VOTING FOR DEMOCRACY: CHILE'S *PLEBISCITO* AND THE ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION OF A GENERATION

Online Appendix

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
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Appendix

A Tables and Figures

Figure A.1: Effect of Plebiscite Eligibility on Downstream Election Turnout: Placebo Cutoffs

(a) 2013 Election

(b) 2016 Election

(c) 2017 Election

Note: Figure A.1 shows the estimated effect of plebiscite eligibility on turnout in the 2013 and 2017 Presidential elections and in the 2016 municipal election (equation (2) using placebo cutoffs within a three-year window on either side of the cutoff. The estimated effect in the main specification follows from estimates of equation (1), using a one-sided eight-week donut hole specification for plebiscite eligibles. The vertical lines in each exhibit represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A.2: Effects of Plebiscite Eligibility on Downstream Electoral Turnout: Robustness to Bandwidth Selection

Effect of Plebiscite Eligibility on 2013 Election Turnout

Effect of Plebiscite Eligibility on 2016 Election Turnout


Effect of Plebiscite Eligibility on 2017 Election Turnout

Note: Figure A.2 shows the estimated impacts of plebiscite eligibility on turnout in the 2013, 2017 Presidential and 2016 municipal elections across the eligibility cut-off in bandwidths ranging from three weeks to one year. The results follow from a linear first-stage specification presented in equation (1) using a one-sided eight-week donut hole specification for plebiscite eligibles.

Figure A.3: Differences in 2013 Election Turnout Rates Across Eligibility Cutoff in Various Elections

(a) 1989 Election

(b) 1993 Election

(c) 1999 Election

(d) 2005 Election

(e) 2009 Election

Note: Figure A.3 shows graphical evidence of differences in 2013 Presidential election turnout rates in a linear specification across the eligibility cut-off (26-week bandwidth) in the 1989, 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009 Presidential elections. The estimated coefficients and standard errors follow from estimates of equation (2) for each upstream election on 2013 electoral turnout rates.

Figure A.4: Differences in 2016 Election Turnout Rates Across Eligibility Cutoff in Various Elections

(a) 1989 Election

(b) 1993 Election

(c) 1999 Election

(d) 2005 Election

(e) 2009 Election

Note: Figure A.4 shows graphical evidence of differences in 2016 municipal election turnout rates in a linear specification across the eligibility cut-off (26-week bandwidth) in the 1989, 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009 Presidential elections. The estimated coefficients and standard errors follow from estimates of equation (2) for each upstream election on 2016 electoral turnout rates.

Figure A.5: Differences in 2017 Election Turnout Rates Across Eligibility Cutoff in Various Elections

(a) 1989 Election

(b) 1993 Election

(c) 1999 Election

**(d)** 2005 Election

(e) 2009 Election


Note: Figure A.5 shows graphical evidence of differences in 2017 Presidential election turnout rates in a linear specification across the eligibility cut-off (26-week bandwidth) in the 1989, 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009 Presidential elections. The estimated coefficients and standard errors follow from estimates of equation (2) for each upstream election on 2017 electoral turnout rates.

Figure A.6: Differences in 2013 and 2017 Election Turnout Rates Across Upstream Cutoffs

(a) 1970 Election on 2013 Turnout

(b) 1970 Election on 2017 Turnout

(c) 1973 Election on 2013 Turnout

(d) 1973 Election on 2017 Turnout

(e) 1980 Referendum on 2013 Turnout

(f) 1980 Referendum on 2017 Turnout

Note: Figure A.6 shows graphical evidence of differences in 2013 and 2017 Presidential election turnout rates across the date of the respective upstream elections/referendum in a linear specification using a 26-week bandwidth. We use the date of the 1970, 1973 elections and the 1980 referendum as a proxy for age-18 eligibility, as we do not observe the exact eligibility rules for these elections. The estimated coefficients and standard errors follow from estimates of equation (2) for each upstream election/plebiscite on downstream electoral turnout rates.

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Figure A.7: Effects of plebiscite Participation on Downstream Electoral Turnout: Robustness to Bandwidth Selection

Effect of Plebiscite Participation on 2013 Election Turnout

Effect of Plebiscite Participation on 2016 Election Turnout

Effect of Plebiscite Participation on 2017 Election Turnout

Note: Figure A.7 shows the estimated impacts of plebiscite participation on turnout in the 2013, 2017 Presidential and 2016 municipal elections across the eligibility cut-off in bandwidths ranging from three weeks to one year. The results follow from a linear first-stage specification presented in equation (1) using a one-sided eight-week donut hole specification for plebiscite eligibles and the empirical strategy introduced in equation (4).

Figure A.8: Downstream Election Turnout Effects of Plebiscite Eligibility by Gender

(a) 2013 Election Turnout: Females

(b) 2013 Election Turnout: Males

(c) 2016 Election Turnout: Females

(d) 2016 Election Turnout: Males

(e) 2017 Election Turnout: Females

(f) 2017 Election Turnout: Males

Note: Figure A.8 shows graphical evidence of differences in 2013, 2017 Presidential and 2016 municipal election turnout rates across the eligibility cut-off (26-week bandwidth) in the 1988 plebiscite by gender. The estimated coefficients and standard errors follow from estimates of equation (1), using a one-sided eight-week donut hole specification for plebiscite eligibles separately by gender. Nine empty circles denote the removed donut hole which are shown on the figure but not used in estimation.

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Figure A.9: Complier Characteristics by Upstream Election and Bandwidth

(a) Complier Ratio by Election: HS Dropouts

(b) Complier Ratio by Election: Males

Note: Figure A.9 presents complier characteristics, focusing on high school dropouts and males, by each upstream election and across bandwidths ranging from one to twelve months. Complier characteristics are calculated using the methodology in Abadie (2003).

Figure A.10: Extent of One-Party Rule in Post-Dictatorship Countries

First and Second Post-Democratization Political Parties, cdf

Source: Polity IV Project.
Note: Figure A.10 shows evidence on the length of governments for the first post-dictatorship party ('First Transition') and the corresponding length for the second party ('Second Transition'). The list of countries considered in this figure follows directly from Table A.7 and includes Argentina where democracy was re-established in 1983, Armenia in 1998, Bangladesh in 1991, Benin in 1991, Bolivia in 1982, Brazil in 1946 and 1985, Bulgaria in 1990, Cape Verde in 1991, Chile in 1989, Colombia in 1974, Croatia in 2000, Cyprus in 1968, Czech Republic in 1993, Dominican Republic in 1978, Ecuador in 1979, Estonia in 1991, Fiji in 1990, France in 1946, Greece in 1974, Guatemala in 1985, Guyana in 1992, Hungary in 1990, Indonesia in 1999, Kenya in 2002, South Korea in 1988, Latvia in 1991, Lithuania in 1992, Madagascar in 1992, Mali in 1992, Moldova in 1991, Mongolia in 1990, Mongolia in 1990, Mozambique in 1994, Namibia in 1990, Nicaragua in 1990, Panama in 1989, Paraguay in 1991, Philippines in 1986, Poland in 1989, Portugal in 1976, Romania in 1990, Senegal in 2000, Slovakia in 1992, Slovenia in 1992, Spain in 1977, Suriname in 1991, Taiwan in 1992, Turkey in 1983, Ukraine in 1991, Uruguay in 1952 and 1985, and Venezuela in 1958.

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics

	Full Sample (1)	Before Plebiscite (2)	After Plebiscite (3)	6 Months Before (4)	6 Months After (5)
Individual-Level Characteristics					
Male	0.487	0.472	0.503	0.494	0.496
	(0.500)	(0.499)	(0.500)	(0.500)	(0.500)
HS Dropout	0.400	0.538	0.273	0.339	0.343
	(0.490)	(0.499)	(0.446)	(0.474)	(0.475)
HS Graduate	0.468	0.372	0.556	0.512	0.503
	(0.499)	(0.483)	(0.497)	(0.500)	(0.500)
> HS Graduate	0.132	0.090	0.171	0.149	0.154
	(0.339)	(0.286)	(0.376)	(0.356)	(0.361)
Comuna-Level Characteristics					
Allende Share	0.367	0.365	0.369	0.368	0.367
	(0.103)	(0.105)	(0.102)	(0.106)	(0.104)
TV Ownership Share	0.871	0.868	0.874	0.866	0.868
	(0.109)	(0.113)	(0.106)	(0.112)	(0.111)
Electricity in Home	0.908	0.904	0.912	0.902	0.905
	(0.137)	(0.141)	(0.133)	(0.140)	(0.139)
Water in Home	0.754	0.750	0.759	0.745	0.749
	(0.193)	(0.197)	(0.189)	(0.197)	(0.194)
Toilet in Home	0.701	0.695	0.706	0.689	0.693
	(0.235)	(0.239)	(0.230)	(0.238)	(0.236)
Literacy Rate	0.904	0.903	0.905	0.902	0.903
	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Unemployment Rate	0.087	0.087	0.087	0.088	0.088
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Registration Outcomes					
Registered by 1988	0.406	0.809	0.000	0.669	0.006
	(0.491)	(0.393)	(0.018)	(0.471)	(0.078)
Registered by 2009	0.598	0.895	0.298	0.864	0.692
	(0.490)	(0.307)	(0.457)	(0.343)	(0.462)
Turnout Outcomes					
Voted in 2013 Election	0.495	0.617	0.373	0.554	0.504
	(0.500)	(0.486)	(0.484)	(0.497)	(0.500)
Voted in 2016 Election	0.352	0.452	0.265	0.398	0.369
	(0.478)	(0.498)	(0.442)	(0.489)	(0.483)
Voted in 2017 Election	0.472	0.559	0.400	0.515	0.483
	(0.499)	(0.496)	(0.490)	(0.500)	(0.500)
Sample Size(Turnout)	13,393,246	6,724,234	6,669,012	114,521	130,684
Sample Size (Education)	9,982,311	4,797,356	5,184,955	87,595	97,518

Note: Table A.1 presents summary statistics for the sample of Chileans who had turned 18 by 2013 and were eligible for the three downstream elections. The first column shows summary statistics for the full sample. The second and third columns present descriptive statistics for Chileans eligible and ineligible for the plebiscite, respectively. The last two columns present information for individuals who turned 18 six months before and after the plebiscite, respectively. In the last two rows, we include the sample size for the turnout data as well as the sample size in the second dataset for whom we observe educational attainment.

Table A.2: Covariate Balance

	1988 Plebiscite		1989 Election		1993 Election		1999 Election		2005 Election		2009 Election	
	Level	Diff.	Level	Diff.	Level	Diff.	Level	Diff.	Level	Diff.	Level	Diff.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
A. Individual-Level Characteristics												
Male	0.493	-0.003	0.496	-0.002	0.501	0.003	0.500	0.000	0.508	0.000	0.505	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Educational Attainment*												
26-Week Bandwidth												
Observed Education	0.869	0.000	0.860	0.005	0.853	0.003	0.844	-0.001	0.839	0.001	0.862	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
HS Dropout	0.364	-0.012	0.316	0.026	0.268	0.031	0.217	0.009	0.126	0.007	0.139	0.023
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.008)
HS Graduate	0.492	0.012	0.515	-0.011	0.529	-0.024	0.557	-0.002	0.603	-0.001	0.826	-0.013
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.008)
> HS Graduate	0.144	-0.001	0.170	-0.015	0.203	-0.008	0.226	-0.007	0.271	-0.007	0.035	-0.011
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.006)
13-Week Bandwidth												
Observed Education	0.869	0.004	0.867	-0.004	0.855	0.004	0.843	0.000	0.843	0.003	0.868	-0.006
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
HS Dropout	0.363	-0.003	0.322	0.014	0.280	0.012	0.224	0.002	0.128	0.007	0.156	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)
HS Graduate	0.497	0.001	0.508	-0.001	0.525	-0.011	0.549	0.002	0.605	0.000	0.808	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.006)
> HS Graduate	0.140	0.001	0.171	-0.013	0.195	-0.001	0.227	-0.004	0.266	-0.007	0.036	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.003)
B. Comuna-Level Characteristics												
Electricity in Home	0.900	-0.001	0.907	-0.003	0.912	-0.005	0.919	-0.005	0.918	-0.004	0.912	-0.005
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Water in Home	0.744	-0.002	0.751	-0.002	0.759	-0.007	0.770	-0.007	0.765	-0.005	0.756	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Toilet in Home	0.687	-0.002	0.696	-0.003	0.707	-0.009	0.720	-0.009	0.765	-0.006	0.702	-0.006
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Literacy Rate	0.901	0.000	0.903	-0.001	0.905	-0.002	0.907	-0.002	0.906	-0.001	0.903	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Unemployment Rate	0.088	0.000	0.088	0.000	0.087	0.000	0.086	0.000	0.087	0.000	0.088	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
TV Ownership Rate	0.864	-0.001	0.870	-0.002	0.087	-0.004	0.879	-0.004	0.878	-0.003	0.874	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Allende Share	0.366	0.001	0.368	-0.002	0.368	-0.002	0.369	-0.001	0.371	-0.002	0.372	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Sample Size	250,388		253,165		248,871		274,566		287,364		296,631	
(*): Sample Size (Education)	185,113		193,708		190,501		216,668		218,036		217,242	

Note: Table A.2 presents estimates of equation (2) in a linear functional form with a 26-week bandwidth using the relevant covariates as outcome variables. *Level* and *Diff.* refer to α_0 and α_1 in equation (2), respectively. For individual-level covariates, we cluster standard errors at the week level. For education-level covariates, we cluster standard errors at the month level. For comuna-level covariates, we cluster standard errors at the comuna-week level. For education variables, we also use a 13-week bandwidth to capture that individuals are in the same academic year. 'Observed Education' denotes the proportion of individuals for whom we observe information on their educational attainment.

Table A.3: Downstream Registration Effects of Upstream Election Eligibility

	Downstream Election					
	1988 Plebiscite	1989 Election	1993 Election	1999 Election	2005 Election	2009 Election
Upstream Election	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. 1988 Plebiscite						
Before	0.664	0.410	0.211	0.193	0.177	0.169
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Control Mean	0.006	0.310	0.626	0.654	0.679	0.692
Observations			243,645			
Panel B. 1989 Election						
Before		0.145	0.024	0.020	0.018	0.017
		(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Control Mean		0.000	0.577	0.614	0.645	0.661
Observations			256,697			
Panel C. 1993 Election						
Before			0.202	0.082	0.060	0.054
			(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Control Mean			0.000	0.289	0.375	0.416
Observations			243,912			
Panel D. 1999 Election						
Before				0.045	0.024	0.019
				(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Control Mean				0.000	0.235	0.298
Observations			269,271			
Panel E. 2005 Election						
Before					0.088	0.033
					(0.002)	(0.003)
Control Mean					0.000	0.165
Observations			281,837			
Panel F. 2009 Election						
Before						0.068
						(0.002)
Control Mean						0.000
Observations			290,900			

Note: Table A.3 presents estimates of equation (2) using a linear functional form with a 26 week bandwidth across each election cut-off. In Panel A, we use a one-sided eight-week donut hole specification for plebiscite eligibles. The results refer to the estimated impacts of upstream election eligibility (1988 Plebiscite, 1989 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009 Presidential elections) on differential registration rates across various elections. The values along the diagonal correspond to the first-stage results. The 'Control Mean' row corresponds to the share of marginally ineligible individuals who had registered to vote by the corresponding election year denoted in each column. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the week-of-birth level.

Table A.4: Estimated Regression Discontinuity Effects of Upstream Election Eligibility on 2013, 2016 and 2017 Turnout

	13-Week Bandwidth			26-Week Bandwidth		
	2013	2016	2017	2013	2016	2017
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. 1989 Election						
Before	-0.003	0.001	0.004	0.000	0.005	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Control Mean	0.487	0.356	0.472	0.489	0.359	0.476
Observations	133,849	133,369	133,485	256,697	255,715	255,900
Panel B. 1993 Election						
Before	0.020	0.009	0.007	0.014	0.006	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Control Mean	0.410	0.320	0.440	0.410	0.319	0.441
Observations	123,682	123,397	123,463	243,912	243,323	243,443
Panel C. 1999 Election						
Before	-0.006	-0.009	-0.008	-0.008	-0.005	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Control Mean	0.364	0.270	0.398	0.364	0.271	0.398
Observations	136,970	136,811	136,714	269,271	268,891	268,775
Panel D. 2005 Election						
Before	-0.005	0.000	-0.007	-0.007	-0.001	-0.010
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Control Mean	0.345	0.235	0.386	0.344	0.234	0.386
Observations	144,516	144,340	144,316	281,837	281,466	281,427
Panel E. 2009 Election						
Before	0.000	-0.005	-0.009	-0.005	-0.007	-0.006
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Control Mean	0.314	0.222	0.374	0.315	0.221	0.376
Observations	149,517	148,985	148,873	290,900	289,952	289,764

Note: Table A.4 presents estimates of equation (2) using a linear functional form with a 13-week (columns (1)-(3)) and 26-week (columns (4)-(6)) bandwidth across each election cut-off. The results refer to the estimated impacts of upstream election eligibility (1989 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009 Presidential elections) on turnout in the 2013, 2016 and 2017 elections. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the week-of-birth level.

Table A.5: Estimated Regression Discontinuity Effects of Upstream Election Participation on 2013, 2016 and 2017 Turnout

	13-Week Bandwidth			26-Week Bandwidth		
	2013	2016	2017	2013	2016	2017
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. 1989 Election						
Before	-0.018	0.004	0.029	-0.002	0.035	0.020
	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.026)
Control Mean	0.487	0.356	0.472	0.489	0.359	0.476
First Stage	0.148	0.148	0.148	0.145	0.145	0.144
Observations	133,849	133,369	133,485	256,697	255,715	255,900
Panel B. 1993 Election						
Before	0.087	0.039	0.032	0.067	0.030	-0.017
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Control Mean	0.410	0.320	0.440	0.410	0.319	0.441
First Stage	0.231	0.231	0.230	0.202	0.202	0.202
Observations	123,682	123,397	123,463	243,912	243,323	243,443
Panel C. 1999 Election						
Before	-0.112	-0.166	-0.143	-0.176	-0.102	-0.037
	(0.070)	(0.089)	(0.081)	(0.067)	(0.079)	(0.077)
Control Mean	0.364	0.270	0.398	0.364	0.271	0.398
First Stage	0.056	0.056	0.056	0.045	0.045	0.045
Observations	136,970	136,811	136,714	269,271	268,891	268,775
Panel D. 2005 Election						
Before	-0.059	-0.005	-0.079	-0.083	-0.006	-0.115
	(0.084)	(0.042)	(0.062)	(0.053)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Control Mean	0.345	0.235	0.386	0.344	0.234	0.386
First Stage	0.089	0.089	0.089	0.088	0.088	0.088
Observations	144,516	144,340	144,316	281,837	281,466	281,427
Panel E. 2009 Election						
Before	0.006	-0.070	-0.129	-0.073	-0.109	-0.085
	(0.099)	(0.085)	(0.088)	(0.070)	(0.061)	(0.060)
Control Mean	0.314	0.222	0.374	0.315	0.221	0.376
First Stage	0.069	0.069	0.069	0.068	0.068	0.068
Observations	149,517	148,985	148,873	290,900	289,952	289,764

Note: Table A.5 presents persistence estimates of upstream election participation (covering the 1989, 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009 Presidential elections) on 2013, 2016 and 2017 electoral turnout. The estimated parameters correspond to the two-stage empirical design outlined in equation (4), where the first stage (equation (2)) is estimated using a linear functional form with 13 (columns (1)-(3)) and 26 (columns (4)-(6)) week bandwidth across each election cut-off. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the week-of-birth level.

Table A.6: Heterogeneous Effects of Plebiscite Eligibility by Gender

	1988 Plebiscite	2009 Registration	2013 Election	2016 Election	2017 Election
Before	0.663	0.163	0.053	0.026	0.033
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Before × Male	0.002	0.012	-0.000	0.005	-0.006
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Observations	243,645	243,645	243,645	242,571	241,999

Note: Table A.6 presents evidence from equation (1), documenting heterogeneous effects of plebiscite eligibility on concurrent plebiscite registration, 2009 registration and downstream 2013, 2016 and 2017 election participation in a linear, 26-week bandwidth specification using a one-sided eight-week donut hole for plebiscite eligibles by gender. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the week-of-birth level.

Table A.7: Democratic Transitions

Country	Transition Year	Years in Democracy	Branch	First Party	Transition (I)	Second Party	Transition (II)
Argentina	1983	36	Exec	Radical Civic Union	6	Justicialist Party	10
Armenia	1998	21	Exec	Independent	10	Republican Party	10
Bangladesh	1991	17	Leg	Bangladesh Nationalist Party	5	Awami League	5
Benin	1991	28	Exec	Benin Rebirth Party	10	Action Front for Renewal and Development	5
Bolivia	1982	37	Exec	Leftwing Revolutionary Nationalist Movement	3	Nationalist Democratic Action	4
Brazil	1946	19	Exec	Social Democratic Party	5	Brazilian Labor Party	5
Brazil	1985	34	Exec	Brazilian Democratic Movement Party	4	Party of National Reconstruction	5
Bulgaria	1990	29	Leg	Bulgarian Socialist Party	1	Union of Democratic Forces	3
Bulgaria	1992	27	Exec	Union of Democratic Forces	12	Bulgarian Socialist Party	10
Cape Verde	1991	28	Exec	Movement for Democracy	10	African Party of Independence of Cape Verde	10
Chile	1989	30	Exec	Concertacion	21	Coalition for Change	4
Colombia	1974	45	Exec	Liberal Party	4	Conservative Party	4
Croatia	2000	19	Leg	Social Democratic Party	3	Croatian Democratic Union	8
Cyprus	1968	51	Exec	Independent	10	Democratic Party	10
Czech Republic	1993	26	Leg	Independent	10	Civil Democratic Party	10
Dominican Republic	1978	41	Exec	Dominican Revolutionary Party	8	Social Christian Reformist Party	10
Ecuador	1979	40	Exec	Concentration of People's Forces	5	Social Christan Forces	4
Estonia	1991	28	Leg	Fatherland Bloc	3	Coalition Party and Country People's Union	4
Estonia	1992	27	Exec	Pro Patria National Coalition Party	9	People's Union of Estonia	5
Fiji	1990	17	Leg	Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei	7	Fijian Labour Party	2
France	1946	73	Leg	French Communist Party	5	Rally of the French People	5
Greece	1974	45	Leg	New Democracy	7	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	8
Guatemala	1985	34	Exec	Guatemalan Christian Democracy	5	Solidarity Action Movement	2
Guyana	1992	27	Exec	People's Progressive Party	23	People's National Congress - Reform	4
Hungary	1990	29	Leg	Hungarian Democratic Forum	4	Hungarian Socialist Party	4
Indonesia	1999	20	Exec	National Awakening Party	5	Democratic Party	10
Kenya	2002	17	Exec	National Rainbow Coalition	5	Party of National Unity	6
Korea South	1988	31	Exec	Democratic Justice Party	5	Democratic Liberal Party	5
Latvia	1991	28	Leg	Popular Front of Latvia	3	Latvian Way	2
Lithuania	1992	27	Exec	Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania	5	Independent	5
Macedonia	1991	28	Leg	Party for Democratic Transformation	4	Alliance for Macedonia	4
Madagascar	1992	18	Exec	National Union for Development and Democracy	3	Malagasy Revolutionary Party	5
Mali	1992	21	Exec	Alliance for Democracy in Mali	10	Independent	10
Moldova	1991	28	Leg	Communist Party of Moldova	4	Agrarian Party of Moldova	4
Mongolia	1990	29	Leg	Mongolian People's Party	6	Democratic Party	4
Mongolia	1993	26	Exec	Democratic Party	4	Mongolian People's Party	12
Mozambique	1994	25	Exec	Mozambique Liberation Front	25		0
Namibia	1990	29	Exec	South West Africa People's Organization	30		0
Nicaragua	1990	29	Exec	National Opposition Union	5	Constitutional Lineral Party	10
Panama	1989	30	Exec	Independent	5	Democratic Revolutionary Party	5
Paraguay	1991	28	Exec	Colorado Party	9	Authentic Radical Liberal Party	3
Philippines	1986	33	Exec	Unido	6	Lakas	6
Poland	1989	30	Exec	Polish United Workers' Party	1	Solidarity Citizens' Committee	5
Portugal	1976	43	Leg	Socialist Party	3	Social Democratic Party	4
Portugal	1976	43	Exec	Independent	10	Socialist Party	20
Romania	1990	29	Exec	Democratic National Salvation Front	6	Christian Democratic National Peasants' Party	4
Senegal	2000	19	Exec	Socialist Party	7	Senegalese Democratic Party	5
Slovak Republic	1992	27	Leg	Movement for a Democratic Slovakia	2	Direction - Slovak Social Democracy	1
Slovenia	1992	27	Leg	Liberal Democracy of Slovenia	12	Slovenian Democratic Party	4
Spain	1977	42	Leg	Union of the Democratic Center	5	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	14
Suriname	1991	28	Leg	New Front for Democracy and Development	18	Megacombinatie	4
Taiwan	1992	27	Leg	Kuomintang	9	Democratic Progressive Party	7
Turkey	1983	32	Leg	Motherland	8	True Path Party	4
Ukraine	1991	24	Exec	Independent	3	Independent	9
Uruguay	1952	21	Exec	Colorado	8	National	8
Uruguay	1985	34	Exec	Colorado	5	National	5
Venezuela	1958	52	Exec	Democratic Action	10	Copei	5

Source: Polity IV Project.

Note: Table A.7 presents evidence on countries which underwent democratic transitions. The second column denotes the year of the transition to democratic rule. The third column refers to the number of years of uninterrupted democratic rule (through 2018 if the country remains a democracy). The fourth column includes the electoral system for the corresponding transition event. The fifth column includes the name of the first party in power, along with the length of their time in power (Column 6). The last two columns denote the second party in power (if any) and their length in power.

References

Abadie, Alberto. 2003. "Semiparametric instrumental variable estimation of treatment response models." *Journal of Econometrics*, 113(2): 231–263.