Online Appendix
Fighting for Tyranny: State Repression and Combat Motivation
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A1. Proof of Proposition 1

The expected risk is equal to

\[ \mathbb{E}_\omega(a^*(\omega, r)) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} a^*(\omega, r) dF(\omega) \]

\[ = \int_{-\infty}^{\pi + \alpha r} \frac{\omega + \delta r \bar{a} - \alpha r}{1 + \delta r} dF(\omega) + \int_{\pi + \alpha r}^{\infty} \omega - \alpha r dF(\omega) \]

\[ = \int_{-\infty}^{\pi + \alpha r} \frac{\omega}{1 + \delta r} dF(\omega) + \int_{\pi + \alpha r}^{\infty} \omega dF(\omega) \]

\[ + \int_{-\infty}^{\pi + \alpha r} \frac{\delta r \bar{a} - \alpha r}{1 + \delta r} dF(\omega) + \int_{\pi + \alpha r}^{\infty} \alpha r dF(\omega) \]

\[ = \frac{\mathbb{E}(\omega)}{1 + \delta r} + \frac{\delta}{1 + \delta r} \int_{\pi + \alpha r}^{\infty} \omega dF(\omega) \]

\[ + \frac{\delta r \bar{a} - \alpha r}{1 + \delta r} F(\bar{a} + \alpha r) - \alpha r (1 - F(\bar{a} + \alpha r)) \]

\[ = \frac{\mathbb{E}(\omega)}{1 + \delta r} + \frac{\delta}{1 + \delta r} \left[ \int_{\pi + \alpha r}^{\infty} \omega dF(\omega) + F(\bar{a} + \alpha r)(\bar{a} + \alpha r) \right] - \alpha. \]

Letting \( z = \bar{a} + \alpha r \), we have

\[ \frac{\partial}{\partial r} \mathbb{E}(a^*(\omega, r)) = -\frac{\delta \mathbb{E}(\omega)}{(1 + \delta r)^2} + \frac{\delta}{(1 + \delta r)^2} \left[ \int_{z}^{\infty} \omega dF(\omega) + F(z) z \right] \]

\[ + \frac{\delta}{1 + \delta r} \left[ -f(z) z \alpha + \alpha F(z) + f(z) z \alpha \right] - \alpha \]

\[ = -\frac{\delta \mathbb{E}(\omega)}{(1 + \delta r)^2} + \frac{\delta}{(1 + \delta r)^2} \left[ \int_{z}^{\infty} \omega dF(\omega) + F(z) z \right] + \frac{\delta r}{1 + \delta r} \alpha F(z) - \alpha \]

\[ > -\frac{\delta \mathbb{E}(\omega)}{(1 + \delta r)^2} + \frac{\delta z}{(1 + \delta r)^2} + \frac{\delta r}{1 + \delta r} \alpha F(z) - \alpha, \]

where the last inequality follows from the fact that \( \int_{z}^{\infty} \omega dF(\omega) = \mathbb{E}(\omega | \omega > z)(1 - F(z)) > z(1 - (F(z)). The above expression is positive if and only if

\[ \bar{a} > g(r, \bar{a}) \equiv \frac{\alpha}{\delta} [(1 - F(\bar{a} + \alpha r))(1 + \delta r(1 + \delta r))] + \mathbb{E}(\omega). \tag{1} \]

\( g \) is finite-valued, since \( \lim_{r \to 0} g(r, \bar{a}) = \lim_{r \to \infty} g(r, \bar{a}) = 0 \). Furthermore, \( g \) is decreasing in \( \bar{a} \) (since \( F \) is increasing), and so for each \( r \), there is an interior point \( \hat{a}(r) = g(r, \hat{a}(r)) \) such that \( \bar{a} > g(r, \bar{a}) \) if and only if \( \bar{a} > \hat{a}(r) \). It follows that \( \mathbb{E}_\omega(a^*(\omega, r)) \) is everywhere increasing in \( r \) if and only if \( \bar{a} > \max_r \hat{a}(r) \).
Since \( \bar{a} > a \), the probability that a soldier defects or surrenders is equal to

\[
\Pr(a^*(\omega, r) < a) = \Pr(a^*(\omega, r) < a, w < \bar{a} + \alpha r) + \Pr(a^*(\omega, r) < a, w > \bar{a} + \alpha r) \\
= \Pr(\omega < a(1 + \delta r) - r(\delta \bar{a} - \alpha), w < \bar{a} + \alpha r) + \Pr(\omega < a + \alpha r, w > \bar{a} + \alpha r) \\
= \Pr(\omega < a(1 + \delta r) - r(\delta \bar{a} - \alpha)) \\
= F(a + r(\delta a - \delta \bar{a} + \alpha)),
\]

which is increasing for all \( r \) if and only if \( \bar{a} > a + \alpha / \delta \). Let

\[
\bar{a}(\delta, \alpha) \equiv \max_r \{ \max \hat{a}(r), a + \alpha / \delta \}.
\]

It then follows that \( \mathbb{E}_\omega(a^*(\omega, r)) \) is increasing and \( \Pr(a^*(\omega, r) \) is decreasing for all \( r \geq 0 \) if \( \bar{a}(\delta, \alpha) > \bar{a} \).

Finally, consider the probability that a soldier takes personal initiative above what the commander orders \( (a^*(\omega, r) > \bar{a}) \). Since \( a^*(\omega, r) \leq \bar{a} \) for \( \omega \leq \bar{a} + \alpha r \), we have

\[
\Pr(a^*(\omega, r) > \bar{a}) = \Pr(a^*(\omega, r) > \bar{a}, w < \bar{a} + \alpha r) + \Pr(a^*(\omega, r) > \bar{a}, w > \bar{a} + \alpha r) \\
= \Pr(a^*(\omega, r) > \bar{a}, w > \bar{a} + \alpha r) \\
= \Pr(\omega - \alpha r > \bar{a}, w > \bar{a} + \alpha r) \\
= \Pr(w > \bar{a} + \alpha r) = 1 - F(\bar{a} + \alpha r),
\]

which is decreasing in \( r \) for \( \alpha > 0 \).

A2. RECORD CLASSIFICATION

The Russian Ministry of Defense’s Pamyat’ Naroda database contains multiple records per soldier, but does not provide a unique ID (e.g. military card number) to automatically match all records to the appropriate individual. In the absence of this unique ID, each record \( r_i \) \((i = 1, \ldots, 106 \text{ mln})\) must be assigned to a cluster in the set \( \{c_1, \ldots, c_N\} \), where \( c_j \) is a soldier (cluster of records) and \( N \) stands for (unknown) number of soldiers for whom we have records. In our baseline analyses, we solve this unsupervised classification problem using a probabilistic record linkage approach. To evaluate the performance of this procedure, we later also apply an alternative, deterministic fuzzy matching approach.
A2.1. Probabilistic approach

Our baseline approach builds on the probabilistic record linkage method proposed by Fellegi and Sunter (1969) and further developed by Enamorado, Fifield and Imai (2019) and implemented in their R package fastLink. While we use the main engine of in the fastLink package, our record classification problem is a bit idiosyncratic and requires some extra steps, as we detail below.

A2.1.1 Blocking Since comparing each pair of 106 million records is computationally infeasible, we first partition the data into blocks of records that are maximally similar on some fields (e.g. surname, first name, patronymic). We then assign records to clusters only within each block, per standard procedure in record linkage with large datasets.

The fastLink package has a functionality to create blocks using $k$-means classification of alphabetically ordered text fields. However, we found that for our application, the package’s blocking scheme returns highly imbalanced blocks with many containing only a single record and some having millions of records. To obtain more balanced blocks, we used the following hierarchical procedure:

1. Partition records by the first letter of the surname, creating a set of initial blocks.
2. Within each initial block, identify frequent surnames, which appear at least 500 times.
3. Calculate the alphabetic order distance between each pair of surnames within each block. Using a size-constrained $k$-means clustering algorithm (Higgins, Sävje and Sekhon, 2016), cluster surnames within each initial block using frequent surnames as primary data points, forcing each cluster to have at least 500 unique surnames.
4. Partition blocks with more than 25,000 records further, using size-constrained $k$-means clustering based on the first name.
5. Partition remaining blocks with more than 25,000 records again using the patronymic.

The blocking procedure is hierarchical because it partitions the records based on the first name only if the partition on the last name alone was too coarse, and so on. We found that the hierarchical approach combined with the use of frequent surnames as primary data points for $k$-means clustering was particularly effective in achieving more balanced blocks, because it avoided creating clusters around misspelled names or clusters around rare surname-first name combinations, both of which generate imbalanced clusters. The procedure yielded 12,997 blocks ranging from 1,014 records to 29,748 records per block.
A2.1.2 Computing linkage probabilities

The next step is to compute the probabilities that any two records belong to the same soldier within each of the 12,997 blocks. In the dataset, there are nineteen fields that can potentially inform these linkage probabilities. However, we found that applying the fastLink procedure for all nineteen fields was computationally infeasible. Therefore, we adopted a stratified approach by splitting the nineteen fields into three strata and then calculating linkage probabilities for each stratum. The fields were stratified as follows:

1. (1) surnames, (2) first name, (3) patronymic, (4) date of birth;

2. (5) birth region, (6) birth region (oblast), (7) birth district (rayon), (8) birth town, (9) discharge year, (10), discharge month, (11) discharge day;


Let $\pi^s_{ij}$ denote the probability that records $i$ and $j$ are a match based on the fields in stratum $s$. To compute the degree of matching across all three strata, we need to aggregate the probabilities $\pi^1_{ij}, \pi^2_{ij},$ and $\pi^3_{ij}$ for each $i \neq j$ within a block. We impose a constraint that for any two pairs of records to be a match, it is necessary (but not sufficient) that they approximately match on the fields in the first stratum. Even if two records match exactly on the fields in the second and third strata, they cannot represent the same person if they do not have similar names and dates of birth.

We calculate pairwise linkage weights between records $i$ and $j$ across the three strata as

$$m_{ij} = \pi^1_{ij}(1 + \pi^2_{ij} + \pi^3_{ij}).$$

Two records can (but don’t have to) be a likely match even if the probabilities $\pi^2_{ij}$ and $\pi^3_{ij}$ are small (or zero). We found it important to allow for this possibility to reduce the false negative match rate, because the fields in the second and third strata have many missing values and the probabilistic linkage tends to assign vanishingly small match probabilities for fully or partially missing fields. On the other hand, records $i$ and $j$ cannot be a likely match if $\pi^1_{ij}$ is small because the fields in the first stratum have few missing values.

A2.1.3 Classification

Having calculated the degree of matching $m_{ij}$ for all pairs of records, we then assigned records into clusters. This classification problem is identical to that of finding a community structure in a non-binary directed network (Leicht and Newman, 2008), where each edge represents a degree of relationship between the nodes.
We solved this problem using Ward’s hierarchical agglomerative clustering, which assigns nodes to the same cluster by minimizing the within-cluster variance of network edges (Murtagh and Legendre, 2014).

Similar to the problem we faced when creating blocks, a naive application of the clustering procedure results in highly imbalanced (and implausible) clusters, with some soldiers having hundreds or even thousands of records. To avoid this problem, we adopted a hierarchical approach: we start by assigning records into clusters using a low similarity threshold; and then we further partition only those clusters that have more than ten records using a higher similarity threshold. Experimentation with different parameters has shown that the results are affected very little by the chosen values of thresholds as long as they are not unreasonable (e.g., we could stop splitting clusters with fewer than 100 records, but this would be mean we are assuming that one soldier could have as many as 99 separate records in the dataset, which makes no sense).

Finally, for each cluster we calculated the total linkage weight, which measures how well all pairs of records assigned to a cluster link with each other. This weight is the geometric mean of pairwise linkage weights of all records assigned to a cluster \( k \):

\[
W_k = \left( \prod_{i<j} m_{ij} \right)^{1/n_k} = \left( \prod_{i<j} \pi_{ij}^1 (1 + \pi_{ij}^2 + \pi_{ij}^3) \right)^{1/n_k},
\]

where \( n_k \) is the number of records assigned to cluster \( k \). The theoretical range of the weight goes from from 0 (i.e. at least one pair of records within a cluster has zero degree of linkage) to 3 (i.e. all pairs in the cluster have pairwise linkage weights equal to one, \( m_{ij} = 1 \); matching probabilities are equal to one in all three strata of the matching fields). In our analyses with soldier-level data, we weight each observation by the total linkage weight \( W_k \) to give more weight to observations that are classified with greater certainty.\(^1\)

A2.2. Record clustering via deterministic fuzzy matching

As a validation exercise, we also clustered the personnel records using deterministic fuzzy string matching. This procedure assigns records to clusters based on the string distances between a set of fields using preset thresholds. It entailed the following steps:

1. Select the same 19 record fields stratified into three groups, as outlined above.

2. Let \( d_{ij}^f \) denote string distance between records \( i \) and \( j \) on field \( f \). After experiment-

\(^1\)The entire probabilistic record classification procedure took about 60 hours on a high performance computing cluster with 32 cores.

A5
ing with multiple distance measures, we settled on restricted Damerau-Levenshtein
distance as it seems to produce the most face validity. Calculate the string distances
\( d_{ij} \) for all the fields in the first strata (surname, first name, patronymic, year of birth).

3. Using the complete hierarchical clustering method, assign records on field \( f \) to the same cluster if the restricted Damerau-Levenshtein distance between each pair of strings within the cluster does not exceed two units for names and one unit for the year of birth. That is, we allow two field entries to belong to the same cluster if they are dissimilar on at most two characters for names and one character for the year of birth. We use different cutoffs because most birth years are assigned to the same cluster if we allow two mistakes in four-digit numbers, most of which start with 19.

4. Aggregate set of records \( i \) and \( j \) into the same cluster if they match within the bounds of an error on all four fields in the first stratum.

5. If a cluster contains more than two records, split each such cluster using the same procedure as above but now employing fields from the second stratum; if large clusters remain, split them again using fields from the third stratum.

In the above scheme, the distance between a string and a missing value (or a distance between two missing values) is assumed to be zero. This assumption is required since missing values cannot be modeled explicitly in this scheme, in contrast to the probabilistic approach. This assumption essentially means that whenever we do not observe evidence of two strings being different, we assume they are the same. For instance, a soldier may have a discharge record that lists his birth location and an award record, which does not list a birth location. We would fail to match these two records if we did not treat missing values as stated, which clearly would be in error.

A2.3. Evaluation I: marginal properties

We first evaluate the probabilistic clustering scheme by comparing the marginal properties of the soldier-level dataset generated by this scheme against the marginal properties of the dataset generated by the deterministic scheme. The two schemes differ on a number of dimensions, such as the distance metric, probabilistic vs deterministic assignment, and treatment of the missing values. If the marginal properties of the two datasets are reasonably similar, then the clustering scheme is robust with respect to the specific choices.

Table A2.1 shows that the two clustering schemes yield reasonably similar results. The deterministic scheme yields more clusters (soldiers) than the probabilistic scheme. Closer inspection shows that this is mostly because the deterministic procedure fails to match
Table A2.1: PROBABILISTIC AND DETERMINISTIC CLUSTERING, MARGINAL PROPERTIES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Probabilistic</th>
<th>Deterministic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers</td>
<td>11,606,552</td>
<td>12,415,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K/WIA</td>
<td>22.42%</td>
<td>21.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>20.17%</td>
<td>19.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>5.65%</td>
<td>5.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDT</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUN</td>
<td>0.78%</td>
<td>0.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medal</td>
<td>17.47%</td>
<td>15.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>11.29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

many records with missing values. More important than the total number of clusters are the distributions of the key outcomes that we analyze. We see that the percentages of outcomes across the two datasets are very similar across all measures. This is a suggestive but nonetheless important indication that the clustering schemes worked “correctly” and are not greatly dependent on specific parametric choices.

A2.4. Evaluation II: comparison with ground truth

While typically, record linkage and clustering problems are unsupervised in the sense that we don’t have the ground truth against which to compare the output of the algorithm, in this particular case, we have some partial access to the ground truth. About 11% of records (about 11.8M) contain a field named “ID card,” which we believe denotes the identification number of a soldier’s military card. The value of this ID is quite limited because it is only included in the award records and in some portion of enlistment records. This means we can only use it to cluster records with and between these types or records, but not others. But we can use this identifier to evaluate how well the probabilistic clustering scheme predicts these “ground truth” clusters for which we have data.

Within each block where records were clustered, we calculate the similarity between the ground truth clustering and the clustering generated by the probabilistic clustering scheme using three standard metrics: (1) true positive rate (TP), the proportion of records that belong to the same cluster that are also assigned to the same cluster by the algorithm; (2) true negative rate (TN), the proportion of records that belong to different clusters being assigned to different clusters; and (3) $F_1$ score defined as $\frac{TP}{TP + 1/2(FP + FN)}$.

Figure A2.1 shows the distributions of three measures. The true positive rate is high across all blocks, ranging from 0.85 to 1, with over 51% of blocks above 95%. The true negative rate is also high across all blocks, with an average of 94%. Finally, the $F_1$ score also indicates high predictive accuracy across most blocks.
Figure A2.1: PERFORMANCE OF CLUSTERING SCHEME AGAINST THE GROUND TRUTH.

A3. VALOR DECORATIONS

A3.1. Categories of orders and medals

Soviet Army decorations and awards for WWII fell into multiple categories depending on their scope (individual, mass), target (civilian, military), merit (various classes of courage), timing (wartime, posthumous, commemorative), service and branch (aviation, infantry, armor, navy). Each category carried different parameters and standards for qualification. The USSR had a multi-tiered system of entities authorized to make award decisions, and this system itself was created based on award categories and their rank order. The complex awarding system meant that any unique decoration might belong to one or multiple categories. As such, the qualification criteria and the decision-making authorities that oversaw the awarding process were unique to each award.

We focus on a particular set of decorations that were given specifically for individual initiative and valor. As a result, we exclude medals and orders awarded en masse to an entire unit (e.g. campaign medals) or granted after 1945 as jubilee decorations. We focus on decorations that were awarded only during WWII and for recognition of acts displayed on the battlefield. Filtering based on these criteria leads us to four military dec-

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2 In general, unit commanders were responsible for the recommendation of individual assignment and promotion of enlisted men at times of war. Upon recommendation by unit commanders, different government agencies were responsible for the conferral of the award. The Main Administration of Personnel of the Commissariat of Defense had discretion over ranks up to lieutenant colonel. The Council of People’s Commissars was responsible for rank advancement decisions between the ranks of lieutenant colonel and marshal (Bolin, 1946).

3 These decorations include medals awarded for the defense or capture of cities, such as “Medal for Defense of Leningrad”, “Medal for Defense of the Caucasus”, “Medal for Defense of Stalingrad”, “Medal for the Capture of Berlin”, “Medal for the Capture of Budapest”, “Medal for the Victory over Japan”, etc.

4 There were significant changes to the awarding procedures and standards of all orders and medals in the postwar period that altered the definition of “merit” required for recognition.

A3.2. Medal “For Courage”

Established by a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on October 17, 1938, the Medal for Courage was intended for soldiers who provided active assistance to the success of military activities and for strengthening the combat readiness of troops. Soviet Army and Navy personnel, border and interior troops could receive the award. The description of the medal and the awarding regulations were amended by decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of June 19, 1943 and on December 16, 1947.

“For Courage” was the second medal after “XX Years of the Red Army” to be established in the USSR. It was awarded mainly to rank and file soldiers and less often to junior officers. Senior officers and generals almost never received the Medal “For Courage”. The first medals in this category were awarded two days after its establishment (62 soldiers). Approximately 26,000 servicemen received the medal before the start of the Great Patriotic War (we exclude these from our measure). Over 4,230,000 medals were awarded exclusively for feats performed during the war.

Awarding criteria
Criteria for recommending Medal “For Courage” included the following acts of bravery:

- For courage demonstrated in battles with the enemies of the Soviet Motherland;
- For courage demonstrated while protecting the state border of the Soviet Motherland;
- For courage demonstrated during performance of military duty in conditions associated with a risk to life.

A3.3. Medal “For Battle Merit”

The Medal “For Battle Merit” was established by a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on October 17, 1938 – on the same day as “For Courage”. Subsequent changes to
the description and awarding regulations took place on the same dates as “For Courage”. Although, the Medal “For Battle Merit” was awarded to rank and file soldiers, civilians could also receive awards for wartime bravery. For instance, in summer 1941, a 15-year-old schoolboy Zhenya Nefedov received the Medal “For Battle Merit” in Moscow for his efforts against German incendiary bombs, with which Nazi bombers bombarded residential areas of Moscow. During one raid, the eighth-grader put out nine “lighters”.

By the decree of June 4, 1944, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet introduced a procedure for awarding orders and medals to servicemen of the Red Army for length of service. The only medal awarded to servicemen for 10 years of impeccable service was the Medal “For Battle Merit” (orders were awarded for 15, 20 and more years of service). This procedure of awarding “for length of service” was canceled only in 1958.

Our measure excludes the approximately 21,000 servicemen who received the medal before the start of the Great Patriotic War, and all those who received it after 1945.

**Awarding criteria**

Criteria for recommending the Medal for “For Battle Merit” included the following:

- For skillful, proactive and courageous actions in battle that contributed to the successful fulfillment of combat missions by a military unit or subunit;

- For courage shown in defense of the state border of the Soviet Motherland;

- For excellent achievements in combat and training, mastering new military equipment and maintaining high combat readiness of military units and subunits during active military service.

**A3.4. The Order of Glory**

The Order of Glory was unique in that it could be awarded only for tactical-level combat valor and ranked among the most prestigious military decorations in Soviet history. It was reserved solely for enlisted personnel and non-commissioned officers (Empric, 2017).

Established by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on November 8, 1943, the Order of Glory comprised three distinct sequential classes, with the I class being the highest. 

Soldiers received a right to be conferred a higher military rank and were referred

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5 Until 1974, the Order of Glory remained the only order of the USSR, issued only for personal merits and never issued to entire military units, enterprises or organizations. The only exception to this rule occurred once in January 1945, when the entire contingent of a single unit was awarded the Order of Glory. In battles for the liberation of Poland, during a break-through of deep-echeloned German defenses on the left bank of the Vistula river, the soldiers of the 1st battalion of the Red Banner 215th Regiment of
to as a “Full Cavalier of the Order of Glory” if awarded all three classes of the order. Only 2,656 Red Army soldiers received all three classes of the Order of Glory during and after WWII, and over 9% of those approved between 1944 and 1946 were posthumous recognitions (Empric, 2017). By 1945, approximately 1,500 Orders of Glory of I class, 17,000 II class, and 200,000 III class had been awarded.

According to official wartime military personnel records, Full Cavaliers of the Order of Glory included representatives of 41 distinct Soviet ethnicities, with Russian comprising the largest ethnic group (70%), followed by Ukrainians (17%) and Belorussians (2%). Half of all Full Cavaliers fought in one of two Red Army fronts: the 1st Belorussian Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgiy Zhukov, and the 1st Ukrainian Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Konev. More than 50% of Full Cavaliers came from infantry, followed by artillery (26.5%), combat engineers (11.45%), tank and mechanized forces (3.46%), aviation forces (2.03%), and miscellaneous and support troops (4.3%) (Empric, 2017). Ten of the Full Cavaliers of the Soviet Union earned their decorations while serving their respective sentences in penal units.

Unit commanders at the brigade level or higher had the right to award the Order of Glory of III class. Army (flotilla) commanders could award the II class. Only the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR could award the I class. In these cases, the battalion or brigade commander would initiate the award recommendation, which would then have to be approved by the division, corps, army and front commanders, before being dispatched to Moscow for final vetting and approval.

**Awarding criteria**

Criteria for recommending Orders of Glory included the following acts of bravery:

- As the first to burst into the enemy’s position, by personal bravery, contributed to the success of the common cause;
- With accurate fire from a personal weapon, destroyed from 10 to 50 enemy soldiers and officers;
- While in a burning tank, continued to carry out the combat mission;
- While in combat, using anti-tank rifle fire, knocked out at least two enemy tanks;
- In a moment of danger, saved his unit’s banner from enemy capture;
- Using hand grenades, destroyed from one to three tanks on the battlefield or in the Orders of the Red Banner, Lenin and Suvorov 77th Guards Chernigov Infantry Rifle Division captured three lines of enemy trenches in a swift assault and held their positions until the main forces arrived.

---

6The statute of the order provided for the rank promotion of those awarded all three classes, which was an exception to the Soviet decoration system.
the enemy’s rear area;

- Using artillery or machine gun fire, destroyed at least three enemy aircrafts;

- Defying clear danger, as the first to burst into an enemy bunker (trench or dugout), destroyed its garrison with decisive actions;

- As a result of personal reconnaissance, determined weak points in the enemy’s defense and led forces into the enemy’s rear area;

- Personally captured an enemy officer;

- At night, removed the guard post (patrol) of the enemy or captured him;

- With resourcefulness and courage, personally made his way to the enemy’s position and destroyed his machine gun or mortar;

- While in night guard, destroyed the enemy’s warehouse with military equipment;

- While risking his life, saved the commander in combat from imminent danger that threatened him;

- Defying personal danger, captured the enemy banner in combat;

- While wounded, returned to duty following immediate treatment;

- Using personal weaponry, shut down an enemy aircraft;

- By destroying enemy firepower with artillery or mortar fire, ensured the successful operation of his unit;

- Under enemy fire, made a passage into the enemy’s wire fences for the advancing unit;

- Risking his life under enemy fire, assisted the wounded during a series of battles;

- Being in a destroyed tank, continued to carry out a combat mission from the tank’s weapons;

- Rapidly crashing into the enemy column on his tank, crumpled it and continued to carry out the combat mission;

- Crushed one or several enemy weapons with his tank or destroyed at least two machine-gun nests;

- While in reconnaissance mission, obtained valuable information about the enemy;

- In an air battle, as a fighter pilot, destroyed from 2 to 4 enemy fighter aircrafts or from 3 to 6 bomber aircrafts;

- As a result of an assault raid, as an attack pilot, destroyed 2 to 5 enemy tanks or 3 to 6 steam locomotives, or detonated a train at a railway station, or destroyed at least two aircrafts at an enemy airfield;

- As a result of bold initiative, as an attack pilot in an air battle, destroyed 1 or 2 enemy aircrafts;
• As members of the crew of daylight bombers, destroyed trains, blew up bridges, the ammunition depot and fuel, destroyed the headquarters of enemy unit, destroyed the railway station, blew up the power station or dam, destroyed a military ship, transport, boat, or destroyed at least two enemy aircrafts;

• As a crew member on a light night bomber, blew up an ammunition depot or fuel dump; destroyed the enemy’s headquarters; blew up a railroad train or bridge;

• As a crew member on a long-range night bomber, demolished a railroad station; blew up an ammunition depot or fuel dump; demolished a port facility; destroyed a sea transport or a railroad train; demolished or burned down an important factory or mill;

• As a crew member on a daylight bomber, as a result of courageous actions in aerial combat, show down 1 to 2 enemy aircrafts;

• As a crew member on a reconnaissance aircraft, for successfully accomplished reconnaissance, which resulted in valuable intelligence about the enemy.

Examples
Below are several examples of individuals who received Orders of Glory of each class.

Order of Glory III Class
From the award page of machine-gunner Egorov Dmitriy Nikolaevich (b. 1923), awarded the Order of Glory III Class on January 30, 1945:

“On January 13, 1945, while repelling counterattacks by numerically superior enemy infantry in the center of Budapest, Comrade Yegorov destroyed the enemy’s machine gun point and 12 enemy soldiers with his personal machine gun. On January 14, 1945, while advancing to a bridge over the Danube River, Yegorov killed 6 enemy soldiers and took 2 Hungarian soldiers as prisoners.”

Commander of the 200th Guards Rifle Regiment
Guard Major Panin

From the award page of Squad Commander Marchenko Anatoliy Andreevich (b. 1917), awarded the Order of Glory III Class on February 20, 1945:

“On 14 February, 1945, in an offensive battle against the German invaders in the area of the city of Wanzen of the 1st Ukrainian Front, while performing a combat mission to destroy a group of machine gunners with his squad, and while entrenched in a cemetery, he showed himself to
be a strong-willed, trained and staunch commander. He made his way through a break in the wall, chose a reliable shelter behind the stone, and with a long burst of machine gun destroyed the enemy’s machine-gun crew of 3 people. The first to rise to the attack, he galvanized his squad and knocked out the entrenched machine gunners, in the meantime destroying 2 fascists with hand grenades. Clearing the houses of the city from the German machine gunners, he shot 3 Nazis and took the Hitler Banner of the military plant as war trophies. For the precise execution of a combat mission and decisive actions on the battlefield against the German invaders, comrade Marchenko is recognized with the Order of Glory III Class.”

Commander of the 181st Infantry Regiment
Lieutenant Colonel Korkishko

From the award page of gunner Galyadinov Fayzirakhman Boltinovich (b. 1915), awarded the Order of Glory III Class on April 18, 1945:

“On April 18, 1945, during the hostilities in the Raygorod region, Comrade Galyadinov proved himself to be a courageous and staunch warrior. Comrade Galyautdinov’s tank was destroyed on the battlefield. He ensured the exit of the entire tank crew covering them with his machine gun fire, and occupied a neighboring house with his crew to guard and defend the tank. During combat, Galyadinov destroyed a light machine gun and 2 soldiers of the enemy. Wounded in the chest, Comrade Galyadinov did not leave his place and remained in the cover of the tank until the infantry approached. His actions are recognized with the Order of Glory III Class.”

Commander of the 78th Guards Heavy Tank Dnovsky Regiment
Guard Lieutenant Colonel Gerasimov

Order of Glory II Class

From the award page of cannon gunner, Guard Staff Sergeant Zolotikh Dmitriy Andreevich (b. 1924), awarded the Order of Glory II Class on August 27, 1944:

“On August 7, 1944, in a fierce battle during the liberation of Lesna station of Baranovichi region, using his 45-mm cannon in the infantry battle formations destroyed one German tank with a direct fire. The Germans, intensifying their onslaught and moving to a fierce counterattack with the support of 20 tanks, approached the firing position of his cannon at 100 meters. Wounded in the arm, he did not leave the battlefield and, not losing his composure in front of the enemy, opened a hurricane of fire on enemy tanks, and knocked out another tank, after which he destroyed up to 20 German soldiers and officers. After repeated orders from the fire platoon commander, he then left the battlefield. His actions are recognized with the Order of Glory II Class.”
Commander of the 162th Guards Rifle Regiment  
Guard Major Stepura

From the award page of foot reconnaissance platoon scout Shmonin Fyodor Vasilyevich (b. 1911), awarded the Order of Glory II Class on September 29, 1944:

“On August 21, 1944, in the battle for the village of Voinesti (Romania), Private Shmonin, showing fearlessness and courage, suddenly and carefully burst into a village and, having approached the house in which there were more than 30 German soldiers, he began to throw grenades at them and shoot the Germans running out of the house in a panic. In total, in this battle, Shmonin destroyed 12 German fascist invaders, and took 19 German soldiers as prisoners and brought them to the regiment headquarters. His actions are recognized with the Order of Glory II Class.”

Commander of the 933th Rifle Regiment  
Lieutenant Colonel Fimosin

From the award page of reconnaissance scout Dolgov Pyotr Nikolaevich (b. 1922), awarded the Order of Glory II Class on October 21, 1944:

“On October 2, 1944, during a night search for scouts in the area north-west of the city of Lomas, Comrade Dolgov was the first to cross the Narev River, and threw a cable rope to his comrades, thereby ensuring the crossing of the safe entire group. During the capture operation of the group, Comrade Dolgov silently crawled to the enemy trench and knocked down the German night guard. Having disarmed the enemy, Comrade Dolgov, with his comrades who arrived in time, delivered the prisoner to his destination. The mission was accomplished. His actions are recognized with the Order of Glory II Class.”

Commander of the 444th Separate Reconnaissance Company  
Senior lieutenant Pismorov

Order of Glory I Class

From the award page of SU-85 gunner, Sergeant Major Zaboev Vasiliiy Andreevich (b. 1914), awarded the Order of Glory I Class on March 24, 1945:

“In battles near the village of Relsheersh, the vehicle commander was wounded during repeated attacks of the enemy. Comrade Zaboev assumed command and, in this battle, repelled 3 enemy attacks, destroyed 3 tanks, 2 guns, 2 mortarts, 1 machine-gun point, and up to 30 enemy soldiers...
and officers. In the same battle Comrade Zaboev was seriously wounded, but did not leave his combat post, and brought his car out in good working condition. His actions are recognized with the Order of Glory I Class.”

Commander 1438th Self-propelled Artillery Red Banner Order of Suvorov Regiment
Colonel Zatylkin

From the award page of Soldier Semyonov Yegor Dmitrievich (b. 1906), awarded the Order of Glory I Class on May 31, 1945:

“On March 27, 1945, during the assault on height 60.6 for liquidation of the Alt-kyustrinskoensky bridgehead on the right bank of the Oder River, Comrade Semyonov showed examples of stamina and fearlessness in battle. At the signal for the start of the attack, Comrade Semyonov was the first to break into the enemy’s location and knocked down five Nazis in hand-to-hand combat. When pursuing the retreating enemy, the first light machine gun went out of order. Comrade Semyonov quickly replaced it and, with his fire, destroyed the enemy light machine gun and 12 German soldiers, scattering the retreating Germans. Thus, he ensured the rapid advancement of the rifle company. His actions are recognized with the Order of Glory I Class.”

Commander 487th Red Banner Infantry Regiment
Lieutenant Colonel Tarasov

A3.5. Hero of the Soviet Union

The Hero of the Soviet Union was the highest degree of distinction of the Soviet period and the most prestigious title in the Soviet hierarchy of awards.

Established by a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on April 16, 1934, title of Hero of the Soviet Union was given for personal or collective services to the Soviet state and society associated with the performance of a heroic deed. Along with this title, the awardee received a) the highest award of the USSR — the Order of Lenin; b) a badge of special distinction — the Gold Star medal; and c) diploma of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The title also carried additional welfare privileges, such as medical, housing, entertainment benefits and a pension. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was first conferred on April 20, 1934 to a number of Soviet aviators for rescuing the polar expedition and the crew of the Chelyuskin icebreaker.

On December 31, 1936, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was for the first time awarded for military exploits. Eleven commanders of the Red Army — participants of the Spanish Civil War — became heroes. It is noteworthy that all of them were also pilots,
and three of them were foreigners by origin: the Italian Primo Gibelli, the German Ernst Schacht and the Bulgarian Zakhari Zakhariev. Among the heroes was the lieutenant of the 61st fighter squadron, Chernykh S.A. In Spain, he was the first Soviet pilot to shoot down the latest Messerschmitt Bf 109B fighter. On June 22, 1941, he commanded the 9th Mixed Air Division. On the first day of the war, the division suffered huge losses (347 out of 409 aircraft of the division were destroyed). As a result, Chernykh was accused of criminal inaction and was executed on June 27, 1941.

In total, before the start of the Great Patriotic War, the title of Hero was awarded to 626 people (including 3 women), five of whom were twice heroes. 11,635 people (92% of the total number of heroes) were awarded the title during the Great Patriotic War. 101 were awarded twice and 3 were awarded thrice. In the first year of the war, only a few dozen people were awarded the title, all in the period from July to October 1941. By 1944, the number of Heroes of the Soviet Union increased by more than 3,000, mainly infantrymen. For the liberation of the Czechoslovakia, the title was awarded 88 times, for the liberation of Poland — 1667 times, for the Berlin operation — more than 600 times.

Among all the Heroes of the Soviet Union, 35% were enlisted, 61% were junior and field-grade officers and 3.3% (380 people) were generals, admirals and marshals. The youngest person to receive the title was 17-year-old partisan Lenya Golikov (posthumously). There were only two wartime cases when the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to all personnel in a unit, comprising 95 mostly posthumous decorations.

According to the ethnic composition, the majority of the Heroes were Russians — 7998 people, followed by 2,021 Ukrainians, 299 Belarusians, 161 Tatars, 107 Jews, 96 Kazakhs, 90 Georgians, 89 Armenians, 67 Uzbeks, 63 Mordvin, 45 Chuvashes, 43 Azerbaijanis, 38 Bashkirs, 31 Ossetians, 18 Mari, 16 Turkmen, 15 Lithuanians, 15 Tajiks, 12 Latvians, 12 Kyrgyz, 10 Komi, 10 Udmurts, 9 Estonians, 8 Karelians, 8 Kalmyks, 6 Kabardins, 6 Adygeis, 4 Abkhazians, 2 Yakuts, 2 Moldovans, and 1 Tuvinian.

Awarding criteria
The title could only be awarded by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for exceptional heroic deeds. A Hero of the Soviet Union who performed a second heroic deed, no less than the one for which others who had performed a similar feat received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, was awarded the Order of Lenin, a second Gold Star, and a commemorative bronze bust in his hometown. A Hero of the Soviet Union awarded two Gold Star medals could again receive the Order of Lenin and Gold Star for new heroic deeds similar to those previously committed.
Examples
From the award page of machine-gunner Bondarenko Pyotr Nikolaevich (b. 1921), awarded the title of the Hero of the Soviet Union on October 26, 1943:

“Guards gunner junior sergeant Bondarenko was among the first to cross with his weapon to the right bank of the Dnieper. On September 27, 1943, while fighting to repel enemy counterattacks, Bondarenko destroyed 4 firing points and up to 45 enemy soldiers with an open direct fire. In the battle on October 7, 1943, under heavy artillery fire and the attack of enemy aircraft, he fired at the enemy’s counterattacking infantry, which was supported by 20 tanks. He was wounded by a shrapnel of a bomb, but despite the pain and severe bleeding, he continued to attack, setting fire to one T-4 tank and destroying up to 15 enemy soldiers. He was again wounded by shrapnel of another bomb, but despite being wounded, he continued to remain in the ranks. When repelling another counterattack, he was killed on the battlefield.”

Commander of the 115th Krasnograd Guards Fighter Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment
Guard Lieutenant Colonel Kozyarenko

From the award page of junior lieutenant Marchenko Fyodor Illarionovich (b. 1919), awarded the title of the Hero of the Soviet Union on April 17, 1945:

“On April 14, 1945, in battles with the German invaders during the breakthrough of the heavily fortified enemy defenses on the West Bank of the Oder River, and during offensive operations, Comrade Marchenko, by his personal actions, inspired military deeds. In the battles for the village of Hardenberg on April 16, 1945, he showed exceptional courage and bravery. The Germans launched a counterattack. Comrade Marchenko personally led the unit, repelling the enemy’s counterattack, with the slogan “Communists Forward For the Motherland”, raising soldiers’ spirits, and rushed to storm the enemy trenches. He was the first to break into the enemy trenches, where he destroyed 5 German soldiers and one officer from his personal weapons, taking 4 German soldiers as prisoners. Following his example, the soldiers knocked the enemy out of his trenches with a swift blow and began to pursue. In the ensuing battle on April 17, 1945, Comrade Marchenko, showing courage and personal bravery, led the fighters forward. In the same battle, he was seriously wounded by a shrapnel as a result of the enemy shelling and died because of his wounds. For the courage and bravery shown, Comrade Marchenko deserves to be posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.”

Commander of the 180th Guards Rifle Regiment
Guard Major Kuzov
From the award page of senior sergeant Nemchikov Vladimir Ivanovich (b. 1925), awarded the title of the Hero of the Soviet Union on July 12, 1944:

“The regiment commander ordered to pick up 12 people from a group of brave soldiers to perform a particularly difficult and dangerous task. The first to voluntarily express a desire to perform any task was guard senior sergeant Nemchikov, stating that he was ready to complete any task for the sake of defeating the enemy and even sacrifice his life. Having received the order, this group, by swimming in special suits, was supposed to ferry 6 rafts with stuffed effigies to the enemy’s shore in order to direct enemy fire on themselves, which was then detected and suppressed by our artillery. However, some rafts with effigies were destroyed by Finnish artillery while still on the shore and could not be lowered into the water. Comrade Nemchikov made an independent decision, threw himself into the water and swam to the enemy’s shore, directing all the fire on himself. Having reached the opposite bank, Comrade Nemchikov began to fighting with the Finns with his machine gun and move towards the enemy’s trenches. A group of 12 people provided the battalion with a crossing into the Svir River and the battalion completed its task successfully.”

Commander of the 300th Guards Rifle Regiment
Guards Colonel Danilov

### A4. Measurement of battlefield outcomes

We measure battlefield outcomes using soldiers’ reported discharge reasons, which are proxies rather than direct observations of theoretically relevant quantities. For example, we use K/WIA as a proxy for resolve, even if many soldiers’ deaths had little to do their actual levels of resolve. Here we evaluate the direction and degree of bias introduced by this kind of measurement error. We use the example of K/WIA as a proxy measure for having battlefield resolve, but the argument equally applies to other outcomes.

Let $Y^*_i \in \{0, 1\}$ denote whether or not soldier $i$ displayed battlefield resolve, which we cannot observe directly, and let $Y_i \in \{0, 1\}$ denote whether or not that soldier was K/WIA, which we do observe. We formalize the measurement process that links observed outcome $Y_i$ with the latent quantity $Y^*_i$ as

$$
\Pr(Y_i = 1|Y^*_i = s, X_i) = \varepsilon_s(X),
$$

for $s \in \{0, 1\}$. The vector $X_i$ represents the covariates that potentially affect the probability of K/WIA independently of the soldier’s resolve, and $\varepsilon_1(X)$ and $\varepsilon_0(X)$ are measurement errors for soldiers with and without resolve, respectively.
Let $D$ denote the level of repression and let $p^*(D, X_i) = \Pr(Y_i^* = 1|X_i, D)$ and $p(D, X_i) = \Pr(Y_i = 1|X_i, D)$ denote the probability that a soldier, conditional on repression and other covariates, has battlefield resolve or that he is K/WIA, respectively. We can estimate only the latter, but are interested in the former. By the law of iterated expectations we get

$$p^*(D, X_i) = \frac{p(D, X_i) - \varepsilon_0(X_i)}{\varepsilon_1(X_i) - \varepsilon_0(X_i)}, \quad (4)$$

and so the marginal change in the probability that the soldier has battlefield resolve when repression increases is equal to

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial D} p^*(D, X_i) = \frac{\partial}{\partial D} p(D, X_i) \frac{1}{\varepsilon_1(X_i) - \varepsilon_0(X_i)}. \quad (5)$$

The partial derivatives on both sides are in the same direction if and only if $\Pr(Y_i = 1|Y_i^* = 1, X_i) > \Pr(Y_i = 1|Y_i^* = 0, X_i)$. The second term in the above equation is always strictly larger than one, and so the marginal effect on $p$ is always smaller in absolute value than the marginal effect on $p^*$. Thus, under the assumption that a soldier who is more willing to fight has a greater chance of being K/WIA, which seems highly plausible, the measurement error in the outcome results in attenuation bias.

**A4.1. Measurement validation through unit-level operational performance**

To further assess how well our measures map onto the theoretical concept of resolve, we assess whether these individual-level battlefield outcomes aggregate to the operational-level success or failure of army units. Specifically, we looked at how predictive these measures are of territorial gains by the Red Army.\footnote{A potential alternative measure of military effectiveness is the loss-exchange ratio (LER) between Soviet and German forces (i.e. enemy losses divided by friendly losses). We do not consider the LER here because (1) the Russian MOD has not made these statistics available at the battle level, (2) there is little evidence that Soviet commanders cared about the LER or used it as a metric of success, and (3) such an analysis would be almost tautological, with Soviet casualty statistics appearing on both the left and right side of the equation. By contrast, there is ample evidence that Soviet authorities used territorial changes as measures of effectiveness, as illustrated by the fact that nearly all battle descriptions in “People’s Memory” mention them, and by the fixation on this metric in Stalin’s wartime orders (e.g. “Not one step back!”).} To conduct this analysis, we matched soldiers’ records to the 225 major battles listed in the “People’s Memory” database (pamyat-naroda.ru/ops/), using information on the army units in which they served and their months of service in those units. Because these battles were large, army-level operations, this linkage procedure required first establishing the “parent” army for each division, regiment, battalion or company listed in the soldier’s service history, and then filtering the records to include only those corresponding to the time of the battle. We then calculated the
proportion of soldiers in each unit-month with each type of outcome (K/WIA, MIA, etc.).

To measure operational-level territorial gains, we conducted a text analysis of battle
descriptions in “People’s Memory”, each approximately one paragraph in length. Rather
than providing our own subjective assessment of battlefield success, this approach allows
us to adopt the Russian MOD’s own official characterization of events, which is more
likely to reflect Soviet commanders’ information set at the time. We read each description
and classified it as denoting a territorial gain, loss, or no change in the status quo.

Because a small subset of descriptions were open to multiple interpretations (e.g. with
Soviet troops advancing on one sector of the front, but retreating elsewhere), we ac-
counted for measurement uncertainty by fitting a supervised machine learning model,
with the manually-coded labels as a training set. Specifically, we employed a recur-
rent neural network (RNN) model with long short-term memory (LSTM) (Hochreiter and
Schmidhuber, 1997). LSTMs are well-suited for learning problems related to sequential
data, such as sequences of words of differential length, where the vocabulary is poten-
tially large, and where context and dependencies between inputs are potentially informa-
tive for classification.\footnote{For an introduction to LSTMs, with applications to political science, see Chang and Masterson (2020).} We employed a standard “vanilla LSTM” architecture (Graves and
Schmidhuber, 2005), using the \texttt{keras} library in Python 3 (Chollet, 2015).\footnote{At the center of this architecture is a memory cell and non-linear gating units, which regulate
information flow into and out of the cell. A “vanilla LSTM” block features three gates (input, forget, and
output), block input, a single cell, and an output activation function. The block’s output recurrently
connects back to the block input and all gates. Greff et al. (2017) demonstrated that this architecture
performs well on a variety of classification tasks, and that common modifications do not significantly
improve performance. To preprocess the text, we mapped each of the 225 descriptions into a real vector
domain, with each word represented as an embedding vector of length 100. The purpose of this step is to
encode words as real-valued vectors in a high dimensional space, where words more similar in meaning
appear closer in the vector space. We limited the total number of words used in modeling to the 5000 most
frequent ones. We used an LSTM layer with 100 memory units, and a dense output layer with a sigmoid
activation function for binary predictions. We fit the model using the efficient ADAM optimization
algorithm, with binary cross-entropy as the loss function.}

Because our training set includes all 225 battles, we used 10 random subsets of these
labels to train the model, setting aside the remainders for cross validation. This created 10
alternative sets of LSTM-classified battles, of which we retained the set with the highest
out-of-sample predictive accuracy, as measured by the area under the Receiver Operator
Characteristic (ROC) curve. In most instances, the network achieved convergence at <
100 epochs, with median predictive accuracy (area under ROC curve) of 0.94.

Figure A4.2 shows word clouds for event descriptions corresponding to territorial
gains. The font size is proportional to word frequencies in the LSTM-predicted test set,
for events predicted as being most likely to belong to this category (99th percentile). The
word frequencies generally align with our qualitative understanding of territorial gains,
with terms such as “advance” (the stems , ), “liberate” () and “to the west” () featuring prominently.

After linking the 225 battles to our unit-month level data, we regressed territorial gains on the proportion of participating soldiers K/WIA, DDT, PUN, POW, MIA, and Medals, along with fixed effects for units, years, and months. The results in Table 1 (main text) correspond to the hand-coded version of these battle outcomes. However, estimates are numerically almost identical if we use the LSTM-predicted labels.

A5. NATIONALITY CLASSIFICATION

To develop a Soviet nationality classifier, we used the Memorial archive as a training set. The archive contains nationality information for 916,675 arrestees, with 163,284 unique surnames. The set of nationalities includes: Armenian, Belarussian, Chechen, Chinese, Estonian, Greek, Jewish, Kabardin, Kalmyk, Korean, Latvian, Lithuanian, Ossetian, Polish, Russian, Tatar and Ukrainian. Because the same surnames reappear multiple times in the archive, often with more than one nationality (due to intermarriage or other reasons), dictionary-based matching of each surname to its corresponding nationality is not feasible. To account for the uncertainty induced by this one-to-many match problem, we used three supervised machine learning algorithms to create a classifier that matches each surname to its most-likely nationality. These classifiers are: Support Vector Machine (SVM), Regression Trees and Random Forest.

Due to the computational burden of fitting these models on a document-term matrix with 163,284 columns, we split the task into chunks of 1,000, and iterated over them. In each iteration, we created an $N \times 1000$ document-term matrix, where $N$ is the number of individuals in Memorial who had one of the 1000 surnames in that chunk. We then fit a model, where the outcome is a $N \times 1$ vector of nationalities for each individual, and the
explanatory variables are the 1000 unique surnames. We then calculated average classification accuracy for each algorithm (% of surnames correctly predicted). Because the set of surnames is fixed at 163,284, and extrapolation is not possible, we report only in-sample prediction accuracy below. Figure A5.3 reports the distribution of these accuracy scores for the three algorithms, with vertical lines showing the mean. SVM clearly outperforms the others, with regression trees faring the worst.

Figure A5.3: DISTRIBUTIONS OF CLASSIFIER ACCURACY SCORES.

![Distributions of classifier accuracy scores](image)

Breaking these statistics down by nationality, we see that some groups (e.g. Russian) have fairly high accuracy scores (96.5% with SVM, 99.3% with Regression Trees, 94.7% with Random Forests). Others, like Ukrainians and Belarusians, don’t score quite as high, even with SVM – likely due to intermarriage and similarity of surnames among the three biggest Slavic republics. In most erroneous cases, Belarusians and Ukrainians are typically mis-classified as Russians. For this reason, our analyses employ only a binary “ethnic Russian” variable, rather than using the full set of predicted ethnicities.

To assess the validity of our SVM classifications of soldiers’ nationalities, we compared oblast-level proportions against census data from 1939. To do so, we spatially matched the census data to 1937 oblasts, and calculated oblast-level proportions for each nationality listed above. We then calculated oblast-level proportions of soldiers’ SVM-classified nationalities, and compared these proportions to those in the 1939 census.

Table A5.2 reports the distribution of test statistics and p-values from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests, conducted country-wide, and by each oblast. The null hypothesis is that the distributions of oblast-level proportions across nationalities (e.g. Russian = .70, Ukrainian = .05, etc.) are the same for census and SVM data. These results suggest that – for all regions except the ethnically-diverse Chuvashiya and Dagestan – we cannot reject the null,
and therefore the oblast-level proportions were likely drawn from the same distribution.

Table A5.2: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test Statistics for Nationality Classifier.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oblast’ (1937)</th>
<th>Wilcoxon Test</th>
<th>Oblast’ (1937)</th>
<th>Wilcoxon Test</th>
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<td>Yaroslavskaya Oblast’</td>
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</table>

Null hypothesis is that the distributions of oblast-level proportions across nationalities are the same for census and SVM data. Significance levels (two-tailed): †p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

A6. **Probing Identifying Assumptions**

A6.1. **Tests of Complete Spatial Randomness**

A key identifying assumption for our OLS analyses is that the local geographic distribution of arrest locations is spatially random. This assumption does not preclude the existence of geographic clusters on a more macro scale, or require a uniform distribution of events across the country – more arrests will surely happen in densely populated areas than in the desert or the tundra. What it assumes is that, after accounting for differences between small geographic areas (e.g. by estimating a fixed effect for each 25×25 km cell), we can treat remaining geographic variation within each of these areas as random. To test the validity of this assumption, we performed a series of tests of the null hypothesis that arrest locations are a realization of a uniform Poisson point process, including Quadrat Count Tests, Clark-Evans Tests, and Spatial Scan Tests.

The set of arrest locations within each grid cell represents a spatial point pattern, whose observed arrangement may be random (H₀) or the result of some non-random
targeting process \( (H_A) \) (e.g. targeting of neighborhoods whom authorities suspect of disloyalty). Complete Spatial Randomness (CSR) requires that (a) events have an equal probability of occurring in any equally-sided subdivision of a region (i.e. if a grid cell is split into 4 tiles, an event has a \( \frac{1}{4} \) chance of occurring in each tile), and (b) the locations of these events are independent of one another. If the CSR null hypothesis is true, and the point pattern is a realization of a random Poisson process, then the expected density of points (intensity of arrests) within grid cell \( j \) should be:

\[
\lambda_j = \frac{n_j}{a_j}
\]

where \( n_j \) is the total number of observed events within grid cell \( j \) and \( a_j \) is \( j \)'s geographic area. If we divide \( j \) into \( K \) tiles of equal shape and area \( (j_1, \ldots, j_K) \), then the expected number of points in any given tile \( j_k \) should depend only on the overall point density within \( j \) and the relative area of the tile:

\[
E[N(j_k)] = \lambda_j a_j k = n_j a_j k \]

The Quadrat Count Test (Cressie and Read, 1984) tests the CSR hypothesis by partitioning grid cell \( j \) into rectangular tiles of equal area, and compares the observed tile count distribution (i.e. number of tiles with 0, 1, 2, … events) against the distribution we would expect if these counts were independent random samples from a Poisson distribution with rate parameter \( \lambda_j \). It then uses a Pearson’s \( \chi^2 \) goodness-of-fit test to quantify the difference between the observed and expected counts, with \( p \)-values calculated using Monte Carlo methods (i.e. generating 2000 random point patterns from \( Poisson(\lambda_j) \) and comparing the \( \chi^2 \) statistic for the observed point pattern against the simulated values).

We performed a series of Quadrat Count Tests for each of the 29,243 \( 25 \times 25 \) km grid cells in our study region, divided into \( K \in \{1, 2^2 = 4, 3^2 = 9, 4^2 = 16, 5^2 = 25\} \) tiles of size \( 25 \times 25 \) km, \( 12.5 \times 12.5 \) km, \( 8.33 \times 8.33 \) km, \( 6.25 \times 6.25 \) km, and \( 5 \times 5 \) km, respectively.

As Table A6.3 reports, we were unable to reject the null hypothesis (\( \chi^2 \) test statistic \( p \)-value was greater than 0.05) in 91 percent of tests, including 100 percent of tests at \( K = 1 \) and 88 percent at \( K = 25 \). These results suggest that – for the vast majority of the grid cells in our sample, across all partitions – there is no significant difference between observed and expected local event counts.

We supplemented these analyses with alternative approaches, which use distances between event locations (rather than fixed areal partitions) to calculate test statistics. These include the Clark-Evans Test (Clark and Evans, 1954), which uses a Normal approximation
Table A6.3: Quadrat Count Test Statistics by Number of Tiles Per Cell.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tiles per cell</th>
<th>Average $\chi^2$ stat.</th>
<th>Average $p$ value</th>
<th>$E[p &gt; .05]$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>(92%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>13.78</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>(90%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>24.44</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>(88%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>35.97</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>(87%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>15.99</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>(91%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values represent average Pearson $\chi^2$ test statistics and two-sided $p$ values for Monte Carlo Quadrat Count Tests, calculated with each 25×25 km grid cell divided into different numbers of tiles: 1 tile (25 km across), 4 tiles (12.5 km), 9 (8.33 km), 16 (6.25 km) and 25 (5 km).

of the nearest-neighbor distance distribution $D$ within region $j$, with mean and variance

$$E[D_j] = \mu_j = \frac{1}{2\sqrt{\lambda_j}}, \quad var(D_j) = \sigma_j^2 = \frac{4 - \pi}{4\pi\lambda_j}$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

where $\lambda_j$ is the point density within grid cell $j$. To compare the observed distribution of distances to what we would expect under CSR, the test calculates a $z$-value:

$$z_j = \frac{\bar{d}_j - \mu_j}{\sigma_j}$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

where $\bar{d}_j$ is the sample mean of nearest-neighbor distances within grid cell $j$. Under the CSR null hypothesis, $z_j$ should be a sample from $N(0, 1)$. $p$-values are based on a two-tailed test, where significantly small values of $\bar{d}_j$ indicate spatial clustering and significantly large values indicate spatial dispersion.

Finally, we performed Spatial Scan Tests for clustering in spatial point patterns (Kulldorff, 1997). This test rejects the null CSR hypothesis if there exists a circle of radius $r$ within grid cell $j$, which contains significantly more points than one would expect under a uniform Poisson process. The alternative hypothesis is that of an inhomogeneous Poisson process with different intensities $\beta_1 \lambda_j$ within the circle, and $\beta_2 \lambda_j$ outside the circle.

As Table A6.4 reports, the results of these additional CSR tests were consistent with those of the Quadrat Test. We were unable to reject the null hypothesis in 87% of grid cells with the Clark-Evans test and 96% with the Spatial Scan test. In the vast majority of grid locations, the spatial distribution of arrests does not significantly deviate from what we would expect under Complete Spatial Randomness.
Table A6.4: TESTS OF COMPLETE SPATIAL RANDOMNESS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Average test stat.</th>
<th>Average p value</th>
<th>$E[p &gt; .05]$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quadrat</td>
<td>15.99</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>(91%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark-Evans</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>(85%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial Scan</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>(95%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values represent test statistics and $p$ values for Monte Carlo Quadrat Count Tests, two-tailed Clark-Evans Tests, and Spatial Scan Tests, averaged across all grid cells.

A6.2. FRDD exclusion restriction

The map in Figure A6.4 shows the borders included in the FRDD analyses. Each dot represents a birth location. A location colored in red is in the more repressive oblast, whereas a location colored in blue is in the less repressive oblast.

- High repression
- Low repression

Figure A6.4: BORDER REGIONS INCLUDED IN FRDD ANALYSES.

A key identifying assumption behind FRDD is the exclusion restriction: differences in repression must be the only channel through which higher arrest rates across regional borders could influence battlefield outcomes. While a comprehensive test of all alternative causal pathways is not feasible, we consider two of the most likely violations here.

The first is a differential pace of mobilization. The same idiosyncratic factors that led to higher arrest rates across regional borders may also have led local administrators to be more efficient in drafting soldiers and transporting them to their battle stations in the early stages of the war, when death rates were particularly high. Although local military
commissariats reported to a different government ministry — the People’s Commissariat of Defense, not the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs — it is quite possible that being under the watchful eye of zealous local secret police agents impacted their work.

Second, regions with higher repression may have had different reporting standards and record-keeping capacity, which affected the likelihood that soldiers’ battlefield outcomes were fully observed in our data. This potential violation assumes a historically implausible level of inter-agency coordination — the NKVD had no role in drafting or cataloging soldiers’ discharge records, which originated with military units in the field and were stored in defense ministerial archives. But it is not impossible for such information sharing to have taken place through informal bureaucratic channels.

To test these possibilities, we ran a series of reduced form FRDD regressions, with soldiers’ draft dates, discharge dates, and missingness of outcomes on the left-hand side. The results, in Table A6.5, provide no evidence that soldiers from one part of border started or ended their service earlier than soldiers from the other side. However, the analyses do reveal a small negative correlation between missingness of outcomes and being born on the higher-repression side of the border. We consider how consequential this pattern of missingness is for our results in section A7.2 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>End date</th>
<th>Missing outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Border effect</td>
<td>-0.2 (0.5)</td>
<td>0.2 (0.4)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Y</td>
<td>302.3</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplaces</td>
<td>36,672</td>
<td>36,457</td>
<td>38,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gridcells</td>
<td>2,045</td>
<td>2,044</td>
<td>2,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers</td>
<td>2,221,196</td>
<td>2,153,078</td>
<td>2,828,431</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by birth location and grid cell. All models include individual and birth location-level covariates. Observations weighted by record clustering probability. Analyses exclude locations in non-matched regions and > 50km from regional borders. Significance levels (two-tailed): †p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

Table A6.5: BORDER EFFECTS AND VIOLATIONS OF EXCLUSION RESTRICTION

A28
A7. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

A7.1. Clustered treatment assignment

To address estimation problems due to clustered treatment assignment and unequal population size, we took three approaches: (1) pair-matched cluster sampling, (2) aggregate analysis of cluster-level averages, (3) both, and (4) aggregate district-level analysis. The first of these corrects for biases due to over-weighting larger clusters. The second addresses the problem of correlated errors within clusters. The third combines these two approaches for an even more conservative set of estimates. The fourth approach allows us to more directly account for local population size and urbanization.

**Matched cluster sampling** Our main individual-level analyses employ a the full sample of 11M+ soldiers, with cluster-level (birth location) exposure to repression. The clusters are geographic coordinates of soldiers’ birth locations. The sample of 11M represents roughly a third of all soldiers who served in the Red Army during WWII, and excluded records with missing information on birth locations as well as those born in other Soviet republics outside the RSFSR. We assume that this missingness is random, and that we can treat the 11M individuals as a simple random sample. Under simple random sampling, however (e.g. take sample of 11M troops from across all clusters), individuals from larger clusters are more likely to appear in the sample than those from small clusters. This is a problem because (a) treatment is assigned at the cluster level, and (b) cluster size is potentially correlated with treatment (i.e. more arrests occurred in higher-population areas). One way to address this issue is to adopt a pair-matched cluster sampling design, which selects pairs of clusters that are as similar to each other as possible on observable pre-treatment covariates, including cluster size (Imai et al., 2009).

Our sampling strategy is a variant of one-stage cluster sampling, where the primary sampling unit is the cluster, and the secondary sampling unit is the soldier.\(^{10}\) Let \( j \in \{1, \ldots, J\} \) index the \( J = 183,354 \) clusters (birth locations). Rather than sampling these clusters with equal probability, as in a standard cluster random sample, we select a subset \( J^{(m)} \), where \( J^{(m)}/2 \) of the clusters are “treated” (i.e. high level of repression) and another \( J^{(m)}/2 \) are “control” clusters (low repression) that are well-balanced on all ob-

---

\(^{10}\)In a one-stage cluster sample, all soldiers within the sampled clusters remain in the sample, regardless of cluster size. We also replicated our results with a two-stage cluster sampling design, in which soldiers within sampled clusters are sampled with equal probability. The two-stage approach ensures that cluster samples are of equal size, at the expense of a reduction in statistical power. Results were similar to one-stage cluster sampling, but more weakly powered, suggesting that the selection of clusters is much more consequential than secondary sampling of soldiers within clusters.
servable pre-treatment cluster-level covariates $X_j$.\textsuperscript{11} The covariates in $X_j$ include the same birth location-level covariates we use in our main analysis (distance to the nearest district administrative center, the number of collective farms and hectares of arable land within 10 km), along with cluster-level averages of local soldiers’ ethnicity (proportion Russian) and age (average birth date).\textsuperscript{12} We also matched exactly on grid cell and cluster size (quantile of number of draft records from location $j$). This last step ensures that within-cluster sample average treatment effects are uncorrelated with differences in cluster sizes within each matched-pair (Imai et al., 2009, p. 36).

Table A7.6: COVARIATE BALANCE STATISTICS, PRE- AND POST-MATCHING.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covariate</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Mean Treated</th>
<th>Mean Control</th>
<th>Std. Diff.</th>
<th>KS Statistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GRID ID</td>
<td>pre-matching</td>
<td>7913.627</td>
<td>7652.871</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.044**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>post-matching</td>
<td>8076.614</td>
<td>8076.614</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population quantile</td>
<td>pre-matching</td>
<td>2.469</td>
<td>2.421</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>post-matching</td>
<td>2.852</td>
<td>2.852</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Russian</td>
<td>pre-matching</td>
<td>0.869</td>
<td>0.864</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.014**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>post-matching</td>
<td>0.942</td>
<td>0.943</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of birth</td>
<td>pre-matching</td>
<td>1914.676</td>
<td>1914.752</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>0.018**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>post-matching</td>
<td>1915.091</td>
<td>1915.098</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cropland within 10km</td>
<td>pre-matching</td>
<td>1.486</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.139</td>
<td>0.077**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>post-matching</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.445</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>0.012’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State farms within 10km</td>
<td>pre-matching</td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.028**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>post-matching</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to district center</td>
<td>pre-matching</td>
<td>21.266</td>
<td>35.503</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>0.165**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>post-matching</td>
<td>18.15</td>
<td>19.799</td>
<td>-0.101</td>
<td>0.146**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to road junction</td>
<td>pre-matching</td>
<td>47.046</td>
<td>61.982</td>
<td>-0.426</td>
<td>0.07**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>post-matching</td>
<td>42.626</td>
<td>43.497</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.043**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables A7.7 and A7.6 report the number of clusters pre- and post-matching ($J$ vs. $J^{(m)}$) and corresponding covariate balance statistics. The matching procedure yielded a sample of 41,274 clusters, or 20,637 matched pairs. The procedure, by design, achieves perfect balance on grid cells and cluster size (population quantile). Balance on remaining covariates is also greatly improved, with all standardized differences falling below the conventional .25 threshold (Ho et al., 2007). Although these differences are numerically

\textsuperscript{11}Matching requires transforming our non-negative integer treatment variable (number of arrests) into a dichotomous indicator, where clusters above some threshold of arrests are “treated” and those below it are “control”. Because we are interested in local variation in repression, we allowed this threshold to vary by grid cell, such that locations above their grid cell median are “treated” and the rest are “control.” Changing this thresholding rule from “grid cell median” to “grid cell mean,” “regional median/mean” or “national median/mean” did not substantively change the results, apart from the matched sample size.

\textsuperscript{12}We used Mahalanobis distance matching for these covariates.
Table A7.7: cluster sample size.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Number of Clusters</th>
<th>Treated</th>
<th>Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pre-matching</td>
<td>186,999</td>
<td>79,794</td>
<td>107,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post-matching</td>
<td>41,272</td>
<td>20,636</td>
<td>20,636</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Treated (control) clusters are ones where the number of arrests is above (below) the grid cell median.

Small, bootstrapped kolmogorov-smirnov statistics are indicate some remaining imbalance on ethnicity and distances to district centers and roads. We address this imbalance by controlling for these and all other pre-treatment covariates in our analysis.

The top row of Table A7.8 reports individual-level analyses for the matched cluster sample. These results align closely with those we report in the main text.

Cluster-level analysis We may worry that conventional standard errors are downwardly biased due to the presence of correlated errors within clusters. In our main analyses, we address this issue by reporting robust clustered standard errors (RCSE). Here, we go one step further, by conducting an aggregate, cluster-level analysis, which addresses the issue of correlated disturbances by eliminating within-cluster variation altogether (Green and Vavreck, 2008).

Our aggregate analyses adopt the same core specification as our main OLS model (equation 3 in main text), replacing $y_{ij}$ with $\bar{y}_j$ (average of individual outcomes for cluster $j$), and $X_{ij}$ with $\bar{X}_j$ (cluster-level averages of pre-treatment covariates). Because cluster-level averages are more precisely estimated for clusters containing more individuals, we weighted each observation by cluster size.

The results of the cluster-level analyses are in the second row of Table A7.8. Estimates are substantively consistent with the individual-level results in the main text.

Matched cluster-level analysis The third row of Table A7.8 reports a more conservative set of estimates: an aggregate, cluster-level analysis that uses only the matched cluster pairs discussed above. Estimates align in direction and statistical with significance with those in our other analyses.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA/WIA</th>
<th>Flee</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>POW</th>
<th>DDT</th>
<th>PUN</th>
<th>Medals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>0.5 (0.1)**</td>
<td>-0.2 (0.1)'</td>
<td>-0.2 (0.1)**</td>
<td>0.1 (0.1)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.003)*</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.4 (0.1)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Y</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplaces</td>
<td>41,272</td>
<td>41,272</td>
<td>41,272</td>
<td>41,272</td>
<td>41,272</td>
<td>41,272</td>
<td>41,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gridcells</td>
<td>3,815</td>
<td>3,815</td>
<td>3,815</td>
<td>3,815</td>
<td>3,815</td>
<td>3,815</td>
<td>3,815</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>0.6 (0.1)**</td>
<td>-0.2 (0.1)**</td>
<td>-0.2 (0.1)**</td>
<td>-0.05 (0.05)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.002)**</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)*</td>
<td>-0.2 (0.04)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Y</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gridcells</td>
<td>12,176</td>
<td>12,176</td>
<td>12,176</td>
<td>12,176</td>
<td>12,176</td>
<td>12,176</td>
<td>12,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplaces</td>
<td>180,895</td>
<td>180,895</td>
<td>180,895</td>
<td>180,895</td>
<td>180,895</td>
<td>180,895</td>
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<td>Units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>0.6 (0.1)**</td>
<td>-0.1 (0.1)</td>
<td>-0.3 (0.1)**</td>
<td>0.1 (0.1)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.01)'</td>
<td>-0.3 (0.1)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Y</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gridcells</td>
<td>3,815</td>
<td>3,815</td>
<td>3,815</td>
<td>3,815</td>
<td>3,815</td>
<td>3,815</td>
<td>3,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplaces</td>
<td>41,272</td>
<td>41,272</td>
<td>41,272</td>
<td>41,272</td>
<td>41,272</td>
<td>41,272</td>
<td>41,272</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>1.3 (0.4)**</td>
<td>-0.6 (0.4)</td>
<td>-0.5 (0.2)*</td>
<td>-0.2 (0.4)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)*</td>
<td>0.02 (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.6 (0.2)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Y</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oblasts</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Districts</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcomes on percentage scale. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All models include regional fixed effects, and group averages of individual and birth location-level covariates. Observations weighted by number of soldiers. Significance levels (two-tailed): †p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

Table A7.8: Reanalysis with Alternative Samples and Units of Analysis (Full)
**District-level aggregate analysis** To more directly account for local population size and urbanization, we conducted aggregate analyses at the level of districts, which is the most fine-grained spatial unit for which 1926 Soviet census data are available \( (N = 403\), including \( N = 373\) within RSRFR’s 1937 borders). These analyses adopt the same OLS specification as our main models (equation 3), replacing \( y_{ij}\) with \( \bar{y}_j\) (average of individual outcomes for district \( j\)), and \( X_{ij}\) with \( \bar{X}_j\) (district-level averages of pre-treatment covariates). We further replaced grid-cell level fixed effects with regional (oblast) fixed effects, and added covariates for district population size (logged) and urbanization (percent residing in urban areas). Because district-level averages are more precisely estimated for areas with more individuals, we used population weights.

The results of the district-level analyses are in the bottom panel of Table A7.8. Estimates are substantively consistent with our individual-level and cluster-level results.

**A7.2. Measurement error due to incomplete records**

Another robustness check explores the possibility that measurement error due to incomplete records is driving our results. Table A7.9 replicates the earlier OLS and FRDD analyses on a restricted sample, which excludes individuals whose reasons for discharge are not observed. As the results show, after we drop the more ambiguous cases of draftees without observed terminal histories, the estimated coefficients are in the same direction as in our baseline specifications and they increase in absolute value, sometimes considerably. Results for wartime decorations and promotions are identical to those in the main paper because information for these variables comes from a separate set of archival materials, and does not require observing discharge records. These results indicate that – in most cases – measurement error is likely to bias our estimates downwards.

**A7.3. Alternative measure of initiative**

The results in Table 2 use a composite measure of initiative, which takes the value of 1 if a soldier received at least one of four valor decorations. A potential concern with this measure is that, because 17.5% of soldiers received at least one such medal, this variable is insufficiently selective to faithfully capture battlefield initiative. By way of a robustness test, we replicated our analyses with a more selective subset of decorations, focusing on the Order of Glory. This medal has the distinction of being highly prestigious — just 2.3% \( (N = 270, 473)\) of soldiers in our sample received one — but not so uncommon as to preclude credible estimation.\(^{13}\) The results, in Table A7.10, are consistent with those in the

\(^{13}\)By contrast, 9.3% of the soldiers in our sample \( (N = 1.1M)\) received the medal *For Courage*, 8.2% received *For Battle Merit* \( (N = 960, 734)\), and 0.05% received *Hero of the Soviet Union* \( (N = 5, 815)\). 2.5%
main text: soldiers more exposed to repression were less likely to receive this decoration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA/WIA</th>
<th>Flee</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>POW</th>
<th>DDT</th>
<th>PUN</th>
<th>Medals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coef. for Repression</td>
<td>0.7 (0.1)**</td>
<td>-0.8 (0.1)**</td>
<td>-0.6 (0.1)**</td>
<td>-0.2 (0.1)**</td>
<td>0.02 (0.005)**</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.01)*</td>
<td>-0.2 (0.1)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean Y</strong></td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplaces</td>
<td>156,022</td>
<td>156,022</td>
<td>156,022</td>
<td>156,022</td>
<td>156,022</td>
<td>156,022</td>
<td>180,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gridcells</td>
<td>11,540</td>
<td>11,540</td>
<td>11,540</td>
<td>11,540</td>
<td>11,540</td>
<td>11,540</td>
<td>12,176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                     |        |      |     |     |     |     |        |
| **Model**           |        |      |     |     |     |     |        |
| Coef. for Repression| 3.1 (0.8)** | -3.1 (0.8)** | -3.2 (0.8)** | 0.1 (0.4) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.2 (0.1)* | -0.9 (0.3)** |
| **Mean Y**          | 46.4   | 57.7 | 44.4 | 13.7 | 0.4 | 1.8 | 17     |
| Birthplaces         | 33,191 | 33,191 | 33,191 | 33,191 | 33,191 | 33,191 | 38,521 |
| Gridcells           | 2,005  | 2,005 | 2,005 | 2,005 | 2,005 | 2,005 | 2,094  |
| Soldiers            | 1,279,002 | 1,279,002 | 1,279,002 | 1,279,002 | 1,279,002 | 1,279,002 | 2,828,431 |

OLS and FRDD estimates. Outcomes on percentage scale (0 to 100). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by birth location and grid cell. All models include grid cell fixed effects, individual and birth location-level covariates. Observations weighted by record linkage probability. FRDD analyses exclude locations in non-matched regions and > 50km from regional borders. Significance levels (two-tailed): †p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

Table A7.9: Estimates for soldiers with observed discharge records.

A7.4. Estimates adjusting for unit and month fixed effects

Table A7.11 reports the full set of estimates for regressions that include fixed effects for the unit to which soldiers were assigned, and the month of the corresponding deployment.

received more than one decoration.
Table A7.10: REPRESSION AND ORDER OF GLORY DECORATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>FRDD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coef. for Repression</td>
<td>-0.1 (0.02)**</td>
<td>-0.3 (0.1)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Y</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Stage $F$</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcome = receiving an *Order of Glory (Orden Slavy)* decoration of first, second or third class, measured on percentage scale (0 to 100). See the note under Table 2 for the number of soldiers, birthplaces, grid cells, and other details. Significance levels (two-tailed): † $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

Table A7.11: ESTIMATES ADJUSTING FOR MILITARY UNIT AND MONTH (full).
A7.5. Subset analyses

Tables A7.12 and A7.13 report estimated effects of repression on KIA/WIA and medals, respectively, in the subset of soldiers who did not flee the battlefield. Among soldiers who did not flee, 26% eventually died or were wounded, and 23% received one of the four valor decorations. Within this subgroup, repression continued to have a positive effect on one’s probability of being KIA/WIA, and a negative effect on medals.

Tables A7.14 and A7.15 report additional estimated effects of repression on medals, now among subsets of soldiers who survived, and among soldiers who were KIA/WIA. Relatively few valor decorations were awarded posthumously, although this was not entirely uncommon: 6% of soldiers who were KIA/WIA received one of the four medals, compared to 21% among those who survived to the end of the war. In each case, estimated effects of repression continued to be negative, although these effects are more precisely estimated in the “no KIA/WIA” subset.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>FRDD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coef. for Repression</td>
<td>0.5 (0.1)**</td>
<td>2.1 (0.7)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Y</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Stage F</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplaces</td>
<td>153,893</td>
<td>32,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gridcells</td>
<td>10,419</td>
<td>1,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers</td>
<td>8,446,981</td>
<td>2,089,967</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcome = killed or wounded in action (KIA/WIA), conditional on not fleeing. Outcome measured on percentage scale (0 to 100). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by birth location and grid cell. All models include grid cell fixed effects, individual and birth location-level covariates. Observations weighted by record clustering probability. FRDD analyses exclude locations in non-matched regions and > 50km from regional borders. Significance levels (two-tailed): †p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

Table A7.12: Repression and Death/Injury (Conditional on Not Fleeing)

A7.6. Estimates with alternative bandwidths

Our main analyses measure exposure to repression as the logged number of arrests within a 10 km bandwidth of a soldier’s birth location. To assess the sensitivity of our results to this choice, Table A7.16 reports OLS coefficient estimates at alternative bandwidths from 1 to 20 km. For all bandwidths smaller than 10 km, estimates were consistent in sign and close in magnitude and precision to those at the 10 km baseline. For larger bandwidths, estimates remain mostly consistent in sign, but begin to attenuate and lose precision after
Table A7.13: Repression and Initiative (Conditional on Not Fleeing)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>FRDD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coef. for Repression</td>
<td>-0.2 (0.1)**</td>
<td>-0.6 (0.2)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Y</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Stage $F$</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplaces</td>
<td>170,593</td>
<td>36,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gridcells</td>
<td>11,859</td>
<td>2,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers</td>
<td>8,927,160</td>
<td>2,234,890</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcome = receiving at least one valor decoration (*For Battle Merit*, *For Courage*, *Order of Glory*, *Hero of Soviet Union*), conditional on not fleeing. See the note under Table A7.12 for the number of soldiers, birthplaces, and grid cells in each specification.

Table A7.14: Repression and Initiative (Conditional on Not KIA/WIA)

15 km. This attenuation pattern is not surprising, since larger bandwidths produce a smoother map with less local variation in the repression measure.14

A7.7. Local effect heterogeneity

As noted in the main text, the magnitude of our OLS coefficient estimates is consistently smaller than their FRDD counterparts. Potential explanations for these differences include measurement error (e.g. underestimation of arrests in places with generally higher K/WIA rates), and local effect heterogeneity (i.e. the impact of repression was stronger in areas closer to some regional borders). While it is difficult to quantify the influence of measurement error on estimation in this case, we are able to rule out at least one source of local effect heterogeneity. The locality of FRDD effect estimates is driven by a com-

---

14 As bandwidths become so large that individuals born in the same grid cell have nearly-identical numbers of arrests, virtually all variation in repression becomes cross-grid cell (captured by fixed effects) rather than within grid cells (captured by the repression exposure measure). Larger bandwidths therefore necessitate changes to model specification, with fixed effects for grid cells of larger size.
Outcome = receiving at least one valor decoration (For Battle Merit, For Courage, Order of Glory, Hero of Soviet Union), conditional on being KIA/WIA.

Table A7.15: Repression and Initiative (Conditional on KIA/WIA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KIA/WIA</th>
<th>Flee</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>POW</th>
<th>DDT</th>
<th>PUN</th>
<th>Medals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1km</td>
<td>0.7 (0.2)**</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.1)</td>
<td>-0.1 (0.1)</td>
<td>0.04 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.005 (0.002)**</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5km</td>
<td>0.3 (0.1)**</td>
<td>-0.2 (0.1)**</td>
<td>-0.2 (0.05)**</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.005 (0.001)**</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.01)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10km</td>
<td>0.4 (0.1)**</td>
<td>-0.1 (0.1)*</td>
<td>-0.1 (0.1)*</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.002)**</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15km</td>
<td>0.3 (0.1)**</td>
<td>-0.1 (0.1)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.1)</td>
<td>-0.1 (0.1)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20km</td>
<td>0.04 (0.1)</td>
<td>0.1 (0.1)</td>
<td>0.1 (0.1)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.1)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.003)</td>
<td>-5e-04 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See the notes under Table 2 for details. Significance levels (two-tailed): †p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

Table A7.16: Coefficient for Repression at Alternative Bandwidths (1–20 km).

A7.8. Estimates adjusting for peer effects

Soldiers’ choices to fight, flee, or show initiative may reflect not only their prewar experiences but also the backgrounds and actions of others in their unit. In this last analysis, to better understand the mechanisms behind our results, we examine the interdependence of the soldier-level outcomes within the units in which they served.

Following the econometric approach of Carrell, Sacerdote and West (2013), we esti-
Outcomes on percentage scale (0 to 100): killed or wounded in action (KIA/WIA); missing in action (MIA), becoming prisoner of war (POW), defecting, deserting, committing treason (DDT), being punished for battlefield misconduct (PUN), or any of the above (Flee); receiving a personal valor decoration (Medal). Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by birth location and grid cell. All models include grid cell fixed effects, individual and birth location-level covariates. Observations weighted by record linkage probability. FRDD sample excludes locations in non-matched regions and > 50 km from regional borders. Significance levels (two-tailed): \(^{1}p < 0.1; {^*}p < 0.05; {^{**}}p < 0.01.\)

**Table A7.17: OLS Analyses on Restricted Samples.**

mate the following equation:

\[
y_{it} = \gamma \cdot \text{Repression}_{j[i]} + \rho \cdot \bar{y}_{ut[-i]} + \zeta \cdot \text{Repression}_{ut[-i]} + \beta' \mathbf{X}_{ij} + s(\text{lon}_{j[i]}, \text{lat}_{j[i]}) + \text{Cell}_{k[i]} + \text{Unit}_{ut[i]} + \text{Month}_{t[i]} + \epsilon_{it},
\]

where \(\bar{y}_{ut[-i]}\) and \(\text{Repression}_{ut[-i]}\) are the average outcome and level of repression for soldier \(i\)'s peers in unit \(u\) and month \(t\) (calculated excluding soldier \(i\)); \(\rho\) and \(\zeta\) are the endogenous and exogenous peer effects, respectively (Manski, 1993). Our identifying assumption is that exogenous peer effects did not significantly impact combat motivation \((\zeta = 0)\). Essentially, we assume that soldiers had limited ways of learning about their peers' level of exposure to repression. This seems plausible because repression was a taboo topic and long-term bonds between soldiers — through which such information might pass — could not crystallize due to high turnover. Provided that \(\rho \neq 1\) and \(\gamma \neq 0\),

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>KIA/WIA</th>
<th>Flee</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>POW</th>
<th>DDT</th>
<th>PUN</th>
<th>Medals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coef. for Repression</td>
<td>0.4 (0.1)**</td>
<td>-0.1 (0.1)*</td>
<td>-0.1 (0.1)*</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.04)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.002)**</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.005)</td>
<td>-0.1 (0.02)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Y</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplaces</td>
<td>180,895</td>
<td>180,895</td>
<td>180,895</td>
<td>180,895</td>
<td>180,895</td>
<td>180,895</td>
<td>180,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gridcells</td>
<td>12,176</td>
<td>12,176</td>
<td>12,176</td>
<td>12,176</td>
<td>12,176</td>
<td>12,176</td>
<td>12,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers</td>
<td>11,351,164</td>
<td>11,351,164</td>
<td>11,351,164</td>
<td>11,351,164</td>
<td>11,351,164</td>
<td>11,351,164</td>
<td>11,351,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>FRDD sample</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coef. for Repression</td>
<td>0.5 (0.2)**</td>
<td>-0.1 (0.2)</td>
<td>-0.1 (0.1)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.1)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.005)**</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.1 (0.04)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Y</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplaces</td>
<td>38,521</td>
<td>38,521</td>
<td>38,521</td>
<td>38,521</td>
<td>38,521</td>
<td>38,521</td>
<td>38,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gridcells</td>
<td>2,094</td>
<td>2,094</td>
<td>2,094</td>
<td>2,094</td>
<td>2,094</td>
<td>2,094</td>
<td>2,094</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
we can solve for the reduced form equation, which can be estimated using OLS:

\[ y_{it} = \gamma \cdot \text{Repression}_{j[i]} + \psi \cdot \text{Repression}_{ut[-i]} + \beta' X_{ij} + s(\text{lon}_{j[i]}, \text{lat}_{j[i]}) + \text{Cell}_{k[i]} + \text{Unit}_{ut[i]} + \text{Month}_{v[i]} + \epsilon_{it} \]  

(11)

where \( \psi = \gamma \rho / (1 - \rho) \) is the reduced form peer effect.

The estimates are valid only if the assignment of soldiers to units with low versus high average levels of repression is exogenous. This assumption is plausible given the results in Table 4 and the pressures of general mobilization. Soviet mobilization plans left little room for accommodating the individual preferences of 30 million military-age males (i.e. no self-selection) or organizing unit composition on a dimension as obscure as exposure to repression. Unit assignment had some systematic components — reservists with prior training were sent to the front more quickly than untrained conscripts, military commissariats responsible for implementing the draft were organized by regional military district (most covering tens of thousands of square kilometers), and specialized units existed for soldiers with both exceptional skills (e.g. special forces) and disciplinary problems (e.g. penal units). However, these specialized units represented a tiny share of the army, and we can address the correlation of individual abilities through unit fixed effects. We can similarly account for geographic sorting with fixed effects for the grid cell of a soldier’s birth. Monthly fixed effects further account for common shocks due to seasonal variation and the changing dynamics of the war. In cases where the unit assignment was based on conscripts’ observable characteristics (e.g. age, ethnicity, class), controlling for these variables should eliminate the potential upward bias in estimated group coefficients.

Table A7.18 reports the estimated reduced form parameters, and the endogenous peer effects recovered from these estimates (\( \hat{\rho} = \hat{\psi} / (\hat{\psi} + \hat{\gamma}) \)). The coefficient estimate on individual exposure to repression (\( \hat{\gamma} \)) is consistent with our baseline: after controlling for the repression of a soldier’s peers from the same unit (and other covariates), a one-quartile increase in repression (0 to 32 arrests) raised one’s chances of death or injury by 0.7 percentage points and reduced the probability of medals by 0.4 points. With the potential exception of the aggregate flight index — which loses significance — our baseline individual-level estimates are robust to the inclusion of peer effects.

For all three outcomes, the endogenous peer effect estimate (\( \hat{\rho} \)) is positive and significant at the 95 percent confidence level, confirming that soldiers’ fortunes were positively correlated with those of others in their unit. If one’s unit took exceptionally high losses in a given month, an individual’s own chances of death or injury were considerably higher. A similar pattern was held for the probabilities of fleeing or receiving a medal. Soldiers’
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA/WIA</th>
<th>Flee</th>
<th>Medal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct individual effect ((\hat{\gamma}))</td>
<td>0.2 (0.03)**</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.1 (0.02)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced form peer effect ((\hat{\psi}))</td>
<td>0.5 (0.03)**</td>
<td>-0.1 (0.02)**</td>
<td>-0.2 (0.02)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endogenous effect ((\hat{\beta}))</td>
<td>0.8 (0.03)**</td>
<td>0.9 (0.2)**</td>
<td>0.7 (0.1)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Y</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gridcells</td>
<td>9,639</td>
<td>9,639</td>
<td>9,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplaces</td>
<td>127,872</td>
<td>127,872</td>
<td>127,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers</td>
<td>4,843,343</td>
<td>4,843,343</td>
<td>4,843,343</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcomes on percentage scale (0 to 100). Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. All models include grid cell, unit and month fixed effects, individual and birth location-level covariates. Observations weighted by record linkage probability. Sample includes disaggregated personnel records, with non-missing unit assignment and date information. Significance levels (two-tailed): \(\dagger p < 0.1; \ast p < 0.05; \ast\ast p < 0.01\).

Table A7.18: Estimates Adjusting for Peer Effects.

behavior — for better or worse — varied with the behavior of their comrades-in-arms. This indicates that repression may not only have impacted the individual behavior of soldiers who were exposed to it but also, indirectly, the behavior of their peers.

A7.9. Railway access as an instrumental variable

Even if repression is exogenous on a small geographic scale, OLS estimates may be attenuated due to errors in the measurement of repression through archival sources. To correct for this bias, we use two-stage least squares (2SLS) as an additional estimation strategy. This approach exploits the industrial scale of Stalin’s repression. Arrestees were transported to execution sites, prisons, and labor camps in large numbers and on short deadlines. This logistical burden fell mainly on railways (Kokurin and Petrov, 2000, 525). A third of the Great Terror’s operating budget was earmarked for rail transport fees (Getty and Naumov, 2002, 478).

Motivated by these facts, we use access to railways, measured as the distance from a birth location to the nearest railway station, as an instrument for repression. The idea here is that otherwise similar locations may be exposed to varying levels of repression due to differing costs of accessing and transporting arrestees. One concern with this instrument is that it may be capturing economic development and population density. All our 2SLS estimations include distance to the nearest administrative center and nearest road junction, which approximate local development and density more directly than railways. Indeed, the Soviet railway system was built not to help foster local economic development.
The estimated function \( \hat{f} \) with 95% confidence bounds relating railway access to repression, adjusted for geographic covariates and grid cell fixed effects. Vertical axis is on logarithmic scale.

**Figure A7.5: RAILWAY ACCESS AND REPRESSION**

or connect population centers, but to help access resource-rich areas (Hopper, 1930).

To test whether birthplaces with better railway access saw more repression, all else equal, we fit the following semi-parametric regression:

\[
\text{Repression}_j = \hat{f}(\text{Raildist}_j) + \beta' \mathbf{X}_j + \text{Cell}_{k[j]} + s(\text{lon}_j, \text{lat}_j) + \epsilon_j,
\]

where \( j \) indexes birth locations, \( \text{Raildist}_j \) is distance from location \( j \) to the nearest railway station, and \( \hat{f} \) is a smooth function approximated by cubic regression splines. As before, we add grid cell fixed effects, location level covariates, and a spatial spline. To ensure greater homogeneity, the 2SLS analyses use only locations within 100 km of rail stations.

Figure A7.5 shows a graph of the estimated function \( \hat{f} \). The expected number of repression victims declines precipitously with distance to rail stations, even after accounting for road density, distance to administrative centers, and other covariates. A 10km higher proximity to a railway station increases the number of victims by a factor of two.

Note that we estimate function \( f \) at the level of birth location, not individual soldier, because this is the level at which the relationship between railway access and repression operates. Specification (12) helps us find an optimal transformation \( f \) of \( \text{Raildist}_j \) that yields the strongest linear first stage relationship. In the 2SLS regression specified at the
level of a soldier, we use the variable \( \hat{f}(\text{Raildist}_{ij}) \) as the instrument. The first stage is

\[
\text{Repression}_{ij} = \alpha \cdot \hat{f}(\text{Raildist}_{ij}) + \beta' \mathbf{X}_{ij} + \text{Cell}_{k[j]} + s(\text{lon}_{j}, \text{lat}_{j}) + \epsilon_i, \tag{13}
\]

where \( \mathbf{X}_{ij} \) includes both location-level and soldier-level covariates. In the second stage, we regress wartime individual outcomes on the predicted values of repression from (13).

The exclusion restriction behind our 2SLS strategy is that railway access impacted the future behavior of soldiers only through repression, and not some other channel outside the included covariates. One reason to doubt this assumption is that railways played a key role in the war effort: the front stretched 2,900 km from the Baltic to the Caspian Sea and motorized vehicles could only support operations up to 400 km (Davie, 2017). However, only a small fraction of RSFSR’s railroad network fell inside areas of active military operations or behind German lines: 3.7% in an average month, and 16% cumulatively at any point in the war. The railway structure also changed significantly in 1941-1945, with 6,700 km of newly-built rail lines (Zickel, 1989, 552), which are not part of the instrument.

Another potential violation of the exclusion restriction has to do with railroads’ use in military mobilization. While almost all military-age males were drafted, it is possible that someone living near railways faced different battlefield conditions by virtue of being drafted in the chaotic early months of the war, when incentives to flee and the odds of being killed were highest. However, the proximity of one’s birthplace to railroads does not relate systematically to the timing of conscription, as we show in the next section.

**Railroad access and draft dates** The validity of the railroad instrument depends in part on the assumption that railroad access at individuals’ birth locations did not affect the battlefield conditions they faced upon being drafted. This assumption would be violated if, for instance, individuals living closer to railroads were drafted earlier in the war, during Germany’s summer offensive of 1941 or before Stalin issued orders for stricter troop discipline.

To assess the plausibility of this scenario, Figure A7.6 reports non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates of the proportion of soldiers drafted by each day in the war.\(^{15}\) The two curves correspond to soldiers born in locations with above- and below-median values of \( \hat{f}(\text{Raildist}_{j}) \), corresponding to \( \text{Raildist}_{j} = 45.6 \text{km} \). The two curves overlap almost perfectly until about mid-1942, at which point they slightly diverge, with soldiers born closer to railroads being less likely to have been drafted by any given date. The two lines converge yet again in 1945. The median draft dates of soldiers in the two groups were just

\[^{15}\text{This analysis includes only individuals drafted between June 22, 1941 and May 9, 1945, for whom draft dates are available, with time precision at the daily level (N = 5,924,878, or 51% of full sample).}\]
over a week apart – February 2, 1943 for soldiers born closer to railroads, and January 23, 1943 for those born further away. In sum, there is no evidence that the proximity of one’s birth location to railroads systematically affected the timing of one’s draft date.

**Figure A7.6: Kaplan-Meier Estimates of Cumulative Proportion Drafted.**

![Proportion drafted into Red Army against days since German invasion (June 22, 1941)](image)

**Results of 2SLS analyses**  Table A7.19 reports 2SLS estimates for all outcomes of interest. The results here are consistent with those from OLS and FRDD in Table 2 of the main text. Soldiers exposed to more repression due to increased railroad access were more likely to be killed or wounded, less likely to flee, but also less likely to receive a decoration for valor.

The relatively large magnitude of 2SLS estimates may indicate violations of the exclusion restriction. In the next section, we conduct sensitivity analyses to assess how large these violations must be to invalidate our results (*Conley, Hansen and Rossi, 2012*).

**Sensitivity analyses of the 2SLS exclusion restriction**  A key identifying assumption of our instrumental variable analyses is the exclusion restriction, which requires that our instrument (distance to nearest railroad) influence individual battlefield outcomes only through its effect on treatment (arrests). An especially concerning violation of this assumption would be one where – for some unobserved socio-economic, cultural or other reason – people living near railroads in 1937 were systematically more likely to die in battle, less likely to surrender or flee, and less likely to receive decorations. We now conduct an additional set of analyses to assess how severe possible violations of the exclusion
Outcomes on percentage scale (0 to 100). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by birth location and grid cell. All models include grid cell fixed effects, individual and birth location-level covariates. Observations weighted by record linkage probability. 2SLS analyses exclude birth locations >100km from railroad. Significance levels (two-tailed): †p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

Table A7.19: TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KIA/WIA</th>
<th>Flee</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>POW</th>
<th>DDT</th>
<th>PUN</th>
<th>Medals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>2SLS (First-stage $F = 99.1$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coef. for Repression</td>
<td>3.3 (0.6)**</td>
<td>-2.6 (0.5)**</td>
<td>-2.5 (0.4)**</td>
<td>0.03 (0.01)**</td>
<td>-0.1 (0.03)*</td>
<td>-2.2 (0.4)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean $Y$</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplaces</td>
<td>145,294</td>
<td>145,294</td>
<td>145,294</td>
<td>145,294</td>
<td>145,294</td>
<td>145,294</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gridcells</td>
<td>5,656</td>
<td>5,656</td>
<td>5,656</td>
<td>5,656</td>
<td>5,656</td>
<td>5,656</td>
<td>5,656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers</td>
<td>9,645,257</td>
<td>9,645,257</td>
<td>9,645,257</td>
<td>9,645,257</td>
<td>9,645,257</td>
<td>9,645,257</td>
<td>9,645,257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

restriction would need to be in order to overturn our 2SLS results. Following Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012), we model these potential violations with an extension of our main two-stage specification,

$$y_i = \zeta \cdot \hat{f}(\text{Raildist}_j) + \gamma \cdot \ln \left( \text{Repression}_{j[i]} + 1 \right) + \beta' X_{ij} + \text{Cell}_{k[i]} + s(\text{lon}_{j[i]}, \text{lat}_{j[i]}) + \epsilon_i$$

where $\hat{f}(\text{Raildist}_j)$ is the excluded (linearized) instrument, and $\zeta$ is a parameter capturing the size and direction of exclusion restriction violations. If there are no violations, $\zeta \equiv 0$.

Our sensitivity analysis employs Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012)'s union of confidence intervals approach, which estimates the maximum value $\zeta$ can take such that the $\gamma$ coefficient estimate remains statistically significant at the 95% level. Given a support region for $\zeta$, we draw a value $\zeta_0 \in \zeta$ and subtract $\zeta_0 \cdot \hat{f}(\text{Raildist}_j)$ from both sides of the second-stage equation:

$$\left(y_i - \zeta_0 \cdot \hat{f}(\text{Raildist}_j)\right) = \gamma \cdot \ln \left( \text{Repression}_{j[i]} + 1 \right) + \beta' X_{ij} + \text{Cell}_{k[i]} + s(\text{lon}_{j[i]}, \text{lat}_{j[i]}) + \epsilon_i$$

We then employ the usual asymptotic approximations to obtain a 95% confidence interval for $\hat{\gamma}$, assuming that $\zeta = \zeta_0$. We construct these intervals for all points in $\zeta = [-5, 5]$.

The sign of $\zeta$ determines whether violations of the exclusion restriction are more likely to attenuate or inflate estimates of $\gamma$. By construction, $\hat{f}(\text{Raildist}_j)$ is increasing in proximity to railroads (i.e. larger values indicate that a location is closer to the railroad). Exclu-
sion restriction violations are therefore more likely to attenuate \( \gamma \) if \( \zeta > 0 \) for KIA/WIA (meaning that individuals born closer to the railroad are more likely to die or become wounded), \( \zeta < 0 \) for MIA/POW/DDT/Punished and for medals (implying that those born closer to railroads are less likely to have these outcomes). If \( \zeta \) takes the opposite signs, then standard 2SLS regression underestimates the true effect of repression.

Table A7.20: 2SLS Sensitivity Analyses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>( \max(\zeta) )</th>
<th>( \hat{\gamma} ) at ( \max(\zeta) )</th>
<th>95% CI</th>
<th>( \zeta \cdot \hat{f} \left( \frac{sd(Z)}{2} \right) )</th>
<th>Mean ( Y )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KIA/WIA</td>
<td>1.467</td>
<td>1.048</td>
<td>(0.002, 2.093)</td>
<td>2.715</td>
<td>21.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flee</td>
<td>-1.156</td>
<td>-0.857</td>
<td>(-1.712, -0.003)</td>
<td>-2.139</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>-1.168</td>
<td>-0.689</td>
<td>(-1.376, -0.003)</td>
<td>-2.161</td>
<td>20.463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDT</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>(0.002, 0.042)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUN</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>(-0.103, -0.002)</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medal</td>
<td>-0.97</td>
<td>-0.714</td>
<td>(-1.428, -0.001)</td>
<td>-1.795</td>
<td>17.596</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2SLS estimates of repression’s effect (includes only results significant at 95% level in main analysis). Outcomes on percentage scale (0 to 100). Confidence intervals based on robust standard errors, clustered by birth location. All models include grid cell fixed effects, individual and birth location-level covariates. Observations weighted by record linkage probability.

Table A7.20 reports the results of these sensitivity analyses, including the maximum size \( \zeta \) can take while maintaining a significant estimate of \( \gamma \), along with the corresponding \( \gamma \) estimate and its 95% confidence region. Note that the table includes only those results, which we originally found to be significant at the 95% level in the main analyses. We also report the implied effect that a median-to-zero decrease in distance to railroad (38km to 0km) would have on \( y \) at each critical value of \( \zeta \).

In the case of KIA/WIA, for example, the critical value of \( \zeta \) is 1.5. In order to overturn the positive effect of repression on this outcome, a median-to-zero decrease in distance from the railroad would need to increase one’s chances of dying or becoming wounded by at least \( 1.5 \cdot \hat{f}(-38 \text{ km}) = 2.7 \text{ percent} \). The magnitude of this violation would therefore need to be quite substantial, considering that the mean value of KIA/WIA is 21.7 percent. These results suggest that – for most battlefield outcomes, and especially KIA/WIA, MIA and Glory Medals – the effect of repression is robust to reasonably-sized violations of the exclusion restriction. Other results, such as the odd positive coefficient for DDT, appear to be highly sensitive to these violations, with \( \zeta < .01 \).
A7.10. Expanded sample analysis: Ukrainian SSR

Table A7.21 replicates the analyses from Table 2 of the main text, using an expanded sample that includes soldiers from both RSFSR and UkrSSR. The results here are consistent with those we report in the main text. Soldiers exposed to more repression were more likely to be killed or wounded, less likely to flee the battlefield, but also less likely to receive a decoration for valor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>KIA/WIA</th>
<th>Flee</th>
<th>MIA</th>
<th>POW</th>
<th>DDT</th>
<th>PUN</th>
<th>Medals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coef. for Repression</td>
<td>0.2 (0.1)**</td>
<td>-0.1 (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.1 (0.03)**</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.002)′</td>
<td>2e-04 (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.3 (0.05)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Y</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplaces</td>
<td>201,221</td>
<td>201,221</td>
<td>201,221</td>
<td>201,221</td>
<td>201,221</td>
<td>201,221</td>
<td>201,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gridcells</td>
<td>12,257</td>
<td>12,257</td>
<td>12,257</td>
<td>12,257</td>
<td>12,257</td>
<td>12,257</td>
<td>12,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers</td>
<td>13,808,303</td>
<td>13,808,303</td>
<td>13,808,303</td>
<td>13,808,303</td>
<td>13,808,303</td>
<td>13,808,303</td>
<td>13,808,303</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>OLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coef. for Repression</td>
<td>1.2 (0.6)′</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Y</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthplaces</td>
<td>47,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gridcells</td>
<td>2,575</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outcomes on percentage scale (0 to 100). Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by birth location and grid cell. All models include grid cell fixed effects, individual and birth location-level covariates. Observations weighted by record linkage probability. FRDD analyses exclude locations in non-matched regions and >50km from regional borders. Significance levels (two-tailed): †p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.

Table A7.21: Reanalysis with Expanded Sample (RSFSR + UkrSSR).

A8. Qualitative evidence on discrimination

The current section considers qualitative evidence in favor and against the alternative interpretation that our findings reflect patterns of discrimination against soldiers from highly-repressed areas, rather than the effect of repression exposure on soldiers’ behavior.

A8.1. Information commanders had about subordinates

We begin by considering whether military commissariats and unit commanders had access to sufficient information to facilitate assignment discrimination — defined as the
selective assignment of soldiers from heavily repressed areas to specific units or tasks. This discrimination could conceivably be in either direction. If soldiers from repressed areas were assigned to more dangerous jobs, then this would help explain the positive association between repression exposure and battlefield deaths and injuries. If soldiers from these areas were assigned to rear duties, away from the frontline, this would help explain the negative association between repression exposure and flight.

In order for either type of assignment discrimination to take place, military commissariats (who assigned soldiers to units) and unit commanders (who assigned soldiers to tasks) would have needed information not only about soldiers’ personal backgrounds and arrest records, but also contextual information about political arrests in the vicinity of each soldier’s birth. This is because our treatment variable captures local geographic exposure to the terror, rather than individual experiences with the secret police.

The documents in Figures A8.7, A8.8 and A8.9 show examples of a soldier’s Service Record Card File (sourced from the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense), which were initially created by military commissariats during enlistment and used by unit commanders throughout soldiers’ service period. The documents illustrate that military authorities had information about soldiers’ personal backgrounds (date and place of birth, nationality, social and marital status, education, place of conscription, awards, party and military registration cards), as well as indicators of political loyalty like party membership, service in the counter-revolutionary White Army during the Civil War, and “foreign connections.” The scope of this information is similar to — in some respects, narrower than — that used for background checks and security clearance investigations in Western militaries and security agencies. This information would have been sufficient as a basis for discrimination based on individual characteristics and background. However, what these documents do not contain is information on the political loyalties or arrest records of other citizens residing near the soldier’s birthplace — the type of contextual information that would have been necessary for authorities to discriminate on the basis of the local environment in which a soldier had been born and raised.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Figure A8.7: SERVICE RECORD CASE FILE (EXAMPLE 1)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Comrade:** Korotkov Vasiliy Antipovich  
**In Red Army since:** July 1941  
**Current post and rank:** T-34 tank platoon commander, lieutenant  
**Decorations:**  
**Social status, profession and background (parents’ details):** from a peasant family  
**Year and place of birth, nationality:** year 1921, Stalingrad province, Kalachevsky district, Motovskiy locality, Motovskiy hamlet, Kalachevsky Russian  
**Education - a) general:** mechanical-technical in 1941  
**b) military:** Pushkin Tank School in 1942  
**VKP(b) [Communist party] membership start date:** since 1939, Communist card number: 5568846  
**Withdrawal from VKP(b), when and why:** no withdrawal  
**Membership in other parties, which ones, when:** no membership  
**History of political dithering (what kind and when), party disciplinary actions (what kind and what for):** no political dithering or party disciplinary actions  
**Party political assessment:**  
**Performance review:**  
**Service in old [Tsarist] army (time, post, rank):** no service  
**Service in White Army, captivity, place of deployment (when, where, in what capacity):** never served in the White Army, never was in captivity, and never was deployed in the indicated territories  
**Foreign connections:** no foreign connections  
**Participation in civil war and subsequent military operations in defense of USSR after civil war (when, where, in what capacity):** since February 1943, served as the commander of T-34 tank platoon  
**Injuries and contusions, where and when:** none
Surname, first name, patronymic: Kononov Ivan Nikitovich

DOB: April 2, 1906

Nationality: Russian

VKP(b) [Communist party] membership start date: since 1929, Communist card number: 1036784

Membership in other parties: no membership

Change of party membership: none

Social status and background: worker from a family of workers

Profession (specialty): --

Marital status: married

General education: self-educated

Military education - a) in old [Tsarist] army: none

b) in Red Army: Cavalry School in 1927. The main department of the Military Academy of the Red Army named after Frunze with a diploma of the first degree in 1938

Party education: none

Military rank, year, order no: major, 1938, Order No 1542

Presence in campaigns (where and against whom: not participated

Injuries and contusions: none

Honorary-revolutionary awards: none (Order of Red Banner in 1940)

Upshot of the Performance Review of 1938 and party political assessment: Quite relevant for the position. He may be assigned to combat work to hold the position of a Commander of a Cavalry Regiment, and after receiving appropriate practice, he may make a suitable assistant to the Commander of a Cavalry Division. Loyal to the work of the Lenin-Stalin's party and to the Socialist Motherland. Politically and morally stable. Politically well-literate. He takes an active part in the life of the party organization.

Home address: --

Service in old [Tsarist] army: no service

Service in White Army or other foreign armies: no service

Special notes: no party disciplinary actions
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Last name, first name, patronymic: Sonov Anastas Nikolaevich</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DOB: 15 March, 1919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality: Greek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign languages: Russian and Azerbaijani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of birth: Georgian SSR, Dmaliss district (Bashkichet), Demirbulag village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social status and background: worker from a family of peasants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VKP(b) [Communist party] membership start date: no party membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership in other parties: no membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change of party membership or party disciplinary action: none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General education: until 5th grade in 1936 in Akbulak district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military education: Cavalry School of Voronezh in October 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party education: none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military rank, year, order no: major, 1938, Order No 1542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service in old [Tsarist] army: no service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service in White Army or other foreign armies: no service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoner of war status: no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military rank, year: lieutenant, 20.08.1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence in campaigns (where and against whom): for the liberation of Bessarabia in 18.04.1942 and Great Patriotic War in 22.06.1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounds or shell shocks: light wound to the head in 12.02.1942 and heavily wounded with a bullet to the right thigh and shoulder in 22.01.1944 in the second Ukrainian front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awards (orders and medals): Order of Red Banner in 24.10.1943 and Medal for the Defense of Stalingrad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status and Address of the family: married, father - Nikolay Inanovich, lives in Georgian SSR, Akbulak district, Alekseevka village</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A8.2. Provision of arms and ammunition to units

We now take a closer look at variation in equipment quality and supplies across the Red Army and over time. As we show below, using evidence from Soviet archives, there was significant geographic and temporal variation in the supply of arms and ammunition to the front — due largely to the pace and location of major military operations — but few signs of systematic discrimination across operational units.\(^{16}\)

Political authorities in Moscow had approval authority over the distribution of materiel across Fronts — the largest military formations in the Red Army, comprising three to five armies each — but little visibility over its subsequent distribution across armies, divisions, regiments and battalions.\(^{17}\) The Rear Services sections overseeing supply and maintenance across these operational-level units had neither the discretionary authority, nor the information needed to selectively withhold support from specific units on the basis of (average) pre-war repression levels. While it is certainly possible that some units were nonetheless chronically under-supplied — by design or by accident — the resulting variation can be captured with unit-level fixed effects.

**Process and Procedures of Provision.** Every month, the General Staff issued a directive, which indicated which Front, in which sequence and on which date would receive ammunition of a certain amount. On the basis of these instructions, along with “report cards” and application documents from the Fronts, the Main Artillery Directorate (GAU) planned to send ammunition to the troops of the active army. The main sources of variation included supply availability at central bases and warehouses, industrial production capacity, and the security and needs of the Fronts. When the GAU did not have the necessary resources, it, in agreement with the General Staff, made adjustments to the established volume of ammunition supply to prioritize the support of frontline units that needed additional ammunition. The monthly supply plan would be considered and signed by the Commander of Artillery of the Soviet Army and the Chief of the GAU, and submitted to the Supreme Commander (Stalin) for approval.

On the basis of this plan, the organizational and planning department of the GAU reported data on the release and dispatch of ammunition to the Fronts and gave orders to the Ammunition Supply Department. The latter, together with the Central Administration of Military Communications (TsUPVOSO), prepared the shipments within five days and informed the Fronts of the transport numbers, locations and dates of their dispatch.

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\(^{16}\) All of the official figures and statistics listed in this section are from (Kurkotkin, 1975).

\(^{17}\) Front-level logistics reports rarely mentioned units below the army level (e.g., Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (TsAMO RF), collection 240, series 2824, case 1, page 37-58).
As a rule, the dispatch of transports with ammunition to the Fronts began on the 5th and ended on the 25th of each month. This method of planning and sending ammunition to the Fronts from the central bases and warehouses remained until the end of the war.

The issues of planning, organizing and implementing rail and water transportation and restoring and blocking railway communications were managed by the Military Communications Department of the Soviet Army, subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff. The headquarters of the military districts (Fronts) and armies had departments of military communications directly subordinate to the chief of staff. The management of military automobile (highway and dirt) roads, the organization and implementation of the supply of materiel to the troops by automobile and horse-drawn vehicles were concentrated in the rear departments. The corresponding heads of the armed forces and services were responsible for the supply of troops with materiel, technical, medical and veterinary support. The Deputy (Assistant) Chief of Staff for Logistics was tasked with directing the work of the chiefs of the military branches and services for providing and servicing the troops. The supply of troops with materiel in peacetime was carried out according to the scheme: center - district - division - unit. The presence of a divisional link in the supply scheme made it possible in the event of war to quickly switch to the supply scheme center - front - army - division - unit.

**Maintenance of Weapons** The choice of specific maintenance methods and procedures depended on the nature of the operations being carried out, their scope, the pace of the advance of the troops, and the availability of forces and means for the restoration of armored vehicles. Starting in the second half of the war, the basic principle of organizing and implementing the technical support of troops relied on bringing repair and evacuation teams from rear areas as close as possible to the frontlines. These teams evacuated broken-down armored equipment and machinery to the collection points of emergency vehicles, which were organized in areas with the largest accumulation of broken military and transport equipment.

Although repair facilities were often located in rear areas, frontline repair centers did exist. Usually, these repair centers comprised two separate tank repair battalions, with three or four mobile tank repair bases, evacuation facilities (one or two evacuators and an evacuation squad), assembly points for emergency vehicles, assembly and distribution points for the dismantling of irrecoverably damaged tanks, and mobile repair and assembly points. In the event that the Front advanced in two separate directions, two frontline repair centers would be created. To ensure the rapid and efficient repair of armored vehicles in conditions of high operational tempo, all repair and evacuation centers remained
under rigid centralized control.

**Temporal and Spatial Variation in Provision of Arms to Frontline Units**

*First period.* In the first weeks of the Great Patriotic War (June-July 1941), the Soviet army suffered significant losses of weapons and ammunition, particularly the stockpiles accumulated by border military districts in the prewar years. The supply of arms and ammunition by military factories in the south of the country effectively ceased, as most artillery and munitions factories were evacuated from threatened areas (e.g. the Donbas) to locations east of the Urals. These developments greatly complicated the production of weapons and ammunition, and their provision to the army and new military formations.

Bureaucratic shortcomings also negatively impacted the resupply of troops. The GAU did not always accurately know the state of security of the troops at the front, and strict accounting standards for this service had not been established before the war. Authorities completely reorganized the GAU in late 1941, formed a new Directorate for the Supply of Ground Artillery Weapons, created a new post of Chief of Logistics of the Soviet Army, and introduced urgent reports on ammunition and weapons systems. This reorganization facilitated closer cooperation between the GAU, other supply services, and the Central Directorate of Military Communications.

In the second half of 1941, as the national economy moved onto a war footing and as more assembly line workers, scientists, engineers and technicians joined the labor force, the Soviet military industry was able to increase weapons production. This included 30,200 guns (including 9,900 76-mm and larger caliber), 42,300 mortars (including 19,100 82-mm caliber and larger), 106,200 machine guns, 89,700 assault rifles, 1.6 million rifles and carbines, and 62.9 million shells, bombs and mines. Yet since these delivery of weapons and ammunition only partially covered the losses of 1941, the supply situation remained tense. It took a huge effort by the military industry, rear services, and the GAU to satisfy the needs of the Fronts in weapons and especially ammunition. By December 1941, the availability of armaments on the Western Front increased from 50-80% of initial stockpiles to 370-640% for some weapon types.

In the second quarter of 1942, after the start of operations in additional military factories, especially in the Urals, Western and Eastern Siberia, and Kazakhstan, the supply of troops with weapons and ammunition began to noticeably improve. Overall, in 1942, the military industry supplied the front with tens of thousands of guns of 76 mm and larger caliber, over 100,000 mortars (82-120 mm), and millions of shells and mines. That year, the main and most difficult task was to provide weapons for units operating in the Stalingrad region, in the large bend of the Don and in the Caucasus.
The consumption of ammunition in the defensive battle near Stalingrad was very high. Due to a huge volume of rail traffic, transports with ammunition moved slowly and were unloaded at the stations of the frontline railway section (Elton, Dzhanybek, Kaisatskaya, Krasny Kut). To deliver ammunition to the troops faster, the Stalingrad Front Artillery Supply Directorate was assigned two automobile battalions, which managed to transport over 500 wagons of ammunition in an extremely limited time frame.

The provision of weapons and ammunition to the Stalingrad Front was further complicated by Germany’s continuous bombardment of supply dumps and river crossings on the Volga. As a result of enemy air raids and shelling, artillery depots often had to change their locations, and trains were unloaded only at night. To disperse supply trains, ammunition was sent to army warehouses and their departments near the railway in quick service trains, 5-10 wagons each, and then to the troops in small automobile columns (10-12 cars each), usually following different routes. This method of transportation ensured the safety of ammunition, but also lengthened the time needed for delivery.

The supply of arms and ammunition to Fronts operating in the Volga and Don regions during this period was less complicated and laborious. During the defensive battle near Stalingrad, all three Fronts (Stalingrad, Don, and South-West) received 5,388 wagons of ammunition, 123,000 rifles and assault rifles, 53,000 machine guns, and 8,000 guns.

Simultaneously with the fighting that unfolded on the banks of the Volga and in the steppes of the Don, the battle for the Caucasus began in a vast area from the Black Sea to the Caspian. Supplying the Transcaucasian Front (Northern and Black Sea Groups) with weapons and ammunition was more complicated than near Stalingrad. The supply of weapons and ammunition proceeded in a roundabout way, from the Urals and Siberia through Central Asia and across the Caspian Sea. Separate transports went through Astrakhan, Baku and Makhachkala. A long route for transports with ammunition (5170-5370 km) and the need for repeated transshipment of goods from rail to water, water to rail, and rail to road and mountain passes, greatly increased delivery times to frontline and army warehouses. For example, transport No. 83/0418, sent on September 1, 1942 from the Urals to the Transcaucasian Front, arrived at its destination only on December 1. Transport No. 83/0334 traveled from Eastern Siberia to Transcaucasia via a 7027 km distance. Despite huge distances and delays, transports with ammunition regularly went to the Caucasus. During six months of hostilities, the Transcaucasian Front received about 2,000 wagons of ammunition.

It was very difficult to deliver ammunition from front and army warehouses to troops defending the mountain passes of the Caucasus Range. The main means of transportation here were army and military pack companies. In the 20th Guards Rifle Division, which
was defending the Belorechensk direction, shells were delivered from Sukhumi to Sochi by sea, then to the divisional warehouse by road, and to regimental combat nutrition points by pack transport. For the 394th Infantry Division, ammunition was delivered by U-2 aircraft from the Sukhumi airfield. Ammunition was delivered in this way for almost all divisions of the 46th Army.

There was some locally-based production in the Caucasus region. Up to 30 heavy machinery plants and workshops in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia were involved in the manufacture of hand grenades, mines and shells of medium caliber. From October 1, 1942 to March 1, 1943, they manufactured 1.3 million cases of hand grenades, 1 million mines and 226 thousand cases of shells. In 1942, the local industry of Transcaucasia manufactured 4,294 50-mm mortars, 688 82-mm mortars, and 46,492 machine guns.

The delivery of arms and ammunition to the besieged city of Leningrad was extremely difficult, which increased reliance on local production. From September until the end of 1941, the city’s industrial complex provided the Leningrad Front with 12,085 assault rifles and signal pistols, 7,682 mortars, 2,298 artillery pieces and 41 rocket launchers. In addition, they produced 3.2 million shells and mines, over 5 million hand grenades. Leningrad supplied weapons to other Fronts as well. As the Germans were advancing toward Moscow in November 1941, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front sent 926 mortars and 431 76-mm regimental guns to Moscow. Disassembled guns were loaded onto aircraft and sent to the Cherepovets station, where an artillery shop assembled them, and loaded them onto trains headed for Moscow. In the same period, Leningrad sent 39,700 rounds of 76-mm armor-piercing ammunition to Moscow by air.

Second period. Provision of the army with weapons and ammunition remained difficult in the second period of the war, which began with a powerful Soviet counteroffensive near Stalingrad in November 1942. By the beginning of the counteroffensive, the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad Fronts had 30,400 guns and mortars, including 16,755 units of 76 mm caliber and above, about 6 million shells and mines, 380 million rounds of ammunition for small arms, and 1.2 million hand grenades. There was a continuous supply of ammunition from GAU warehouses for the duration of the counteroffensive. From November 19, 1942 to January 1, 1943, the Stalingrad Front received 1,095 wagons of ammunition, the Don Front (from November 16, 1942 to February 2, 1943) – 1,460 wagons, the South-West (from November 19, 1942 to January 1, 1942) – 1090 cars and the Voronezh Front (from December 15, 1942 to January 1, 1943) – 278 cars. Between November 1942 and January 1943, the four Fronts received 3,923 carloads of ammunition.

Total consumption of ammunition in the Battle of Stalingrad, starting from July 12, 1942, reached 9539 wagons and was unparalleled in the history of warfare. This amounted
to a third of the ammunition consumption of the entire Russian army during the First World War and twice the consumption of ammunition by both sides near Verdun.

Table A8.22: INCREASE IN WEAPONRY SUPPLY BETWEEN 1942-1943.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in thousands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>2113,6</td>
<td>3151,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault rifles</td>
<td>54,3</td>
<td>556,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Guns (light and medium)</td>
<td>54,3</td>
<td>123,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>10,5</td>
<td>57,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns of all calibers</td>
<td>13,2</td>
<td>42,7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The volume of deliveries of weapons and ammunition increased again during preparations for the Battle of Kursk. The large concentration of weapons and troops on the Kursk Bulge, and the intensity of hostilities in the planned offensive operations, required an increase in supply. Between March and July of 1943, GAU warehouses supplied the Fronts with more than a half million rifles, 31.6 thousand light and medium machine guns, 520 heavy machine guns, 21.8 thousand anti-tank rifles, 12,326 guns and mortars. In April-June 1943, the Central, Voronezh and Bryansk Fronts received over 4.2 million shells and mines, about 300 million rounds of small arms ammunition and almost 2 million hand grenades (over 4 thousand wagons). During the battle itself, the Fronts received another 4,781 wagons (over 119 full-weight trains) of various types of ammunition from central bases and warehouses. The average daily supply was 51 wagons to the Central Front, 72 wagons to the Voronezh Front, and to 31 wagons to the Bryansk Front.

Third period. In the final period of the war, after the Soviet victory in Kursk in August 1943, the supply situation improved significantly. The bases and warehouses of the GAU had accumulated significant stocks of guns, mortars, and especially small arms — permitting a slight decrease in the production of small arms and ground artillery guns. If in 1943 the military industry supplied the Soviet Army with 130,300 guns, this number declined to 122,500 thousand in 1944. Deliveries of rocket launchers also decreased (from 3,330 in 1943 to 2,564 in 1944). The production of tanks and self-propelled guns continued to grow (29,000 in 1944 against 24,000 in 1943).

Due to high consumption, the supply of ammunition continued to be tight, especially for shells of 122 mm caliber and above. Total stocks of these munitions had decreased by 670,000 for 122-mm rounds, by 1.2 million for 152-mm shells and by 172,000 for 203-mm shells. Given the scarcity of shells on the eve of decisive offensive operations, the Politburo and the State Defense Committee tasked the military industry with radically increased production targets for all types of ammunition in 1944. Following this decision,
the production of ammunition significantly increased compared to 1943: especially 122-
mm and 152-mm shells, but also 76-mm (by 3,064 thousand, 9%), M-13 (by 385,500, 19%),
and M-31 shells (by 15,200, 4%). This made it possible to provide Soviet troops with all
types of ammunition for offensive operations.

On the eve of the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky offensive operation, the First and Second
Ukrainian Fronts had about 50,000 guns and mortars, 2 million rifles and assault rifles,
10,000 machine guns, 12.2 million shells and mines, 700 million ammunition for small
arms and 5 million hand grenades. During the operation, these Fronts received more
than 1,300 wagons of all types of ammunition, with no interruptions in supply. How-
ever, due to the early spring thaw on military roads and supply routes, the movement of
road transport became impossible, and the Fronts began to experience great difficulties in
transporting ammunition to the troops and to artillery firing positions.

To provide ammunition for tank formations of the 1st Ukrainian Front, advancing in
the operational depth of the Germans’ defense, the state resorted to using of Po-2 aircrafts.
On February 7 and 8, 1944, from the Fursy airfield, the state delivered 4.5 million rounds
of ammunition, 5.5 thousand hand grenades, 15 thousand 82- and 120-mm mines and 10
thousand 76- and 122 mm shells. Every day, 80-85 aircraft delivered ammunition to tank
units, making three to four flights a day. In total, the First Ukrainian Front received more
than 400 tons of ammunition by aircraft.

The preparation and conduct of the Belarusian offensive operation, one of the largest
strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War, required a huge amount of weapons and
ammunition. Between May and July 1944, 6,370 guns and mortars, over 10,000 machine
guns and 260,000 rifles were supplied to fully equip the troops of the First Baltic, First, Sec-
ond and Third Belorussian Fronts. Such a high supply of ammunition had no precedent
in previous offensive operations on a strategic scale. To send weapons and ammunition
to the Fronts, the bases, warehouses and arsenals of the People’s Commissariat of De-
fense (NKO) operated at maximum capacity. However, during the Belarusian operation,
a rapid separation of troops from their bases, the wooded and swampy terrain, off-road
conditions, and slow rates of restoration of damaged railway communications, compli-
cated the supply of ammunition. Road transport was under great pressure, and could not
by itself cope with the huge volume of supplies coming from the rear.

The dispersion of ammunition stocks along the frontline and in depth also had a nega-
tive effect. For example, on August 1, 1944, two warehouses of the 5th Army of the Third
Belorussian Front were located at six points at a distance of 60 to 650 km from the front-
line. Several armies in the Second and First Belorussian Fronts faced a similar situation.
The advancing units could not carry all the stocks of ammunition they had accumulated
during the preparation of the operation. The military councils of the Fronts and armies allocated a large number of motor vehicles to collect and deliver the ammunition that remained in the rear. For example, the Military Council of the Third Belorussian Front allocated 150 vehicles for this purpose, and the Head of Logistics of the 50th Army of the Second Belorussian Front allocated 60 vehicles and a working company of 120 people. By the end of July 1944, ammunition stocks were located at 85 different points for the Second Belorussian Front’s, and at 100 points for the First Belorussian Front. The command was forced to transfer them by aircraft.

The consumption of ammunition in the Lvov-Sandomierz and Brest-Lublin offensive operations was also significant. During July and August, the First Ukrainian Front used up 4,706 wagons of ammunition, and the First Belorussian Front expended 2,372 wagons of ammunition. As in the Belarusian operation, the supply of ammunition was fraught with serious difficulties due to the high pace of advance, the large separation from artillery depots, poor road conditions, and the large volume of supplies on roadways.

During the offensive operations of 1945, there were no particular difficulties in providing the troops with weapons and ammunition. As of January 1, 1945, the total stocks of ammunition increased as compared to 1944: for mines – by 54%, for anti-aircraft artillery shells – by 35%, for ground artillery shells – by 11%. Thus, in the final period of the war between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, not only were the needs of the troops of the active army fully met, but it was also possible to create additional stocks of ammunition in front and army warehouses.

The beginning of 1945 was marked by two major offensive operations — East Prussian and Vistula-Oder. Troops were fully provided with weapons and ammunition during their preparations, and the presence of a well-developed network of railways and highways alleviated serious supply difficulties during the battles. The East Prussian operation, which lasted about three months, saw the largest consumption of ammunition in the entire Great Patriotic War. During its course, the troops of the Second and Third Belorussian Fronts used 15,038 wagons of ammunition (5,382 wagons in Vistula-Oder).

In terms of the pace and intensity of the supply effort, the Berlin offensive operation surpassed all offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. During preparations, the First Belorussian and First Ukrainian Fronts received over 2,000 guns and mortars, almost 11 million shells and mines, over 292.3 million cartridges and about 1.5 million hand grenades. By the beginning of the operation, they had over 2 million rifles and assault rifles, over 76,000 machine guns and 48,000 other guns and mortars. From April 16 to May 8, 1945, 7.2 million (5,924 wagons) of shells and mines were delivered to the Fronts, which (taking into account stocks) fully covered their needs and made it possible to create
a reserve of them by the end of the operation.

In general, the supply of ammunition to the front in 1945 significantly exceeded the level of previous years of the Great Patriotic War. In the fourth quarter of 1944, 31,736 wagons of ammunition (793 trains) arrived at the front, compared to 44,041 wagons (1,101 trains) in the first four months of 1945.

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