0237**<br>(0.0100)   | -0.0211**<br>(0.00986)  | -0.0259**<br>(0.0112)   | -0.0224**<br>(0.00996)     | -0.0170<br>(0.0113)    |
| Success × Post × State         | 0.00601<br>(0.0292)      | -0.000414<br>(0.0248)  | 0.00638<br>(0.0304)   | 0.0140<br>(0.0376)     | 0.0135<br>(0.0393)      | -0.00869<br>(0.0270)    | -0.0417***<br>(0.00977) | -0.00282<br>(0.0264)       | -0.0190<br>(0.0120)    |
| $\bar{Y}_{Pre}$<br>[S.D.]      | 0.30<br>[0.11]           | 0.30<br>[0.11]         | 0.31<br>[0.10]        | 0.30<br>[0.11]         | 0.30<br>[0.11]          | 0.30<br>[0.11]          | 0.31<br>[0.10]          | 0.29<br>[0.11]             | 0.31<br>[0.10]         |
| <i>N</i>                       | 776                      | 776                    | 706                   | 776                    | 761                     | 776                     | 568                     | 702                        | 582                    |
| Clusters                       | 124                      | 124                    | 114                   | 124                    | 123                     | 124                     | 91                      | 112                        | 94                     |

*Notes:* The dependent variable is the vote share for the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party at the municipality level. Success is one if a municipality experienced a successful terror attack anytime after 2010 and 0 if it experienced a failed attack but not a successful attack in that same time period. Post is 1 if the first attack in a municipality occurred prior to an election and zero if it occurred after an election. Column 2 includes an indicator that is 1 if a municipality is located in East Germany and zero otherwise interacted with year dummies. In Column 3 we omit 10 of the 12 municipal districts, *Stadtbezirke*, of Berlin targeted with attacks. In Column 4 we include an indicator for whether a municipality is an urban district interacted with year dummies and in Column 5 we interact the weapon used in the attack with year dummies. In Column 6 we control for the number of days between an attack and an election. In Column 7 we omit those municipalities targeted with more than one attack. In Column 8, we omit those municipalities that experienced coordinated attack with multiple attacks on the same day. In Column 9 we include mean values of all pre-attack municipality covariates presented in Table [L.1](#) interacted with year dummies. All regressions include election-type by municipality fixed effects, election-type by year fixed effects, and all lower order interactions. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the municipality level. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## M. Additional SOEP Results

### M.1 Balance in the SOEP

In this Online Appendix, we test for balance across a range of pre-attack individual characteristics between people who live in municipalities that experience successful or failed attacks. For each person, we regress different individual characteristics on the variable,  $SUCCESS_i$ , defined as before. We present the results in Figure M.1. As shown, there are very little distinguishable differences in socio-economic characteristics between people living in municipalities hit with successful or failed attacks. Moreover, we document very little differences in people's pre-attack political attitudes and preferences. This increases our confidence that successful acts of terror lead to differences in voting outcomes because they affect political preferences and not because they target different types of people. Moreover, people do not report moving after experiencing a successful attack, suggesting that successful terror does not lead to geographical sorting.




Figure M.1

Individual characteristics of people in successful v. failed municipalities

**Note:** This figure plots the differences in individual characteristics for people residing in municipalities that experienced successful attacks compared to those that experienced failed attacks. Specifically, it plots  $\beta$  from the following regression:  $X_{p,t < t_{Attack-1}} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 SUCCESS_i + \epsilon_i$  where  $X_{p,t < t_{Attack-1}}$  is a person  $p$ 's characteristic measured in year immediately prior to an attack. The only exception is the variable *Moved* (which is 1 if a person reports moving after a terror attack and zero otherwise) for which we use the whole sample period. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality and confidence intervals are drawn at 95%.

### M.2 Political Preferences in the SOEP

In Table M.1, we test the impact on terror on political preferences, reporting all the main parties in the political spectrum in Germany as well as support for ultra-right wing parties. The outcome is one if a person reports preferring a given party (indicated on the column) and zero if not. The reader will notice that these coefficients do not sum entirely to zero. This is because

party preferences in the SOEP are not mutually exclusive and include mixed preferences. Some (most) responses include preferences for individual parties: For example the SPD or the FDP. But there are some responses that include a joint preference for multiple parties: For instance, the SPD/FDP or the SPD/CDU. These mixed preferences imply that the increases (decreases) in preference for a given party will not necessarily be offset by decreases (increases) in preference for other parties; they can simply arise because a person switches from a mixed party preference to a single party preference (or vice versa). We do not believe this to be a major concern, however, because what is missing for the coefficients to sum to zero is just 1 percentage point.

Table M.1  
Terrorism and Individual Political Preferences using SOEP

|                       | Dependent Variable: Individual Political Preferences |                      |                     |                      |                       |                      |                         |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|
|                       | (1)<br>AfD                                           | (2)<br>CDU           | (3)<br>SPD          | (4)<br>Greens        | (5)<br>FDP            | (6)<br>Linke         | (7)<br>Ultra-Right      |
| Success $\times$ Post | 0.0234**<br>(0.0104)                                 | -0.00693<br>(0.0185) | 0.0314*<br>(0.0178) | -0.0293*<br>(0.0154) | 0.000214<br>(0.00604) | 0.000105<br>(0.0190) | -0.00874**<br>(0.00362) |
| <i>N</i>              | 13,279                                               | 13,279               | 13,279              | 13,279               | 13,279                | 13,279               | 13,279                  |
| Number of Clusters    | 89                                                   | 89                   | 89                  | 89                   | 89                    | 89                   | 89                      |
| People in Sample      | 2,401                                                | 2,401                | 2,401               | 2,401                | 2,401                 | 2,401                | 2,401                   |
| $\bar{Y}$             | 0.0297                                               | 0.318                | 0.307               | 0.195                | 0.0327                | 0.0826               | 0.0064                  |
| [ <i>S.D.</i> ]       | [0.17]                                               | [0.47]               | [0.46]              | [0.40]               | [0.18]                | [0.28]               | [0.08]                  |

*Notes:* The dependent variable is the attitude of a given person in a given municipality toward various political parties as measured in the SOEP survey. Success is one if a person's municipality experienced a successful terror attack anytime after 2010 and 0 if it experienced a failed attack. Post is 1 if the attack occurred prior to the individual being surveyed and zero if it occurred after the survey. All regressions include person fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors (shown in parentheses) are clustered at the municipality level. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## N. SOEP Event Study: Preferences for the AfD

Using the SOEP, we are also able to examine how people's political preferences change in response to successful terror over time. To this purpose, we run an event-study regression in which a person's preference for the AfD is used as the outcome. The results are shown in Figure N.1. As shown, there are no pre-trends, suggesting that prior to an attack, people do not display increasing preferences for the AfD in successfully targeted municipalities. By contrast, we observe clear, positive effects following an attack.




Figure N.1  
Successful v. Failed Terror and Preferences for the AfD

**Note:** This figure plots the coefficient on *SUCCESS* when it is interacted with time period dummies and regressed against an indicator that is 1 if a person reports preference for the AfD and zero otherwise. Responses are grouped into two year bins. Confidence intervals drawn at 95 percent and standard errors are clustered at the level of the municipality.

As another test, we estimate event study coefficients using SOEP data using only individuals residing in municipalities that experienced successful attacks and rely on variation in the timing of an attack to identify effects (i.e., comparing people hit with successful attacks early in the sample to those hit with successful attacks later in the sample). Three of the five post-treatment coefficients are distinguishable from zero at the 90 or 95 percent level. Importantly, the *p*-value for a specification test that the pre-period coefficients follow a linear trend is .35,

suggesting no pre-trends. This confirms our effects are driven by successful attacks.<sup>55</sup>




Figure N.2  
Successful Terror and Preferences for the AfD

**Note:** This figure plots event study estimates of a person's preference for the AfD for those people residing only in municipalities targeted with successful terror attacks, relying on variation in attack timing to identify effects. The regression includes individual and time period fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality and confidence intervals are drawn at 95%.

55. Of course, analyses that do not rely on a pure control group must be interpreted with some caution. This is because, for instance, the size and composition of the control group changes (i.e., as in Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) who use not-yet-treated cohorts as the control group) or because coefficients are estimated by using just the last treated cohort as the control group (i.e., as in Sun and Abraham (2021)). We use the estimator from Sun and Abraham (2021) to conduct this exercise. Importantly, we observe similar patterns when we use a "pure" control group (shown above in Figure N.1), increasing confidence that successful terror has a significant impact on political preferences.

## O. Terror and Social Media Posts

In this Online Appendix we examine whether successful terror leads to differential social media activity. To conduct this exercise, we rely on data from Müller and Schwarz (2021) who collect data on the number of AfD Facebook page users per population at the county level. We therefore assign municipalities hit with successful and failed attacks the outcome of their associated county. In order to estimate the parameter on the variable *SUCCESS*, the model omits municipality fixed effects and includes, instead, federal state  $\times$  year fixed effects. As shown in Table O.1, successful attacks leads to differentially more AfD Facebook users.

Table O.1  
Social Media and Successful Terror

|          | (1)<br>AfD<br>Users |
|----------|---------------------|
| Success  | 0.255**<br>(0.106)  |
| <i>N</i> | 10,101              |
| Clusters | 64                  |

*Notes:* The outcome variable is the number of AfD Facebook users per 1,000 population. The model includes federal state  $\times$  year fixed effects so that we can estimate the parameter on *SUCCESS*. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ,

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

## P. Terrorism and Media

Following Taylor and Thompson (1982), we argue that successful terror attacks are made salient in the media because they (a) attract differential attention compared to failed attacks and (b) disproportionately affect subsequent voting decisions because of that attention. In this section, we support these claims with evidence first by documenting the extent to which successful attacks receive differential media coverage compared to failed attacks and second by investigating the impact of highly-covered attacks on the AfD vote share. We begin by describing the data used in this analysis.

### P.1 Media Data

*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)*: The FAZ is a prominent newspaper in Germany that enjoys some of the highest nationwide circulation. We obtain its newspaper data in order to test whether successful attacks receive differential coverage compared to failed attacks. Specifically, for each of the attacks in our sample, we obtain all news stories that mention the city of the attack on the particular day of the attack and for the 10 days that follow the attack. This provides us with a database of some 105,000 unique news stories.<sup>56</sup> We employ three criteria to match stories to attacks: a neural-network based classification model trained on Austrian terror data and its coverage; matching based on key words; and, as a final step, we manually checked all remaining stories to rule out false positives.<sup>57</sup> In the end, we are left with around 350 stories.

*LexisNexis*: We use LexisNexis in order to collect news stories from national, regional and local publishers across Germany. This provides us with a sample of some 80,000 stories. For each of the attacks in our sample, we match them to stories from the LexisNexis data using the same three criteria we used for the FAZ data. Moreover, we identify all news stories from *local and regional* sources and exclude stories from national publishers. This leaves us with a sample of around 4,500 stories.

### P.2 Differential Media Coverage of Successful and Failed Attacks

To test whether successful attacks receive more media coverage than failed attacks, we collect news stories from two sources: the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), a prominent national publisher in Germany, and LexisNexis which collects stories from a range of publishers and which includes regional and local news reports.<sup>58</sup> For each terror attack in our sample, we first aggregate the number of stories that cover it in order to understand whether successful attacks are (a) more *likely* to receive coverage and/or (b) whether they receive greater *quantity* of coverage than failed attacks. Then, for each story that is linked to a terror attack in our sample, we analyze the extent to which success influences the *tone* of coverage, as measured by sentiment scores, and the *content* of coverage, as measured by the frequency of key words. Our results are presented in Table P.1. In Columns 1 and 2, the unit of observation is the terror attack. In Columns 3 to 9, the unit of observation is the news story. Because we aim at estimating the difference in media coverage between successful and failed attacks — and not between successful and failed attacks before and after an election — we drop municipality and

56. We thank the FAZ-Foundation for its financial support in helping us to procure these data.

57. Further details on the methods used to match stories to attacks can be found in the Supplementary Data Appendix.

58. LexisNexis also includes stories from national outlets but we omit these so that our LexisNexis measures only local and regional coverage.

year fixed effects and replace them with state  $\times$  year fixed effects so that we can estimate the parameter of interest.

In Panel A, we present results from regional and local news reports collected from LexisNexis. In Column 1 we find that successful attacks are no more *likely* than failed attacks to receive coverage. However, in Column 2 we find that successful attacks, on average, receive differentially *more* coverage: compared the failed attacks, successful attacks receive around 8 more news reports among regional and local news sources (a 73 percent increase relative to the sample mean of 11 stories per attack). The results in Columns 1 and 2 thus suggest that successful attacks are salient in the news media because they are covered more intensively and not because failed attacks fail to receive coverage, results that are directly in line with Brodeur (2018). In Columns 3 and 4, we find that news stories that cover successful attacks have worse sentiments, both in the story title (though not quantitatively significant) and body, suggesting that success not only influences the quantity of coverage but the *tone* of coverage. Finally, we investigate the extent to which successful terror attacks influence the *content* of news reports as measured by the frequency of key words. Stories that cover successful attacks speak significantly less about right-wing populism and crime but significantly more about Islam, a result that is particularly noteworthy given that the majority of the attacks in our sample are motivated by right-wing causes and are targeted against migrants. We also find that news coverage at the sub-national level uses words related to terrorism significantly more in response to successful attacks. This suggests that local and regional media coverage differentially label successful attacks as terrorist events and differentially highlight Islam when describing them.

The patterns for national coverage are different. As shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Panel B, successful attacks do not enjoy greater coverage at the national level, nor is the sentiment of a story (Columns 3 and 4) affected by an attacks success. National stories that cover successful attacks, compared to national stories that cover failed attacks, do, however, appear to highlight issues related to Islam and downplay crime, just like news coverage at the local and regional level. On the whole, however, not only do the attacks in our sample receive less coverage at the national level compared to the local level, successful attacks are no more salient than failed attacks in national reporting. Together, these results suggest that the regional and local news media play an important role in making successful attacks, and certain topics used to describe those attacks, salient.<sup>59</sup>

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59. In Online Appendix [O](#) we also test for differential coverage of successful attacks using Facebook data. Drawing on data from Müller and Schwarz (2021), we find that successful attacks lead to differentially more AfD Facebook users. We should also mention here that the readership of the FAZ may not be the ideal population for this empirical test as the FAZ draws better educated readers than average.

Table P.1  
Media Coverage of Successful Terror Attacks

|                            | Articles         |                    | Sentiment         |                     | Topics                 |                   |                      |                     |                     |
|----------------------------|------------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------------------|------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
|                            | (1)              | (2)                | (3)               | (4)                 | (5)                    | (6)               | (7)                  | (8)                 | (9)                 |
|                            | Found            | Count              | Title             | Body                | Right-wing<br>Populism | Migration         | Crime                | Islam               | Terror              |
| <i>Panel A: LexisNexis</i> |                  |                    |                   |                     |                        |                   |                      |                     |                     |
| Success                    | .0756<br>(.1754) | 8.246**<br>(4.015) | -.0339<br>(.0232) | -.0321**<br>(.0145) | -.3467***<br>(.091)    | -.1185<br>(.0995) | -.8085***<br>(.1641) | .6186***<br>(.0818) | .1895***<br>(.0684) |
| State × Year FE            | ✓                | ✓                  | ✓                 | ✓                   | ✓                      | ✓                 | ✓                    | ✓                   | ✓                   |
| Publisher FE               |                  |                    | ✓                 | ✓                   | ✓                      | ✓                 | ✓                    | ✓                   | ✓                   |
| <i>N</i>                   | 232              | 232                | 4,683             | 4,683               | 4,683                  | 4,683             | 4,683                | 4,683               | 4,683               |
| Clusters                   | 124              | 124                | 1,303             | 1,303               | 1,303                  | 1,303             | 1,303                | 1,303               | 1,303               |
| $\bar{Y}$                  | 0.642            | 11.125             | -0.091            | -0.114              | 0.544                  | 0.440             | 1.162                | 0.314               | 0.607               |
| <i>Panel B: FAZ</i>        |                  |                    |                   |                     |                        |                   |                      |                     |                     |
| Success                    | .0241<br>(.1531) | -.017<br>(.3378)   | -.0251<br>(.042)  | .0338<br>(.029)     | -.2848<br>(.212)       | .1211<br>(.0963)  | -.4963*<br>(.2774)   | .3178***<br>(.1052) | .1145<br>(.1023)    |
| State × Year FE            | ✓                | ✓                  | ✓                 | ✓                   | ✓                      | ✓                 | ✓                    | ✓                   | ✓                   |
| <i>N</i>                   | 186              | 186                | 338               | 338                 | 338                    | 338               | 338                  | 338                 | 338                 |
| $\bar{Y}$                  | 0.457            | 0.828              | -0.053            | -0.105              | 0.715                  | 0.576             | 1.229                | 0.298               | 0.515               |
| Unit of Observation        | Attack           |                    |                   |                     | Story                  |                   |                      |                     |                     |

*Notes:* Panel A presents results when using regional and local news sources collected via LexisNexis. Panel B presents the same results but using national news stories collected from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ). In Columns 1 and 2 the individual terror attack is the unit of observation. In Columns 3 to 9, the news story is the observation. In both cases, Success is an indicator that is 1 for successful terror attacks (or stories that cover successful attacks) and 0 for failed attacks (or stories that cover failed attacks). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. In Panel A, they are clustered at the municipality level in Columns 1 and 2 and at the municipality × publisher level in Columns 3 to 9. In Panel B, robust standard errors are reported. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

### P.3 High-Coverage Attacks and AfD Vote Share

We now examine how media coverage affects our baseline results. To conduct this test, we repeat our baseline analysis in samples split by the amount of media coverage that terrorist attacks receive. The results are presented in Figure P.1. In Panel (a), we repeat our baseline analysis. Panel (b) shows the same parameters but in a sample of municipalities whose terror attacks (successful and failed) received more than the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of news coverage. There are two noteworthy conclusions: first, the baseline effect on state elections nearly doubles, in line with the view that greater media coverage of successful attacks leads to stronger political effects. Second, there is now a positive, significant effect for Federal elections. The point estimate on Federal elections is around 4 percentage points which represents a 35 percent increase relative to the sample mean, very similar to our baseline effects for state elections. By contrast, in the sample of municipalities hit with low-coverage attacks, shown in Panel (c), the Federal election effect vanishes while the coefficient on state elections decreases by around 50 percent but remains statistically significant. Together, these results are consistent with previous research that demonstrates the important role of media coverage in shaping political outcomes (Gentzkow and Shapiro [2006]; Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson [2011]; Strömberg [2004]). They are also in line with scholarship that illustrates the impact of media attention in amplifying terror's effects on educational and economic outcomes (Alfano and Görlach [2022]; Brodeur [2018]). Of course, these results should be interpreted with some caution because of reverse causality. It could be, for example, that highly-covered attacks are more deadly or more emotionally triggering for voters and this is the reason why they (a) receive more coverage and (b) drive up the AfD vote share significantly more.




Figure P.1  
Baseline Effects of Terror on AfD Vote Share in Samples Split by Media Coverage

**Note:** Panel (a) presents our baseline estimate for  $SUCCESS \times POST$  for European, Federal and State elections, respectively. Panels (b) and (c) reports the same coefficient but for samples split by the amount of media coverage attacks receive. Panel (b) is the sample of municipalities hit with terror attacks that receive more than 75<sup>th</sup> percentile news coverage while Panel (c) includes the sample of municipalities targeted with attacks that receive less than the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of coverage.