

Crowdsourcing City Government: Using Tournaments to Improve Inspection Accuracy

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ONLINE APPENDIX – PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1

The value of $(1 - \varphi)^{1 - \frac{\bar{w}}{w}} - 1$ is monotonically increasing in φ and goes from 0 to ∞ as φ goes from 0 to 1. Hence, there must exist a value of φ at which $(1 - \varphi)^{1 - \frac{\bar{w}}{w}} - 1$ equals $\frac{V(\bar{q}) - V(\underline{q})}{V(q_{\max}) - V(\bar{q})}$, a constant. The value of $\frac{V(\bar{q}) - V(\underline{q})}{V(q_{\max}) - V(\bar{q})}$ is rising with $V(\bar{q})$ and falling with $V(\underline{q})$ and $V(q_{\max})$; hence, φ^* is rising with $V(\bar{q})$ and falling with $V(\underline{q})$ and $V(q_{\max})$. For a given φ , the value of $(1 - \varphi)^{1 - \frac{\bar{w}}{w}} - 1$ is rising with $\frac{\bar{w}}{w}$; hence, φ^* must be falling with $\frac{\bar{w}}{w}$.