

IV. Online Mathematical Appendix

Proof of the condition for $s^* < s^{}$.** From (6)-(7) we first easily check that, if $s^* = +\infty$, then $s^{**} = +\infty$. Next, when both s^* and s^{**} are finite, $s^* < s^{**}$ if and only if

$$\begin{aligned} (y_B - 2v_L) [v_H + \lambda v_L + (1 - \lambda)\bar{v} - y_B] > \\ (y_B - v_H - v_L) [2(\lambda v_L + (1 - \lambda)v_H) - y_B] \iff \end{aligned}$$

Denoting $\Delta \equiv v_H - v_L$, this becomes

$$\begin{aligned} (y_B - 2v_L) [2v_L + \Delta + (1 - \lambda)\Delta/2 - y_B] > \\ (y_B - 2v_L - \Delta) [2v_L + 2(1 - \lambda)\Delta - y_B] \iff \\ (y_B - 2v_L) [\Delta + (1 - \lambda)\Delta/2 - 2(1 - \lambda)\Delta] > \\ -\Delta [2v_L + 2(1 - \lambda)\Delta] \iff \\ (y_B - 2v_L) [-3/2 - \lambda/2 + 2\lambda] + 2(1 - \lambda)\Delta > 0 \end{aligned}$$

or, finally, $2v_H + v_L > (3/2)y_B$.

Proof of Proposition 1. The result for $s < s^*$ was shown in the text. The others follow from Lemmas 1 and 2 below.

LEMMA 1: *For $s > s^*$, HL pairs must split.*

(a) One cannot have both HL and LL agreeing since this requires $s \leq \min\{s^*, s^{**}\}$.

(b) One also cannot have HL agreeing and LL splitting. Otherwise, let $(\theta_H^*, \theta_L^* = 1 - \theta_H^*)$ be the shares agreed to in an HL pair and (θ', θ'') , with $\theta' + \theta'' > 1$ the incompatible shares demanded in an LL pair. If neither of θ' nor θ'' equals θ_H^* , by deviating to θ_H^* the L in an HL pair can achieve a gain of $s(1 - \lambda)(v_H - v_L) > 0$. Therefore, it must be that $\theta_H^* \in \{\theta', \theta''\}$, say $\theta' = \theta_H^*$. But the other partner can then deviate from θ'' to $1 - \theta' = \theta_L^*$, i.e. concede: he will remain identified as an L , but now achieve $(1 + s)\theta_L^* y_B \geq (1 + \lambda s)v_L + \lambda s\bar{v} > (1 + s)v_L$, where the first inequality must hold in order for the L partner in an HL pair to agree. The deviation is thus profitable, so once again LL pairs cannot be sustained.

It follows from the Lemma that, for $s^* < s \leq s^{**}$, at most the LL matches can be sustained; and indeed, we showed in the text that in this region the shares $(1/2, 1/2)$ allow these pairs to reach agreement.

LEMMA 2: *For $s > s^{**}$, LL pairs must split.*

(a) Once again HL and LL cannot both agree, as this requires $s \leq \min\{s^*, s^{**}\}$.

(b) We also cannot have LL agreeing and HL splitting. Otherwise, let (θ_H^*, θ_L^*) with $\theta_H^* + \theta_L^* > 1$ be the incompatible shares demanded by H and L respectively in an unbalanced pair and $(\theta', 1 - \theta')$ the shares agreed to in an LL pair, with $\theta' \geq 1/2$. Consider now a deviation by the partner who was getting $1 - \theta'$, to some $\theta''' > \theta'$ and $\theta''' \notin \{\theta_H^*, \theta_L^*\}$, and distinguish the following cases.

(i) If $\theta' \neq \theta_H^*$ the non-deviating partner, who is still asking for the equilibrium share θ' , remains unambiguously identified as L (by the first of our refinements), and the deviating partner as an H (by the second refinement, or by D1), thus achieving $(1 + \lambda s)v_L + s(1 - \lambda)v_H > (1 + s)y_B/2$, since $s > s^{**}$. A fortiori, this is better than his equilibrium utility $(1 + s)(1 - \theta')y_B$.

(ii) If $\theta' = \theta_H^*$, this implies $\theta_H^* \geq 1/2$. The LL partner receiving $1 - \theta_H^*$ in equilibrium (say, Player 1) can profitably deviate to $\theta''' > \theta_H^*$ (clearly $\theta'' = 1 - \theta_H^* > 0$, otherwise LL pairs are unsustainable), with $\theta''' \neq \theta_L^*$. Indeed, by our first refinement Player 2 is then presumed to have played according to equilibrium (which stipulates θ_H^* for both H types and one side in LL pairs), while the fact that Player 1 broke the match identifies him, by D1, as an H type. Since $s > s^{**}$ this is again a profitable deviation.

It follows from the two Lemmas that, for $s > s^{**}$, no matches can be sustained, even through asymmetric equilibria.