Online appendix

Cooperation, but no reciprocity: Individual strategies in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

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Overview

This appendix contains tables summarizing the robustness checks that I did and further tables describing the elimination sequence in the finite mixture analysis of the individual strategies. All tables should be fairly self-explanatory (the table notes include all required information). Depending on context, the table entries are complemented either by standard errors or by p-values in parentheses; the table caption always states clearly whether standard errors or p-values are reported. All tables summarizing regression results are presented in duplicate, once with and once without subject-level random effects. The qualitative results are always similar.

- Tables 1 and 2 provide the unadjusted and adjusted p-values for the main hypothesis $\sigma_{cc} > \sigma_{dc} = \sigma_{cd} > \sigma_{dd}$ as tested in Table 2 in the paper
- Tables 3–5 contain alternative estimates of average strategies
- Tables 6–9 analyze time trends in the cooperation probabilities, for two different measures (based on the total number of supergames or total number of rounds), both with and without subject-level random effects
- Tables 10 and 11 analyze the relevance of individual cooperation rates in the first halves of the sessions with respect to behavior in the second halves
- Tables 12 and 13 analyze differences in expected payoffs as implied by the estimated 1-memory Markov strategies
- Tables 14 and 15 analyze differences in expected payoffs as estimated directly from the data, with and without random effects
- Table 16 provides the number of observations and number of different subjects per state
- Tables 17–20 analyze the statistical significance of 2-memory histories, with and without random effects, details on which are provided below under the heading "Testing the Markov assumption"
- Table 21 presents a basic, unrestricted classification of strategies

- Tables 22–28 provide information on the order in which components have been eliminated during the estimation of the prototypical strategies. In each of these tables, the top row is the model with all components, and in each subsequent row, one component is eliminated. Standard errors are given in parentheses.

- Tables 29, 32, 40 summarize the (finite) mixtures of prototypical strategies estimated after eliminating insignificant components. The first of these tables is equal to the respective table from the paper, repeated only for convenience, the second table contains the results for models allowing for an asymmetric semi-grim strategy $(1, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, 0)$ in addition to the semi-grim strategy, and the third table contains the results for models allowing for a second (symmetric) semi-grim strategy in addition to the first one.

- Table 30 evaluates whether the model of prototypical strategies allowing for asymmetric semi-grim *instead of* semi-grim allows for an improvement of the goodness-of-fit (over the symmetric model; implicitly the null hypothesis is that the semi-grim component is symmetric in the sense $\sigma_{cd} = \sigma_{dc}$ – all deviations turn out to be insignificant).

- Table 31 evaluates whether the model of prototypical strategies allowing for asymmetric semi-grim *in addition to* semi-grim allows for an improvement of the goodness-of-fit (over the fully symmetric model; implicitly the null hypothesis is that a second semi-grim component would be symmetric in the sense $\sigma_{cd} = \sigma_{dc}$ – all deviations turn out to be insignificant).

- Tables 33–39 report the elimination order for finite mixture models including an asymmetric semi-grim strategy $(1, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, 0)$ in addition to the semi-grim strategy.

- Tables 41–47 report the elimination order for finite mixture models for a second (symmetric) semi-grim strategy in addition to the first one.

- Tables 48–57 report the elimination order for finite mixtures of equilibrium strategies. The notation mimicks that in the previous tables. Except, standard errors are NaN (not a number) when a component is behaviorally equivalent to Always-Defect (which may happen if an equilibrium does not exist). In case an equilibrium does not exist for $\delta^{2/3}$, Always-defect is used instead (and the component will have zero share in the end). The notation is the same as in the paper.

- Tables 58 and 59 illustrate the robustness of the strategy classification for alternative ways of treating nonequilibrium strategies

- Tables 60 and 61 present the strategy classification when the noise parameter γ is zero (for the prototypical strategies) or almost zero ($\gamma = 0.001$ for the equilibrium strategies)

Bootstrap procedure For each treatment, I obtain R bootstrap samples by randomly sampling the original number of subjects with replacement (all resampled subjects are assigned different labels). I set $R = 10.000$ if p-values are to be determined, and $R = 1.000$ if "merely" standard errors are determined. For each bootstrap sample b, I obtain the estimates x_b from the respective econometric model. The standard errors are determined as standard deviation of the estimates across the bootstrap samples. To define the p-value of the null hypothesis that some statistic s is zero (e.g. a coefficient or the difference of two coefficients), let s_b denote its value in sample b and let s_0 denote its original value. The p-value of the two-sided test is $\frac{1}{2R}\#\{b : |s_b - \bar{s}| > |s_0|\} + \frac{1}{2R}\#\{b : |s_b - \bar{s}| \geq |s_0|\}$, where $\bar{s}$ is the mean of (s_b) and R is the number of bootstrap samples. For further information and references, see Fox (2008, chap. 21).

Adjusted p-values To accommodate for the multiplicity of comparisons within treatments, I adjust the bootstrapped p-values (Wright, 1992) using the Holm-Bonferroni method (Holm, 1979). For any treatment (i.e. any line in a given table), let $p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_N$ denote the unadjusted p-values of the tests reported in this table line. Arrange them in increasing order, denoted as $p_{(1)}, p_{(2)}, \ldots, p_{(N)}$, then the ith-lowest p-value is adjusted toward $\widetilde{p}_{(i)} = \max_{j \leq i} \min\{1, (N - j + 1)p_{(j)}\}$. Note that this implies that adjusted p-values may well be equal to 1 for several hypotheses. Also note that the adjustment is still rather modest, as it does not account for the simultaneity of tests across the 16 treatments. In order to additionally account for that, a simple Bonferroni correction suggests to apply the threshold $.003 = .05/16$. All tables indicate the significance of all results with respect to these two levels, 0.003 and 0.05.

Testing the Markov assumption Tables 17–20 test the Markov assumption in models regressing the probability of cooperation (either 0 or 1 in each round) on all 1-memory histories and as many 2-memory histories as the nonsingularity condition permits. This condition implies, amongst others, that in addition to controlling for say the 1-memory history (c,c), at most three 2-memory histories can be included where (c,c) was played in $t-1$. For, the sum of the cooperation probabilities after all four 2-memory histories where (c,c) was played in $t-1$ equates with the cooperation probability after the 1-memory history (c,c), and thus including all four would violate the singularity condition. In addition, the event that (d,d) was observed immediately after (c,c) was very rare, and thus I can include at most two 2-memory histories with (d,d) in $t-1$ without violating singularity.

I provide two sets of estimates, controlling for individual differences by subject-level random effects or not (as indicated in the table captions). The p-values of the hypothesis tests are bootstrapped as described in the paper and adjusted as described above. For transparency about the estimated cooperation probabilities (i.e. strategies), I use linear-probability models without intercept. The results do not change notably if logit models are used instead.

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Table 1: The estimated 1-memory strategies, including p-values, with standard errors in parentheses

	Game parameters			Probability of cooperation after 1-memory histories									Adjusted p-values				Unadjusted p-values			
Tr	b	a	δ	$\hat{\sigma}_\emptyset$		$\hat{\sigma}_{cc}$		$\hat{\sigma}_{dc}$		$\hat{\sigma}_{cd}$		$\hat{\sigma}_{dd}$	$\frac{\sigma_\emptyset}{\sigma_{cc}}$	$\frac{\sigma_{cc}}{\sigma_{cd,dc}}$	$\frac{\sigma_{dc}}{\sigma_{cd}}$	$\frac{\sigma_{cd,dc}}{\sigma_{dd}}$	$\frac{\sigma_\emptyset}{\sigma_{cc}}$	$\frac{\sigma_{cc}}{\sigma_{cd,dc}}$	$\frac{\sigma_{dc}}{\sigma_{cd}}$	$\frac{\sigma_{cd,dc}}{\sigma_{dd}}$
Blonski et al. (2011)																				
6	1.43	1.29	0.5																	
3	2.5	1.5	0.5																	
2	1.25	1.12	0.75	0.087 (0.045)	$<$	0.973 (0.192)	$\approx$	0.349 (0.116)	$\approx$	0.232 (0.098)	$>$	0.006 (0.003)	0.015	0.074	0.283	0.004	0.005	0.037	0.283	0.001
7	1.43	1.29	0.75	0.25 (0.089)	$\ll$	1.009 (0.033)	$\gg$	0.45 (0.08)	$\approx$	0.345 (0.088)	$\gg$	−0.009 (0.005)	0	0	0.283	0	0	0	0.283	0
4	2.5	1.5	0.75	0.169 (0.063)	$\approx$	0.865 (0.204)	$\gg$	0.049 (0.051)	$\approx$	0.058 (0.058)	$\approx$	0.027 (0.025)	0.114	0	0.799	0.163	0.038	0	0.799	0.082
8	1.43	1.29	0.88	0.47 (0.093)	$\ll$	0.945 (0.025)	$\gg$	0.347 (0.096)	$\approx$	0.287 (0.123)	$\gg$	0.03 (0.021)	0	0	0.646	0	0	0	0.646	0
5	2.5	1.5	0.88	0.42 (0.09)	$\ll$	0.922 (0.033)	$\gg$	0.383 (0.085)	$\approx$	0.217 (0.068)	$\gg$	0.056 (0.017)	0	0	0.071	0	0	0	0.071	0
9	2.4	1.8	0.75	0.494 (0.088)	$\ll$	0.981 (0.015)	$\gg$	0.18 (0.069)	$\approx$	0.185 (0.077)	$>$	0.011 (0.005)	0	0	0.948	0.009	0	0	0.948	0.004
1	3	2	0.75	0.406 (0.093)	$\ll$	0.905 (0.051)	$\gg$	0.281 (0.082)	$\approx$	0.328 (0.064)	$\gg$	0.01 (0.005)	0	0	0.637	0	0	0	0.637	0
10	4.67	3	0.75	0.775 (0.07)	$\approx$	0.89 (0.036)	$\gg$	0.277 (0.07)	$\approx$	0.177 (0.056)	$>$	0.061 (0.037)	0.199	0	0.199	0.031	0.106	0	0.1	0.01
Agg				0.358 (0.03)	$\ll$	0.921 (0.015)	$\gg$	0.278 (0.03)	$\approx$	0.22 (0.028)	$\gg$	0.022 (0.006)	0	0	0.081	0	0	0	0.081	0
∞*Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)*																				
1	2.92	1.54	0.5	0.062 (0.021)	$\ll$	0.795 (0.098)	$\gg$	0.428 (0.102)	$\approx$	0.207 (0.079)	$\gg$	0.031 (0.017)	0.001	0.001	0.072	0	0	0	0.072	0
3	2.92	2.15	0.5	0.194 (0.035)	$\ll$	0.811 (0.059)	$\gg$	0.383 (0.066)	$\approx$	0.255 (0.067)	$\gg$	0.118 (0.031)	0	0	0.183	0	0	0	0.183	0
2	2.92	1.54	0.75	0.263 (0.05)	$\ll$	0.899 (0.03)	$\gg$	0.414 (0.07)	$\approx$	0.3 (0.061)	$\gg$	0.041 (0.009)	0	0	0.267	0	0	0	0.267	0
5	2.92	2.77	0.5	0.408 (0.061)	$\ll$	0.929 (0.022)	$\gg$	0.244 (0.057)	$\approx$	0.319 (0.058)	$\gg$	0.072 (0.017)	0	0	0.286	0	0	0	0.286	0
4	2.92	2.15	0.75	0.768 (0.061)	$\ll$	0.945 (0.019)	$\gg$	0.548 (0.071)	$>$	0.364 (0.066)	$\gg$	0.167 (0.041)	0.003	0	0.018	0	0.001	0	0.018	0
6	2.92	2.77	0.75	0.955 (0.018)	$\approx$	0.98 (0.006)	$\gg$	0.383 (0.085)	$\approx$	0.303 (0.073)	$\gg$	0.106 (0.029)	0.231	0	0.444	0	0.116	0	0.444	0
Agg				0.427 (0.026)	$\ll$	0.907 (0.013)	$\gg$	0.393 (0.032)	$>$	0.298 (0.028)	$\gg$	0.091 (0.011)	0	0	0.023	0	0	0	0.023	0
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment																				
	3	2	0.9	0.696 (0.054)	$\ll$	0.957 (0.012)	$\gg$	0.38 (0.049)	$\approx$	0.342 (0.032)	$\gg$	0.134 (0.027)	0	0	0.478	0	0	0	0.478	0
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment																				
6	5	4	0.88	0.825 (0.048)	$<$	0.949 (0.019)	$\gg$	0.483 (0.076)	$\approx$	0.466 (0.058)	$\gg$	0.171 (0.043)	0.012	0	0.809	0	0.006	0	0.809	0

Note: For each treatment, four hypotheses are tested. These are $H_0 : \sigma_\emptyset = \sigma_{cc}$, $H_0 : \sigma_{cc} = \sigma_{cd,dc}$, $H_0 : \sigma_{dc} = \sigma_{cd}$, and $H_0 : \sigma_{cd,dc} = \sigma_{dd}$. In the table header, these nulls are abbreviated as $\frac{\sigma_\emptyset}{\sigma_{cc}}$ and so on. The respective p-values are reported in this order in the respective columns above.
The p-values are adjusted as described above. Let $p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_N$ denote the unadjusted p-values of the tests reported for a given treatment. Arrange them in increasing order, denoted $p_{(1)}, p_{(2)}, \ldots, p_{(N)}$, then the i-lowest p-value is adjusted toward $\widetilde{p}_{(i)} = \max_{j \leq i} \min\left\{1, (N-j+1)p_{(j)}\right\}$. Note that the lower the p-value-rank (the lower the p-value), the higher the adjustment. The highest p-value is not adjusted at all.

Table 2: The estimated 1-memory strategies, including p-values (without random effects, i.e. OLS), with standard errors in parentheses

	Game parameters			Probability of cooperation after 1-memory histories									Adjusted p-values				Unadjusted p-values			
Tr	b	a	δ	$\hat{\sigma}_{\emptyset}$		$\hat{\sigma}_{cc}$		$\hat{\sigma}_{dc}$		$\hat{\sigma}_{cd}$		$\hat{\sigma}_{dd}$	$\frac{\sigma_{\emptyset}}{\sigma_{cc}}$	$\frac{\sigma_{cc}}{\sigma_{cd,dc}}$	$\frac{\sigma_{dc}}{\sigma_{cd}}$	$\frac{\sigma_{cd,dc}}{\sigma_{dd}}$	$\frac{\sigma_{\emptyset}}{\sigma_{cc}}$	$\frac{\sigma_{cc}}{\sigma_{cd,dc}}$	$\frac{\sigma_{dc}}{\sigma_{cd}}$	$\frac{\sigma_{cd,dc}}{\sigma_{dd}}$
Blonski et al. (2011)																				
6	1.43	1.29	0.5																	
3	2.5	1.5	0.5																	
2	1.25	1.12	0.75	0.088 (0.046)	$<$	1 (0.195)	$\approx$	0.35 (0.116)	$\approx$	0.25 (0.101)	$\gg$	0.005 (0.003)	0.006	0.082	0.377	0.002	0.002	0.041	0.377	0
7	1.43	1.29	0.75	0.25 (0.089)	$\ll$	0.977 (0.024)	$\gg$	0.452 (0.08)	$\approx$	0.323 (0.084)	$\gg$	0 (0)	0	0	0.2	0	0	0	0.2	0
4	2.5	1.5	0.75	0.169 (0.064)	$\approx$	1 (0.206)	$\gg$	0.045 (0.049)	$\approx$	0.136 (0.112)	$\approx$	0.016 (0.016)	0.122	0	0.512	0.122	0.041	0	0.512	0.041
8	1.43	1.29	0.88	0.47 (0.093)	$\ll$	0.979 (0.013)	$\gg$	0.279 (0.097)	$\approx$	0.419 (0.184)	$\gg$	0.008 (0.007)	0	0	0.597	0	0	0	0.597	0
5	2.5	1.5	0.88	0.42 (0.092)	$\ll$	0.984 (0.015)	$\gg$	0.365 (0.086)	$\approx$	0.254 (0.071)	$\gg$	0.031 (0.013)	0	0	0.298	0	0	0	0.298	0
9	2.4	1.8	0.75	0.494 (0.089)	$\ll$	0.986 (0.011)	$\gg$	0.176 (0.071)	$\approx$	0.196 (0.079)	$>$	0.008 (0.005)	0	0	0.803	0.005	0	0	0.803	0.003
1	3	2	0.75	0.406 (0.093)	$\ll$	0.92 (0.048)	$\gg$	0.271 (0.079)	$\approx$	0.356 (0.062)	$\gg$	0.004 (0.004)	0	0	0.374	0	0	0	0.374	0
10	4.67	3	0.75	0.775 (0.07)	$\approx$	0.885 (0.035)	$\gg$	0.27 (0.074)	$\approx$	0.206 (0.056)	$>$	0.06 (0.033)	0.204	0	0.295	0.008	0.102	0	0.295	0.002
Agg				0.351 (0.031)	$\ll$	0.952 (0.012)	$\gg$	0.268 (0.03)	$\approx$	0.266 (0.036)	$\gg$	0.014 (0.004)	0	0	0.951	0	0	0	0.951	0
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)																				
1	2.92	1.54	0.5	0.064 (0.022)	$\ll$	1 (0.024)	$\gg$	0.477 (0.108)	$\approx$	0.352 (0.073)	$\gg$	0.022 (0.012)	0.001	0.001	0.339	0	0.001	0	0.339	0
3	2.92	2.15	0.5	0.194 (0.035)	$\ll$	0.922 (0.035)	$\gg$	0.364 (0.068)	$\approx$	0.377 (0.067)	$\gg$	0.078 (0.021)	0	0	0.896	0	0	0	0.896	0
2	2.92	1.54	0.75	0.264 (0.05)	$\ll$	0.96 (0.018)	$\gg$	0.408 (0.07)	$\approx$	0.357 (0.058)	$\gg$	0.024 (0.006)	0	0	0.623	0	0	0	0.623	0
5	2.92	2.77	0.5	0.414 (0.062)	$\ll$	1 (0)	$\gg$	0.189 (0.056)	$<$	0.409 (0.07)	$\gg$	0.027 (0.01)	0	0	0.012	0	0	0	0.012	0
4	2.92	2.15	0.75	0.708 (0.073)	$\ll$	0.974 (0.008)	$\gg$	0.5 (0.085)	$\approx$	0.405 (0.07)	$\gg$	0.088 (0.038)	0	0	0.341	0	0	0	0.341	0
6	2.92	2.77	0.75	0.957 (0.017)	$\approx$	0.984 (0.005)	$\gg$	0.372 (0.089)	$\approx$	0.302 (0.073)	$\gg$	0.083 (0.025)	0.178	0	0.529	0	0.089	0	0.529	0
Agg				0.355 (0.025)	$\ll$	0.979 (0.004)	$\gg$	0.362 (0.033)	$\approx$	0.376 (0.029)	$\gg$	0.041 (0.006)	0	0	0.749	0	0	0	0.749	0
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment																				
	3	2	0.9	0.696 (0.054)	$\ll$	0.971 (0.007)	$\gg$	0.364 (0.05)	$\approx$	0.346 (0.031)	$\gg$	0.098 (0.026)	0	0	0.755	0	0	0	0.755	0
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment																				
6	5	4	0.88	0.829 (0.048)	$<$	0.971 (0.01)	$\gg$	0.412 (0.083)	$\approx$	0.487 (0.061)	$\gg$	0.083 (0.023)	0.008	0	0.379	0	0.004	0	0.379	0

Note: The sole difference to Table 1 is that the random effects are dropped (the model is estimated by OLS).

Table 3: Alternative estimation strategies: Average 1-memory strategies (besides treatment parameters, numbers of observations)

Treatment	Game parameters			Sizes of the data sets				Average 1-memory strategy						
	b	a	δ	#Subj	$\frac{\#Games}{Subj}$	$\frac{\#Decis}{Subj}$	#Decis	$\hat{\sigma}_{cc}$		$\hat{\sigma}_{dc}$		$\hat{\sigma}_{cd}$		$\hat{\sigma}_{dd}$
Blonski et al. (2011)														
6	1.429	1.286	0.5	20	8	17	340					0.133	$\approx$	0.006
3	2.5	1.5	0.5	0	0	0	0							
2	1.25	1.125	0.75	20	8	42	840							0.005
7	1.429	1.286	0.75	20	8	25	500	0.982	$>$	0.411	$\approx$	0.308	$>$	0
4	2.5	1.5	0.75	20	8	27	540	1				0.15	$\approx$	0.028
8	1.429	1.286	0.875	20	5	34	680	0.983	$>$	0.093	$\approx$	0.352	$>$	0.029
5	2.5	1.5	0.875	20	5	46	920	0.942	$>$	0.308	$\approx$	0.233	$>$	0.035
9	2.4	1.8	0.75	20	8	38	760	0.979	$>$	0.111	$\approx$	0.215	$>$	0.013
1	3	2	0.75	20	8	30	600	0.927	$>$	0.198	$\approx$	0.324	$\gg$	0.006
10	4.667	3	0.75	20	8	34	680	0.84	$\gg$	0.272	$\approx$	0.197	$\approx$	0.085
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)														
1	2.923	1.538	0.5	44	30–36	55–80	2988	1	$>$	0.464	$\approx$	0.406	$>$	0.03
3	2.923	2.154	0.5	50	36	62–81	3614	0.951	$\gg$	0.364	$\approx$	0.403	$\gg$	0.122
2	2.923	1.538	0.75	44	14–17	70–103	3606	0.946	$\gg$	0.38	$>$	0.358	$\gg$	0.03
5	2.923	2.769	0.5	46	34–39	67–78	3398	1	$\gg$	0.21	$\approx$	0.371	$\gg$	0.037
4	2.923	2.154	0.75	38	12–24	49–75	2524	0.959	$\gg$	0.555	$>$	0.328	$\gg$	0.103
6	2.923	2.769	0.75	44	15–18	59–83	3140	0.976	$\gg$	0.347	$\approx$	0.28	$>$	0.074
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment														
	3	2	0.9	56	4–7	28–103	3276	0.924	$\gg$	0.37	$\approx$	0.347	$\gg$	0.123
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment														
6	5	4	0.875	48	3–5	24–42	1800	0.935	$\gg$	0.465	$>$	0.465	$\gg$	0.078

Note: The "game parameters" are standardized as in the paper. The "average 1-memory strategies" are estimated as follows: For each state, the individual cooperation probability in this state is estimated for each subject, and then averaged over all subjects with at least 3 observations per subject; the result is printed here if there are at least three such subjects. The relation signs indicate the p-values of Wilcoxon matched-pair tests (using the cooperation probabilities of individual subjects as independent observations): "$\gg, \ll$" indicate the p-value is $p < .003$, "$>, <$" indicate $p < .05$, and "$\approx$" indicates p-values greater than 0.01. As σ_{cd}, σ_{dc} mostly do not differ significantly, the relative frequencies of $\sigma_{cd,dc}$ have been pooled in tests against either σ_{cc} or σ_{dd}.

Table 4: Linear probability estimates of average strategies (with subject-level random effects), standard errors in parentheses

	Treatment parameters			$H_0 : \sigma_{cc} = \sigma_{dd}$			$H_0 : \sigma_{dc} = \sigma_{cd}$			$H_0 : \sigma_{cc} = \sigma_{\emptyset}$			Pooled estimate (using $\sigma_{cd,dc}$)				
Tr	b	a	δ	σ_{cc}		σ_{dd}	σ_{dc}		σ_{cd}	σ_{cc}		$\sigma_{\emptyset}$	σ_{cc}		$\sigma_{cd,dc}$		σ_{dd}
Blonski et al. (2011)																	
6	1.43	1.29	0.5														
3	2.5	1.5	0.5														
2	1.25	1.12	0.75	0.973 (0.192)	$\gg$	0.006 (0.003)	0.349 (0.116)	$\approx$	0.232 (0.098)	0.973 (0.192)	$>$	0.087 (0.045)	0.98 (0.189)	$\approx$	0.293 (0.086)	$>$	0.006 (0.003)
7	1.43	1.29	0.75	1.009 (0.033)	$\gg$	−0.009 (0.005)	0.45 (0.08)	$\approx$	0.345 (0.088)	1.009 (0.033)	$\gg$	0.25 (0.089)	1.015 (0.033)	$\gg$	0.4 (0.066)	$\gg$	−0.01 (0.006)
4	2.5	1.5	0.75	0.865 (0.204)	$\gg$	0.027 (0.025)	0.049 (0.051)	$\approx$	0.058 (0.058)	0.865 (0.204)	$\approx$	0.169 (0.063)	0.864 (0.21)	$\gg$	0.053 (0.031)	$\approx$	0.027 (0.026)
8	1.43	1.29	0.88	0.945 (0.025)	$\gg$	0.03 (0.021)	0.347 (0.096)	$\approx$	0.287 (0.123)	0.945 (0.025)	$\gg$	0.47 (0.093)	0.948 (0.03)	$\gg$	0.318 (0.085)	$\gg$	0.028 (0.023)
5	2.5	1.5	0.88	0.922 (0.033)	$\gg$	0.056 (0.017)	0.383 (0.085)	$\approx$	0.217 (0.068)	0.922 (0.033)	$\gg$	0.42 (0.09)	0.934 (0.035)	$\gg$	0.302 (0.055)	$\gg$	0.051 (0.017)
9	2.4	1.8	0.75	0.981 (0.015)	$\gg$	0.011 (0.005)	0.18 (0.069)	$\approx$	0.185 (0.077)	0.981 (0.015)	$\gg$	0.494 (0.088)	0.981 (0.016)	$\gg$	0.182 (0.062)	$>$	0.011 (0.005)
1	3	2	0.75	0.905 (0.051)	$\gg$	0.01 (0.005)	0.281 (0.082)	$\approx$	0.328 (0.064)	0.905 (0.051)	$\gg$	0.406 (0.093)	0.902 (0.052)	$\gg$	0.303 (0.055)	$\gg$	0.012 (0.006)
10	4.67	3	0.75	0.89 (0.036)	$\gg$	0.061 (0.037)	0.277 (0.07)	$\approx$	0.177 (0.056)	0.89 (0.036)	$\approx$	0.775 (0.07)	0.891 (0.036)	$\gg$	0.227 (0.054)	$>$	0.06 (0.038)
Agg				0.921 (0.015)	$\gg$	0.022 (0.006)	0.278 (0.03)	$\approx$	0.22 (0.028)	0.921 (0.015)	$\gg$	0.358 (0.03)	0.925 (0.016)	$\gg$	0.25 (0.023)	$\gg$	0.021 (0.006)
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)																	
1	2.92	1.54	0.5	0.795 (0.098)	$\gg$	0.031 (0.017)	0.428 (0.102)	$\approx$	0.207 (0.079)	0.795 (0.098)	$\gg$	0.062 (0.021)	0.816 (0.096)	$\gg$	0.327 (0.065)	$\gg$	0.03 (0.017)
3	2.92	2.15	0.5	0.811 (0.059)	$\gg$	0.118 (0.031)	0.383 (0.066)	$\approx$	0.255 (0.067)	0.811 (0.059)	$\gg$	0.194 (0.035)	0.822 (0.058)	$\gg$	0.323 (0.043)	$\gg$	0.116 (0.029)
2	2.92	1.54	0.75	0.899 (0.03)	$\gg$	0.041 (0.009)	0.414 (0.07)	$\approx$	0.3 (0.061)	0.899 (0.03)	$\gg$	0.263 (0.05)	0.906 (0.027)	$\gg$	0.36 (0.038)	$\gg$	0.039 (0.008)
5	2.92	2.77	0.5	0.929 (0.022)	$\gg$	0.072 (0.017)	0.244 (0.057)	$\approx$	0.319 (0.058)	0.929 (0.022)	$\gg$	0.408 (0.061)	0.917 (0.028)	$\gg$	0.28 (0.048)	$\gg$	0.077 (0.019)
4	2.92	2.15	0.75	0.945 (0.019)	$\gg$	0.167 (0.041)	0.548 (0.071)	$>$	0.364 (0.066)	0.945 (0.019)	$\gg$	0.768 (0.061)	0.948 (0.018)	$\gg$	0.454 (0.053)	$\gg$	0.157 (0.041)
6	2.92	2.77	0.75	0.98 (0.006)	$\gg$	0.106 (0.029)	0.383 (0.085)	$\approx$	0.303 (0.073)	0.98 (0.006)	$\approx$	0.955 (0.018)	0.981 (0.006)	$\gg$	0.342 (0.059)	$\gg$	0.104 (0.03)
Agg				0.907 (0.013)	$\gg$	0.091 (0.011)	0.393 (0.032)	$>$	0.298 (0.028)	0.907 (0.013)	$\gg$	0.427 (0.026)	0.913 (0.013)	$\gg$	0.347 (0.02)	$\gg$	0.088 (0.011)
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment																	
	3	2	0.9	0.957 (0.012)	$\gg$	0.134 (0.027)	0.38 (0.049)	$\approx$	0.342 (0.032)	0.957 (0.012)	$\gg$	0.696 (0.054)	0.958 (0.012)	$\gg$	0.361 (0.03)	$\gg$	0.133 (0.028)
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment																	
6	5	4	0.88	0.949 (0.019)	$\gg$	0.171 (0.043)	0.483 (0.076)	$\approx$	0.466 (0.058)	0.949 (0.019)	$>$	0.825 (0.048)	0.95 (0.02)	$\gg$	0.474 (0.055)	$\gg$	0.169 (0.044)

Note: Next to the treatment parameters, there are four sets of columns with strategy estimates and hypothesis tests. The first three sets contain estimates from the regression model discussed in the paper (linear probability, subject-level random effects, regression on all five 1-memory states). The material is rearranged to provide additional information. The fourth column contains the respective estimates when states (d,c) and (c,d) are pooled. Both, standard errors (in parentheses) and p-values of the hypothesis tests are bootstrapped and adjusted. $\gg, \ll$ indicates significance at $p < .003$, $>, <$ indicates significance at $p < .05$.

Table 5: Linear probability estimates of average strategies (OLS), standard errors in parentheses

	Treatment parameters			$H_0: \sigma_{cc} = \sigma_{dd}$			$H_0: \sigma_{dc} = \sigma_{cd}$			$H_0: \sigma_{cc} = \sigma_{\emptyset}$			Pooled estimate (using $\sigma_{cd,dc}$)				
Tr	b	a	δ	σ_{cc}		σ_{dd}	σ_{dc}		σ_{cd}	σ_{cc}		$\sigma_{\emptyset}$	σ_{cc}		$\sigma_{cd,dc}$		σ_{dd}
Blonski et al. (2011)																	
6	1.43	1.29	0.5														
3	2.5	1.5	0.5														
2	1.25	1.12	0.75	1 (0.195)	$\gg$	0.005 (0.003)	0.35 (0.116)	$\approx$	0.25 (0.101)	1 (0.195)	$>$	0.088 (0.046)	1 (0.2)	$\approx$	0.3 (0.085)	$\gg$	0.005 (0.003)
7	1.43	1.29	0.75	0.977 (0.024)	$\gg$	0 (0)	0.452 (0.08)	$\approx$	0.323 (0.084)	0.977 (0.024)	$\gg$	0.25 (0.089)	0.977 (0.021)	$\gg$	0.387 (0.065)	$\gg$	0 (0)
4	2.5	1.5	0.75	1 (0.206)	$\gg$	0.016 (0.016)	0.045 (0.049)	$\approx$	0.136 (0.112)	1 (0.206)	$\approx$	0.169 (0.064)	1 (0.195)	$\gg$	0.091 (0.058)	$\approx$	0.016 (0.016)
8	1.43	1.29	0.88	0.979 (0.013)	$\gg$	0.008 (0.007)	0.279 (0.097)	$\approx$	0.419 (0.184)	0.979 (0.013)	$\gg$	0.47 (0.093)	0.979 (0.013)	$\gg$	0.349 (0.11)	$\gg$	0.008 (0.007)
5	2.5	1.5	0.88	0.984 (0.015)	$\gg$	0.031 (0.013)	0.365 (0.086)	$\approx$	0.254 (0.071)	0.984 (0.015)	$\gg$	0.42 (0.092)	0.984 (0.015)	$\gg$	0.31 (0.055)	$\gg$	0.031 (0.013)
9	2.4	1.8	0.75	0.986 (0.011)	$\gg$	0.008 (0.005)	0.176 (0.071)	$\approx$	0.196 (0.079)	0.986 (0.011)	$\gg$	0.494 (0.089)	0.986 (0.011)	$\gg$	0.186 (0.062)	$>$	0.008 (0.005)
1	3	2	0.75	0.92 (0.048)	$\gg$	0.004 (0.004)	0.271 (0.079)	$\approx$	0.356 (0.062)	0.92 (0.048)	$\gg$	0.406 (0.093)	0.92 (0.048)	$\gg$	0.314 (0.054)	$\gg$	0.004 (0.004)
10	4.67	3	0.75	0.885 (0.035)	$\gg$	0.06 (0.033)	0.27 (0.074)	$\approx$	0.206 (0.056)	0.885 (0.035)	$\approx$	0.775 (0.07)	0.885 (0.035)	$\gg$	0.238 (0.056)	$>$	0.06 (0.033)
Agg				0.952 (0.012)	$\gg$	0.014 (0.004)	0.268 (0.03)	$\approx$	0.266 (0.036)	0.952 (0.012)	$\gg$	0.351 (0.031)	0.952 (0.012)	$\gg$	0.267 (0.025)	$\gg$	0.014 (0.004)
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)																	
1	2.92	1.54	0.5	1 (0.024)	$\gg$	0.022 (0.012)	0.477 (0.108)	$\approx$	0.352 (0.073)	1 (0.024)	$\gg$	0.064 (0.022)	1 (0.017)	$\gg$	0.415 (0.063)	$\gg$	0.022 (0.012)
3	2.92	2.15	0.5	0.922 (0.035)	$\gg$	0.078 (0.021)	0.364 (0.068)	$\approx$	0.377 (0.067)	0.922 (0.035)	$\gg$	0.194 (0.035)	0.922 (0.035)	$\gg$	0.37 (0.046)	$\gg$	0.078 (0.021)
2	2.92	1.54	0.75	0.96 (0.018)	$\gg$	0.024 (0.006)	0.408 (0.07)	$\approx$	0.357 (0.058)	0.96 (0.018)	$\gg$	0.264 (0.05)	0.96 (0.018)	$\gg$	0.382 (0.038)	$\gg$	0.024 (0.006)
5	2.92	2.77	0.5	1 (0)	$\gg$	0.027 (0.01)	0.189 (0.056)	$<$	0.409 (0.07)	1 (0)	$\gg$	0.414 (0.062)	1 (0)	$\gg$	0.299 (0.053)	$\gg$	0.027 (0.01)
4	2.92	2.15	0.75	0.974 (0.008)	$\gg$	0.088 (0.038)	0.5 (0.085)	$\approx$	0.405 (0.07)	0.974 (0.008)	$\gg$	0.708 (0.073)	0.974 (0.008)	$\gg$	0.453 (0.057)	$\gg$	0.088 (0.039)
6	2.92	2.77	0.75	0.984 (0.005)	$\gg$	0.083 (0.025)	0.372 (0.089)	$\approx$	0.302 (0.073)	0.984 (0.005)	$\approx$	0.957 (0.017)	0.984 (0.005)	$\gg$	0.337 (0.06)	$\gg$	0.083 (0.026)
Agg				0.979 (0.004)	$\gg$	0.041 (0.006)	0.362 (0.033)	$\approx$	0.376 (0.029)	0.979 (0.004)	$\gg$	0.355 (0.025)	0.979 (0.004)	$\gg$	0.369 (0.022)	$\gg$	0.041 (0.006)
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment																	
	3	2	0.9	0.971 (0.007)	$\gg$	0.098 (0.026)	0.364 (0.05)	$\approx$	0.346 (0.031)	0.971 (0.007)	$\gg$	0.696 (0.054)	0.971 (0.007)	$\gg$	0.355 (0.03)	$\gg$	0.098 (0.026)
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment																	
6	5	4	0.88	0.971 (0.01)	$\gg$	0.083 (0.023)	0.412 (0.083)	$\approx$	0.487 (0.061)	0.971 (0.01)	$>$	0.829 (0.048)	0.971 (0.01)	$\gg$	0.45 (0.06)	$\gg$	0.083 (0.023)

Note: The only difference to Table 4 is that the random effects are dropped. That is, the regression model is estimated simply by OLS, and the estimates are the "raw cooperation probabilities" in the various states. As always, standard errors and p-values are bootstrapped and adjusted, $\gg, \ll$ indicates significance at $p < .003$, $>, <$ indicates significance at $p < .05$.

Table 6: Interdependence with time G (number of game in the session), with random effects and adjusted p-values in parentheses

	Treatment parameters												
Tr	b	a	δ	σ_{cc}	$\sigma_{cc} \times G$	σ_{dc}	$\sigma_{dc} \times G$	σ_{cd}	$\sigma_{cd} \times G$	σ_{dd}	$\sigma_{dd} \times G$	$\sigma_{\emptyset}$	$\sigma_{\emptyset} \times G$
Blonski et al. (2011)													
6	1.43	1.29	0.5										
3	2.5	1.5	0.5										
2	1.25	1.12	0.75	0.988** (0)	0.003 (1)	0.258 (0.764)	0.278 (1)	0.093 (1)	0.455 (1)	0.009 (1)	−0.006 (1)	0.142 (0.275)	−0.108 (1)
7	1.43	1.29	0.75	0.951** (0)	0.114 (0.768)	0.517* (0.004)	−0.161 (0.768)	0.274* (0.046)	0.182 (0.768)	−0.007 (0.625)	−0.008 (0.768)	0.279* (0.006)	−0.058 (0.768)
4	2.5	1.5	0.75	0.764** (0)	1.433 (0.942)	0.066 (1)	−0.06 (1)	0.078 (1)	−0.104 (0.415)	0.032 (1)	−0.011 (1)	0.325* (0.018)	−0.312* (0.016)
8	1.43	1.29	0.88	0.968** (0)	−0.062 (1)	0.272 (0.284)	0.211 (1)	0.314 (0.284)	−0.079 (1)	0.029 (0.682)	0.001 (1)	0.4** (0)	0.14 (1)
5	2.5	1.5	0.88	0.938** (0)	−0.026 (1)	0.293* (0.014)	0.192 (0.695)	0.12 (0.695)	0.207 (0.695)	0.052 (0.272)	0.008 (1)	0.4** (0)	0.04 (1)
9	2.4	1.8	0.75	0.977** (0)	0.016 (1)	0.3 * (0.044)	−0.315 (0.141)	0.232* (0.039)	−0.113 (1)	0.011 (0.802)	−0.004 (1)	0.421** (0)	0.146 (1)
1	3	2	0.75	0.855** (0)	0.082 (1)	0.246 (0.214)	0.079 (1)	0.458** (0)	−0.289 (0.426)	0.013 (0.614)	−0.006 (1)	0.354** (0.002)	0.104 (0.749)
10	4.67	3	0.75	0.882** (0)	0.01 (1)	0.261 (0.396)	0.026 (1)	0.241 (0.066)	−0.099 (1)	0.137 (0.498)	−0.106 (0.647)	0.696** (0)	0.158 (0.155)
Agg				0.936** (0)	−0.027 (1)	0.258** (0)	0.046 (1)	0.217** (0)	0.006 (1)	0.021* (0.015)	0.002 (1)	0.361** (0)	−0.005 (1)
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)													
1	2.92	1.54	0.5	0.738 (0.057)	0.07 (1)	0.215 (0.239)	0.367 (0.172)	0.473* (0.015)	−0.465 (0.239)	0.03 (0.315)	0.002 (1)	0.07 * (0.037)	−0.016 (1)
3	2.92	2.15	0.5	0.879** (0)	−0.129 (0.662)	0.322** (0.001)	0.117 (0.662)	0.397** (0.001)	−0.268 (0.165)	0.118* (0.007)	0.001 (1)	0.179** (0)	0.032 (1)
2	2.92	1.54	0.75	0.904** (0)	−0.01 (1)	0.351** (0.001)	0.118 (1)	0.344** (0.001)	−0.08 (1)	0.033** (0.003)	0.015 (1)	0.24 ** (0.001)	0.046 (1)
5	2.92	2.77	0.5	0.941** (0)	−0.02 (1)	0.305** (0.002)	−0.105 (1)	0.265** (0.002)	0.096 (1)	0.079* (0.025)	−0.015 (1)	0.336** (0)	0.144* (0.05)
4	2.92	2.15	0.75	0.935** (0)	0.016 (0.618)	0.518** (0)	0.076 (0.618)	0.425** (0)	−0.14 (0.505)	0.134* (0.011)	0.102 (0.173)	0.722** (0)	0.092 (0.106)
6	2.92	2.77	0.75	0.978** (0)	0.005 (1)	0.213 (0.151)	0.405* (0.008)	0.212** (0.001)	0.218 (0.806)	0.089 (0.151)	0.049 (1)	0.92** (0)	0.071 (0.411)
Agg				0.905** (0)	0.003 (0.808)	0.34** (0)	0.101 (0.18)	0.346** (0)	−0.09 (0.251)	0.085** (0)	0.014 (0.33)	0.398** (0)	0.06 * (0.036)
Duffy and Ochs (2009), “random rematching” treatment													
	3	2	0.9	0.935** (0)	0.036 (0.242)	0.355** (0)	0.05 (1)	0.321** (0)	0.041 (1)	0.117** (0.002)	0.036 (1)	0.692** (0)	0.007 (1)
Fudenberg et al. (2012), “no-noise” treatment													
6	5	4	0.88	0.94** (0)	0.017 (0.554)	0.511** (0)	−0.051 (1)	0.431** (0)	0.066 (1)	0.153* (0.045)	0.036 (1)	0.811** (0)	0.026 (1)

Note: The model regresses “cooperation” (0 or 1) on the five states and on the interactions of states and G. G is the number of the subject’s game, normalized such that the first analyzed game has index 0 and the last analyzed one has index 1. The coefficient of say $\hat{\sigma}_{cc} \times G$ thus indicates how much σ_{cc} changed over the course of the second half of the session. The normalization does not affect the statistical significance of any coefficient. Adjusted, bootstrapped p-values are provided in parentheses, ** indicates significance at $p < .003$, * indicates significance at $p < .05$.

Table 7: Interdependence with time G (number of game in the session), without random effects (i.e. OLS), adjusted p-values in parentheses

Tr	Treatment parameters b	a	δ	σ_{cc}	$\sigma_{cc} \times G$	σ_{dc}	$\sigma_{dc} \times G$	σ_{cd}	$\sigma_{cd} \times G$	σ_{dd}	$\sigma_{dd} \times G$	$\sigma_{\emptyset}$	$\sigma_{\emptyset} \times G$
Blonski et al. (2011)													
6	1.43	1.29	0.5										
3	2.5	1.5	0.5										
2	1.25	1.12	0.75	1** (0)	0 (1)	0.257 (0.765)	0.284 (1)	0.095 (1)	0.473 (1)	0.008 (1)	−0.007 (1)	0.142 (0.284)	−0.108 (1)
7	1.43	1.29	0.75	0.917** (0)	0.106 (0.77)	0.517* (0.005)	−0.156 (1)	0.262 (0.058)	0.144 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.279* (0.011)	−0.058 (1)
4	2.5	1.5	0.75	1** (0)	0 (1)	0.081 (1)	−0.123 (1)	0.136 (0.954)	0 (1)	0.011 (1)	0.011 (0.954)	0.325* (0.008)	−0.313* (0.01)
8	1.43	1.29	0.88	0.979** (0)	−0.001 (1)	0.194 (0.62)	0.261 (1)	0.505* (0.026)	−0.265 (1)	0.014 (1)	−0.023 (1)	0.4** (0.001)	0.14 (1)
5	2.5	1.5	0.88	0.998** (0)	−0.036 (1)	0.283* (0.018)	0.179 (0.746)	0.159 (0.412)	0.207 (0.626)	0.031 (0.412)	0.001 (1)	0.4** (0)	0.04 (1)
9	2.4	1.8	0.75	0.971** (0)	0.033 (0.813)	0.301* (0.034)	−0.324 (0.126)	0.246* (0.014)	−0.129 (0.832)	0.012 (0.507)	−0.009 (0.832)	0.421** (0)	0.146 (0.832)
1	3	2	0.75	0.873** (0)	0.081 (1)	0.239 (0.239)	0.072 (1)	0.486** (0.002)	−0.291 (0.416)	0.01 (1)	−0.015 (1)	0.354** (0)	0.104 (0.94)
10	4.67	3	0.75	0.881** (0)	0.006 (1)	0.247 (0.474)	0.035 (1)	0.264* (0.042)	−0.09 (1)	0.13 (0.474)	−0.099 (0.848)	0.696** (0)	0.158 (0.133)
Agg				0.97** (0)	−0.037 (0.536)	0.247** (0)	0.049 (1)	0.273** (0)	−0.017 (1)	0.015* (0.013)	−0.003 (1)	0.353** (0)	−0.005 (1)
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)													
1	2.92	1.54	0.5	1** (0)	0 (0.18)	0.201 (0.332)	0.48* (0.038)	0.554* (0.013)	−0.35 (0.455)	0.012 (0.53)	0.018 (0.53)	0.072* (0.021)	−0.016 (0.696)
3	2.92	2.15	0.5	0.966** (0)	−0.083 (1)	0.283* (0.004)	0.153 (0.608)	0.475** (0)	−0.187 (0.524)	0.074* (0.04)	0.007 (1)	0.179** (0)	0.032 (1)
2	2.92	1.54	0.75	0.98** (0)	−0.039 (1)	0.336** (0.002)	0.133 (1)	0.402** (0)	−0.084 (1)	0.019* (0.022)	0.011 (1)	0.241** (0.002)	0.046 (1)
5	2.92	2.77	0.5	1** (0)	0 (0.521)	0.279* (0.008)	−0.155 (0.446)	0.333** (0.001)	0.132 (0.508)	0.04 (0.055)	−0.024 (0.521)	0.342** (0)	0.144 (0.055)
4	2.92	2.15	0.75	0.972** (0)	0.005 (1)	0.446** (0)	0.121 (0.7)	0.441** (0)	−0.081 (1)	0.076 (0.089)	0.031 (1)	0.662** (0)	0.092 (0.111)
6	2.92	2.77	0.75	0.98** (0)	0.007 (0.936)	0.193 (0.26)	0.424* (0.01)	0.208** (0)	0.222 (0.794)	0.066 (0.32)	0.061 (0.936)	0.922** (0)	0.071 (0.39)
Agg				0.979** (0)	0 (1)	0.308** (0)	0.101 (0.298)	0.403** (0)	−0.052 (0.951)	0.04** (0)	0.003 (1)	0.325** (0)	0.06* (0.039)
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment													
	3	2	0.9	0.951** (0)	0.032 (0.246)	0.334** (0)	0.056 (1)	0.329** (0)	0.032 (1)	0.097* (0.007)	0.001 (1)	0.693** (0)	0.007 (1)
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment													
6	5	4	0.88	0.964** (0)	0.013 (1)	0.468** (0)	−0.102 (1)	0.454** (0)	0.06 (1)	0.057 (0.373)	0.053 (1)	0.816** (0)	0.026 (1)

Note: The only difference to Table 6 is that the random effects are dropped (the regression model is estimated simply by OLS, to obtain raw cooperation probabilities). Adjusted, bootstrapped p-values are provided in parentheses, ** indicates significance at $p < .003$, * indicates significance at $p < .05$.

Table 8: Interdependence with time T (number of decision in session), with random effects and adjusted p-values in parentheses

Tr	b	a	δ	σ_{cc}	$\sigma_{cc} \times T$	σ_{dc}	$\sigma_{dc} \times T$	σ_{cd}	$\sigma_{cd} \times T$	σ_{dd}	$\sigma_{dd} \times T$	$\sigma_{\emptyset}$	$\sigma_{\emptyset} \times T$
Blonski et al. (2011)													
6	1.43	1.29	0.5										
3	2.5	1.5	0.5										
2	1.25	1.12	0.75	0.986** (0)	0.004 (1)	0.234 (1)	0.354 (1)	0.058 (1)	0.566 (1)	0.008 (1)	−0.006 (1)	0.135 (0.304)	−0.109 (1)
7	1.43	1.29	0.75	0.934** (0)	0.138 (0.913)	0.537* (0.004)	−0.198 (0.913)	0.241 (0.147)	0.244 (0.913)	−0.006 (0.644)	−0.009 (0.913)	0.287* (0.01)	−0.081 (0.913)
4	2.5	1.5	0.75	0.572 (0.329)	0.976 (1)	0.064 (1)	−0.043 (1)	0.086 (1)	−0.107 (1)	0.038 (1)	−0.021 (1)	0.363** (0.002)	−0.36* (0.008)
8	1.43	1.29	0.88	1.005** (0)	−0.106 (0.903)	0.237 (0.645)	0.217 (0.903)	0.264 (0.369)	0.041 (1)	0.031 (0.903)	−0.005 (1)	0.377* (0.005)	0.163 (0.903)
5	2.5	1.5	0.88	0.933** (0.001)	−0.014 (1)	0.256 (0.056)	0.244 (0.544)	0.07 (1)	0.282 (0.412)	0.06 (0.415)	−0.01 (1)	0.391** (0)	0.059 (1)
9	2.4	1.8	0.75	0.972** (0)	0.021 (1)	0.347 (0.121)	−0.347 (0.817)	0.204 (0.145)	−0.035 (1)	0.014 (1)	−0.009 (1)	0.4* (0.004)	0.174 (1)
1	3	2	0.75	0.868* (0.006)	0.055 (1)	0.203 (0.388)	0.161 (1)	0.444** (0.002)	−0.236 (0.403)	0.016 (0.648)	−0.011 (1)	0.348** (0)	0.117 (0.648)
10	4.67	3	0.75	0.883** (0)	0.012 (1)	0.276 (0.161)	0.004 (1)	0.224* (0.031)	−0.094 (1)	0.122 (0.397)	−0.101 (0.397)	0.728** (0)	0.145 (0.249)
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)													
1	2.92	1.54	0.5	0.767** (0)	0.036 (1)	0.261 (0.082)	0.317 (0.213)	0.468* (0.018)	−0.505 (0.169)	0.029 (0.369)	0.005 (1)	0.067* (0.029)	−0.012 (1)
3	2.92	2.15	0.5	0.866** (0)	−0.099 (0.977)	0.33** (0)	0.102 (0.977)	0.385* (0.005)	−0.247 (0.31)	0.12* (0.007)	−0.002 (0.977)	0.173** (0.001)	0.044 (0.977)
2	2.92	1.54	0.75	0.909** (0)	−0.019 (1)	0.317* (0.006)	0.182 (0.829)	0.353** (0)	−0.098 (1)	0.031* (0.006)	0.019 (1)	0.24* (0.003)	0.048 (1)
5	2.92	2.77	0.5	0.931** (0)	−0.003 (1)	0.301* (0.004)	−0.103 (1)	0.279* (0.004)	0.073 (1)	0.081* (0.022)	−0.019 (1)	0.338** (0)	0.149* (0.041)
4	2.92	2.15	0.75	0.93** (0)	0.025 (0.694)	0.525** (0)	0.053 (0.694)	0.421** (0)	−0.126 (0.694)	0.137* (0.02)	0.077 (0.514)	0.714** (0)	0.106 (0.085)
6	2.92	2.77	0.75	0.975** (0)	0.009 (0.965)	0.193 (0.345)	0.41* (0.027)	0.206* (0.018)	0.21 (0.965)	0.092 (0.292)	0.036 (0.965)	0.912** (0)	0.085 (0.345)
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment													
	3	2	0.9	0.938** (0)	0.035 (0.194)	0.376** (0)	0.009 (1)	0.346** (0)	−0.01 (1)	0.117* (0.005)	0.036 (1)	0.702** (0)	−0.017 (1)
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment													
6	5	4	0.88	0.941** (0)	0.016 (1)	0.556** (0)	−0.143 (1)	0.433** (0)	0.066 (1)	0.153 (0.085)	0.033 (1)	0.806** (0)	0.049 (1)

Treatment parameters: b, a, δ.

Note: The only difference to Table 6 is that time index is defined differently. T is the number of the subject's decision, normalized such that the first decision (in the second half) has index 0 and the last one has index 1. Again, the coefficient of say $\hat{\sigma}_{cc} \times T$ indicates how much σ_{cc} changed over the course of the second half of the session. Adjusted, bootstrapped p-values are in parentheses, ** indicates significance at $p < .003$, and * indicates significance at $p < .05$.

Table 9: Interdependence with time T (number of decision in session), without random effects (i.e. OLS), adjusted p-values in parentheses

Tr	Treatment parameters b	a	δ	σ_{cc}	$\sigma_{cc} \times T$	σ_{dc}	$\sigma_{dc} \times T$	σ_{cd}	$\sigma_{cd} \times T$	σ_{dd}	$\sigma_{dd} \times T$	$\sigma_{\emptyset}$	$\sigma_{\emptyset} \times T$
Blonski et al. (2011)													
6	1.43	1.29	0.5										
3	2.5	1.5	0.5										
2	1.25	1.12	0.75	1 ** (0)	0 (1)	0.232 (1)	0.362 (1)	0.059 (1)	0.586 (1)	0.008 (1)	−0.006 (1)	0.135 (0.334)	−0.109 (1)
7	1.43	1.29	0.75	0.9 ** (0.001)	0.131 (0.745)	0.538* (0.005)	−0.194 (1)	0.231 (0.19)	0.208 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.287* (0.01)	−0.081 (1)
4	2.5	1.5	0.75	1 ** (0)	0 (1)	0.09 (1)	−0.127 (1)	0.11 (0.925)	0.074 (1)	0.014 (1)	0.003 (0.771)	0.363* (0.004)	−0.36* (0.008)
8	1.43	1.29	0.88	0.993** (0)	−0.027 (1)	0.156 (1)	0.249 (1)	0.458 (0.169)	−0.08 (1)	0.025 (1)	−0.035 (1)	0.377** (0.002)	0.163 (1)
5	2.5	1.5	0.88	0.996** (0)	−0.024 (1)	0.248 (0.066)	0.226 (0.792)	0.105 (1)	0.288 (0.324)	0.04 (0.591)	−0.017 (1)	0.391** (0)	0.059 (1)
9	2.4	1.8	0.75	0.962** (0)	0.045 (0.346)	0.347 (0.098)	−0.354 (0.638)	0.223 (0.068)	−0.055 (0.758)	0.016 (0.657)	−0.017 (0.751)	0.4 ** (0.003)	0.174 (0.751)
1	3	2	0.75	0.884** (0.001)	0.056 (1)	0.195 (0.436)	0.158 (1)	0.473** (0.002)	−0.241 (0.436)	0.012 (1)	−0.017 (1)	0.348** (0)	0.117 (0.629)
10	4.67	3	0.75	0.881** (0)	0.007 (1)	0.264 (0.267)	0.011 (1)	0.243* (0.006)	−0.071 (1)	0.12 (0.31)	−0.101 (0.345)	0.728** (0)	0.145 (0.267)
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)													
1	2.92	1.54	0.5	1 ** (0)	0 (0.636)	0.261 (0.117)	0.417 (0.075)	0.568* (0.007)	−0.415 (0.348)	0.018 (0.636)	0.007 (0.722)	0.079* (0.025)	−0.032 (0.722)
3	2.92	2.15	0.5	0.968** (0)	−0.083 (0.928)	0.297* (0.004)	0.127 (0.886)	0.478** (0)	−0.193 (0.546)	0.083* (0.029)	−0.011 (0.928)	0.17** (0)	0.049 (0.928)
2	2.92	1.54	0.75	0.987** (0)	−0.053 (1)	0.299* (0.022)	0.202 (0.774)	0.407** (0)	−0.094 (1)	0.017 (0.098)	0.014 (1)	0.256** (0.002)	0.017 (1)
5	2.92	2.77	0.5	1 ** (0)	0 (0.695)	0.274* (0.013)	−0.155 (0.617)	0.358** (0)	0.093 (0.695)	0.041* (0.046)	−0.026 (0.659)	0.344** (0)	0.149* (0.048)
4	2.92	2.15	0.75	0.971** (0)	0.007 (1)	0.456** (0)	0.095 (1)	0.44** (0)	−0.075 (1)	0.089 (0.065)	−0.001 (1)	0.616** (0)	0.182** (0.002)
6	2.92	2.77	0.75	0.98** (0)	0.007 (0.991)	0.174 (0.546)	0.427* (0.027)	0.204* (0.026)	0.212 (0.95)	0.068 (0.546)	0.044 (0.991)	0.918** (0)	0.077 (0.409)
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment													
	3	2	0.9	0.949** (0)	0.041 (0.062)	0.352** (0)	0.025 (1)	0.351** (0)	−0.011 (1)	0.096* (0.013)	0.003 (1)	0.687** (0)	0.027 (1)
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment													
6	5	4	0.88	0.964** (0)	0.013 (1)	0.519** (0)	−0.209 (0.906)	0.456** (0)	0.062 (1)	0.054 (0.693)	0.058 (1)	0.808** (0)	0.055 (1)

Note: The two differences to Table 6 are that time index is defined differently (T is the number of the subject's decision, as in Table 8), and that the random effects are dropped (estimation by OLS, as in Table 7). Adjusted, bootstrapped p-values are in parentheses, ** indicates significance at $p < .003$, and * indicates significance at $p < .05$.

Figure 1: Plots of the cooperation probabilities over time



Table 10: Interdependence of behavior with cooperation rates in the first half, with random effects and adjusted p-values in parentheses

Tr	Treatment parameters b	a	δ	σ_{cc}	σ_{dc}	σ_{cd}	σ_{dd}	$\sigma_{\emptyset}$	$\Pr(c\,\vert\,\text{Own, Half 1})$	$\Pr(c\,\vert\,\text{Opp, Half 1})$
Blonski et al. (2011)										
6	1.43	1.29	0.5							
3	2.5	1.5	0.5							
2	1.25	1.12	0.75	0.951** (0)	0.331* (0.035)	0.213 (0.181)	−0.006 (0.558)	0.075 (0.274)	0.053 (0.328)	0.015 (0.558)
7	1.43	1.29	0.75	0.972** (0)	0.418** (0)	0.305* (0.004)	−0.04 (0.05)	0.217* (0.035)	0.122* (0.035)	0.005 (0.915)
4	2.5	1.5	0.75	0.843** (0)	0.012 (1)	0.021 (1)	−0.01 (0.88)	0.133 (0.281)	1.035* (0.023)	0.02 (1)
8	1.43	1.29	0.88	0.886** (0)	0.287* (0.035)	0.221* (0.035)	−0.034 (0.327)	0.407** (0)	0.291* (0.035)	−0.021 (0.688)
5	2.5	1.5	0.88	0.867** (0)	0.326** (0.001)	0.161* (0.032)	0.002 (1)	0.365** (0.001)	0.501* (0.022)	0.073 (1)
9	2.4	1.8	0.75	0.923** (0)	0.131 (0.218)	0.141 (0.266)	−0.023 (0.85)	0.452** (0)	0.051 (0.85)	0.124 (0.054)
1	3	2	0.75	0.907** (0)	0.283* (0.01)	0.332** (0)	0.017* (0.045)	0.411** (0)	−1.84 (0.054)	−2.151 (0.222)
10	4.67	3	0.75	0.863** (0)	0.253* (0.004)	0.149 (0.14)	0.035 (1)	0.749** (0)	0.08 (0.818)	−0.019 (1)
Agg				0.897** (0)	0.256** (0)	0.196** (0)	0 (1)	0.336** (0)	0.117* (0.022)	0.007 (1)
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)										
1	2.92	1.54	0.5	0.748** (0.002)	0.38** (0)	0.157 (0.149)	−0.02 (0.366)	0.011 (1)	0.427* (0.045)	0.001 (1)
3	2.92	2.15	0.5	0.684** (0)	0.261** (0.001)	0.136 (0.212)	0.004 (0.905)	0.078 (0.212)	0.654** (0.002)	0.075 (0.212)
2	2.92	1.54	0.75	0.862** (0)	0.378** (0)	0.262** (0)	0.003 (1)	0.226** (0)	0.208 (0.114)	−0.012 (1)
5	2.92	2.77	0.5	0.881** (0)	0.199* (0.007)	0.271** (0)	0.025 (0.942)	0.361** (0)	0.137 (0.494)	0.001 (0.973)
4	2.92	2.15	0.75	0.751** (0)	0.36** (0)	0.177* (0.035)	−0.015 (0.658)	0.579** (0)	0.358** (0)	0.031 (0.408)
6	2.92	2.77	0.75	0.919** (0)	0.324** (0.001)	0.243* (0.003)	0.047 (0.193)	0.894** (0)	0.088* (0.04)	0.009 (0.501)
Agg				0.799** (0)	0.291** (0)	0.195** (0)	−0.008 (0.525)	0.324** (0)	0.316** (0)	0.012 (0.525)
Duffy and Ochs (2009), “random rematching” treatment										
	3	2	0.9	0.879** (0)	0.302** (0)	0.265** (0)	0.061* (0.04)	0.617** (0)	0.136* (0.013)	0.038 (0.124)
Fudenberg et al. (2012), “no-noise” treatment										
6	5	4	0.88	0.616** (0)	0.19 * (0.023)	0.18 * (0.023)	−0.098* (0.022)	0.507** (0)	0.332** (0)	0.126* (0.003)

Note: The model regresses “cooperation” (0 or 1) on the five states and on the relative frequencies of cooperation of the two players (*own* and *opponent*) in the first half of the session, labeled $\Pr(c\,|\,\text{Own, Half 1})$ and $\Pr(c\,|\,\text{Opp, Half 1})$, respectively. The opponent’s cooperation rate is unknown to DM, but he might adapt to cooperative opponents (which would be indicative of actual strategies being more complex than 1-memory Markov). Adjusted, bootstrapped p-values are provided in parentheses, ** indicates significance at $p < .003$, * indicates significance at $p < .05$.

Table 11: Interdependence of behavior with cooperation rates in the first half, without random effects (i.e. OLS) and adjusted p-values in parentheses

	Treatment parameters									
Tr	b	a	δ	σ_{cc}	σ_{dc}	σ_{cd}	σ_{dd}	$\sigma_{\emptyset}$	$\Pr(c \mid \text{Own, Half 1})$	$\Pr(c \mid \text{Opp, Half 1})$
Blonski et al. (2011)										
6	1.43	1.29	0.5							
3	2.5	1.5	0.5							
2	1.25	1.12	0.75	0.938** (0)	0.312 (0.056)	0.201 (0.196)	−0.02 (0.464)	0.061 (0.196)	0.106 (0.464)	0.033 (0.464)
7	1.43	1.29	0.75	0.755** (0)	0.304* (0.031)	0.124 (0.331)	−0.113* (0.014)	0.112 (0.112)	0.419* (0.02)	0.111 (0.272)
4	2.5	1.5	0.75	0.912** (0)	0.02 (1)	0.052 (1)	−0.008 (1)	0.139 (0.158)	0.868 (0.342)	0.005 (1)
8	1.43	1.29	0.88	0.881** (0)	0.254* (0.039)	0.255* (0.03)	−0.045 (0.126)	0.4 ** (0.001)	0.333* (0.017)	−0.031 (0.548)
5	2.5	1.5	0.88	0.928** (0)	0.328** (0.001)	0.195* (0.02)	−0.005 (1)	0.378** (0)	0.419 (0.066)	0.024 (1)
9	2.4	1.8	0.75	0.847** (0)	0.081 (0.579)	0.062 (0.585)	−0.077 (0.08)	0.392** (0.002)	0.346* (0.036)	0.082 (0.579)
1	3	2	0.75	0.92** (0)	0.279* (0.007)	0.359** (0)	0.018 (0.162)	0.417** (0)	−6.174* (0.007)	−2.402 (0.218)
10	4.67	3	0.75	0.857** (0)	0.249* (0.014)	0.177 (0.058)	0.033 (1)	0.748** (0)	0.082 (0.847)	−0.02 (1)
Agg				0.877** (0)	0.227** (0)	0.196** (0)	−0.023* (0.007)	0.305** (0)	0.24** (0)	0.013 (0.65)
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)										
1	2.92	1.54	0.5	0.849** (0)	0.411** (0)	0.219** (0.001)	−0.026 (0.184)	0.011 (0.874)	0.417* (0.036)	0.029 (0.874)
3	2.92	2.15	0.5	0.755** (0)	0.257** (0.003)	0.219 (0.086)	−0.018 (1)	0.092* (0.043)	0.637** (0.003)	0.007 (1)
2	2.92	1.54	0.75	0.839** (0)	0.335** (0)	0.239** (0.002)	−0.041* (0.005)	0.189** (0.001)	0.396** (0)	0.004 (0.921)
5	2.92	2.77	0.5	0.642** (0)	0.034 (1)	0.074 (1)	−0.154** (0)	0.177* (0.012)	0.637** (0)	0.058 (0.127)
4	2.92	2.15	0.75	0.652** (0)	0.317* (0.004)	0.142 (0.249)	−0.049 (0.249)	0.456** (0)	0.474** (0)	0.062 (0.249)
6	2.92	2.77	0.75	0.91** (0)	0.315** (0.003)	0.239** (0.001)	0.028 (0.32)	0.886** (0)	0.09 (0.067)	0.022 (0.25)
Agg				0.548** (0)	0.169** (0)	0.114** (0.003)	−0.09** (0)	0.15** (0)	0.575** (0)	0.165** (0)
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment										
	3	2	0.9	0.871** (0)	0.28** (0)	0.254** (0)	0.028 (0.407)	0.604** (0)	0.176** (0.002)	0.036 (0.407)
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment										
6	5	4	0.88	0.643** (0)	0.198* (0.024)	0.22 * (0.003)	−0.116* (0.003)	0.532** (0)	0.305** (0)	0.119** (0.002)

Note: The only difference to Table 6 is that the random effects are dropped (the regression model is estimated simply by OLS, to obtain raw cooperation probabilities). Adjusted, bootstrapped p-values are in parentheses, ** indicates significance at $p < .003$, * indicates significance at $p < .05$.

Table 12: Expected payoffs of c and d in the five states (using the normalized stage game payoffs), derived from the estimated 1-memory Markov strategies with random effects (Table 4), bootstrapped standard erros in parentheses

	State (c,c)			State (d,c)			State (c,d)			State (d,d)			State $\emptyset$			Symmetry between (c,d) and (d,c)		
Tr	$\hat{\pi}_{cc}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{cc}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{dc}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{dc}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{cd}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{cd}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{dd}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{dd}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{\emptyset}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{\emptyset}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{dc}(c)-\hat{\pi}_{cd}(c)$	$\hat{\pi}_{dc}(d)-\hat{\pi}_{cd}(d)$	$\tilde{\pi}_{dc}-\tilde{\pi}_{cd}$
Blonski et al. (2011)																		
6																		
3																		
2	1.092 (0.029)	$\approx$	1.014 (0.014)	0.811 (0.033)	$\ll$	1 (0.005)	0.858 (0.048)	$<$	1.001 (0.005)	0.73 (0.011)	$\ll$	0.996 (0.002)	0.76 (0.018)	$\ll$	0.997 (0.002)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
7	1.315 (0.091)	$\approx$	1.115 (0.03)	0.963 (0.064)	$\approx$	1.043 (0.02)	1.017 (0.066)	$\approx$	1.053 (0.017)	0.776 (0.023)	$\ll$	1.001 (0.002)	0.913 (0.05)	$<$	1.029 (0.01)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
4	1.268 (0.136)	$\approx$	1.334 (0.033)	0.787 (0.028)	$\ll$	1.03 (0.032)	0.791 (0.047)	$\ll$	1.029 (0.022)	0.777 (0.022)	$\ll$	1.022 (0.02)	0.861 (0.054)	$\ll$	1.074 (0.024)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
8	1.145 (0.046)	$\approx$	1.042 (0.017)	0.95 (0.04)	$\approx$	1.008 (0.013)	0.975 (0.047)	$\approx$	1.01 (0.014)	0.884 (0.021)	$\ll$	0.993 (0.007)	1.009 (0.043)	$\approx$	1.016 (0.012)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
5	1.286 (0.052)	$\approx$	1.247 (0.034)	1.058 (0.051)	$\approx$	1.102 (0.035)	1.113 (0.063)	$\approx$	1.137 (0.04)	1.008 (0.04)	$\approx$	1.068 (0.025)	1.126 (0.058)	$\approx$	1.144 (0.036)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
9	1.715 (0.064)	$\gg$	1.39 (0.034)	0.968 (0.086)	$\approx$	1.081 (0.039)	0.967 (0.091)	$\approx$	1.079 (0.032)	0.805 (0.031)	$\ll$	1.01 (0.005)	1.26 (0.102)	$\approx$	1.199 (0.034)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
1	1.681 (0.14)	$\approx$	1.598 (0.054)	1.165 (0.08)	$\approx$	1.226 (0.056)	1.128 (0.119)	$\approx$	1.2 (0.061)	0.89 (0.06)	$\approx$	1.022 (0.012)	1.237 (0.115)	$\approx$	1.277 (0.065)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
10	2.32 (0.148)	$\approx$	2.067 (0.097)	1.334 (0.15)	$\approx$	1.352 (0.127)	1.477 (0.171)	$\approx$	1.457 (0.123)	1.181 (0.124)	$\approx$	1.235 (0.13)	2.167 (0.127)	$\approx$	1.951 (0.083)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)																		
1	1.316 (0.1)	$\ll$	1.802 (0.107)	0.839 (0.073)	$\ll$	1.225 (0.082)	1.003 (0.117)	$\ll$	1.427 (0.099)	0.694 (0.056)	$\ll$	1.049 (0.026)	0.719 (0.056)	$\ll$	1.08 (0.025)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
3	1.706 (0.111)	$<$	1.876 (0.075)	1.014 (0.091)	$\ll$	1.332 (0.079)	1.171 (0.113)	$\ll$	1.455 (0.074)	0.839 (0.067)	$\ll$	1.193 (0.048)	0.935 (0.07)	$\ll$	1.268 (0.044)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
2	1.386 (0.035)	$\ll$	1.548 (0.038)	1.081 (0.042)	$\ll$	1.219 (0.045)	1.135 (0.059)	$\ll$	1.279 (0.045)	0.946 (0.039)	$\ll$	1.073 (0.017)	1.06 (0.048)	$\ll$	1.197 (0.035)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
5	2.465 (0.081)	$\gg$	2.069 (0.046)	1.256 (0.127)	$<$	1.403 (0.085)	1.113 (0.151)	$<$	1.322 (0.076)	0.767 (0.069)	$\ll$	1.13 (0.035)	1.436 (0.144)	$\approx$	1.5 (0.078)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
4	1.955 (0.063)	$\approx$	1.814 (0.077)	1.49 (0.103)	$\approx$	1.479 (0.095)	1.638 (0.11)	$\approx$	1.586 (0.099)	1.333 (0.089)	$\approx$	1.362 (0.082)	1.815 (0.081)	$\approx$	1.712 (0.075)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
6	2.609 (0.045)	$\gg$	1.824 (0.105)	1.586 (0.165)	$>$	1.401 (0.118)	1.709 (0.194)	$>$	1.452 (0.122)	1.302 (0.129)	$\approx$	1.277 (0.089)	2.572 (0.05)	$\gg$	1.808 (0.101)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment																		
	1.741 (0.05)	$>$	1.572 (0.041)	1.452 (0.047)	$\approx$	1.408 (0.044)	1.471 (0.057)	$\approx$	1.419 (0.046)	1.355 (0.046)	$\approx$	1.352 (0.045)	1.619 (0.053)	$>$	1.502 (0.043)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment																		
6	3.426 (0.165)	$\approx$	2.978 (0.21)	2.898 (0.218)	$>$	2.585 (0.236)	2.914 (0.24)	$>$	2.601 (0.251)	2.578 (0.22)	$\approx$	2.339 (0.224)	3.292 (0.173)	$\approx$	2.877 (0.211)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$

Note: I estimate the 1-memory Markov strategies as above (linear probability model with random effects), and using these esimates, I compute the expected payoffs of cooperate and defect in the various states. The right-most column presents the difference of $\tilde{\pi}_{dc} = \hat{\pi}_{dc}(c) - \hat{\pi}_{dc}(d)$ and $\tilde{\pi}_{cd} = \hat{\pi}_{cd}(c) - \hat{\pi}_{cd}(d)$. Standard errors and p-values are bootstrapped as above. As in all tables, $\ll, \gg$ indicates significance at $p < .003$, $<, >$ indicates significance at $p < .05$.

Table 13: Expected payoffs of c and d in the five states (using the normalized stage game payoffs), derived from the estimated 1-memory Markov strategies without random effects (OLS, Table 5), bootstrapped standard errros in parentheses

	State (c,c)			State (d,c)			State (c,d)			State (d,d)			State $\emptyset$			Symmetry between (c,d) and (d,c)		
Tr	$\hat{\pi}_{cc}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{cc}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{dc}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{dc}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{cd}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{cd}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{dd}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{dd}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{\emptyset}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{\emptyset}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{dc}(c)-\hat{\pi}_{cd}(c)$	$\hat{\pi}_{dc}(d)-\hat{\pi}_{cd}(d)$	$\tilde{\pi}_{dc}-\tilde{\pi}_{cd}$
Blonski et al. (2011)																		
6																		
3																		
2	1.125 (0)	$\gg$	1.019 (0.015)	0.823 (0.035)	$\ll$	1.002 (0.005)	0.868 (0.048)	$<$	1.003 (0.005)	0.731 (0.011)	$\ll$	0.997 (0.002)	0.764 (0.02)	$\ll$	0.998 (0.002)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
7	1.238 (0.042)	$\gg$	1.094 (0.019)	0.923 (0.044)	$\ll$	1.033 (0.015)	0.983 (0.051)	$\approx$	1.043 (0.013)	0.767 (0.017)	$\ll$	1 (0)	0.888 (0.042)	$\ll$	1.023 (0.008)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
4	1.5 (0)	$\approx$	1.414 (0.048)	0.84 (0.069)	$\ll$	1.062 (0.061)	0.779 (0.059)	$\ll$	1.027 (0.021)	0.756 (0.024)	$\ll$	1.015 (0.016)	0.871 (0.067)	$\ll$	1.075 (0.025)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
8	1.209 (0.038)	$\gg$	1.075 (0.035)	1.004 (0.069)	$\approx$	1.033 (0.029)	0.978 (0.056)	$\approx$	1.022 (0.018)	0.882 (0.029)	$<$	1 (0.004)	1.037 (0.044)	$\approx$	1.035 (0.02)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
5	1.423 (0.046)	$>$	1.275 (0.038)	1.102 (0.056)	$\approx$	1.104 (0.038)	1.153 (0.068)	$\approx$	1.131 (0.043)	1.007 (0.045)	$\approx$	1.051 (0.024)	1.178 (0.06)	$\approx$	1.142 (0.036)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
9	1.729 (0.046)	$\gg$	1.396 (0.034)	0.979 (0.086)	$\approx$	1.086 (0.041)	0.961 (0.092)	$\approx$	1.077 (0.033)	0.8 (0.033)	$\ll$	1.008 (0.005)	1.261 (0.096)	$\approx$	1.2 (0.034)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
1	1.724 (0.142)	$\approx$	1.623 (0.058)	1.197 (0.086)	$\approx$	1.243 (0.057)	1.127 (0.119)	$\approx$	1.193 (0.057)	0.88 (0.058)	$\approx$	1.009 (0.009)	1.245 (0.112)	$\approx$	1.278 (0.064)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
10	2.304 (0.137)	$\approx$	2.083 (0.097)	1.365 (0.157)	$\approx$	1.384 (0.132)	1.46 (0.187)	$\approx$	1.455 (0.138)	1.174 (0.134)	$\approx$	1.234 (0.121)	2.159 (0.125)	$\approx$	1.969 (0.08)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)																		
1	1.538 (0)	$\ll$	2.059 (0.042)	0.974 (0.069)	$\ll$	1.379 (0.094)	1.072 (0.127)	$\ll$	1.501 (0.112)	0.694 (0.062)	$\ll$	1.038 (0.021)	0.73 (0.062)	$\ll$	1.082 (0.026)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
3	1.942 (0.082)	$\approx$	2.059 (0.064)	1.194 (0.098)	$\ll$	1.47 (0.094)	1.174 (0.127)	$\ll$	1.454 (0.081)	0.78 (0.065)	$\ll$	1.142 (0.038)	0.941 (0.076)	$\ll$	1.268 (0.043)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
2	1.465 (0.027)	$\ll$	1.606 (0.035)	1.125 (0.039)	$\ll$	1.249 (0.047)	1.151 (0.064)	$\ll$	1.278 (0.046)	0.937 (0.041)	$<$	1.049 (0.013)	1.072 (0.051)	$\ll$	1.193 (0.036)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
5	2.769 (0)	$\gg$	2.213 (0.058)	1.466 (0.154)	$\approx$	1.51 (0.108)	0.99 (0.165)	$<$	1.25 (0.073)	0.632 (0.063)	$\ll$	1.054 (0.019)	1.477 (0.148)	$\approx$	1.513 (0.08)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$>$
4	2.045 (0.036)	$>$	1.834 (0.085)	1.53 (0.11)	$>$	1.455 (0.11)	1.616 (0.128)	$>$	1.519 (0.122)	1.247 (0.115)	$\approx$	1.241 (0.098)	1.806 (0.079)	$>$	1.656 (0.084)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
6	2.628 (0.04)	$\gg$	1.805 (0.104)	1.572 (0.167)	$>$	1.368 (0.114)	1.68 (0.201)	$>$	1.413 (0.119)	1.248 (0.127)	$\approx$	1.227 (0.081)	2.588 (0.045)	$\gg$	1.788 (0.1)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment																		
	1.785 (0.038)	$\gg$	1.551 (0.044)	1.449 (0.046)	$>$	1.37 (0.05)	1.459 (0.06)	$\approx$	1.375 (0.053)	1.316 (0.053)	$\approx$	1.297 (0.055)	1.637 (0.049)	$\gg$	1.471 (0.049)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment																		
6	3.537 (0.131)	$>$	2.814 (0.243)	2.846 (0.233)	$\gg$	2.319 (0.264)	2.741 (0.292)	$\gg$	2.248 (0.294)	2.289 (0.269)	$\gg$	1.905 (0.233)	3.337 (0.152)	$\gg$	2.668 (0.245)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$

Note: The only difference to Table 12 is that the random effects in the strategy estimations are dropped (estimation by OLS, to obtain raw cooperation probabilities). As always, standard errors and p-values are bootstrapped and adjusted, ** indicates significance at $p < .003$, * indicates significance at $p < .05$.

Table 14: Expected payoffs of c and d in the five states, accounting for continuation play, estimated directly from the data with subject-level random effects (using the normalized stage game payoffs), bootstrapped standard errros in parentheses

	State (c,c)			State (d,c)			State (c,d)			State (d,d)			State $\emptyset$			Symmetry between (c,d) and (d,c)		
Tr	$\hat{\pi}_{cc}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{cc}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{dc}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{dc}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{cd}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{cd}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{dd}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{dd}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{\emptyset}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{\emptyset}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{dc}(c)-\hat{\pi}_{cd}(c)$	$\hat{\pi}_{dc}(d)-\hat{\pi}_{cd}(d)$	$\tilde{\pi}_{dc}-\tilde{\pi}_{cd}$
Blonski et al. (2011)																		
6																		
3																		
2	1.116 (0.009)			0.777 (0.113)	$\approx$	1.027 (0.022)	0.639 (0.312)	$\approx$	1.036 (0.03)	0.876 (0.063)	$\approx$	0.996 (0.003)	0.701 (0.114)	$\approx$	1.002 (0.005)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
7	1.228 (0.06)	$\approx$	1.429 (0.008)	0.785 (0.118)	$\approx$	1.039 (0.034)	0.883 (0.137)	$\approx$	1.106 (0.028)			1.001 (0.002)	0.71 (0.051)	$\ll$	1.042 (0.011)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
4	1.494 (0.004)			1.493 (0.004)	$\approx$	1.058 (0.031)	0.934 (0.006)	$\approx$	1.024 (0.025)	0.449 (0.006)	$\ll$	1.017 (0.007)	0.77 (0.05)	$\ll$	1.113 (0.032)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
8	1.243 (0.033)	$\approx$	1.355 (0.054)	0.82 (0.143)	$\approx$	1.088 (0.057)	0.964 (0.115)	$\approx$	1.032 (0.05)	0.783 (0.06)	$\approx$	0.978 (0.029)	0.828 (0.081)	$\approx$	1.112 (0.049)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
5	1.466 (0.038)	$\approx$	1.608 (0.42)	1.1 (0.11)	$\approx$	1.065 (0.03)	1.261 (0.089)	$\approx$	1.211 (0.066)	0.723 (0.13)	$\approx$	1.027 (0.012)	1.124 (0.037)	$\approx$	1.19 (0.028)	$\approx$	$<$	$\approx$
9	1.737 (0.053)	$\approx$	1.797 (0.437)	0.798 (0.215)	$\approx$	1.165 (0.078)	0.609 (0.218)	$\approx$	1.124 (0.053)	0.554 (0.246)	$\approx$	1.009 (0.007)	1.228 (0.07)	$\approx$	1.243 (0.044)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
1	1.765 (0.12)	$\approx$	2.7 (0.141)	1.288 (0.185)	$\approx$	1.261 (0.059)	0.917 (0.117)	$<$	1.356 (0.105)	-0.023 (0.017)	$\ll$	1.011 (0.012)	1.158 (0.075)	$\approx$	1.409 (0.063)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
10	2.454 (0.088)	$\gg$	1.878 (0.088)	1.122 (0.157)	$\approx$	1.326 (0.125)	1.271 (0.217)	$\approx$	1.625 (0.131)	1.581 (0.322)	$\approx$	1.177 (0.078)	2.224 (0.093)	$\approx$	2.6 (0.263)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)																		
1	1.491 (0.026)			1.019 (0.098)	$<$	1.554 (0.145)	0.792 (0.218)	$<$	1.506 (0.081)	0.478 (0.104)	$\ll$	1.03 (0.009)	0.405 (0.077)	$\ll$	1.1 (0.013)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
3	2 (0.076)	$\approx$	2.309 (0.26)	1.126 (0.102)	$\ll$	1.55 (0.072)	1.042 (0.079)	$\ll$	1.546 (0.082)	0.617 (0.073)	$\ll$	1.138 (0.023)	0.651 (0.051)	$\ll$	1.33 (0.019)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
2	1.502 (0.02)	$\approx$	1.561 (0.154)	1.155 (0.064)	$\approx$	1.263 (0.049)	1.067 (0.07)	$\ll$	1.377 (0.061)	0.762 (0.07)	$<$	1.033 (0.007)	0.941 (0.062)	$\ll$	1.255 (0.028)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
5	2.774 (0.007)			1.898 (0.168)	$\approx$	1.609 (0.09)	0.9 (0.101)	$<$	1.228 (0.066)	0.597 (0.164)	$<$	1.047 (0.011)	1.294 (0.077)	$\ll$	1.663 (0.045)	$\gg$	$\gg$	$>$
4	2.073 (0.023)	$\approx$	1.896 (0.116)	1.321 (0.097)	$\approx$	1.453 (0.103)	1.266 (0.15)	$\approx$	1.595 (0.084)	0.869 (0.105)	$\approx$	1.119 (0.043)	1.866 (0.06)	$\approx$	1.755 (0.066)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
6	2.653 (0.022)	$\gg$	2.151 (0.11)	1.566 (0.241)	$\approx$	1.368 (0.109)	1.893 (0.177)	$\approx$	1.652 (0.11)	1.321 (0.201)	$\approx$	1.265 (0.075)	2.634 (0.022)	$\gg$	1.887 (0.102)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment																		
	1.832 (0.031)	$>$	1.581 (0.067)	1.355 (0.067)	$\approx$	1.365 (0.049)	1.424 (0.067)	$\approx$	1.47 (0.051)	1.11 (0.06)	$<$	1.247 (0.04)	1.6 (0.041)	$\approx$	1.681 (0.067)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment																		
6	3.758 (0.042)	$\approx$	3.3 (0.204)	2.737 (0.205)	$\approx$	2.362 (0.223)	2.267 (0.22)	$\approx$	2.013 (0.159)	1.352 (0.241)	$\approx$	1.438 (0.119)	3.481 (0.065)	$\gg$	2.612 (0.157)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$

Note: Subjects were paid the payoff from all rounds of each game. Ex post, their payoff from a given game is thus proportional to the mean payoff, and their payoff from a given decision (incl. continuation play) is proportional to their mean payoff from this round on. The above table presents estimates of these continuation payoffs for all possible choices, controlling for subject-level random effects. Bootstrapped standard errors are presented in parentheses, $\ll,\gg$ indicates significance at $p<.003$, $<,>$ indicates significance at $p<.05$.

Table 15: Expected payoffs of c and d in the five states, accounting for continuation play, estimated directly from the data by OLS (using the normalized stage game payoffs), bootstrapped standard erros in parentheses

	State (c,c)			State (d,c)			State (c,d)			State (d,d)			State $\emptyset$			Symmetry between (c,d) and (d,c)		
Tr	$\hat{\pi}_{cc}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{cc}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{dc}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{dc}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{cd}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{cd}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{dd}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{dd}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{\emptyset}(c)$		$\hat{\pi}_{\emptyset}(d)$	$\hat{\pi}_{dc}(c)-\hat{\pi}_{cd}(c)$	$\hat{\pi}_{dc}(d)-\hat{\pi}_{cd}(d)$	$\tilde{\pi}_{dc}-\tilde{\pi}_{cd}$
Blonski et al. (2011)																		
6																		
3																		
2	1.125 (0)			0.771 (0.118)	$\approx$	1.031 (0.022)	0.696 (0.262)	$\approx$	1.038 (0.028)	0.874 (0.066)	$\approx$	0.996 (0.003)	0.717 (0.097)	$\approx$	1.001 (0.004)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
7	1.233 (0.056)	$\approx$	1.429 (0)	0.784 (0.12)	$\approx$	1.041 (0.035)	0.883 (0.135)	$\approx$	1.11 (0.028)			1 (0)	0.714 (0.053)	$\ll$	1.041 (0.012)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
4	1.5 (0)			1.5 (0)	$\approx$	1.056 (0.031)	0.944 (0)	$\approx$	1.028 (0.025)	0.46 (0)	$\ll$	1.016 (0.007)	0.732 (0.045)	$\ll$	1.12 (0.032)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
8	1.228 (0.041)	$\approx$	1.429 (0)	0.861 (0.143)	$\approx$	1.151 (0.062)	0.686 (0.284)	$\approx$	1.02 (0.064)	0.492 (0.254)	$\ll$	1 (0.006)	0.864 (0.062)	$<$	1.082 (0.023)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
5	1.483 (0.025)	$\approx$	1.562 (0.445)	1.108 (0.11)	$\approx$	1.064 (0.034)	1.24 (0.106)	$\approx$	1.197 (0.072)	0.687 (0.122)	$\approx$	1.024 (0.011)	1.118 (0.04)	$\approx$	1.194 (0.028)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
9	1.746 (0.046)	$\approx$	1.781 (0.471)	0.813 (0.211)	$\approx$	1.157 (0.079)	0.602 (0.21)	$\approx$	1.143 (0.055)	0.599 (0.196)	$\approx$	1.005 (0.004)	1.195 (0.058)	$\approx$	1.277 (0.037)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
1	1.777 (0.126)	$\approx$	2.747 (0.191)	1.281 (0.185)	$\approx$	1.277 (0.059)	0.872 (0.111)	$<$	1.352 (0.103)	0 (0)	$\ll$	1.009 (0.011)	1.173 (0.074)	$\approx$	1.399 (0.063)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
10	2.492 (0.076)	$\gg$	1.851 (0.084)	1.072 (0.164)	$\approx$	1.342 (0.126)	1.209 (0.221)	$\approx$	1.627 (0.13)	1.642 (0.37)	$\approx$	1.132 (0.061)	2.259 (0.077)	$\approx$	2.481 (0.199)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)																		
1	1.538 (0)			1.069 (0.099)	$<$	1.588 (0.148)	0.815 (0.226)	$<$	1.541 (0.08)	0.489 (0.102)	$\ll$	1.033 (0.01)	0.43 (0.087)	$\ll$	1.099 (0.013)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
3	1.986 (0.076)	$\approx$	2.252 (0.261)	1.132 (0.106)	$<$	1.563 (0.077)	1.033 (0.072)	$\ll$	1.517 (0.083)	0.607 (0.073)	$\ll$	1.126 (0.022)	0.645 (0.049)	$\ll$	1.331 (0.019)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
2	1.512 (0.014)	$\approx$	1.565 (0.153)	1.163 (0.064)	$\approx$	1.27 (0.049)	1.048 (0.073)	$\ll$	1.377 (0.062)	0.756 (0.069)	$\ll$	1.032 (0.007)	0.935 (0.075)	$\ll$	1.257 (0.026)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
5	2.769 (0)			1.904 (0.167)	$\approx$	1.608 (0.089)	0.902 (0.103)	$<$	1.225 (0.067)	0.604 (0.166)	$<$	1.047 (0.011)	1.375 (0.065)	$<$	1.622 (0.043)	$\gg$	$\gg$	$>$
4	2.076 (0.019)	$\approx$	1.878 (0.114)	1.316 (0.097)	$\approx$	1.476 (0.097)	1.26 (0.154)	$\approx$	1.584 (0.085)	0.867 (0.096)	$\approx$	1.124 (0.044)	1.84 (0.07)	$\approx$	1.667 (0.043)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
6	2.678 (0.017)	$>$	2.056 (0.121)	1.588 (0.271)	$\approx$	1.252 (0.094)	1.797 (0.191)	$\approx$	1.606 (0.117)	1.227 (0.217)	$\approx$	1.168 (0.065)	2.639 (0.021)	$\gg$	1.849 (0.116)	$\approx$	$<$	$\approx$
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment																		
	1.891 (0.018)	$\gg$	1.521 (0.067)	1.366 (0.065)	$\approx$	1.281 (0.048)	1.34 (0.079)	$\approx$	1.408 (0.057)	0.972 (0.06)	$<$	1.15 (0.037)	1.624 (0.037)	$\approx$	1.587 (0.071)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment																		
6	3.812 (0.034)	$\approx$	3.193 (0.243)	2.66 (0.226)	$\approx$	2.267 (0.252)	2.111 (0.225)	$\approx$	1.937 (0.153)	1.2 (0.239)	$\approx$	1.296 (0.094)	3.515 (0.065)	$\gg$	2.441 (0.179)	$\approx$	$\approx$	$\approx$

Note: The only difference to Table 14 is that the random effects are dropped (estimation is by OLS). As always, standard errors and p-values are bootstrapped and adjusted, ** indicates significance at $p < .003$, * indicates significance at $p < .05$.

Table 16: Number of observations per state (first entry) and number of different subjects per state (second entry)

	Treatment parameters			1-Memory histories				2-Memory histories $(t-1)\times(t-2)$										
Tr	b	a	δ	(c,c)	(d,c)	(c,d)	(d,d)	$cc\times cc$	$cc\times cd$	$cc\times dc$	$cd\times cc$	$cd\times dc$	$cd\times dd$	$dc\times cc$	$dc\times cd$	$dc\times dd$	$dd\times cd$	$dd\times dc$
Blonski et al. (2011)																		
6	1.43	1.29	0.5															
3	2.5	1.5	0.5															
2	1.25	1.12	0.75	14/3	20/13	20/10	626/20	10/3	1/1	1/1	0/0	5/5	3/3	0/0	5/5	3/3	9/5	9/7
7	1.43	1.29	0.75	44/8	31/17	31/13	234/20	30/7	4/4	4/4	0/0	8/7	0/0	0/0	8/5	0/0	10/6	10/9
4	2.5	1.5	0.75	14/3	22/14	22/10	322/20	10/3	1/1	1/1	0/0	0/0	3/1	0/0	0/0	3/3	14/10	14/11
8	1.43	1.29	0.88	140/14	43/15	43/13	354/20	118/13	5/3	5/5	2/1	4/4	3/2	2/2	4/4	3/2	14/9	14/7
5	2.5	1.5	0.88	184/12	63/19	63/15	510/20	156/11	7/6	7/6	2/2	12/9	14/6	2/2	12/9	14/9	30/13	30/12
9	2.4	1.8	0.75	138/13	51/16	51/14	360/20	104/13	0/0	0/0	1/1	8/5	2/2	1/1	8/5	2/2	29/12	29/12
1	3	2	0.75	50/11	59/18	59/14	272/20	28/9	2/2	2/2	2/2	11/9	0/0	2/2	11/8	0/0	21/10	21/11
10	4.67	3	0.75	226/19	63/17	63/18	168/20	154/18	3/3	3/3	22/13	12/7	8/5	22/12	12/7	8/7	29/15	29/13
Agg				810/83	369/139	369/113	2992/180	610/77	23/20	23/22	29/19	60/46	34/20	29/19	60/43	34/27	166/85	166/90
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)																		
1	2.92	1.54	0.5	48/7	88/30	88/21	1292/44	30/6	8/5	8/5	0/0	20/10	17/7	0/0	20/9	17/12	16/10	16/12
3	2.92	2.15	0.5	102/26	231/46	231/35	1250/50	40/15	17/11	17/15	5/4	22/13	46/19	5/4	22/13	46/25	55/25	55/24
2	2.92	1.54	0.75	374/29	255/44	255/32	2044/44	272/23	30/14	30/16	13/7	52/17	41/16	13/7	52/19	41/25	80/25	80/28
5	2.92	2.77	0.5	370/29	254/38	254/28	838/44	196/25	16/10	16/13	0/0	11/8	13/8	0/0	11/10	13/12	72/22	72/23
4	2.92	2.15	0.75	1170/35	148/29	148/32	374/27	842/35	22/14	22/14	25/14	35/20	15/8	25/12	35/18	15/9	32/20	32/14
6	2.92	2.77	0.75	2064/44	86/25	86/30	180/29	1526/44	9/6	9/6	26/19	12/8	12/9	26/10	12/9	12/12	29/21	29/16
Agg				4128/170	1062/212	1062/178	5978/238	2906/148	102/60	102/69	69/44	152/76	144/67	69/33	152/78	144/95	284/123	284/117
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment																		
	3	2	0.9	1560/53	283/48	283/54	870/49	1353/50	40/25	37/24	41/34	56/24	78/25	40/24	57/30	78/31	104/41	108/33
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment																		
6	5	4	0.88	1128/45	119/32	119/39	218/33	930/44	23/18	23/16	26/23	23/15	13/10	26/10	23/16	13/12	35/24	35/16

Table 17: Testing the 1-memory Markov assumption: Levels of significance of 1-memory and 2-memory Markov strategies (with subject-level random effects; the coefficients are provided in the next Table)

	1-Memory histories				2-Memory histories $(t-1)\times(t-2)$										
Tr	(c,c)	(d,c)	(c,d)	(d,d)	$cc\times cc$	$cc\times cd$	$cc\times dc$	$cd\times cc$	$cd\times dc$	$cd\times dd$	$dc\times cc$	$dc\times cd$	$dc\times dd$	$dd\times cd$	$dd\times dc$
Blonski et al. (2011)															
6															
3															
2	++														
7	++														
4	++									++					
8	++							++							
5															
9	++														
1	++		++												
10	++														
Agg	++	++	+						++						
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)															
1															
3	++	++	+												
2	++	+	++	+								+			
5	++		++												
4	++	++	+												
6	++														
Agg	++	++	++	++								++			
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment															
	++	++	++	+											++
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment															
6	++	+	++												

Note: $^{++}$ indicates significance of a positive coefficient at $p < .003$, $^{+}$ indicates significance of a positive coefficient at $p < .05$, $^{--}$ and $^{-}$ indicate the respective levels of significance for negative coefficients

Table 18: Testing the Markov assumption: Cooperation probabilities after 1-memory and 2-memory histories (with subject-level random effects, adjusted p-values in parentheses below coefficients) and Bayes Information Criteria of model with and without 2-memomory histories (p-value of the H_0 that they are equal is below the respective relation sign; less is better)

Treatment parameters				1-Memory histories				2-Memory histories $(t-1)\times(t-2)$											BIC		
Tr	b	a	δ	(c,c)	(d,c)	(c,d)	(d,d)	$cc\times cc$	$cc\times cd$	$cc\times dc$	$cd\times cc$	$cd\times dc$	$cd\times dd$	$dc\times cc$	$dc\times cd$	$dc\times dd$	$dd\times cd$	$dd\times dc$	2-mem		1-mem
Blonski et al. (2011)																					
6	1.43	1.29	0.5																		
3	2.5	1.5	0.5																		
2	1.25	1.12	0.75	0.994** (0)	0.249 (1)	0.163 (1)	0.005 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.434 (1)	−0.167 (1)	0 (1)	0.151 (1)	0.415 (1)	−0.009 (1)	−0.003 (1)	462.2	≈ (0.32)	422.6
7	1.43	1.29	0.75	1 ** (0)	0.391 (0.202)	0.174 (1)	0 (1)	−0.033 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.576 (0.273)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.234 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	65.4	≈ (0.15)	38.8
4	2.5	1.5	0.75	0.873** (0)	0.01 (1)	−0.042 (1)	0.026 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.739** (0)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.324 (1)	−0.05 (1)	0.05 (1)	297.8	≈ (1)	236.9
8	1.43	1.29	0.88	0.922** (0)	0.336 (0.526)	0.19 (1)	0.031 (1)	0.031 (1)	0 (1)	−0.09 (1)	0.423** (0)	0.589 (1)	0.202 (1)	−0.243 (1)	0.457 (1)	−0.221 (1)	−0.08 (1)	0.052 (1)	162	≈ (0.2)	120.6
5	2.5	1.5	0.88	0.883 (0.204)	0.342 (0.504)	0.084 (1)	0.047 (0.312)	0.05 (1)	−0.105 (1)	0.087 (1)	−0.083 (1)	0.478 (1)	0.213 (1)	−0.391 (0.204)	0.322 (1)	−0.021 (1)	−0.008 (1)	0.13 (1)	75.1	≈ (0.31)	32.9
9	2.4	1.8	0.75	0.994** (0)	0.156 (1)	0.096 (1)	0.009 (1)	−0.018 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	−0.086 (1)	0.5 (1)	0.364 (1)	−0.15 (1)	0.225 (1)	−0.152 (1)	−0.013 (1)	0.037 (1)	198	≈ (0.08)	163
1	3	2	0.75	1.001** (0)	0.177 (1)	0.275** (0)	0.005 (1)	−0.104 (1)	0 (1)	−0.496 (1)	0.206 (1)	0.353 (1)	0 (1)	−0.166 (1)	0.549 (0.331)	0 (1)	−0.012 (1)	0 (1)	36.3	≈ (0.71)	48.3
10	4.67	3	0.75	0.941** (0)	0.43 (0.112)	0.044 (1)	0.058 (1)	−0.067 (1)	−0.665 (0.331)	−0.595 (1)	−0.069 (1)	0.678 (0.521)	0.271 (1)	−0.297 (1)	−0.248 (1)	0.067 (1)	−0.019 (1)	0.087 (1)	150.1	≈ (0.5)	164.2
Agg				0.962** (0)	0.242** (0)	0.122* (0.017)	0.02 (0.336)	−0.039 (1)	−0.217 (0.464)	−0.159 (1)	−0.064 (1)	0.51** (0)	0.191 (1)	−0.131 (0.882)	0.276 (0.057)	0.095 (1)	−0.022 (1)	0.067 (0.336)	709.2	> (0)	479.1
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)																					
1	2.92	1.54	0.5	0.804 (0.128)	0.314 (0.179)	0.228 (1)	0.032 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.133 (1)	−0.223 (1)	0 (1)	0.414 (0.585)	0.131 (1)	−0.158 (1)	0.063 (1)	366.8	≈ (0.07)	311.8
3	2.92	2.15	0.5	0.903** (0)	0.321** (0)	0.296* (0.039)	0.119 (0.118)	−0.079 (1)	−0.213 (1)	−0.106 (1)	−0.098 (1)	−0.165 (1)	−0.09 (1)	0.215 (1)	0.24 (1)	0.168 (1)	−0.065 (1)	0.035 (1)	448.9	≈ (0.05)	427.3
2	2.92	1.54	0.75	0.936** (0)	0.306* (0.02)	0.342** (0)	0.034* (0.043)	−0.003 (1)	0.003 (1)	−0.182 (1)	−0.156 (1)	0.055 (1)	−0.162 (1)	0.432 (1)	0.439* (0.02)	−0.023 (1)	0.008 (1)	0.054 (1)	47.5	≈ (0.95)	64.4
5	2.92	2.77	0.5	0.944** (0)	0.201 (0.331)	0.326** (0)	0.064 (0.543)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.297 (1)	−0.131 (1)	0 (1)	0.451 (0.37)	0.273 (1)	−0.024 (1)	0.031 (1)	90.5	≈ (0.76)	101.6
4	2.92	2.15	0.75	0.952** (0)	0.555** (0)	0.35* (0.02)	0.177 (0.151)	−0.008 (1)	−0.064 (1)	−0.064 (1)	−0.127 (1)	0.106 (1)	0.078 (1)	0.087 (1)	0.017 (1)	−0.222 (1)	−0.189 (0.151)	0.087 (1)	115.7	≈ (0.51)	99.1
6	2.92	2.77	0.75	0.985** (0)	0.344 (1)	0.25 (0.381)	0.105 (1)	−0.006 (1)	−0.116 (1)	−0.003 (1)	−0.096 (1)	0.403 (1)	0.187 (1)	−0.088 (1)	0.231 (1)	0.246 (1)	−0.06 (1)	0.06 (1)	675.4	≈ (0.09)	617.7
Agg				0.939** (0)	0.313** (0)	0.313** (0)	0.082** (0)	−0.009 (1)	−0.084 (0.119)	−0.105 (1)	−0.146 (1)	0.088 (1)	−0.09 (1)	0.174 (1)	0.341** (0)	0.102 (1)	−0.054 (0.872)	0.058 (0.084)	74.9	≈ (0.93)	138.5
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment																					
	3	2	0.9	0.978** (0)	0.295** (0)	0.279** (0)	0.109* (0.014)	−0.011 (1)	−0.174 (1)	−0.124 (1)	0.063 (1)	0.234 (1)	0.02 (1)	0.213 (1)	0.155 (1)	0.073 (1)	−0.003 (1)	0.156** (0)	534.9	≈ (0.99)	535.1
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment																					
6	5	4	0.88	0.944** (0)	0.497* (0.02)	0.418** (0)	0.163 (0.235)	0.012 (1)	−0.072 (1)	−0.088 (1)	0.061 (1)	0.122 (1)	0.071 (1)	−0.019 (1)	−0.067 (1)	0.011 (1)	−0.03 (1)	0.059 (1)	138.8	> (0.02)	102.2

Note: ⋆⋆, ≫ and ≪ indicate significance at $p < .003$; ⋆, > and < indicate significance at $p < .05$ in two-sided tests. The p-values of the tests of BIC-equality between 2-memory models and 1-memory models are bootstrapped and not adjusted. The exact procedure is as follows: By resamling at the subject level a new data set is constructed (each time a subject is drawn, its entire history of actions is added to the data), the parameters are estimated and the BICs are calculated using the number of used parameters (usually, not all of the 2-memory history-probabilities can be estimated).

Table 19: Testing the 1-memory Markov assumption: Levels of significance of 1-memory and 2-memory Markov strategies (OLS; the coefficients are provided in the next Table)

	1-Memory histories				2-Memory histories $(t-1)\times(t-2)$										
Tr	(c,c)	(d,c)	(c,d)	(d,d)	$cc\times cc$	$cc\times cd$	$cc\times dc$	$cd\times cc$	$cd\times dc$	$cd\times dd$	$dc\times cc$	$dc\times cd$	$dc\times dd$	$dd\times cd$	$dd\times dc$
Blonski et al. (2011)															
6															
3															
2	++														
7	++	+													
4	++									++					
8	++							++							
5	++														
9	++														
1	++		++												
10	++	+													
Agg	++	++							++			+			
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)															
1	++														
3	++	+	++												
2	++	+	++									++			
5	++		++									+			
4	++	++	++												
6	++														
Agg	++	++	++	++								++			
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment															
	++	++	++												+
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment															
6	++		++												

Note: $^{++}$ indicates significance of a positive coefficient at $p < .003$, $^{+}$ indicates significance of a positive coefficient at $p < .05$, $^{--}$ and $^{-}$ indicate the respective levels of significance for negative coefficients

Table 20: Testing the Markov assumption: Cooperation probabilities after 1-memory and 2-memory histories (estimated by OLS, adjusted p-values in parentheses below coefficients) and Bayes Information Criteria of model with and without 2-memomory histories (p-value of the H_0 that they are equal is below the respective relation sign; less is better)

Treatment parameters				1-Memory histories				2-Memory histories $(t-1)\times(t-2)$											BIC		
Tr	b	a	δ	(c,c)	(d,c)	(c,d)	(d,d)	$cc\times cc$	$cc\times cd$	$cc\times dc$	$cd\times cc$	$cd\times dc$	$cd\times dd$	$dc\times cc$	$dc\times cd$	$dc\times dd$	$dd\times cd$	$dd\times dc$	2-mem		1-mem
Blonski et al. (2011)																					
6	1.43	1.29	0.5																		
3	2.5	1.5	0.5																		
2	1.25	1.12	0.75	1** (0)	0.25 (1)	0.167 (1)	0.005 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.433 (1)	−0.167 (1)	0 (1)	0.15 (1)	0.417 (1)	−0.005 (1)	−0.005 (1)	493.3	≈ (0.12)	434.6
7	1.43	1.29	0.75	1** (0)	0.391* (0.022)	0.174 (1)	0 (1)	−0.033 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.576 (0.292)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.234 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	93.3	> (0.04)	49.3
4	2.5	1.5	0.75	1** (0)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.014 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	1** (0)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.333 (1)	−0.014 (1)	0.058 (1)	286.6	≈ (1)	189.5
8	1.43	1.29	0.88	1** (0)	0.265 (1)	0.324 (1)	0.009 (1)	−0.017 (1)	0 (1)	−0.2 (1)	0.676** (0)	0.426 (1)	0.343 (1)	−0.265 (1)	0.485 (1)	−0.265 (1)	−0.009 (1)	−0.009 (1)	148.8	≈ (0.17)	94.5
5	2.5	1.5	0.88	0.929** (0)	0.314 (1)	0.114 (1)	0.022 (1)	0.065 (1)	−0.071 (1)	0.071 (1)	−0.114 (1)	0.469 (1)	0.243 (1)	−0.314 (1)	0.352 (1)	−0.029 (1)	0.044 (1)	0.111 (1)	90.9	≈ (0.27)	32.6
9	2.4	1.8	0.75	1** (0)	0.15 (1)	0.1 (1)	0.007 (1)	−0.019 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	−0.1 (1)	0.525 (1)	0.4 (1)	−0.15 (1)	0.225 (1)	−0.15 (1)	−0.007 (1)	0.028 (1)	225.4	> (0.01)	169.1
1	3	2	0.75	1** (0)	0.174 (1)	0.283** (0)	0.004 (1)	−0.107 (1)	0 (1)	−0.5 (1)	0.217 (1)	0.354 (1)	0 (1)	−0.174 (1)	0.553 (0.351)	0 (1)	−0.004 (1)	−0.004 (1)	26.1	≈ (0.86)	38.5
10	4.67	3	0.75	0.939** (0)	0.429* (0.022)	0.048 (1)	0.045 (1)	−0.056 (1)	−0.606 (1)	−0.606 (1)	−0.048 (1)	0.702 (0.351)	0.327 (1)	−0.338 (1)	−0.262 (1)	0.071 (1)	0.024 (1)	0.058 (1)	129.9	≈ (0.14)	160.4
Agg				0.968** (0)	0.224** (0)	0.167 (0.072)	0.011 (0.096)	−0.012 (1)	−0.098 (1)	−0.141 (1)	−0.063 (1)	0.5** (0)	0.245 (1)	−0.155 (0.792)	0.293* (0.017)	0.1 (1)	0.013 (1)	0.043 (1)	650.2	> (0.01)	409.6
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)																					
1	2.92	1.54	0.5	1** (0)	0.333 (0.246)	0.314 (0.701)	0.021 (1)	0 (0.816)	0 (0.655)	0 (0.816)	0 (1)	0.186 (1)	−0.02 (1)	0 (1)	0.517 (0.331)	0.137 (1)	−0.021 (1)	0.041 (1)	264.7	≈ (0.16)	193.8
3	2.92	2.15	0.5	0.929** (0)	0.291* (0.039)	0.361** (0)	0.078 (0.202)	−0.029 (1)	0.013 (1)	0.013 (1)	−0.161 (1)	−0.088 (1)	0.139 (1)	0.309 (1)	0.345 (1)	0.165 (1)	0.013 (1)	−0.024 (1)	604.2	≈ (0.89)	602.2
2	2.92	1.54	0.75	0.952** (0)	0.289* (0.017)	0.383** (0)	0.021 (0.143)	0.022 (1)	0.048 (1)	−0.152 (1)	−0.152 (1)	0.041 (1)	−0.163 (1)	0.481 (1)	0.481** (0)	−0.02 (1)	0.042 (1)	0.042 (1)	53.7	≈ (0.9)	97.8
5	2.92	2.77	0.5	1** (0)	0.148 (1)	0.4** (0)	0.026 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.327 (1)	−0.092 (1)	0 (1)	0.579* (0.039)	0.314 (1)	0.03 (1)	−0.012 (1)	158.2	≈ (0.44)	179.3
4	2.92	2.15	0.75	0.965** (0)	0.507** (0)	0.397** (0)	0.094 (1)	0.013 (1)	0.035 (1)	−0.01 (1)	−0.157 (1)	0.088 (1)	0.136 (1)	0.053 (1)	0.065 (1)	−0.307 (1)	−0.094 (1)	0.031 (1)	192	≈ (0.92)	194.1
6	2.92	2.77	0.75	0.987** (0)	0.333 (1)	0.25 (0.291)	0.082 (1)	−0.004 (1)	−0.098 (1)	0.013 (1)	−0.096 (1)	0.417 (1)	0.167 (1)	−0.103 (1)	0.25 (1)	0.25 (1)	−0.047 (1)	0.056 (1)	700.2	> (0.03)	616.9
Agg				0.979** (0)	0.271** (0)	0.373** (0)	0.039** (0)	0.001 (1)	0.001 (1)	−0.058 (1)	−0.17 (0.948)	0.094 (1)	0.002 (1)	0.207 (1)	0.426** (0)	0.118 (1)	0.014 (1)	0.024 (1)	616.4	≈ (0.09)	797.8
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment																					
	3	2	0.9	0.977** (0)	0.278** (0)	0.287** (0)	0.073 (0.358)	0.001 (1)	−0.152 (1)	−0.112 (1)	0.054 (1)	0.231 (1)	0.021 (1)	0.222 (1)	0.178 (1)	0.068 (1)	0.033 (1)	0.168* (0.017)	511.1	≈ (0.16)	538.6
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment																					
6	5	4	0.88	0.954** (0)	0.404 (0.624)	0.456** (0)	0.068 (1)	0.023 (1)	−0.041 (1)	−0.084 (1)	0.044 (1)	0.109 (1)	0.005 (1)	0.02 (1)	−0.012 (1)	0.058 (1)	0.075 (1)	0.018 (1)	137	≈ (0.56)	121.8

Note: **, $\gg$ and $\ll$ indicate significance at $p < .003$; *, $>$ and $<$ indicate significance at $p < .05$ in two-sided tests. The p-values of the tests of BIC-equality between 2-memory models and 1-memory models are bootstrapped and not adjusted. The exact procedure is as follows: By resamling at the subject level a new data set is constructed (each time a subject is drawn, its entire history of actions is added to the data), the parameters are estimated and the BICs are calculated using the number of used parameters (usually, not all of the 2-memory history-probabilities can be estimated).

Table 21: Finite mixture analysis of 1-memory strategies, with exogeneous restrictions (standard errors in parentheses)

	Component 1								Component 2								Component 3							
Tr	$\hat{\sigma}_{cc}$		$\hat{\sigma}_{dc}$		$\hat{\sigma}_{cd}$		$\hat{\sigma}_{dd}$	Weight	$\hat{\sigma}_{cc}$		$\hat{\sigma}_{dc}$		$\hat{\sigma}_{cd}$		$\hat{\sigma}_{dd}$	Weight	$\hat{\sigma}_{cc}$		$\hat{\sigma}_{dc}$		$\hat{\sigma}_{cd}$		$\hat{\sigma}_{dd}$	Weight
Blonski et al. (2011)																								
6																								
3																								
2	1 (0)	$\gg$	0.35 (0.114)	$\approx$	0.25 (0.099)	$\gg$	0.005 (0.003)	1 (0)																
7	0.977 (0.021)	$\gg$	0.452 (0.081)	$\approx$	0.323 (0.083)	$\gg$	0 (0)	1 (0)																
4	1 (0.096)	$\gg$	0.048 (0.309)	$\approx$	0 (0.285)	$\approx$	0 (0.264)	0.95 (0.397)	1 (0.097)	$\gg$	0 (0.31)	$\approx$	0.6 (0.284)	$\gg$	0.556 (0.263)	0.05 (0.397)								
8	0.979 (0.013)	$\gg$	0.279 (0.096)	$\approx$	0.419 (0.188)	$\gg$	0.008 (0.007)	1 (0)																
5	1 (0.18)	$>$	0.218 (0.294)	$\approx$	0.046 (0.171)	$\approx$	0.003 (0.054)	0.631 (0.195)	0.965 (0.177)	$\approx$	0.713 (0.293)	$\approx$	0.368 (0.175)	$>$	0.096 (0.056)	0.369 (0.195)								
9	0.986 (0.011)	$\gg$	0.176 (0.071)	$\approx$	0.196 (0.078)	$>$	0.008 (0.005)	1 (0)																
1	0.92 (0.048)	$\gg$	0.271 (0.076)	$\approx$	0.356 (0.063)	$\gg$	0.004 (0.004)	1 (0)																
10	0.885 (0.035)	$\gg$	0.27 (0.074)	$\approx$	0.206 (0.056)	$>$	0.06 (0.034)	1 (0)																
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)																								
1	1 (0.082)	$\gg$	0.292 (0.405)	$\approx$	0.251 (0.167)	$\approx$	0.005 (0.174)	0.908 (0.322)	1 (0.075)	$\approx$	1 (0.397)	$>$	0.513 (0.168)	$>$	0.229 (0.159)	0.092 (0.328)								
3	0.863 (0.127)	$\gg$	0.081 (0.388)	$\approx$	0.329 (0.229)	$\approx$	0.016 (0.284)	0.607 (0.172)	0.975 (0.128)	$\approx$	0.939 (0.394)	$\approx$	0.294 (0.236)	$\approx$	0.076 (0.283)	0.254 (0.172)	0.919 (0.128)	$\approx$	0.888 (0.395)	$\approx$	0.562 (0.231)	$\approx$	0.635 (0.283)	0.139 (0.175)
2	0.972 (0.196)	$\approx$	0.508 (0.369)	$\approx$	0.515 (0.208)	$\gg$	0.021 (0.046)	0.53 (0.158)	0.972 (0.192)	$\gg$	0 (0.372)	$\approx$	0.095 (0.206)	$\approx$	0.008 (0.046)	0.33 (0.16)	0.935 (0.201)	$\approx$	0.957 (0.374)	$\gg$	0.088 (0.205)	$\approx$	0.11 (0.045)	0.14 (0.162)
5	1 (0)	$\gg$	0.029 (0.381)	$\approx$	0.675 (0.281)	$\gg$	0.007 (0.038)	0.552 (0.113)	1 (0)	$\approx$	0.838 (0.381)	$\approx$	0.298 (0.276)	$\approx$	0.067 (0.039)	0.448 (0.113)								
4	0.991 (0.077)	$\approx$	0.579 (0.343)	$\approx$	0.214 (0.296)	$\approx$	0.055 (0.212)	0.536 (0.141)	0.977 (0.074)	$\approx$	0.968 (0.336)	$\approx$	0.745 (0.29)	$\approx$	0.459 (0.216)	0.3 (0.143)	0.8 (0.073)	$\gg$	0.122 (0.339)	$\approx$	0.115 (0.292)	$\approx$	0.006 (0.218)	0.164 (0.147)
6	0.997 (0.059)	$\gg$	0.339 (0.182)	$\approx$	0.183 (0.218)	$\approx$	0.04 (0.175)	0.818 (0.332)	0.896 (0.058)	$>$	0.404 (0.182)	$\approx$	0.519 (0.215)	$>$	0.212 (0.168)	0.182 (0.335)								
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment																								
	0.981 (0.155)	$\approx$	0.572 (0.238)	$\approx$	0.369 (0.118)	$\approx$	0.081 (0.129)	0.647 (0.196)	0.987 (0.159)	$\gg$	0.02 (0.238)	$\approx$	0.21 (0.115)	$\approx$	0.007 (0.131)	0.207 (0.194)	0.64 (0.159)	$\approx$	0.218 (0.239)	$\approx$	0.343 (0.113)	$\approx$	0.304 (0.128)	0.145 (0.198)
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment																								
6	0.997 (0.14)	$>$	0.379 (0.22)	$\approx$	0.494 (0.133)	$>$	0.047 (0.147)	0.819 (0.291)	0.789 (0.139)	$\approx$	0.458 (0.218)	$\approx$	0.471 (0.138)	$\approx$	0.204 (0.143)	0.181 (0.291)								

Note: The table presents an analysis of individual strategies similarly to the analysis of prototypical strategies (e.g. Table 63). The analysis follows the procedure described in Appendix A of the paper, but without any restriction on the strategies except for the 1-memory condition. I estimate the number of components (i.e. the number of distinct strategies identified) by *ICL-BIC*, also as described in Appendix A. The components are ordered by weight, in decreasing order. In case a single component was found to be optimal, the estimated strategy is equal to the OLS estimates of the raw cooperation probabilities (Table 2). As always, standard errors (in parentheses) and p-values of the hypothesis tests are bootstrapped, $\gg, \ll$ indicates significance at $p < .003$, $>, <$ indicates significance at $p < .05$.

Results: More than three component was never optimal, the median number of components is two. The largest component never significantly violates the Semi-Grim pattern, of the remaining components, just two significantly violate Grim (in DF treatments 1 und 3). Overall, however, the number of significances is small if more than one component is identified (for, the number of parameters, hence standard errors, are large).

Table 22: Elimination order and weights of prototypical strategies in Blonski et al. (2011)

(a) Treatment 1

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		Gen Grim $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		Gen Coop $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		Gen TFT $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		Gen WSLS $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		Semi-Grim $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.015 (0.007)	0 (0.001)	0.309 (0.417)	0.275 (0.188)	0.003 (−)	0.05 (0.206)	0.507 (0.528)	0.005 (0.138)	0.5 (−)	0 (0.003)	0.542 (93.358)	0.67 (−)	0.403 (0.062)	−96.1	122.4
0.015 (0.007)	0 (0.001)	0.31 (4.373)	0.261 (0.184)	0.004 (−)	0.072 (0.199)	0.528 (0.436)	0.019 (0.073)	0.781 (1.059)	−	−	0.648 (−)	0.404 (0.06)	−96.1	120.6
0.015 (0.007)	−	−	0.266 (0.181)	0.014 (−)	0.061 (0.193)	0.543 (0.466)	0.022 (0.063)	0.993 (−)	−	−	0.651 (−)	0.401 (0.06)	−96	117.2
0.015 (0.007)	−	−	0.273 (0.179)	0.012 (−)	0.05 (0.189)	0.545 (0.514)	−	−	−	−	0.677 (−)	0.402 (0.059)	−96.1	112.9
0.015 (0.007)	−	−	0.303 (0.137)	0.012 (−)	−	−	−	−	−	−	0.697 (−)	0.401 (0.058)	−96.1	107.1
0.016 (0.007)	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	1 (−)	0.314 (0.043)	−99.2	102.2

(b) Treatment 2

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		Gen Grim $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		Gen Coop $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		Gen TFT $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		Gen WSLS $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		Semi-Grim $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.005 (0.003)	0 (0.023)	0.293 (25.857)	0 (0.037)	0.364 (62.371)	0 (0.013)	0.5 (−)	0.163 (0.341)	0.5 (−)	0 (0.008)	0.65 (−)	0.837 (−)	0.324 (0.099)	−43.5	69.3
0.005 (0.003)	0 (0)	0.297 (32.042)	0 (0)	0.372 (84.893)	0 (0)	0.502 (0.061)	0.082 (0.296)	0.5 (−)	−	−	0.918 (−)	0.316 (0.089)	−43.5	63.6
0.005 (0.003)	0 (0)	0.148 (0.142)	0 (0)	0.372 (84.882)	−	−	0.083 (0.295)	0.5 (−)	−	−	0.917 (−)	0.311 (0.087)	−43.5	60.7
0.005 (0.003)	0 (0)	0.074 (0.02)	0 (0.022)	0.372 (89.554)	−	−	−	−	−	−	1 (−)	0.3 (0.072)	−43.5	52.5
0.005 (0.003)	−	−	0 (0)	0.186 (0.276)	−	−	−	−	−	−	1 (−)	0.3 (0.072)	−43.5	49.5
0.005 (0.003)	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	1 (−)	0.3 (0.072)	−43.5	46.5

(c) Treatment 4

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		Gen Grim $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		Gen Coop $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		Gen TFT $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		Gen WSLS $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		Semi-Grim $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0 (0)	0 (0.002)	0.208 (0.002)	0.05 (0.05)	0.535 (0.129)	0 (0.026)	0.5 (−)	0.093 (0.43)	0.657 (4.578)	0 (0.224)	0.714 (−)	0.857 (−)	0 (0.001)	−18	39.2
0 (0)	0 (0.001)	0.208 (5.759)	0.048 (0.047)	0.535 (0.129)	0 (0)	0.5 (2.818)	0.074 (0.137)	0.988 (3.122)	−	−	0.878 (−)	0 (0.001)	−17.9	34.5
0 (0.001)	0 (0)	0.104 (0.331)	0.048 (0.047)	0.535 (0.129)	−	−	0.074 (0.137)	0.988 (3.122)	−	−	0.878 (−)	0 (0)	−17.9	31.5
0 (0.001)	−	−	0.048 (0.047)	0.535 (0.129)	−	−	0.074 (0.137)	0.988 (3.122)	−	−	0.878 (−)	0 (0)	−17.9	28.5
0 (0.055)	−	−	0.05 (0.049)	0.533 (0.129)	−	−	−	−	−	−	0.95 (−)	0.026 (0.026)	−19	25

Table 23: Elimination order and weights of prototypical strategies in Blonski et al. (2011) (continued)

(a) Treatment 5

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Coop** $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		**Gen TFT** $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		**Gen WSLS** $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.012 (0.004)	0.1 (0.071)	0.219 (0.046)	0 (0)	0.408 (0.029)	0.235 (0.13)	0.5 (−)	0.319 (0.156)	0.5 (−)	0 (0.224)	0.5 (−)	0.346 (−)	0.559 (0.098)	−150.5	176.1
0.012 (0.004)	0.1 (0.067)	0.219 (0.046)	0 (0)	0.204 (0.066)	0.234 (0.118)	0.5 (−)	0.319 (0.139)	0.5 (−)	−	−	0.347 (−)	0.557 (0.098)	−150.5	173.1
0.012 (0.004)	0.1 (0.067)	0.219 (0.046)	−	−	0.234 (0.118)	0.5 (0.006)	0.32 (0.139)	0.5 (0.012)	−	−	0.347 (−)	0.557 (0.098)	−150.5	170.1
0.013 (0.004)	0.1 (0.067)	0.219 (0.046)	−	−	−	−	0.199 (0.16)	0.5 (−)	−	−	0.701 (−)	0.347 (0.066)	−154.3	169.5
0.013 (0.004)	0.1 (0.067)	0.219 (0.046)	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	0.9 (−)	0.314 (0.046)	−156.1	162.1

(b) Treatment 6

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Coop** $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		**Gen TFT** $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		**Gen WSLS** $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.005 (0.022)	0.082 (1.544)	0.019 (0.095)	0 (0)	0.082 (0.247)	0.229 (0.203)	0.5 (−)	0 (0.047)	0.5 (−)	0 (0.035)	0.873 (367.457)	0.689 (−)	0.002 (−)	−12	43.8
0 (0.018)	0.759 (0.206)	0.007 (0.009)	0.002 (0.061)	0.031 (0.033)	0.238 (0.215)	0.5 (−)	0 (0.005)	0.5 (0.932)	−	−	0 (−)	0.001 (0.023)	−11.9	36.1
0 (0.183)	0.76 (0.362)	0.007 (0.035)	0.002 (0.122)	0.019 (0.012)	0.238 (0.384)	0.5 (0.066)	0 (−)	0.5 (3022.453)	−	−	−	−	−11.9	33
0 (0.179)	0.76 (0.364)	0.007 (0.034)	0.002 (0.117)	0.019 (0.015)	0.238 (−)	0.5 (0.006)	−	−	−	−	−	−	−11.9	30
0 (0.075)	0.762 (0.252)	0.007 (0.016)	−	−	0.238 (−)	0.5 (0.006)	−	−	−	−	−	−	−11.9	26.7
0.002 (−)	1 (−)	0.017 (0.009)	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−15.3	18.3

(c) Treatment 7

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Coop** $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		**Gen TFT** $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		**Gen WSLS** $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.004 (0.004)	0 (0.025)	0.44 (558.372)	0.013 (0.197)	0.003 (−)	0 (0.002)	0.832 (0.522)	0.152 (0.18)	0.5 (0.01)	0 (0.23)	0.5 (−)	0.835 (−)	0.436 (0.1)	−47.5	72.5
0.004 (0.004)	0 (0.082)	0.441 (990.394)	0.033 (0.196)	0.003 (0.009)	0 (0)	0.838 (0.584)	0.149 (0.171)	0.5 (−)	−	−	0.818 (−)	0.44 (0.098)	−47.5	70.4
0.004 (0.004)	0 (0.001)	0.22 (5.899)	0.034 (0.197)	0.003 (0.006)	−	−	0.146 (0.171)	0.5 (−)	−	−	0.82 (−)	0.438 (0.098)	−47.5	67.4
0.004 (0.004)	0 (0)	0.109 (0.115)	−	−	−	−	0.15 (0.177)	0.5 (−)	−	−	0.85 (−)	0.43 (0.083)	−47.5	62.4
0.004 (0.004)	−	−	−	−	−	−	0.145 (0.175)	0.5 (−)	−	−	0.855 (−)	0.429 (0.083)	−47.5	59.3
0.004 (0.004)	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	1 (−)	0.387 (0.062)	−48	51

Table 24: Elimination order and weights of prototypical strategies in Blonski et al. (2011) (continued)

(a) Treatment 8

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		Gen Grim $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		Gen Coop $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		Gen TFT $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		Gen WSLS $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		Semi-Grim $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.007 (0.004)	0.048 (0.059)	0.061 (0.052)	0.05 (0.05)	0.8 (0.089)	0 (0.367)	0.5 (−)	0.1 (0.106)	0.995 (−)	0 (0.239)	0.944 (−)	0.803 (−)	0.241 (0.098)	−73.2	95.4
0.007 (0.004)	0.048 (0.058)	0.061 (0.052)	0.05 (0.049)	0.8 (0.089)	0 (0)	0.5 (0.253)	0.1 (0.101)	0.995 (−)	−	−	0.803 (−)	0.241 (0.067)	−73.2	92.4
0.007 (0.004)	0.048 (0.058)	0.061 (0.052)	0.05 (0.049)	0.8 (0.089)	−	−	0.1 (0.101)	0.995 (−)	−	−	0.803 (−)	0.241 (0.067)	−73.2	89.4
0.007 (0.004)	0.048 (0.057)	0.061 (0.052)	0.05 (0.049)	0.8 (0.089)	−	−	−	−	−	−	0.902 (−)	0.255 (0.06)	−74	84
0.008 (0.004)	−	−	0.05 (0.049)	0.8 (0.089)	−	−	−	−	−	−	0.95 (−)	0.229 (0.05)	−74.8	80.8

(b) Treatment 9

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		Gen Grim $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		Gen Coop $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		Gen TFT $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		Gen WSLS $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		Semi-Grim $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.011 (0.005)	0 (0)	0.329 (22.527)	0.536 (0.206)	0.006 (−)	0.091 (0.157)	0.5 (−)	0.169 (0.134)	0.5 (−)	0 (0)	0.528 (0.32)	0.204 (−)	0.545 (0.125)	−71.3	100.8
0.011 (0.006)	0 (0.001)	0.164 (2.389)	0.536 (0.218)	0.006 (−)	0.091 (0.107)	0.5 (0.187)	0.169 (0.288)	0.5 (0.668)	−	−	0.204 (−)	0.545 (0.108)	−71.3	97.8
0.011 (0.005)	−	−	0.536 (0.209)	0.006 (−)	0.091 (0.159)	0.5 (0.048)	0.169 (0.136)	0.5 (0.051)	−	−	0.204 (−)	0.545 (0.125)	−71.3	94.8
0.012 (0.005)	−	−	0.606 (0.161)	0.011 (−)	−	−	0.151 (0.129)	0.5 (−)	−	−	0.242 (−)	0.51 (0.119)	−71.5	88.5
0.014 (0.006)	−	−	0.728 (0.161)	0.006 (−)	−	−	−	−	−	−	0.272 (−)	0.472 (0.151)	−72.8	83.4
0.01 (0.005)	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	1 (−)	0.186 (0.039)	−77	80

(c) Treatment 10

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		Gen Grim $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		Gen Coop $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		Gen TFT $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		Gen WSLS $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		Semi-Grim $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.073 (0.013)	0.053 (0.053)	0.453 (0.103)	0.592 (0.301)	0.047 (−)	0 (0.323)	0.5 (−)	0.15 (0.154)	0.5 (−)	0 (0)	0.687 (0.246)	0.205 (−)	0.492 (0.14)	−175.3	203.2
0.074 (0.013)	0.053 (0.052)	0.452 (0.103)	0.658 (0.156)	0.046 (−)	0 (0)	0.503 (0.111)	0.061 (0.069)	0.93 (−)	−	−	0.228 (−)	0.473 (0.129)	−175.2	196.8
0.074 (0.013)	0.053 (0.052)	0.452 (0.103)	0.658 (0.156)	0.046 (−)	−	−	0.061 (0.069)	0.93 (−)	−	−	0.228 (−)	0.473 (0.129)	−175.2	193.8
0.074 (0.013)	0.053 (0.052)	0.453 (0.102)	0.645 (0.187)	0.037 (−)	−	−	−	−	−	−	0.302 (−)	0.434 (0.119)	−176.1	191.7
0.073 (0.013)	0.052 (0.051)	0.454 (0.104)	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	0.948 (−)	0.216 (0.039)	−180	186.2

Table 25: Elimination order and weights of prototypical strategies in Dal Bo and Frechette (2011)

(a) Treatment 1

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Coop** $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		**Gen TFT** $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		**Gen WSLS** $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.006 (0.002)	0 (0.16)	0.5 (–)	0.045 (0.028)	0.553 (0.03)	0.405 (0.182)	0.5 (–)	0.072 (0.051)	0.998 (–)	0 (0.047)	0.5 (–)	0.477 (–)	0.368 (0.067)	−184.8	232.7
0.006 (0.002)	0.023 (0.023)	0.444 (0.074)	0.023 (0.023)	0.743 (0.074)	0.405 (0.172)	0.5 (–)	0.073 (0.049)	0.996 (–)	–	–	0.477 (–)	0.368 (0.067)	−184.8	229
0.006 (0.002)	–	–	0.045 (0.031)	0.553 (0.057)	0.405 (0.172)	0.5 (–)	0.072 (0.049)	0.999 (–)	–	–	0.477 (–)	0.368 (0.067)	−184.8	225.1
0.006 (0.002)	–	–	0.045 (0.031)	0.553 (0.057)	–	–	0.069 (0.047)	0.997 (–)	–	–	0.885 (–)	0.276 (0.041)	−187	202.2

(b) Treatment 2

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Coop** $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		**Gen TFT** $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		**Gen WSLS** $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.028 (0.003)	0 (0.907)	0.5 (–)	0.186 (0.109)	0.024 (–)	0.215 (0.123)	0.564 (0.13)	0.147 (0.063)	0.95 (0.036)	0 (0.906)	0.5 (–)	0.452 (–)	0.532 (0.035)	−558.9	598.5
0.028 (0.003)	0 (0)	0.148 (0.191)	0.186 (0.106)	0.025 (–)	0.215 (0.119)	0.564 (0.13)	0.147 (0.059)	0.95 (0.036)	–	–	0.452 (–)	0.532 (0.035)	−558.9	594.8
0.028 (0.003)	–	–	0.186 (0.106)	0.026 (–)	0.215 (0.119)	0.564 (0.13)	0.147 (0.059)	0.95 (0.036)	–	–	0.452 (–)	0.532 (0.035)	−558.9	591
0.027 (0.003)	–	–	0.325 (0.075)	0.005 (–)	–	–	0.141 (0.057)	0.952 (0.035)	–	–	0.533 (–)	0.508 (0.031)	−562.6	579.5

(c) Treatment 3

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Coop** $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		**Gen TFT** $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		**Gen WSLS** $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.036 (0.005)	0.043 (0.043)	0.5 (–)	0.097 (0.044)	0.718 (0.049)	0.353 (0.09)	0.808 (0.094)	0.16 (0.057)	0.941 (0.046)	0 (0.033)	0.5 (–)	0.348 (–)	0.275 (0.053)	−509	548.9
0.036 (0.005)	0.043 (0.031)	0.5 (–)	0.097 (0.044)	0.718 (0.049)	0.353 (0.09)	0.808 (0.094)	0.16 (0.057)	0.941 (0.046)	–	–	0.348 (–)	0.275 (0.053)	−509	545
0.033 (0.005)	0.355 (0.075)	0.008 (–)	0.14 (0.049)	0.647 (0.035)	–	–	0.157 (0.058)	0.88 (0.064)	–	–	0.348 (–)	0.446 (0.044)	−513	539.4

Table 26: Elimination order and weights of prototypical strategies in Dal Bo and Frechette (2011) (continued)

(a) Treatment 4

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Coop** $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		**Gen TFT** $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		**Gen WSLS** $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.026	0	0.017	0.217	0.696	0.158	0.871	0.298	0.54	0.02	0.5	0.307	0.463	−392.7	434.6
(0.004)	(0.147)	(–)	(0.089)	(0.048)	(0.134)	(0.108)	(0.113)	(0.094)	(0.03)	(–)	(–)	(0.11)		
0.026	–	–	0.217	0.696	0.158	0.871	0.298	0.54	0.02	0.5	0.307	0.463	−392.7	430.9
(0.004)			(0.089)	(0.048)	(0.072)	(0.106)	(0.111)	(0.094)	(0.03)	(–)	(–)	(0.11)		
0.027	–	–	0.223	0.698	0.16	0.861	0.272	0.561	–	–	0.345	0.416	−393	427.2
(0.004)			(0.087)	(0.048)	(0.073)	(0.119)	(0.111)	(0.111)			(–)	(0.088)		
0.026	–	–	0.226	0.703	0.146	0.873	–	–	–	–	0.628	0.358	−401.8	423.4
(0.004)			(0.084)	(0.046)	(0.07)	(0.103)					(–)	(0.04)		

(b) Treatment 5

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Coop** $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		**Gen TFT** $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		**Gen WSLS** $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.017	0	0.262	0.08	0.314	0.552	0.5	0.188	0.991	0	0.5	0.18	0.782	−333.7	363.1
(0.004)	(0)	(1.131)	(0.048)	(0.062)	(0.113)	(–)	(0.068)	(–)	(0.148)	(–)	(–)	(0.057)		
0.017	0	0.002	0.08	0.314	0.552	0.5	0.188	0.995	–	–	0.18	0.782	−333.7	359.2
(0.004)	(0.2)	(–)	(0.046)	(0.062)	(0.198)	(–)	(0.062)	(–)			(–)	(0.057)		
0.017	–	–	0.08	0.314	0.552	0.5	0.188	0.984	–	–	0.18	0.782	−333.7	355.4
(0.004)			(0.046)	(0.062)	(0.078)	(–)	(0.061)	(–)			(–)	(0.057)		
0.004	–	–	0.299	0.137	0.402	0.97	–	–	–	–	0.299	0.552	−337.3	354.5
(0.002)			(0.073)	(0.021)	(0.074)	(0.033)					(–)	(0.046)		

(c) Treatment 6

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Coop** $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		**Gen TFT** $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		**Gen WSLS** $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.017	0.023	0.5	0.067	0.808	0.035	0.5	0.111	0.986	0.083	0.5	0.681	0.242	−317	363.2
(0.003)	(0.023)	(–)	(0.047)	(0.08)	(0.078)	(–)	(0.081)	(–)	(0.059)	(–)	(–)	(0.049)		
0.017	0.023	0.5	0.068	0.808	–	–	0.108	0.987	0.082	0.5	0.72	0.234	−317.1	354.4
(0.003)	(0.023)	(–)	(0.048)	(0.081)			(0.08)	(–)	(0.059)	(–)	(–)	(0.044)		
0.018	0.023	0.5	0.073	0.799	–	–	0.11	0.988	–	–	0.794	0.213	−319.1	348.2
(0.003)	(0.023)	(–)	(0.051)	(0.085)			(0.082)	(–)			(–)	(0.04)		
0.017	0.023	0.5	0.074	0.796	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.902	0.227	−322.2	338.3
(0.003)	(0.023)	(–)	(0.051)	(0.083)							(–)	(0.037)		

Table 27: Elimination order and weights of prototypical strategies in Duffy and Ochs (2009)

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		Gen Grim $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		Gen Coop $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		Gen TFT $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		Gen WSLS $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		Semi-Grim $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.022 (0.003)	0.09 (0.042)	0.408 (0.037)	0.256 (0.085)	0.255 (0.027)	0.177 (0.068)	0.5 (−)	0.079 (0.048)	0.987 (−)	0 (0.045)	0.5 (−)	0.397 (−)	0.482 (0.042)	−783.8	835.2
0.022 (0.003)	0.09 (0.042)	0.408 (0.037)	0.256 (0.079)	0.255 (0.027)	0.177 (0.067)	0.5 (−)	0.079 (0.048)	0.987 (−)	−	−	0.397 (−)	0.482 (0.042)	−783.8	831.1
0.022 (0.003)	0.089 (0.042)	0.408 (0.038)	0.273 (0.083)	0.255 (0.027)	0.169 (0.067)	0.5 (−)	−	−	−	−	0.47 (−)	0.476 (0.04)	−789.1	829.2
0.022 (0.004)	0.089 (0.042)	0.407 (0.038)	0.263 (0.082)	0.259 (0.028)	−	−	−	−	−	−	0.649 (−)	0.386 (0.03)	−798.8	825.8
0.028 (0.004)	0.144 (0.047)	0.34 (0.024)	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	0.856 (−)	0.385 (0.025)	−815.7	824.3

Table 28: Elimination order and weights of prototypical strategies in Fudenberg et al. (2012)

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		Gen Grim $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		Gen Coop $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		Gen TFT $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		Gen WSLS $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		Semi-Grim $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.016 (0.005)	0.084 (0.041)	0.418 (0.044)	0.205 (0.215)	0.448 (0.218)	0.254 (0.094)	0.654 (0.159)	0.24 (0.083)	0.5 (−)	0 (0.205)	0.5 (−)	0.216 (−)	0.708 (0.089)	−334.9	390.6
0.016 (0.004)	0.084 (0.04)	0.418 (0.044)	0.205 (0.099)	0.448 (0.08)	0.254 (0.094)	0.654 (0.159)	0.24 (0.083)	0.5 (−)	−	−	0.216 (−)	0.708 (0.088)	−334.9	386.7
0.02 (0.004)	0.085 (0.041)	0.421 (0.047)	−	−	0.29 (0.099)	0.599 (0.153)	0.256 (0.086)	0.5 (−)	−	−	0.37 (−)	0.694 (0.067)	−339.1	378.8
0.021 (0.004)	0.083 (0.041)	0.419 (0.046)	−	−	0.244 (0.101)	0.623 (0.254)	−	−	−	−	0.673 (−)	0.517 (0.071)	−345.1	373
0.021 (0.004)	0.083 (0.041)	0.419 (0.046)	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	0.917 (−)	0.434 (0.037)	−354.7	363.6

Table 29: Estimated weights and randomization parameters of prototypical strategies $(\sigma_{cc}, \sigma_{cd}, \sigma_{dc}, \sigma_{dd})$ (as printed in the paper, repeated for convience)

			Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Coop** $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		**Gen TFT** $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		**Gen WSLS** $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$		
Treat	$\delta-\delta^{\star}$	γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL
Blonski et al. (2011)															
6	-0.3	0.002 (0.001)	1 (–)	0.017 (0.014)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	−15.3
2	-0.15	0.005 (0.004)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.3 (0.105)	−43.5
4	-0.05	0 (0)	–	–	0.05 (0.048)	0.533 (0)	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.95 (–)	0.026 (0.026)	−19
7	-0.05	0.004 (0.004)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.387 (0.066)	−48
8	0.075	0.008 (0.006)	–	–	0.05 (0.049)	0.8 (0)	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.95 (–)	0.229 (0.06)	−74.8
5	0.075	0.013 (0.008)	0.1 (0.065)	0.219 (0.072)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.9 (–)	0.314 (0.068)	−156.1
1	0.083	0.016 (0.012)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.314 (0.081)	−99.2
9	0.083	0.01 (0.007)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.186 (0.067)	−77
10	0.179	0.073 (0.028)	0.052 (0.06)	0.454 (0.035)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.948 (–)	0.216 (0.072)	−180
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)															
1	-0.316	0.006 (0.004)	–	–	0.045 (0.034)	0.553 (0.128)	–	–	0.069 (0.046)	0.997 (0.043)	–	–	0.885 (–)	0.276 (0.064)	−187
3	-0.105	0.033 (0.018)	0.355 (0.076)	0.008 (0)	0.14 (0.048)	0.647 (0.071)	–	–	0.157 (0.063)	0.88 (0.186)	–	–	0.348 (–)	0.446 (0.081)	−513
2	-0.066	0.027 (0.024)	–	–	0.325 (0.07)	0.005 (0)	–	–	0.141 (0.061)	0.952 (0.06)	–	–	0.533 (–)	0.508 (0.046)	−562.6
5	0.105	0.004 (0.006)	–	–	0.299 (0.1)	0.137 (0.092)	0.402 (0.109)	0.97 (0.246)	–	–	–	–	0.299 (–)	0.552 (0.114)	−337.3
4	0.145	0.026 (0.022)	–	–	0.226 (0.088)	0.703 (0.104)	0.146 (0.073)	0.873 (0.141)	–	–	–	–	0.628 (–)	0.358 (0.054)	−401.8
6	0.355	0.017 (0.007)	0.023 (0.026)	0.5 (0)	0.074 (0.078)	0.796 (0.122)	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.902 (–)	0.227 (0.044)	−322.2
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment															
1	0.233	0.028 (0.023)	0.144 (0.053)	0.34 (0.048)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.856 (–)	0.385 (0.032)	−815.7
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment															
1	0.475	0.021 (0.015)	0.083 (0.051)	0.419 (0.17)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.917 (–)	0.434 (0.063)	−354.7

Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are provided in parentheses (in the four cases where $\alpha \approx 0$ is estimated, these standard errors are not guaranteed to be consistent). Irrelevant components are identified (and then eliminated, as indicated by "–") based on the *ICL-BIC* information criterion, as described in the appendix. The right-most weight, usually that of the Semi-Grim component, is simply the difference of the remaining weights to 1. Thus, it is not a model parameter and is not assigned a standard error.

Table 30: Comparison of prototypical strategies including either symmetric or asymmetric Semi-Grim strategies, comparison by ICL (less is better). Standard errors are reported below the estimated parameters, p-values below the relation sign indicating significant differences of the ICLs.

		Finite mixture including symmetric Semi-Grim											Finite mixture including asymmetric Semi-Grim									
			Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$								**Constant** $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$		
Treat	$\delta-\delta^*$	γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL		ICL	LL	γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2
Blonski et al. (2011)																					
6	-0.3	0.007 (0.007)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.059 (0.052)	−13.6	16.6	≈ 0.99	16.7	−12.2	0.006 (0.007)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.118 (0.099)	0.005 (0.003)
2	-0.15	0.005 (0.004)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.3 (0.105)	−43.5	46.5	≈ 0.93	47.8	−43.3	0.005 (0.004)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.25 (0.103)	0.35 (0.131)
4	-0.05	0 (0)	–	–	0.05 (0.047)	0.533 (0)	0.95 (–)	0.026 (0.026)	−19	25	≈ 0.27	25.8	−18.4	0 (0)	–	–	0.05 (0.049)	0.533 (0)	0.95 (–)	0 (0)	0.048 (0.057)
7	-0.05	0.004 (0.004)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.387 (0.066)	−48	51	≈ 0.14	52	−47.5	0.004 (0.004)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.323 (0.085)	0.452 (0.081)
8	0.075	0.008 (0.006)	–	–	0.05 (0.049)	0.8 (0)	0.95 (–)	0.229 (0.06)	−74.8	80.8	≈ 0.64	81.5	−74	0.008 (0.006)	–	–	0.05 (0.049)	0.8 (0)	0.95 (–)	0.148 (0.061)	0.279 (0.095)
5	0.075	0.013 (0.008)	0.1 (0.065)	0.219 (0.072)	–	–	0.9 (–)	0.314 (0.068)	−156.1	162.1	≈ 0.99	162.5	−155	0.013 (0.009)	0.1 (0.074)	0.219 (0.077)	–	–	0.9 (–)	0.239 (0.076)	0.375 (0.114)
1	0.083	0.016 (0.012)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.314 (0.081)	−99.2	102.2	≈ 0.95	103.2	−98.7	0.016 (0.012)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.356 (0.067)	0.271 (0.084)
9	0.083	0.01 (0.007)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.186 (0.067)	−77	80	≈ 0.06	81.5	−77	0.01 (0.007)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.196 (0.084)	0.176 (0.079)
10	0.179	0.073 (0.027)	0.051 (0.052)	0.5 (0.034)	–	–	0.949 (–)	0.216 (0.067)	−180.1	186.2	≈ 0.98	187.2	−179.5	0.073 (0.024)	0.052 (0.06)	0.454 (0.048)	–	–	0.948 (–)	0.178 (0.068)	0.254 (0.09)
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)																					
1	-0.316	0.006 (0.004)	–	–	0.045 (0.034)	0.553 (0.125)	0.955 (–)	0.354 (0.072)	−202.7	210.4	≈ 1	210.3	−200.7	0.006 (0.004)	–	–	0.045 (0.035)	0.553 (0.128)	0.955 (–)	0.266 (0.075)	0.425 (0.113)
3	-0.105	0.028 (0.022)	0.063 (0.062)	0.424 (0.108)	0.1 (0.052)	0.715 (0.106)	0.838 (–)	0.302 (0.063)	−550.1	563.2	≈ 0.98	564.5	−549.3	0.028 (0.022)	0.064 (0.06)	0.421 (0.11)	0.1 (0.051)	0.715 (0.11)	0.836 (–)	0.337 (0.083)	0.275 (0.087)
2	-0.066	0.026 (0.024)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.382 (0.037)	−634.8	639.1	≈ 0.78	605.8	−593.5	0.026 (0.023)	0.312 (0.076)	0.023 (0.01)	–	–	0.688 (–)	0.367 (0.065)	0.637 (0.08)
5	0.105	0.016 (0.009)	0.022 (0.022)	0.391 (0.03)	0.533 (0.08)	0.004 (0.001)	0.445 (–)	0.561 (0.073)	−348.7	363	≈ 0.96	360.1	−345	0.016 (0.009)	0.022 (0.022)	0.393 (0.028)	0.533 (0.073)	0.008 (0.003)	0.445 (–)	0.51 (0.087)	0.723 (0.102)
4	0.145	0.027 (0.022)	–	–	0.251 (0.091)	0.706 (0.095)	0.749 (–)	0.333 (0.07)	−411.6	425.3	≈ 0.99	426.1	−410.2	0.027 (0.023)	–	–	0.263 (0.093)	0.703 (0.084)	0.737 (–)	0.266 (0.098)	0.381 (0.095)
6	0.355	0.017 (0.007)	0.023 (0.026)	0.5 (0)	0.074 (0.078)	0.796 (0.122)	0.902 (–)	0.227 (0.044)	−322.2	338.3	≈ 0.99	339.5	−321.6	0.017 (0.007)	0.023 (0.026)	0.5 (0)	0.074 (0.076)	0.797 (0.123)	0.902 (–)	0.188 (0.044)	0.269 (0.093)
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment																					
1	0.233	0.028 (0.023)	0.144 (0.053)	0.34 (0.048)	–	–	0.856 (–)	0.385 (0.032)	−815.7	824.3	≈ 0.72	825.3	−814.6	0.028 (0.023)	0.143 (0.049)	0.34 (0.048)	–	–	0.857 (–)	0.347 (0.037)	0.421 (0.056)
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment																					
1	0.475	0.021 (0.015)	0.083 (0.051)	0.419 (0.17)	–	–	0.917 (–)	0.434 (0.063)	−354.7	363.6	≈ 0.87	364.1	−353.2	0.021 (0.015)	0.083 (0.052)	0.419 (0.18)	–	–	0.917 (–)	0.495 (0.065)	0.368 (0.1)

Note: In relation to Table 29, this table contains estimates for models including asymmetric semi-grim strategies $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$. These asymmetric strategies include "Gen Coop" and "Gen TFT" (as well as Semi-Grim) as special cases, but they allow for joint occurrences of $\alpha_1,\alpha_2 \neq 0$. The analysis determines if the descriptive adequacy improves if we replace the symmetric semi-grim strategy by such asymmetric ones. The notation is very similar to Table 29. That is, strategies are printed in the order $(\sigma_{cc},\sigma_{cd},\sigma_{dc},\sigma_{dd})$, standard errors are printed below the estimated weights and parameters, but in addition to the log-likelihood, the ICL (integrated classification likelihood is printed) – to facilitate model comparisons as discussed above. The statistical significance of the null that there is no comparison is evaluated by bootstrapping, as above, and the unadjusted p-values of these null hypotheses are printed below the respetive relation signs.
Main result: Allowing the semi-grim component to be asymmetric does not improve the goodness-of-fit.

Table 31: Comparison of prototypical strategies including either symmetric or asymmetric Semi-Grim strategies in addition to one component with symmetric Semi-Grim strategies, comparison by ICL (less is better). Standard errors are reported below the estimated parameters, p-values below the relation sign indicating significant differences of the ICLs.

	Finite mixture including symmetric Semi-Grim											Finite mixture including asymmetric Semi-Grim										
	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim I** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$		**Semi-Grim II** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$							**Constant** $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$			**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$	
Treat	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL		ICL	LL	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2	Weight	α
Blonski et al. (2011)																						
6	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.059 (0.052)	–	–	−13.6	16.6	≈ 0.99	16.7	−12.2	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.118 (0.099)	0.005 (0.003)	–	–
2	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.3 (0.105)	–	–	−43.5	46.5	≈ 1	46.5	−43.5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.3 (0.105)
4	–	–	0.053 (0.047)	0.533 (0)	–	–	0.947 (–)	0.026 (0.024)	−19	25	≈ 1	25	−19	–	–	0.05 (0.047)	0.533 (0)	–	–	–	0.95 (–)	0.026 (0.026)
7	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.387 (0.066)	–	–	−48	51	≈ 0.5	51	−48	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.387 (0.066)
8	–	–	0.05 (0.049)	0.8 (0)	0.95 (–)	0.229 (0.06)	–	–	−74.8	80.8	≈ 0.5	80.8	−74.8	–	–	0.05 (0.049)	0.8 (0)	–	–	–	0.95 (–)	0.229 (0.06)
5	0.1 (0.07)	0.219 (0.072)	–	–	0.9 (–)	0.314 (0.069)	–	–	−156.1	162.1	≈ 1	162.1	−156.1	0.1 (0.065)	0.219 (0.072)	–	–	–	–	–	0.9 (–)	0.314 (0.068)
1	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.314 (0.064)	–	–	−99.2	102.2	≈ 1	102.2	−99.2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.314 (0.081)
9	–	–	–	–	0.821 (0.097)	0.06 (0.027)	0.179 (–)	0.572 (0.156)	−70	78.1	≈ 0.95	79.5	−69.8	–	–	–	–	0.18 (0.11)	0.53 (0.187)	0.636 (0.195)	0.82 (–)	0.06 (0.028)
10	0.052 (0.06)	0.454 (0.037)	–	–	–	–	0.948 (–)	0.216 (0.072)	−180	186.2	≈ 1	186.2	−180.1	0.051 (0.052)	0.5 (0.034)	–	–	–	–	–	0.949 (–)	0.216 (0.067)
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)																						
1	–	–	0.045 (0.034)	0.553 (0.123)	0.955 (–)	0.354 (0.07)	–	–	−202.7	210.4	≈ 1	210.3	−200.7	–	–	0.045 (0.035)	0.553 (0.128)	0.955 (–)	0.266 (0.075)	0.425 (0.113)	–	–
3	0.09 (0.046)	0.356 (0.11)	0.1 (0.047)	0.713 (0.11)	0.412 (0.077)	0.004 (0)	0.398 (–)	0.509 (0.058)	−516.2	539	≈ 1	538.5	−514.3	0.085 (0.048)	0.357 (0.128)	0.101 (0.051)	0.712 (0.107)	0.393 (0.084)	0.443 (0.103)	0.596 (0.143)	0.421 (–)	0.021 (0.018)
2	–	–	–	–	0.315 (0.073)	0.023 (0.012)	0.685 (–)	0.483 (0.034)	−604.8	616.3	≈ 0.48	605.8	−593.5	0.312 (0.076)	0.023 (0.01)	–	–	0.688 (–)	0.367 (0.065)	0.637 (0.08)	–	–
5	–	–	0.124 (0.075)	0.263 (0.1)	0.544 (0.099)	0.031 (0.045)	0.333 (–)	0.617 (0.135)	−335.3	351.5	≈ 0.9	359.7	−335.2	0.022 (0.022)	0.391 (0.029)	0.489 (0.087)	0 (0)	0.073 (0.064)	0.994 (0.046)	0.141 (0.116)	0.415 (–)	0.493 (0.067)
4	–	–	0.251 (0.09)	0.706 (0.094)	0.749 (–)	0.333 (0.071)	–	–	−411.6	425.3	≈ 1	425.3	−411.6	–	–	0.251 (0.091)	0.706 (0.095)	–	–	–	0.749 (–)	0.333 (0.07)
6	0.023 (0.025)	0.5 (0)	0.074 (0.075)	0.796 (0.105)	0.902 (–)	0.227 (0.04)	–	–	−322.2	338.3	≈ 1	338.3	−322.2	0.023 (0.026)	0.5 (0)	0.074 (0.078)	0.796 (0.122)	–	–	–	0.902 (–)	0.227 (0.044)
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment																						
1	0.144 (0.053)	0.34 (0.048)	–	–	0.856 (–)	0.385 (0.032)	–	–	−815.7	824.3	≈ 0.5	824.3	−815.7	0.144 (0.053)	0.34 (0.048)	–	–	–	–	–	0.856 (–)	0.385 (0.032)
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment																						
1	0.083 (0.05)	0.419 (0.17)	–	–	0.917 (–)	0.434 (0.063)	–	–	−354.7	363.6	≈ 1	363.6	−354.7	0.083 (0.051)	0.419 (0.17)	–	–	–	–	–	0.917 (–)	0.434 (0.063)

Note: In relation to the previous table, this table now contains estimates of individual weights when we allow for an asymmetric semi-grim strategy $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$ in addition to the symmetric one. Thus, if we take the existence of a Semi-Grim component taken as given, it askes if the rest of the population is best described as playing strategies (as opposed to the rest playing symmetric semi-grim). The notation is very similar to Table 29. That is, strategies are printed in the order $(\sigma_{cc},\sigma_{cd},\sigma_{dc},\sigma_{dd})$, standard errors are printed below the estimated weights and parameters, but in addition to the log-likelihood, the ICL (integrated classification likelihood is printed) – to facilitate model comparisons as discussed above. The statistical significance of the null that there is no comparison is evaluated by bootstrapping, as above, and the unadjusted p-values of these null hypotheses are printed below the respetive relation signs.
Main result: Allowing a second semi-grim component to be asymmetric does not improve the goodness-of-fit over it being symmetric.

Table 32: Estimated weights and randomization parameters including asymmetric prototypical strategies $(\sigma_{cc}, \sigma_{cd}, \sigma_{dc}, \sigma_{dd})$

			Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$			**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
Treat	$\delta-\delta^\star$	γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2	Weight	α	LL	ICL
Blonski et al. (2011)													
6	-0.3	0.006 (0.007)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.118 (0.099)	0.005 (0.003)	–	–	−12.2	16.7
2	-0.15	0.005 (0.004)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.3 (0.105)	−43.5	46.5
4	-0.05	0 (0)	–	–	0.05 (0.047)	0.533 (0)	–	–	–	0.95 (–)	0.026 (0.026)	−19	25
7	-0.05	0.004 (0.004)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.387 (0.066)	−48	51
8	0.075	0.008 (0.006)	–	–	0.05 (0.049)	0.8 (0)	–	–	–	0.95 (–)	0.229 (0.06)	−74.8	80.8
5	0.075	0.013 (0.008)	0.1 (0.065)	0.219 (0.072)	–	–	–	–	–	0.9 (–)	0.314 (0.068)	−156.1	162.1
1	0.083	0.016 (0.012)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.314 (0.081)	−99.2	102.2
9	0.083	0.01 (0.006)	–	–	–	–	0.18 (0.11)	0.53 (0.187)	0.636 (0.195)	0.82 (–)	0.06 (0.028)	−69.8	79.5
10	0.179	0.073 (0.027)	0.051 (0.052)	0.5 (0.034)	–	–	–	–	–	0.949 (–)	0.216 (0.067)	−180.1	186.2
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)													
1	-0.316	0.006 (0.004)	–	–	0.045 (0.035)	0.553 (0.128)	0.955 (–)	0.266 (0.075)	0.425 (0.113)	–	–	−200.7	210.3
3	-0.105	0.025 (0.023)	0.085 (0.048)	0.357 (0.128)	0.101 (0.051)	0.712 (0.107)	0.393 (0.084)	0.443 (0.103)	0.596 (0.143)	0.421 (–)	0.021 (0.018)	−514.3	538.5
2	-0.066	0.026 (0.023)	0.312 (0.076)	0.023 (0.01)	–	–	0.688 (–)	0.367 (0.065)	0.637 (0.08)	–	–	−593.5	605.8
5	0.105	0.015 (0.007)	0.022 (0.022)	0.391 (0.029)	0.489 (0.087)	0 (0)	0.073 (0.064)	0.994 (0.046)	0.141 (0.116)	0.415 (–)	0.493 (0.067)	−335.2	359.7
4	0.145	0.027 (0.022)	–	–	0.251 (0.091)	0.706 (0.095)	–	–	–	0.749 (–)	0.333 (0.07)	−411.6	425.3
6	0.355	0.017 (0.007)	0.023 (0.026)	0.5 (0)	0.074 (0.078)	0.796 (0.122)	–	–	–	0.902 (–)	0.227 (0.044)	−322.2	338.3
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment													
1	0.233	0.028 (0.023)	0.144 (0.053)	0.34 (0.048)	–	–	–	–	–	0.856 (–)	0.385 (0.032)	−815.7	824.3
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment													
1	0.475	0.021 (0.015)	0.083 (0.051)	0.419 (0.17)	–	–	–	–	–	0.917 (–)	0.434 (0.063)	−354.7	363.6

Table 33: Elimination order and weights including asymmetric prototypical strategies in Blonski et al. (2011)

(a) Treatment 1

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$			**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.015	0	0.347	0	0.9	0.33	0.423	0.986	0.67	0.154	−93.3	108.8
(0.007)	(0)	(0.014)	(0.221)	(−)	(0.136)	(0.08)	(−)	(−)	(0.052)		
0.015	0	0.173	−	−	0.33	0.423	0.986	0.67	0.154	−93.3	105.8
(0.007)	(0)	(0.469)			(0.115)	(0.08)	(−)	(−)	(0.052)		
0.015	−	−	−	−	0.33	0.423	0.986	0.67	0.154	−93.3	102.8
(0.007)					(0.115)	(0.08)	(−)	(−)	(0.052)		
0.016	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	1	0.314	−99.2	102.2
(0.007)								(−)	(0.043)		

(b) Treatment 2

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$			**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.005	0	0.341	0	0.405	0.203	0.214	0.391	0.797	0.299	−43.4	67
(0.003)	(0.052)	(194.245)	(0.063)	(235.558)	(1.012)	(0.073)	(0.198)	(−)	(0.056)		
0.005	−	−	0	0.409	0.234	0.431	0.998	0.766	0.127	−41.9	57.5
(0.003)			(0)	(224.379)	(0.136)	(0.17)	(−)	(−)	(0.087)		
0.005	−	−	−	−	0.234	0.431	0.998	0.766	0.127	−41.9	54.5
(0.003)					(0.136)	(0.17)	(−)	(−)	(0.087)		
0.005	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	1	0.3	−43.5	46.5
(0.003)								(−)	(0.072)		

(c) Treatment 4

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$			**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0	0.053	0.5	0.051	0.677	0.568	0.008	0.073	0.328	0.032	−20.3	46.5
(0.002)	(0.315)	(−)	(0.085)	(0.162)	(0.171)	(0.654)	(0.264)	(−)	(0.404)		
0	0	0.5	0.05	0.533	−	−	−	0.95	0.026	−19	27.9
(0.055)	(0.2)	(−)	(0.053)	(0.129)				(−)	(0.026)		
0	−	−	0.05	0.533	−	−	−	0.95	0.026	−19	25
(0.055)			(0.049)	(0.129)				(−)	(0.026)		

Table 34: Elimination order and weights including asymmetric prototypical strategies in Blonski et al. (2011) (continued)

(a) Treatment 5

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$			**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.014	0.053	0.124	0.054	0.287	0.527	0.275	0.656	0.367	0.036	−149.3	167.3
(0.005)	(0.052)	(0.065)	(0.054)	(0.074)	(0.161)	(0.076)	(0.123)	(−)	(0.06)		
0.013	0.1	0.219	−	−	0.53	0.276	0.659	0.37	0.038	−148.8	163.2
(0.004)	(0.067)	(0.046)			(0.16)	(0.075)	(0.122)	(−)	(0.06)		
0.013	0.1	0.219	−	−	−	−	−	0.9	0.314	−156.1	162.1
(0.004)	(0.067)	(0.046)						(−)	(0.046)		

(b) Treatment 6

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$			**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0	0.331	0.008	0.363	0.008	0.305	0.314	0	0	0.001	−11.6	45.2
(0)	(14.47)	(0.01)	(14.469)	(0.008)	(0.306)	(0.242)	(0)	(−)	(5.193)		
0	0.331	0.008	0.363	0.008	0.305	0.314	0	−	−	−11.6	42.2
(0)	(12.69)	(0.009)	(12.691)	(0.009)	(−)	(0.242)	(0)				
0	0.7	0.008	−	−	0.3	0.312	0	−	−	−11.6	29.5
(0)	(0.302)	(0.009)			(−)	(0.239)	(0)				
0.006	−	−	−	−	1	0.118	0.005	−	−	−12.2	16.7
(0.006)					(−)	(0.078)	(−)				

(c) Treatment 7

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$			**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.004	0	0.198	0	0.17	0.133	0.666	1	0.867	0.324	−47.3	64.7
(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.553)	(0.001)	(0.154)	(0.128)	(0.355)	(0.002)	(−)	(0.082)		
0.004	0	0.143	0	0.188	−	−	−	1	0.387	−48	57
(0.004)	(0.001)	(2.024)	(0)	(0.654)				(−)	(0.062)		
0.004	0	0.071	−	−	−	−	−	1	0.387	−48	54
(0.004)	(0)	(0.068)						(−)	(0.062)		
0.004	−	−	−	−	−	−	−	1	0.387	−48	51
(0.004)								(−)	(0.062)		

Table 35: Elimination order and weights including asymmetric prototypical strategies in Blonski et al. (2011) (continued)

(a) Treatment 8

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$			**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.008	0	0.304	0.05	0.8	0.557	0.004	0.16	0.393	0.433	−73.9	95.5
(0.004)	(0)	(0.299)	(0.049)	(0.089)	(0.212)	(−)	(0.078)	(−)	(0.165)		
0.008	−	−	0.05	0.8	0.875	0.111	0.235	0.076	0.852	−73	85.6
(0.004)			(0.049)	(0.09)	(0.128)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(−)	(0.365)		
0.008	−	−	0.05	0.8	−	−	−	0.95	0.229	−74.8	80.8
(0.004)			(0.049)	(0.089)				(−)	(0.05)		

(b) Treatment 9

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$			**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.01	0	0.434	0	0.123	0.18	0.53	0.636	0.82	0.06	−69.8	85.5
(0.005)	(0)	(176.386)	(0)	(0.105)	(0.099)	(0.148)	(0.174)	(−)	(0.029)		
0.01	0	0.217	−	−	0.18	0.53	0.636	0.82	0.06	−69.8	82.5
(0.005)	(0)	(10.589)			(0.099)	(0.148)	(0.174)	(−)	(0.029)		
0.01	−	−	−	−	0.18	0.53	0.636	0.82	0.06	−69.8	79.5
(0.005)					(0.099)	(0.148)	(0.174)	(−)	(0.029)		

(c) Treatment 10

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$			**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.073	0.052	0.5	0.099	0.044	0.289	0.32	0.637	0.561	0.086	−174.7	199.2
(0.013)	(0.05)	(−)	(41.124)	(−)	(0.168)	(0.117)	(0.171)	(−)	(1.028)		
0.073	0.054	0.452	−	−	0.289	0.32	0.637	0.658	0.084	−174.5	190.6
(0.014)	(0.053)	(0.103)			(0.164)	(0.117)	(0.169)	(−)	(0.043)		
0.073	0.051	0.5	−	−	−	−	−	0.949	0.216	−180.1	186.2
(0.013)	(0.05)	(−)						(−)	(0.039)		

Table 36: Elimination order and weights including asymmetric prototypical strategies in Dal Bo and Frechette (2011)

(a) Treatment 1

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$			**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.006	0.367	0.006	0.046	0.553	0.16	0.211	0.008	0.427	0.49	−194.4	243.6
(0.002)	(0.527)	(−)	(0.031)	(0.057)	(0.602)	(0.439)	(0.171)	(−)	(0.063)		
0.006	0.581	0.005	0.045	0.553	0.373	0.309	0.757	−	−	−185.4	212.7
(0.002)	(0.103)	(−)	(0.031)	(0.057)	(−)	(0.063)	(0.078)				
0.006	−	−	0.045	0.553	0.955	0.266	0.425	−	−	−200.7	210.3
(0.002)			(0.031)	(0.057)	(−)	(0.055)	(0.055)				

(b) Treatment 2

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$			**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.021	0	0.149	0.064	0.29	0.366	0.312	0.005	0.57	0.496	−601.8	624.4
(0.003)	(0)	(0.202)	(0.041)	(0.04)	(0.085)	(0.141)	(−)	(−)	(0.031)		
0.026	0.312	0.023	0	0.357	0.688	0.367	0.637	−	−	−593.5	609.6
(0.003)	(0.073)	(−)	(0)	(0.383)	(−)	(0.031)	(0.039)				
0.026	0.312	0.023	−	−	0.688	0.367	0.637	−	−	−593.5	605.8
(0.003)	(0.073)	(−)			(−)	(0.031)	(0.039)				

(c) Treatment 3

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$			**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.025	0.085	0.357	0.101	0.712	0.393	0.443	0.596	0.421	0.021	−514.3	538.5
(0.005)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.076)	(0.051)	(0.059)	(−)	(−)		

Table 37: Elimination order and weights including asymmetric prototypical strategies in Dal Bo and Frechette (2011) (continued)

(a) Treatment 4

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$			**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.027	0	0.367	0.214	0.693	0.522	0.329	0.671	0.263	0.11	−398.3	429.2
(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.883)	(0.089)	(0.048)	(0.133)	(0.068)	(0.102)	(–)	(0.064)		
0.027	–	–	0.217	0.694	0.526	0.327	0.665	0.257	0.107	−398.3	425.5
(0.004)			(0.089)	(0.048)	(0.134)	(0.068)	(0.102)	(–)	(0.066)		
0.027	–	–	0.251	0.706	–	–	–	0.749	0.333	−411.6	425.3
(0.004)			(0.085)	(0.044)				(–)	(0.034)		

(b) Treatment 5

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$			**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.015	0.022	0.391	0.489	0	0.073	0.994	0.141	0.415	0.493	−335.2	359.7
(0.003)	(0.022)	(0.088)	(0.084)	(–)	(0.051)	(–)	(0.133)	(–)	(0.038)		

(c) Treatment 6

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$			**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.018	0.023	0.5	0.034	0.907	0.189	0.181	0.984	0.754	0.199	−317	348.6
(0.003)	(0.023)	(–)	(0.033)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(–)	(–)	(0.04)		
0.017	0.023	0.5	0.074	0.796	–	–	–	0.902	0.227	−322.2	338.3
(0.003)	(0.023)	(–)	(0.051)	(0.083)				(–)	(0.037)		

Table 38: Elimination order and weights including asymmetric prototypical strategies in Duffy and Ochs (2009)

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$			**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.022 (0.003)	0.087 (0.041)	0.407 (0.038)	0.269 (0.084)	0.263 (0.027)	0.182 (0.065)	0.183 (0.103)	0.018 (−)	0.462 (−)	0.491 (0.038)	−786.5	827.4
0.022 (0.004)	0.089 (0.042)	0.407 (0.038)	0.263 (0.082)	0.259 (0.028)	–	–	–	0.649 (−)	0.386 (0.03)	−798.8	825.8
0.028 (0.004)	0.144 (0.047)	0.34 (0.024)	–	–	–	–	–	0.856 (−)	0.385 (0.025)	−815.7	824.3

Table 39: Elimination order and weights including asymmetric prototypical strategies in Fudenberg et al. (2012)

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Asymmetric Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha_1,\alpha_2,0)$			**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α_1	α_2	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.016 (0.004)	0.083 (0.04)	0.417 (0.044)	0.217 (0.114)	0.455 (0.091)	0.269 (0.089)	0.007 (−)	0.132 (0.062)	0.43 (−)	0.639 (0.069)	−340.1	383.2
0.02 (0.004)	0.083 (0.04)	0.419 (0.045)	–	–	0.287 (0.091)	0.001 (−)	0.137 (0.06)	0.63 (−)	0.623 (0.054)	−343.5	369.6
0.021 (0.004)	0.083 (0.041)	0.419 (0.046)	–	–	–	–	–	0.917 (−)	0.434 (0.037)	−354.7	363.6

Table 40: Estimated weights and randomization parameters including two Semi-Grim strategies $(\sigma_{cc}, \sigma_{cd}, \sigma_{dc}, \sigma_{dd})$

			Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim 1** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$		**Semi-Grim 2** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
Treat	$\delta-\delta^\star$	γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
Blonski et al. (2011)												
6	-0.3	0.007 (0.007)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.059 (0.052)	–	–	−13.6	16.6
2	-0.15	0.005 (0.004)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.3 (0.105)	–	–	−43.5	46.5
4	-0.05	0 (0)	–	–	0.053 (0.047)	0.533 (0)	–	–	0.947 (–)	0.026 (0.024)	−19	25
7	-0.05	0.004 (0.004)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.387 (0.066)	–	–	−48	51
8	0.075	0.008 (0.006)	–	–	0.05 (0.049)	0.8 (0)	0.95 (–)	0.229 (0.06)	–	–	−74.8	80.8
5	0.075	0.013 (0.008)	0.1 (0.07)	0.219 (0.072)	–	–	0.9 (–)	0.314 (0.069)	–	–	−156.1	162.1
1	0.083	0.016 (0.012)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.314 (0.064)	–	–	−99.2	102.2
9	0.083	0.01 (0.006)	–	–	–	–	0.821 (0.097)	0.06 (0.027)	0.179 (–)	0.572 (0.156)	−70	78.1
10	0.179	0.073 (0.028)	0.052 (0.06)	0.454 (0.037)	–	–	–	–	0.948 (–)	0.216 (0.072)	−180	186.2
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)												
1	-0.316	0.006 (0.004)	–	–	0.045 (0.034)	0.553 (0.123)	0.955 (–)	0.354 (0.07)	–	–	−202.7	210.4
3	-0.105	0.024 (0.022)	0.09 (0.046)	0.356 (0.11)	0.1 (0.047)	0.713 (0.11)	0.412 (0.077)	0.004 (0)	0.398 (–)	0.509 (0.058)	−516.2	539
2	-0.066	0.026 (0.024)	–	–	–	–	0.315 (0.073)	0.023 (0.012)	0.685 (–)	0.483 (0.034)	−604.8	616.3
5	0.105	0.007 (0.005)	–	–	0.124 (0.075)	0.263 (0.1)	0.544 (0.099)	0.031 (0.045)	0.333 (–)	0.617 (0.135)	−335.3	351.5
4	0.145	0.027 (0.023)	–	–	0.251 (0.09)	0.706 (0.094)	0.749 (–)	0.333 (0.071)	–	–	−411.6	425.3
6	0.355	0.017 (0.008)	0.023 (0.025)	0.5 (0)	0.074 (0.075)	0.796 (0.105)	0.902 (–)	0.227 (0.04)	–	–	−322.2	338.3
Duffy and Ochs (2009), “random rematching” treatment												
1	0.233	0.028 (0.023)	0.144 (0.053)	0.34 (0.048)	–	–	0.856 (–)	0.385 (0.032)	–	–	−815.7	824.3
Fudenberg et al. (2012), “no-noise” treatment												
1	0.475	0.021 (0.014)	0.083 (0.05)	0.419 (0.17)	–	–	0.917 (–)	0.434 (0.063)	–	–	−354.7	363.6

Table 41: Elimination order and weights including two Semi-Grim strategies in Blonski et al. (2011)

(a) Treatment 1

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim 1** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$		**Semi-Grim 2** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.015 (0.007)	0 (0)	0.453 (0.899)	0.303 (0.132)	0.013 (–)	0.417 (337.361)	0.401 (0.148)	0.28 (–)	0.401 (0.211)	−96.1	122.5
0.015 (0.007)	0 (0)	0.466 (1.012)	0.303 (0.137)	0.005 (–)	0.697 (–)	0.401 (0.058)	–	–	−96.1	110.1
0.015 (0.007)	–	–	0.303 (0.137)	0.005 (–)	0.697 (–)	0.401 (0.058)	–	–	−96.1	107.1
0.016 (0.007)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.314 (0.043)	–	–	−99.2	102.2

(b) Treatment 2

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim 1** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$		**Semi-Grim 2** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.005 (0.003)	0 (0.001)	0.144 (1.473)	0 (0.004)	0.267 (35.597)	0.403 (14.153)	0.304 (0.146)	0.597 (–)	0.296 (0.082)	−43.5	69
0.005 (0.003)	–	–	0 (0)	0.134 (0.072)	0.409 (0.502)	0.459 (0.244)	0.591 (–)	0.131 (0.151)	−43.2	63.3
0.005 (0.003)	–	–	–	–	0.409 (0.502)	0.459 (0.244)	0.591 (–)	0.131 (0.151)	−43.2	60.4
0.005 (0.003)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.3 (0.072)	–	–	−43.5	46.5

(c) Treatment 4

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim 1** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$		**Semi-Grim 2** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0 (0.055)	0 (0)	0.423 (0.607)	0.05 (0.049)	0.533 (0.129)	0.565 (99.053)	0.026 (0.024)	0.385 (–)	0.026 (0.03)	−19	43.8
0 (0.055)	0 (0.001)	0.423 (10.663)	0.053 (0.051)	0.533 (0.129)	–	–	0.947 (–)	0.026 (0.026)	−19	27.9
0 (0.047)	–	–	0.053 (0.051)	0.533 (0.129)	–	–	0.947 (–)	0.026 (0.026)	−19	25

Table 42: Elimination order and weights including two Semi-Grim strategies in Blonski et al. (2011) (continued)

(a) Treatment 5

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim 1** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$		**Semi-Grim 2** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.014 (0.005)	0.052 (0.051)	0.124 (0.064)	0.06 (0.061)	0.284 (0.072)	0.288 (0.193)	0.024 (0.076)	0.6 (–)	0.409 (0.077)	−153.6	171.9
0.013 (0.004)	0.1 (0.067)	0.219 (0.046)	–	–	0.289 (0.193)	0.025 (0.076)	0.611 (–)	0.412 (0.075)	−153.2	167.5
0.013 (0.004)	0.1 (0.067)	0.219 (0.046)	–	–	0.9 (–)	0.314 (0.046)	–	–	−156.1	162.1

(b) Treatment 6

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim 1** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$		**Semi-Grim 2** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.005 (0.046)	0.265 (18.81)	0.007 (0.058)	0.208 (22.683)	0.007 (0.073)	0.385 (29.96)	0.001 (–)	0.142 (–)	0.297 (0.236)	−12.5	48.7
0 (0.088)	0.561 (11.769)	0.007 (0.009)	0.301 (11.763)	0.007 (0.016)	0.137 (–)	0.302 (0.259)	–	–	−12.5	38.3
0 (0.088)	0.862 (0.174)	0.007 (0.012)	–	–	0.138 (–)	0.301 (0.259)	–	–	−12.5	24.2
0.007 (0.007)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.059 (0.04)	–	–	−13.6	16.6

(c) Treatment 7

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim 1** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$		**Semi-Grim 2** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.004 (0.003)	0 (0.003)	0.259 (1.474)	0 (0.227)	0.002 (–)	0.226 (1.584)	0.305 (0.115)	0.774 (–)	0.41 (0.052)	−48	70.4
0.004 (0.004)	0 (0.002)	0.264 (1.584)	0.003 (0.213)	0.001 (–)	0.997 (–)	0.387 (0.08)	–	–	−48	57.4
0.004 (0.004)	0 (0)	0.132 (0.668)	–	–	1 (–)	0.387 (0.062)	–	–	−48	54
0.004 (0.004)	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.387 (0.062)	–	–	−48	51

Table 43: Elimination order and weights including two Semi-Grim strategies in Blonski et al. (2011) (continued)

(a) Treatment 8

γ	**Constant** $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$ Weight	α	**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$ Weight	α	**Semi-Grim 1** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$ Weight	α	**Semi-Grim 2** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$ Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.007 (0.004)	0.042 (0.057)	0.062 (0.055)	0.05 (0.049)	0.8 (0.09)	0.086 (0.146)	0.816 (0.387)	0.822 (−)	0.199 (0.08)	−73.3	88.9
0.008 (0.004)	–	–	0.05 (0.049)	0.8 (0.09)	0.101 (0.143)	0.788 (0.339)	0.849 (−)	0.179 (0.064)	−73.8	85.8
0.008 (0.004)	–	–	0.05 (0.049)	0.8 (0.089)	0.95 (−)	0.229 (0.05)	–	–	−74.8	80.8

(b) Treatment 9

γ	**Constant** $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$ Weight	α	**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$ Weight	α	**Semi-Grim 1** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$ Weight	α	**Semi-Grim 2** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$ Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.01 (0.005)	0 (0.002)	0.206 (8.489)	0 (0.697)	0 (−)	0.821 (0.701)	0.06 (0.044)	0.179 (−)	0.572 (0.116)	−70	84.1
0.01 (0.005)	0 (0)	0.103 (0.29)	–	–	0.821 (0.098)	0.06 (0.029)	0.179 (−)	0.572 (0.116)	−70	81.1
0.01 (0.005)	–	–	–	–	0.821 (0.098)	0.06 (0.029)	0.179 (−)	0.572 (0.116)	−70	78.1

(c) Treatment 10

γ	**Constant** $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$ Weight	α	**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$ Weight	α	**Semi-Grim 1** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$ Weight	α	**Semi-Grim 2** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$ Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.074 (−)	0.053 (−)	0.453 (0.102)	0.318 (−)	0.039 (−)	0.326 (−)	0.035 (−)	0.302 (−)	0.434 (−)	−176.1	203.6
0.074 (0.013)	0.053 (0.052)	0.453 (0.102)	0.645 (0.187)	0.019 (−)	–	–	0.302 (−)	0.434 (0.119)	−176.1	191.7
0.073 (0.013)	0.052 (0.051)	0.454 (0.104)	–	–	–	–	0.948 (−)	0.216 (0.039)	−180	186.2

Table 44: Elimination order and weights including two Semi-Grim strategies in Dal Bo and Frechette (2011)

(a) Treatment 1

	Constant (α, α, α, α)		**Gen Grim** (1, α, α, α)		**Semi-Grim 1** (1, α, α, 0)		**Semi-Grim 2** (1, α, α, 0)			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.006	0.454	0.001	0.045	0.553	0.337	0.326	0.164	0.662	−192.8	237.4
(0.002)	(0.143)	(−)	(0.031)	(0.057)	(0.179)	(0.12)	(−)	(0.142)		
0.006	0.502	0.002	0.045	0.553	0.452	0.484	−	−	−194.5	223.7
(0.002)	(0.118)	(−)	(0.031)	(0.057)	(−)	(0.054)				
0.006	−	−	0.045	0.553	0.955	0.354	−	−	−202.7	210.4
(0.002)			(0.031)	(0.057)	(−)	(0.04)				

(b) Treatment 2

	Constant (α, α, α, α)		**Gen Grim** (1, α, α, α)		**Semi-Grim 1** (1, α, α, 0)		**Semi-Grim 2** (1, α, α, 0)			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.02	0.153	0.019	0.064	0.292	0.164	0.011	0.619	0.483	−599.7	626.8
(0.003)	(0.12)	(−)	(0.041)	(0.04)	(0.121)	(−)	(−)	(0.028)		
0.021	−	−	0.063	0.292	0.315	0.018	0.623	0.482	−602.1	617.5
(0.003)			(0.041)	(0.04)	(0.074)	(−)	(−)	(0.028)		
0.026	−	−	−	−	0.315	0.023	0.685	0.483	−604.8	616.3
(0.003)					(0.074)	(−)	(−)	(0.026)		

(c) Treatment 3

	Constant (α, α, α, α)		**Gen Grim** (1, α, α, α)		**Semi-Grim 1** (1, α, α, 0)		**Semi-Grim 2** (1, α, α, 0)			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.024	0.09	0.356	0.1	0.713	0.412	0.004	0.398	0.509	−516.2	539
(0.005)	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.075)	(−)	(−)	(0.04)		

Table 45: Elimination order and weights including two Semi-Grim strategies in Dal Bo and Frechette (2011) (continued)

(a) Treatment 4

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim 1** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$		**Semi-Grim 2** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.027 (0.004)	0 (0)	0.262 (0.631)	0.154 (0.082)	0.676 (0.053)	0.557 (0.101)	0.232 (0.038)	0.289 (–)	0.73 (0.074)	−402.7	431.1
0.027 (0.004)	–	–	0.154 (0.082)	0.676 (0.053)	0.557 (0.101)	0.232 (0.038)	0.289 (–)	0.73 (0.074)	−402.7	427.5
0.027 (0.004)	–	–	0.251 (0.085)	0.706 (0.044)	0.749 (–)	0.333 (0.034)	–	–	−411.6	425.3

(b) Treatment 5

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim 1** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$		**Semi-Grim 2** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.007 (0.003)	0 (0.521)	0.001 (–)	0.123 (0.056)	0.263 (0.05)	0.544 (0.477)	0.031 (0.039)	0.333 (–)	0.617 (0.041)	−335.3	355.4
0.007 (0.003)	–	–	0.124 (0.055)	0.263 (0.049)	0.544 (0.076)	0.031 (0.014)	0.333 (–)	0.617 (0.04)	−335.3	351.5

(c) Treatment 6

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim 1** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$		**Semi-Grim 2** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.017 (0.003)	0.023 (0.023)	0.5 (–)	0.074 (0.051)	0.796 (0.083)	0.268 (68.613)	0.227 (0.117)	0.634 (–)	0.227 (0.051)	−322.2	365.6
0.017 (0.003)	0.023 (0.023)	0.5 (–)	0.074 (0.051)	0.796 (0.083)	0.902 (–)	0.227 (0.037)	–	–	−322.2	338.3

Table 46: Elimination order and weights including two Semi-Grim strategies in Duffy and Ochs (2009)

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim 1** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$		**Semi-Grim 2** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.022 (0.004)	0.087 (0.041)	0.407 (0.038)	0.263 (0.084)	0.264 (0.027)	0.174 (0.063)	0.058 (0.033)	0.475 (−)	0.488 (0.038)	−788.6	826.9
0.022 (0.004)	0.089 (0.042)	0.407 (0.038)	0.263 (0.082)	0.259 (0.028)	0.649 (−)	0.386 (0.03)	−	−	−798.8	825.8
0.028 (0.004)	0.144 (0.047)	0.34 (0.024)	−	−	0.856 (−)	0.385 (0.025)	−	−	−815.7	824.3

Table 47: Elimination order and weights including two Semi-Grim strategies in Fudenberg et al. (2012)

	Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim 1** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$		**Semi-Grim 2** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$			
γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL	ICL
0.016 (0.004)	0.083 (0.04)	0.417 (0.044)	0.215 (0.112)	0.457 (0.091)	0.318 (0.126)	0.132 (0.066)	0.383 (−)	0.657 (0.082)	−340.3	384.7
0.021 (0.004)	0.083 (0.04)	0.419 (0.045)	−	−	0.331 (0.128)	0.133 (0.064)	0.586 (−)	0.632 (0.064)	−343.8	372.3
0.021 (0.004)	0.083 (0.041)	0.419 (0.046)	−	−	0.917 (−)	0.434 (0.037)	−	−	−354.7	363.6

Table 48: Elimination order and weights of equilibrium strategies in Blonski et al. (2011)

(a) Treatment 1

	Cooperative MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				**Semi-Grim MPEs**					
A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL	ICL
0 (−)	0.305 (0.145)	0.04 (−)	0 (−)	0 (0.379)	0.415 (0.261)	0 (0.337)	0.24 (−)	0 (−)	−95.1	117.4
0 (0.102)	0.305 (0.206)	0.04 (0.058)	0 (0.126)	0 (0.419)	0.415 (0.414)	−	0.24 (−)	0 (0.035)	−95.1	115.9
0 (−)	0.305 (−)	0.04 (−)	0 (−)	−	0.415 (0.155)	−	0.24 (−)	0 (−)	−95.1	114.4
0 (0.033)	0.305 (0.145)	0.039 (0.057)	−	−	0.415 (0.188)	−	0.241 (−)	0 (0.012)	−95.1	113
−	0.305 (0.162)	0.039 (0.057)	−	−	0.415 (0.284)	−	0.241 (−)	0 (0.029)	−95.1	111.5
−	0.3 (0.155)	−	−	−	0.421 (0.247)	−	0.279 (−)	0 (0.019)	−95.6	110.3
−	0.378 (0.119)	−	−	−	0.622 (−)	−	−	0 (0.016)	−97	101.5

(b) Treatment 2

	Cooperative MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				**Semi-Grim MPEs**					
A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL	ICL
0.007 (0.62)	0.601 (0.608)	0.355 (0.149)	0.013 (−)	0.022 (−)	0.001 (−)	0 (−)	0 (−)	0.015 (−)	−59.7	81.5
0.011 (−)	0.61 (0.625)	0.357 (0.161)	0.017 (−)	0 (−)	0.004 (0.629)	0 (−)	−	0.015 (−)	−59.7	79
0.009 (−)	0.623 (0.63)	0.353 (0.148)	0.015 (−)	0 (0.642)	0 (−)	−	−	0.015 (−)	−59.7	76.7
0.006 (0.663)	0.646 (0.651)	0.348 (0.146)	0 (−)	0 (−)	−	−	−	0.015 (−)	−59.7	73.6
0 (0.687)	0.671 (18.904)	0.329 (9.273)	0 (−)	−	−	−	−	0.015 (0.004)	−59.6	71.3
0 (0.683)	0.671 (0.673)	0.329 (−)	−	−	−	−	−	0.015 (0.005)	−59.6	69.8
−	0.671 (0.139)	0.329 (−)	−	−	−	−	−	0.015 (0.005)	−59.6	68.3

Table 49: Elimination order and weights of equilibrium strategies in Blonski et al. (2011) (continued)

(a) Treatment 4

	Cooperative MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				**Semi-Grim MPEs**					
A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL	ICL
0 (−)	0.862 (0.228)	0.058 (−)	0 (−)	0 (0.357)	0 (1.018)	0 (0.925)	0.08 (−)	0.014 (−)	−37.5	54
0 (2.259)	0.862 (0.986)	0.058 (0.108)	0 (2.458)	0 (0.503)	0.003 (−)	0.077 (−)	–	0.014 (0.006)	−37.5	52.5
0 (1.758)	0.862 (0.987)	0.058 (0.11)	0 (2.008)	0 (0.521)	0.08 (−)	–	–	0.014 (0.006)	−37.5	50.9
0 (−)	0.862 (0.077)	0.058 (−)	0 (−)	–	0.08 (−)	–	–	0.014 (−)	−37.5	49.4
0 (0.964)	0.862 (0.979)	0.058 (0.073)	–	–	0.08 (−)	–	–	0.014 (0.006)	−37.5	47.9
–	0.862 (0.101)	0.058 (0.072)	–	–	0.08 (−)	–	–	0.014 (0.006)	−37.5	46.5
–	0.911 (0.085)	–	–	–	0.089 (−)	–	–	0.016 (0.007)	−38.3	44.3
–	1 (−)	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.02 (0.008)	−42.6	44.1

Table 50: Elimination order and weights of equilibrium strategies in Blonski et al. (2011) (continued)

(a) Treatment 5

	Cooperative MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				Semi-Grim MPEs					
A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL	ICL
0 (0.017)	0.243 (0.176)	0.069 (0.182)	0 (0.282)	0 (0.222)	0.335 (1.225)	0.101 (0.716)	0.251 (–)	0 (0.047)	−152.3	175.9
0 (0.023)	0.243 (0.287)	0.069 (0.115)	0 (0.282)	–	0.335 (0.608)	0.101 (0.341)	0.251 (–)	0 (0.022)	−152.3	174.4
0 (0.282)	0.243 (0.299)	0.069 (0.129)	–	–	0.335 (0.733)	0.101 (0.408)	0.251 (–)	0 (0.026)	−152.3	172.9
–	0.243 (0.215)	0.069 (0.127)	–	–	0.335 (0.724)	0.101 (0.401)	0.251 (–)	0 (0.026)	−152.3	171.4
–	0.24 (0.139)	0.074 (0.082)	–	–	0.434 (0.15)	–	0.252 (–)	0 (0.008)	−152.8	167.5
–	0.21 (0.138)	–	–	–	0.432 (0.145)	–	0.358 (–)	0 (0.005)	−153.4	165.9
–	–	–	–	–	0.41 (0.137)	–	0.59 (–)	0 (0.003)	−155	161.7

(b) Treatment 6

	Cooperative MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				Semi-Grim MPEs					
A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL	ICL
0.069 (–)	0.182 (–)	0 (0.451)	0 (0.316)	0.146 (–)	0.148 (–)	0.202 (–)	0.253 (–)	0.017 (0.01)	−15.3	61.8
0.111 (–)	0.238 (–)	0 (0.42)	0 (0.305)	0.112 (–)	0.201 (–)	0.338 (–)	–	0.017 (0.01)	−15.3	56.1
0.194 (–)	0.393 (–)	0 (0.451)	0 (0.316)	0.212 (–)	0.202 (–)	–	–	0.017 (0.01)	−15.3	51
0.255 (–)	0.222 (–)	0 (0.176)	0 (0.24)	0.522 (–)	–	–	–	0.017 (0.01)	−15.3	43.2
0.319 (–)	0.681 (–)	0 (–)	0 (–)	–	–	–	–	0.017 (–)	−15.3	33.8
0.319 (–)	0.681 (–)	0 (–)	–	–	–	–	–	0.017 (–)	−15.3	32.3
0.319 (–)	0.681 (–)	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.017 (0.01)	−15.3	30.8
1 (–)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.02 (0.01)	−15.3	16.8

Table 51: Elimination order and weights of equilibrium strategies in Blonski et al. (2011) (continued)

(a) Treatment 7

	Cooperative MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				**Semi-Grim MPEs**					
A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL	ICL
0 (0.279)	0.266 (0.202)	0.053 (0.056)	0 (0.255)	0 (0.605)	0 (1.208)	0 (1.447)	0.68 (–)	0.004 (0.004)	−52.1	70
0 (0.315)	0.266 (0.207)	0.053 (0.056)	0 (0.274)	0 (1.384)	0 (1.738)	–	0.68 (–)	0.004 (0.004)	−52.1	68.5
0 (0.29)	0.266 (0.207)	0.053 (0.056)	0 (0.255)	0 (0.209)	–	–	0.68 (–)	0.004 (0.004)	−52.1	67
0 (0.288)	0.266 (0.207)	0.053 (0.056)	0 (0.245)	–	–	–	0.68 (–)	0.004 (0.004)	−52.1	65.5
0 (0.264)	0.266 (0.207)	0.053 (0.055)	–	–	–	–	0.68 (–)	0.004 (0.004)	−52.1	64
–	0.266 (0.133)	0.053 (0.055)	–	–	–	–	0.68 (–)	0.004 (0.004)	−52.1	62.5
–	–	0.054 (0.055)	–	–	–	–	0.946 (–)	0.004 (0.003)	−56	59.8
–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0 (0.004)	−58.1	59.6

(b) Treatment 8

	Cooperative MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				**Semi-Grim MPEs**					
A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL	ICL
0.077 (0.102)	0.178 (0.183)	0.111 (0.11)	0 (0.251)	0 (0.565)	0 (0.316)	0.071 (0.071)	0.562 (–)	0.01 (0.005)	−75.5	100.5
0.077 (0.102)	0.178 (0.183)	0.111 (0.107)	0 (0.226)	0 (0.139)	–	0.071 (0.071)	0.562 (–)	0.01 (0.005)	−75.5	99
0.077 (0.102)	0.178 (0.18)	0.111 (0.107)	0 (0.224)	–	–	0.071 (0.069)	0.562 (–)	0.01 (0.005)	−75.5	97.5
0.077 (0.1)	0.178 (0.176)	0.111 (0.104)	–	–	–	0.071 (0.067)	0.562 (–)	0.01 (0.005)	−75.5	96
–	0.201 (0.171)	0.099 (0.1)	–	–	–	0.069 (0.066)	0.631 (–)	0.009 (0.004)	−76	92.7
–	0.18 (0.175)	–	–	–	–	0.068 (0.065)	0.753 (–)	0.008 (0.004)	−76.8	88.9
–	–	–	–	–	–	0.064 (0.062)	0.936 (–)	0.008 (0.004)	−77.4	81.4

Table 52: Elimination order and weights of equilibrium strategies in Blonski et al. (2011) (continued)

(a) Treatment 9

	Cooperative MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				Semi-Grim MPEs					
A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL	ICL
0 (0.015)	0.601 (0.215)	0.045 (0.066)	0 (0.414)	0.044 (0.087)	0.07 (0.402)	0 (0.726)	0.241 (−)	0.011 (0.005)	−72.1	95.4
0 (0.392)	0.601 (0.293)	0.042 (0.064)	0 (0.312)	0.046 (0.079)	0.066 (0.098)	−	0.245 (−)	0.011 (0.005)	−72.1	93.9
0 (0.28)	0.602 (0.289)	0.044 (0.064)	−	0.046 (0.079)	0.065 (0.096)	−	0.242 (−)	0.011 (0.005)	−72.1	92.4
−	0.603 (0.159)	0.043 (0.064)	−	0.047 (0.079)	0.064 (0.095)	−	0.242 (−)	0.011 (0.005)	−72.1	90.9
−	0.601 (0.16)	0.042 (0.064)	−	−	0.104 (0.099)	−	0.253 (−)	0.011 (0.005)	−72.4	88.6
−	0.603 (0.165)	−	−	−	0.098 (0.1)	−	0.299 (−)	0.011 (0.005)	−72.8	87
−	0.554 (0.162)	−	−	−	−	−	0.446 (−)	0.011 (0.005)	−73.6	84.5
−	−	−	−	−	−	−	1 (−)	0.01 (0.005)	−80.4	81.9

(b) Treatment 10

	Cooperative MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				Semi-Grim MPEs					
A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL	ICL
0.022 (0.047)	0.517 (0.2)	0.075 (0.076)	0 (0.068)	0 (0.274)	0.385 (0.221)	0 (0.359)	0 (−)	0.05 (0.021)	−182.9	202.3
0.022 (0.057)	0.517 (0.224)	0.075 (0.078)	0 (0.314)	0 (0.349)	0.385 (0.254)	0 (−)	−	0.05 (0.028)	−182.9	200.8
0.022 (0.056)	0.516 (0.177)	0.075 (0.077)	0 (0.267)	0 (0.108)	0.386 (−)	−	−	0.05 (0.028)	−182.9	199.3
0.022 (0.056)	0.516 (0.172)	0.075 (0.077)	0 (0.261)	−	0.386 (−)	−	−	0.05 (0.028)	−182.9	197.8
0.022 (0.053)	0.517 (0.17)	0.075 (0.076)	−	−	0.385 (−)	−	−	0.05 (0.02)	−182.9	196.3
−	0.558 (0.152)	0.074 (0.075)	−	−	0.368 (−)	−	−	0.055 (0.019)	−183	194.3
−	0.622 (0.15)	−	−	−	0.378 (−)	−	−	0.064 (0.02)	−184.8	193.5

Table 53: Elimination order and weights of equilibrium strategies in Dal Bo and Frechette (2011)

(a) Treatment 1

	Cooperative MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				**Semi-Grim MPEs**					
A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL	ICL
0.135 (–)	0.126 (–)	0.127 (–)	0.13 (–)	0.127 (–)	0.125 (–)	0.103 (–)	0.126 (–)	0.098 (0.008)	−487.1	581.1
0.153 (–)	0.144 (–)	0.145 (–)	0.148 (–)	0.145 (–)	0.143 (–)	0.121 (–)	–	0.098 (0.008)	−487.1	574.2
0.173 (–)	0.164 (–)	0.166 (–)	0.169 (–)	0.165 (–)	0.163 (–)	–	–	0.098 (0.008)	−487.1	566.5
0.206 (–)	0.197 (–)	0.198 (–)	0.201 (–)	0.198 (–)	–	–	–	0.098 (0.008)	−487.1	557.7
0.255 (–)	0.246 (–)	0.248 (–)	0.251 (–)	–	–	–	–	0.098 (0.008)	−487.1	547.3
0.339 (–)	0.33 (–)	0.331 (–)	–	–	–	–	–	0.098 (0.008)	−487.1	534.5
0.504 (–)	0.496 (–)	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.098 (0.008)	−487.1	517.2
1 (–)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.1 (0.008)	−487.1	489

(b) Treatment 2

	Cooperative MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				**Semi-Grim MPEs**					
A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL	ICL
0.023 (–)	0.164 (–)	0.109 (–)	0.132 (–)	0.106 (–)	0 (–)	0 (–)	0.466 (–)	0.026 (–)	−560.4	597.9
0.023 (0.122)	0.165 (0.123)	0.109 (0.052)	0.132 (–)	0.104 (0.071)	0 (0.061)	–	0.468 (–)	0.026 (–)	−560.4	596
0.022 (0.122)	0.166 (0.124)	0.109 (0.053)	0.131 (–)	0.104 (0.071)	–	–	0.467 (–)	0.026 (–)	−560.4	594.1
0.153 (0.122)	0.166 (0.124)	0.109 (0.053)	–	0.104 (0.071)	–	–	0.467 (–)	0.026 (0.003)	−560.4	589.4
0.151 (0.121)	0.167 (0.123)	0.139 (0.057)	–	–	–	–	0.544 (–)	0.027 (0.003)	−562.3	583.7
–	0.315 (0.075)	0.139 (0.057)	–	–	–	–	0.546 (–)	0.027 (0.003)	−564.3	575.9

Table 54: Elimination order and weights of equilibrium strategies in Dal Bo and Frechette (2011) (continued)

(a) Treatment 3

	Cooperative MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				**Semi-Grim MPEs**					
A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL	ICL
0.092	0.315	0.132	0.048	0.111	0.169	0.133	0	0.074	−601.4	657.6
(–)	(0.059)	(0.055)	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)		
0.08	0.359	0.13	0.022	0.113	0.165	0.132	–	0.074	−601.4	652.2
(0.12)	(0.134)	(–)	(–)	(0.065)	(–)	(–)		(–)		
0.056	0.359	0.13	0.045	0.113	0.297	–	–	0.074	−601.4	643.6
(–)	(0.076)	(–)	(–)	(0.065)	(–)			(–)		
0.102	0.359	0.13	–	0.113	0.297	–	–	0.074	−601.4	638.2
(0.12)	(0.136)	(0.068)		(0.076)	(–)			(0.007)		
–	0.461	0.13	–	0.112	0.297	–	–	0.074	−602	626.5
	(0.079)	(0.068)		(0.075)	(–)			(0.007)		
–	0.458	0.196	–	–	0.346	–	–	0.076	−604.5	621.8
	(0.079)	(0.064)			(–)			(0.007)		

(b) Treatment 4

	Cooperative MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				**Semi-Grim MPEs**					
A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL	ICL
0	0.097	0.086	0	0.028	0.199	0.394	0.198	0.007	−393.1	427.7
(0.033)	(0.068)	(0.061)	(0.165)	(0.057)	(0.079)	(0.135)	(–)	(0.003)		
0	0.097	0.086	–	0.028	0.199	0.394	0.197	0.007	−393.1	425.9
(0.114)	(0.116)	(0.061)		(0.057)	(0.074)	(0.112)	(–)	(0.003)		
–	0.097	0.086	–	0.028	0.198	0.394	0.197	0.007	−393.1	424.1
	(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.057)	(0.073)	(0.111)	(–)	(0.003)		
–	0.098	0.084	–	–	0.197	0.424	0.196	0.007	−393.2	419.5
	(0.06)	(0.06)			(0.073)	(0.099)	(–)	(0.003)		
–	–	0.079	–	–	0.194	0.402	0.325	0.007	−396	418.2
		(0.059)			(0.072)	(0.1)	(–)	(0.003)		
–	–	–	–	–	0.199	0.415	0.386	0.006	−398.9	416.5
					(0.074)	(0.101)	(–)	(0.003)		

Table 55: Elimination order and weights of equilibrium strategies in Dal Bo and Frechette (2011) (continued)

(a) Treatment 5

	Cooperative MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				**Semi-Grim MPEs**					
A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL	ICL
0 (0.259)	0.449 (0.249)	0.047 (0.048)	0.013 (0.024)	0.038 (0.039)	0 (0.129)	0.103 (0.058)	0.35 (–)	0.013 (0.004)	−334.9	362
0 (0.047)	0.449 (0.092)	0.046 (0.044)	0.013 (0.023)	0.038 (0.038)	–	0.103 (0.052)	0.351 (–)	0.013 (0.004)	−334.9	360.1
–	0.45 (0.081)	0.046 (0.044)	0.013 (0.023)	0.038 (0.038)	–	0.103 (0.052)	0.35 (–)	0.013 (0.004)	−334.9	358.2
–	0.447 (0.081)	0.043 (0.042)	–	0.036 (0.037)	–	0.118 (0.053)	0.356 (–)	0.011 (0.004)	−335.1	356
–	0.449 (0.08)	–	–	0.037 (0.037)	–	0.12 (0.053)	0.395 (–)	0.01 (0.004)	−336.4	352.9
–	0.448 (0.08)	–	–	–	–	0.15 (0.054)	0.403 (–)	0.01 (0.003)	−337.9	350.1

(b) Treatment 6

	Cooperative MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				**Semi-Grim MPEs**					
A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL	ICL
0 (0.158)	0 (0.195)	0.13 (0.086)	0.054 (0.065)	0 (0.012)	0.065 (0.04)	0.039 (0.04)	0.712 (–)	0.013 (0.003)	−316.6	350.5
0 (0.161)	0 (0.229)	0.129 (0.086)	0.053 (0.065)	–	0.065 (0.04)	0.039 (0.039)	0.715 (–)	0.013 (0.003)	−316.6	348.4
0 (0.036)	–	0.128 (0.083)	0.053 (0.062)	–	0.065 (0.039)	0.039 (0.04)	0.714 (–)	0.013 (0.003)	−316.6	346.6
–	–	0.128 (0.083)	0.053 (0.062)	–	0.065 (0.039)	0.039 (0.039)	0.715 (–)	0.013 (0.003)	−316.6	344.6
–	–	0.13 (0.085)	–	–	0.065 (0.039)	0.039 (0.04)	0.765 (–)	0.013 (0.003)	−317.2	338.3
–	–	0.129 (0.085)	–	–	0.092 (0.044)	–	0.779 (–)	0.012 (0.002)	−319.6	336.6
–	–	–	–	–	0.092 (0.044)	–	0.908 (–)	0.012 (0.002)	−324.2	329.1

Table 56: Elimination order and weights of equilibrium strategies in Duffy and Ochs (2009)

	Cooperative MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				**Semi-Grim MPEs**					
A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL	ICL
0	0	0.096	0.044	0.031	0.301	0.288	0.241	0	−819.3	850.3
(0.115)	(0.129)	(0.05)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.081)	(0.086)	(−)	(0.004)		
0	–	0.096	0.044	0.031	0.301	0.288	0.241	0	−819.3	848.3
(0.1)		(0.049)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.081)	(0.085)	(−)	(0.004)		
–	–	0.096	0.044	0.031	0.301	0.288	0.241	0	−819.3	846.3
		(0.049)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.078)	(0.083)	(−)	(0.004)		
–	–	0.094	0.043	–	0.311	0.294	0.259	0	−820.5	844.1
		(0.049)	(0.035)		(0.078)	(0.082)	(−)	(0.004)		
–	–	0.095	–	–	0.312	0.298	0.296	0	−822.2	842.9
		(0.049)			(0.076)	(0.081)	(−)	(0.003)		

Table 57: Elimination order and weights of equilibrium strategies in Fudenberg et al. (2012)

	Cooperative MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				**Semi-Grim MPEs**					
A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL	ICL
0	0	0.144	0	0.162	0.164	0.317	0.213	0.005	−331.3	370.6
(0.117)	(0.02)	(0.064)	(0.011)	(0.091)	(0.056)	(0.094)	(−)	(0.002)		
0	0	0.146	–	0.157	0.165	0.315	0.218	0.005	−331.3	368.6
(0.124)	(0.087)	(0.064)		(0.089)	(0.057)	(0.093)	(−)	(0.002)		
0	–	0.147	–	0.157	0.165	0.316	0.215	0.005	−331.3	366.7
(0.055)		(0.064)		(0.087)	(0.055)	(0.092)	(−)	(0.002)		
–	–	0.147	–	0.155	0.165	0.317	0.216	0.005	−331.3	364.7
		(0.064)		(0.086)	(0.055)	(0.092)	(−)	(0.002)		
–	–	0.137	–	–	0.165	0.423	0.275	0.005	−334.3	357.1
		(0.063)			(0.055)	(0.084)	(−)	(0.002)		

Table 58: Estimated weights of the MPEs when the strategies are included only if they form MPEs

			Cooperative MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				**Semi-Grim MPEs**				
Treat	$\delta - \delta^{\star}$	A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL
Blonski et al. (2011)											
6	-0.3	1 (–)	–	–	–					0.02 (0.014)	−15.3
2	-0.15	–	0.671 (0.141)	0.329 (–)						0.015 (0.007)	−59.6
4	-0.05	–	1 (–)	–		–				0.02 (0.021)	−42.6
7	-0.05	–	–	–	–				1 (–)	0 (0.004)	−58.1
8	0.075	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.064 (0.061)	0.936 (–)	0.008 (0.006)	−77.4
5	0.075	–	–	–		–	0.41 (0.115)	–	0.59 (–)	0 (0.008)	−155
1	0.083	–	0.378 (0.163)	–		–	0.622 (–)	–	–	0 (0.002)	−97
9	0.083	–	–	–		–	–	–	1 (–)	0.01 (0.005)	−80.4
10	0.179	–	0.622 (0.145)	–		–	0.378 (–)	–	–	0.064 (0.033)	−184.8
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)											
1	-0.316	1 (–)								0.1 (0.04)	−487.1
3	-0.105	–	0.583 (0.071)	–		0.417 (–)				0.087 (0.023)	−633
2	-0.066	–	0.342 (0.073)	0.09 (0.052)		0.569 (–)				0.026 (0.024)	−622.7
5	0.105	–	0.448 (0.078)	–	–	–	–	0.15 (0.058)	0.403 (–)	0.01 (0.009)	−337.9
4	0.145	–	–	–	–	–	0.199 (0.079)	0.415 (0.104)	0.386 (–)	0.006 (0.005)	−398.9
6	0.355	–	–	–	–	–	0.092 (0.045)	–	0.908 (–)	0.012 (0.006)	−324.2
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment											
1	0.233	–	–	0.095 (0.05)	–	–	0.312 (0.078)	0.298 (0.089)	0.296 (–)	0.011 (0.004)	−822.2
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment											
1	0.475	–	–	0.137 (0.067)	–	–	0.165 (0.055)	0.423 (0.081)	0.275 (–)	0.005 (0.004)	−334.3

Table 59: Estimated weights of the MPEs when the strategies are always included, regardless of whether they form MPEs (here δ is increased until the corresponding MPE comes into existence)

			Cooperative MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				**Semi-Grim MPEs**				
Treat	$\delta - \delta^{\star}$	A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL
Blonski et al. (2011)											
6	-0.3	1 (–)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.02 (0.014)	−15.3
2	-0.15	–	0.639 (0.183)	–	–	–	–	–	0.361 (–)	0.007 (0.005)	−49.1
4	-0.05	–	0.948 (0.05)	–	0.052 (–)	–	–	–	–	0.011 (0.01)	−34.7
7	-0.05	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0 (0.004)	−58.1
8	0.075	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.064 (0.061)	0.936 (–)	0.008 (0.006)	−77.4
5	0.075	–	–	–	–	–	0.41 (0.115)	–	0.59 (–)	0 (0.008)	−155
1	0.083	–	0.378 (0.165)	–	–	–	0.622 (–)	–	–	0 (0.002)	−97
9	0.083	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.01 (0.005)	−80.4
10	0.179	–	0.622 (0.145)	–	–	–	0.378 (–)	–	–	0.064 (0.033)	−184.8
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)											
1	-0.316	–			–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.02 (0.014)	−255.9
3	-0.105	–	0.458 (0.074)	0.196 (0.069)	–	–	0.346 (–)	–	–	0.076 (0.023)	−604.5
2	-0.066	–	0.315 (0.073)	0.139 (0.063)	–	–	–	–	0.546 (–)	0.027 (0.024)	−564.3
5	0.105	–	0.448 (0.078)	–	–	–	–	0.15 (0.058)	0.403 (–)	0.01 (0.009)	−337.9
4	0.145	–	–	–	–	–	0.199 (0.079)	0.415 (0.104)	0.386 (–)	0.006 (0.005)	−398.9
6	0.355	–	–	–	–	–	0.092 (0.045)	–	0.908 (–)	0.012 (0.006)	−324.2
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment											
1	0.233	–	–	0.095 (0.05)	–	–	0.312 (0.078)	0.298 (0.089)	0.296 (–)	0.011 (0.004)	−822.2
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment											
1	0.475	–	–	0.137 (0.067)	–	–	0.165 (0.055)	0.423 (0.081)	0.275 (–)	0.005 (0.004)	−334.3

Table 60: Estimated weights of equilibrium strategies with $\gamma = 0.001$

			Efficient MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				**Semi-Grim MPEs**				
Treat	$\delta - \delta^{\star}$	A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL
Blonski et al. (2011)											
6	-0.3	1 (–)	–	–	–					0 (0)	−20.9
2	-0.15	–	0.667 (0.157)	0.333 (–)						0.001 (0)	−77.4
4	-0.05	–	0.851 (0.196)	0.069 (0.086)		–	0.079 (–)	–	–	0.001 (0)	−46.1
7	-0.05	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0 (0)	−58.7
8	0.075	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.07 (0.078)	0.93 (–)	0.001 (0)	−82.2
5	0.075	–	–	–		–	0.396 (0.184)	–	0.604 (–)	0.001 (0)	−155
1	0.083	–	0.381 (0.194)	–		–	0.619 (–)	–	–	0.001 (0)	−97.1
9	0.083	–	0.666 (0.124)	–	–	–	0.334 (–)	–	–	0.001 (0)	−81.5
10	0.179	–	–	–	–	–	0.67 (0.136)	–	0.33 (–)	0.001 (0)	−194.8
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)											
1	-0.316	1 (–)								0 (0)	−1012.2
3	-0.105	–	0.404 (0.074)	0.031 (0.034)		0.227 (0.075)	0.337 (–)	–	–	0.001 (0)	−962.3
2	-0.066	0.269 (0.115)	–	0.1 (0.071)		–	–	–	0.63 (–)	0.001 (0)	−720.7
5	0.105	–	0.418 (0.078)	–	–	–	–	0.174 (0.063)	0.408 (–)	0.001 (0)	−350.6
4	0.145	–	–	–	–	–	0.267 (0.159)	0.36 (0.123)	0.373 (–)	0.001 (0)	−401.2
6	0.355	–	–	–	–	–	0.144 (0.065)	–	0.856 (–)	0.001 (0)	−351
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment											
1	0.233	–	–	0.089 (0.05)	0.053 (0.041)	–	0.404 (0.073)	0.217 (0.074)	0.237 (–)	0.001 (0)	−832.8
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment											
1	0.475	–	–	–	–	–	0.188 (0.06)	0.459 (0.081)	0.353 (–)	0.001 (0)	−343

Table 61: Estimated weights and randomization parameters of prototypical strategies $(\sigma_{cc}, \sigma_{cd}, \sigma_{dc}, \sigma_{dd})$ with $\gamma = 0$

			Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Coop** $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		**Gen TFT** $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		**Gen WSLS** $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$		
Treat	$\delta-\delta^*$	γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL
Blonski et al. (2011)															
6	-0.3	0 (0)	1 (–)	0.017 (0.014)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	−15.3
2	-0.15	0 (0.001)	–	–	0.318 (0.201)	0.019 (0.03)	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.682 (–)	0.387 (0.158)	−44.3
4	-0.05	0 (0)	–	–	0.05 (0.047)	0.533 (0)	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.95 (–)	0.026 (0.026)	−19
7	-0.05	0 (0)	0.05 (0.059)	0.5 (0)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.95 (–)	0.379 (0.076)	−54.2
8	0.075	0 (0)	0.15 (0.102)	0.241 (0.196)	0.101 (0.099)	0.499 (0.252)	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.749 (–)	0.25 (0.139)	−110.1
5	0.075	0 (0)	0.152 (0.083)	0.226 (0.096)	0.224 (0.103)	0.143 (0.092)	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.625 (–)	0.2 (0.095)	−169.7
1	0.083	0 (0)	0.15 (0.086)	0.272 (0.03)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.85 (–)	0.323 (0.154)	−107.5
9	0.083	0 (0.013)	0.15 (0.088)	0.244 (0.032)	0.703 (0.176)	0.013 (0.016)	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.147 (–)	0.514 (0.282)	−100.1
10	0.179	0 (0)	0.6 (0.101)	0.394 (0.144)	0.143 (0.099)	0.056 (0.041)	–	–	0.179 (0.097)	0.676 (0.162)	–	–	0.079 (–)	0.585 (0.089)	−244.2
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)															
1	-0.316	0 (0)	0.118 (0.154)	0.074 (0.05)	0.065 (0.053)	0.387 (0.134)	–	–	0.087 (0.044)	1 (0.193)	–	–	0.73 (–)	0.196 (0.109)	−207.5
3	-0.105	0 (0)	0.355 (0.089)	0.167 (0.099)	0.208 (0.088)	0.448 (0.186)	0.329 (0.072)	0.5 (0.126)	–	–	–	–	0.108 (–)	0.655 (0.144)	−624.5
2	-0.066	0 (0)	0.137 (0.056)	0.336 (0.078)	0.289 (0.065)	0.127 (0.066)	0.258 (0.067)	0.5 (0.006)	0.02 (0.028)	1 (0.188)	–	–	0.295 (–)	0.438 (0.062)	−746
5	0.105	0 (0)	–	–	0.364 (0.082)	0.176 (0.086)	0.364 (0.072)	0.955 (0.228)	–	–	–	–	0.272 (–)	0.528 (0.123)	−353.7
4	0.145	0 (0)	0.316 (0.078)	0.5 (0)	0.153 (0.079)	0.605 (0.105)	0.176 (0.079)	0.867 (0.086)	–	–	–	–	0.355 (–)	0.412 (0.068)	−588.9
6	0.355	0 (0)	0.295 (0.076)	0.5 (0)	0.705 (–)	0.125 (0.037)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	−541.3
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment															
1	0.233	0 (0)	0.447 (0.062)	0.5 (0.007)	0.454 (0.065)	0.137 (0.039)	–	–	0.1 (–)	0.969 (0.178)	–	–	–	–	−1295
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment															
1	0.475	0 (0)	0.229 (0.066)	0.5 (0.003)	0.355 (0.091)	0.344 (0.17)	0.217 (0.079)	0.758 (0.122)	0.199 (–)	0.5 (0.148)	–	–	–	–	−413.5

Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are provided in parentheses (in the four cases where $\alpha \approx 0$ is estimated, these standard errors are not guaranteed to be consistent). Irrelevant components are identified (and then eliminated, as indicated by "–") based on the *ICL-BIC* information criterion, as described in the appendix. The right-most weight, usually that of the Semi-Grim component, is simply the difference of the remaining weights to 1. Thus, it is not a model parameter and is not assigned a standard error.

Table 62: Estimated weights of equilibrium strategies (as reported in the paper)

			Efficient MPEs that are not Semi-Grim				**Semi-Grim MPEs**				
Treat	$\delta - \delta^{\star}$	A-Def	Grim	TFT	W-WSLS	Asymm BF	LimLog BF	Eff Symm BF	Eff LimLog SG	γ	LL
Blonski et al. (2011)											
6	-0.3	1 (–)	–	–	–					0.02 (0.014)	−15.3
2	-0.15	–	0.671 (0.141)	0.329 (–)						0.015 (0.007)	−59.6
4	-0.05	–	1 (–)	–		–	–	–	–	0.02 (0.021)	−42.6
7	-0.05	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0 (0.004)	−58.1
8	0.075	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.064 (0.061)	0.936 (–)	0.008 (0.006)	−77.4
5	0.075	–	–	–		–	0.41 (0.115)	–	0.59 (–)	0 (0.008)	−155
1	0.083	–	0.378 (0.163)	–		–	0.622 (–)	–	–	0 (0.002)	−97
9	0.083	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.01 (0.005)	−80.4
10	0.179	–	0.622 (0.145)	–	–	–	0.378 (–)	–	–	0.064 (0.033)	−184.8
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)											
1	-0.316	1 (–)								0.1 (0.04)	−487.1
3	-0.105	–	0.458 (0.074)	0.196 (0.069)		–	0.346 (–)	–	–	0.076 (0.023)	−604.5
2	-0.066	–	0.315 (0.073)	0.139 (0.063)		–	–	–	0.546 (–)	0.027 (0.024)	−564.3
5	0.105	–	0.448 (0.078)	–	–	–	–	0.15 (0.058)	0.403 (–)	0.01 (0.009)	−337.9
4	0.145	–	–	–	–	–	0.199 (0.079)	0.415 (0.104)	0.386 (–)	0.006 (0.005)	−398.9
6	0.355	–	–	–	–	–	0.092 (0.045)	–	0.908 (–)	0.012 (0.006)	−324.2
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment											
1	0.233	–	–	0.095 (0.049)	–	–	0.312 (0.076)	0.298 (0.081)	0.296 (–)	0 (0.003)	−822.2
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment											
1	0.475	–	–	0.137 (0.067)	–	–	0.165 (0.055)	0.423 (0.081)	0.275 (–)	0.005 (0.004)	−334.3

Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are provided in parentheses. Empty cells indicate that the respective MPE does not exist even after inflating δ up to $\delta^{2/3}$. Hyphens ("–") indicate that the MPE exists but attracts insignificant weight according to *ICL-BIC*. Since the right-most weight is not a parameter but a (usually sizeable) residual, it is not assigned a standard error.

Table 63: Estimated weights and randomization parameters of prototypical strategies $(\sigma_{cc}, \sigma_{cd}, \sigma_{dc}, \sigma_{dd})$ [as reported in the paper]

			Constant $(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,\alpha)$		**Gen Coop** $(1,\alpha,0,0)$		**Gen TFT** $(1,0,\alpha,0)$		**Gen WSLS** $(1,0,0,\alpha)$		**Semi-Grim** $(1,\alpha,\alpha,0)$		
Treat	$\delta-\delta^{\star}$	γ	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	Weight	α	LL
Blonski et al. (2011)															
6	-0.3	0.002 (0.001)	1 (–)	0.017 (0.014)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	−15.3
2	-0.15	0.005 (0.004)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.3 (0.105)	−43.5
4	-0.05	0 (0)	–	–	0.05 (0.048)	0.533 (0)	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.95 (–)	0.026 (0.026)	−19
7	-0.05	0.004 (0.004)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.387 (0.066)	−48
8	0.075	0.008 (0.006)	–	–	0.05 (0.049)	0.8 (0)	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.95 (–)	0.229 (0.06)	−74.8
5	0.075	0.013 (0.008)	0.1 (0.065)	0.219 (0.072)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.9 (–)	0.314 (0.068)	−156.1
1	0.083	0.016 (0.012)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.314 (0.081)	−99.2
9	0.083	0.01 (0.007)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1 (–)	0.186 (0.067)	−77
10	0.179	0.073 (0.028)	0.052 (0.06)	0.454 (0.035)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.948 (–)	0.216 (0.072)	−180
Dal Bo and Fréchette (2011)															
1	-0.316	0.006 (0.004)	–	–	0.045 (0.034)	0.553 (0.128)	–	–	0.069 (0.046)	0.997 (0.043)	–	–	0.885 (–)	0.276 (0.064)	−187
3	-0.105	0.033 (0.018)	0.355 (0.076)	0.008 (0)	0.14 (0.048)	0.647 (0.071)	–	–	0.157 (0.063)	0.88 (0.186)	–	–	0.348 (–)	0.446 (0.081)	−513
2	-0.066	0.027 (0.024)	–	–	0.325 (0.07)	0.005 (0)	–	–	0.141 (0.061)	0.952 (0.06)	–	–	0.533 (–)	0.508 (0.046)	−562.6
5	0.105	0.004 (0.006)	–	–	0.299 (0.1)	0.137 (0.092)	0.402 (0.109)	0.97 (0.246)	–	–	–	–	0.299 (–)	0.552 (0.114)	−337.3
4	0.145	0.026 (0.022)	–	–	0.226 (0.088)	0.703 (0.104)	0.146 (0.073)	0.873 (0.141)	–	–	–	–	0.628 (–)	0.358 (0.054)	−401.8
6	0.355	0.017 (0.007)	0.023 (0.026)	0.5 (0)	0.074 (0.078)	0.796 (0.122)	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.902 (–)	0.227 (0.044)	−322.2
Duffy and Ochs (2009), "random rematching" treatment															
1	0.233	0.028 (0.023)	0.144 (0.053)	0.34 (0.048)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.856 (–)	0.385 (0.032)	−815.7
Fudenberg et al. (2012), "no-noise" treatment															
1	0.475	0.021 (0.015)	0.083 (0.051)	0.419 (0.17)	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.917 (–)	0.434 (0.063)	−354.7

Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are provided in parentheses (in the four cases where $\alpha \approx 0$ is estimated, these standard errors are not guaranteed to be consistent). Irrelevant components are identified (and then eliminated, as indicated by "–") based on the *ICL-BIC* information criterion, as described in the appendix. The right-most weight, usually that of the Semi-Grim component, is simply the difference of the remaining weights to 1. Thus, it is not a model parameter and is not assigned a standard error.

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