

**Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field  
Experiment in Afghanistan  
Michael Callen  
James D. Long  
Online Appendix**

## **A Appendix**

### **A.A Measuring Political Connections**

Data on the historical political connections of candidates are based on a set of investigations performed by Indicium consulting, an Afghan consulting firm, at the request of Democracy International. These data were collected in the months leading up to the election and were completed prior to the election. The Indicium research team for this project comprised an international research lead, two supporting researchers based in Kabul, and one Afghan researcher based in every constituency (province). The lead research coordinator had, through years of experience in Afghanistan, gained considerable knowledge of relevant local dynamics and power structures.

Research into candidate histories proceeded in four stages. First, Democracy International requested data on a specified list of candidates. In compiling this initial list, Democracy International referenced the 2005 parliamentary outcomes and consulted experts within the organization and a broader set of Afghanistan experts. Second, Indicium expanded the list based on recommendations from the research team it had convened for this project. Indicium adapted the list through the course of the campaign, expanding the list when new powerful candidates emerged, and dropping some candidates as they withdrew. Third, after compiling the list, the Kabul team and the local staff based in the provinces began a series of expert interviews. Experts interviewed for this purpose included local journalists, foreign embassy staff, parliamentary candidates (both the contenders themselves and their rivals), and tribal elders. These interviews were cross-checked against newspaper reports and

against information obtained by Indicium from the United Nations, the International Security Assistance Force, and the broader intelligence community. Last, after these steps were completed, Indicium performed a second round of interviews and of cross-checking before providing the data to Democracy International. The investigations provide data for 57 of the leading candidates since the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Table A1 provides summary statistics for these data.

Table A1: Summary Statistics for Political Connections Data

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.
Connected to Provincial Aggregator (=1)	0.491	0.504
Connected to Provincial + District Aggregator (=1)	0.228	0.423
Served in Senior Post Since 2001 (=1)	0.614	0.491
Served in Junior Post Since 2001 (=1)	0.158	0.368
Government Service (=1)	0.772	0.423
Connected Directly to Karzai (=1)	0.298	0.462
Indirectly Connected to Karzai (=1)	0.281	0.453
Karzai Connection (=1)	0.579	0.498

*Notes:* Each row is a separate dummy variable that equals one if the candidate has a connection of the indicated type according to the data. Candidates are the unit of observation. There are 57 candidates in the data. Column (1) reports the average across these candidates and Column (2) reports the standard deviation.

## A.B Impacts on Electoral Outcomes

To benchmark the size of the impacts estimated in Table ??, we examine the impact of treatment on whether candidates score enough votes at a given polling substation to be ranked above the threshold required to obtain office in their constituency. Specifically, we define a dummy variable that equals 1 for every candidate - polling substation observation recording enough votes to rank among the winning candidates at the polling station. For example, in Kabul, this dummy variable is set equal to 1 for the top 33 candidates at each polling station.<sup>1</sup> We then estimate Specification (??) with this dummy as the dependent variable. Table A2 displays the results of this exercise.

The largest effects are for candidates connected to the provincial aggregator (column 3). These candidates have a 57 percent chance of ranking above the victory threshold in control polling stations. Point estimates indicate that treatment reduced the probability of winning by 11.5 percentage points. Correspondingly, estimates suggest an 8.9 percentage point reduction from a 45.3 percent chance of being above the victory threshold for candidates linked to both aggregators (column 4); a 5.1 percentage point reduction from 57 percent for candidates with a history of government service; and a .3 percentage point reduction from 54 percent for candidates with a connection to Karzai.

This exercise is necessarily speculative. We are limited in our ability to extrapolate from these results because our sample is not representative. If we had a representative sample, then our estimates should be consistent for the partial equilibrium effect of photo quick count at scale. The partial equilibrium nature of the exercise implies additional limits; we do not know the degree of substitutability between aggregation fraud and other types of fraud that we do not observe. Last, some spatial externalities are present, which we examine below. Nonetheless, the size of the estimates in this section suggest that the treatment effects we find could be large enough to impact final election outcomes.

---

<sup>1</sup>In cases where several candidates are tied at the position of the lowest winning rank (e.g. the 33rd position in Kabul), we code all candidates as 1. We also require that those tied for the bottom position receive at least one vote.

Table A2: Estimates of Impact on Whether a Candidate Receives Enough Votes to Win

<i>Dependent Variable:</i> Impacts by Connection Type	Received Enough Votes to be in a Winning Rank Position (=1)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Letter Treatment (=1)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Treat x Most Connected	-0.051 (0.039)					
Treat x Investigated		-0.040 (0.026)	0.004 (0.030)	-0.029 (0.027)	0.001 (0.053)	-0.020 (0.041)
Treat x Provincial Aggregator Connection			-0.115*** (0.044)			
Treat x Prov. and District Aggregator Connection				-0.060 (0.051)		
Treat x Government Service					-0.051 (0.059)	
Treat x Karzai Connection						-0.030 (0.049)
Most Connected (=1)	0.473*** (0.028)					
Provincial Aggregator Connection (=1)			-0.106*** (0.032)			
Prov. and District Aggregator Connection (=1)				-0.140*** (0.039)		
Government Service (=1)					-0.019 (0.043)	
Karzai Connect. (=1)						-0.053 (0.036)
Investigated (=1)		0.481*** (0.018)	0.521*** (0.021)	0.508*** (0.019)	0.496*** (0.038)	0.508*** (0.030)
Constant	0.088*** (0.004)	0.083*** (0.004)	0.083*** (0.004)	0.083*** (0.004)	0.083*** (0.004)	0.082*** (0.004)
Stratum FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Full Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Trimming top 1% of votes for interacted candidate type	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
R-Squared	0.026	0.050	0.051	0.051	0.050	0.049
# Polling Centers	440	440	440	440	440	440
# Candidate - Polling Station Observations	309822	309843	309893	309900	309852	309699
Mean of Dep. Var. in Controls	0.091	0.091	0.091	0.091	0.091	0.090
Mean of Dep. Var. in Controls for Interacted Connection	0.582	0.571	0.497	0.453	0.565	0.540
P - Value: Treat x Investigated + Treat x Connection = 0	0.190	0.128	0.002	0.051	0.078	0.112

*Notes:* This table reports effects on whether candidates receive enough votes to be in the set of winning candidates at a given polling substation. The unit of observation is the candidate - polling substation. Each column reports the results of an OLS regression where a dummy variable that equals 1 for every candidate - polling substation observation recording enough votes to rank among the winning candidates at the polling substation is the dependent variable. Columns (2) through (6) report results from regressions interacting the treatment dummy with each candidate connection type dummy and a dummy for being investigated. Note we observe connections data only for investigated candidates. All regressions include stratum fixed effects and controls for the share of respondents reporting that they are Pashtun, Tajik, and whether the polling center was visited by international election monitors. The final two rows report the mean of the dependent variable in the controls and in the controls among observations for the interacted candidate type. *Level of significance:* \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors clustered at the polling center level are reported in parentheses.

## **A.C Impact on Problems During the Vote Count**

After votes are cast on election day, the Polling Center Manager at each polling center is responsible for counting up votes and for completing a Declaration of Results form for each polling substation. We obtained data on problems during this process from the Electoral Complaints Commission. These include complaints about the electoral process made by candidates, observers, and candidate agents. Complaints indicating problems during the count occur widely in our sample. For example, a complaint made by a candidate about the Charahi Taymani neighborhood in Kabul reports “in Ismailya Polling substation, ten of my family members voted for me, but the Declaration of Results Form displayed only seven.” The Electoral Complaints Commission received 5,869 total complaints regarding the September 2010 parliamentary elections, of which 4,138 were made by candidates and 944 were made about Independent Elections Commission polling officials violating protocols. 650 of the 944 complaints about polling staff were made by candidates. In our sample of 1,977 polling substations in the 465 operating polling centers, 1,847 complaints were filed with the Electoral Complaints Commission. 1,217 of these complaints were filed by candidates and 900 were filed regarding polling center staff. We assess impacts on two measures: (i) the number of complaints filed by candidates about a given polling substation; and (ii) the number of complaints filed against election commission staff about a given polling substation.

As the example given above suggests, these might reflect efforts by the Polling Center Manager to increase fraud during the count because photo quick count prohibits tampering later in the aggregation process. However, these measures are problematic for at least three reasons. First, we cannot verify these complaints. Second, while many of the translated complaints report candidates manipulating the counting process, complaints in these categories may also be filed for other reasons. Last, it may be that candidates who are filing complaints do so strategically to try to cancel out their competitors’ votes. Moreover, the Letter Treatment might merely empower potential complainants. They might, for example, believe that the photograph of the Declaration of Results form will provide them a means

to substantiate their claim.

Table A3: Impact on Complaints

Dependent Variable:	Complaints by Candidates			Complaints Against Polling Official		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Letter Treatment (=1)	1.477** (0.726)	1.477** (0.749)	1.302* (0.723)	0.939 (0.621)	0.988 (0.622)	0.983* (0.566)
Constant	1.899*** (0.297)	1.899*** (0.294)	2.926 (3.742)	1.476*** (0.320)	1.451*** (0.318)	2.357 (2.749)
Stratum FEs	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Full Covariates	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
R-squared	0.009	0.154	0.177	0.005	0.201	0.238
# Observations	461	461	440	461	461	440

*Notes:* This table reports on the complaints registered by the Electoral Complaints Commission and treatment. All columns report OLS specifications. Columns (1) - (3) use the number of complaints filed by candidates as a dependent variable. Columns (4) - (6) use the number of complaints against a polling official as a dependent variable. Columns (1) and (4) report from bivariate regressions. Columns (2) and (5) add stratum fixed effects to the respective preceding specification. Columns (3) and (6) control for stratum fixed effects, the share of respondents who are Pashtun, Tajik and whether the polling center was visited by international election monitors. *Level of significance:* \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

## A.D Aggregation Fraud and Vote Reductions

This section examines the effect of treatment on votes recorded on the declaration of returns form immediately after the treatment letter was delivered. The objective is to increase our understanding of how the limited impact of treatment on simple vote differences can be consistent with the estimates indicating an end-of-the-day reduction of votes in Table ??.

Table A4 reports estimates of the difference between pre-aggregation and post-aggregation votes using the method of Lee (2009). This table follows Table ?? in the manuscript, with the only difference being that we have changed the outcome, replacing the absolute vote difference with the simple vote difference. The final two columns report the lower and upper bound respectively. The estimates suggest no clear mean effect on vote differences.

This contrasts with Table ??, which reports negative effects for the absolute vote difference. To understand why we find reductions for the absolute vote difference but not for the simple vote difference, we plot the densities of the vote addition measures by treatment

status for each of the candidate subsamples in Figure A1. The figures suggests that one of the principal consequences of treatment for powerful candidates is to increase the frequency with which the pre-aggregation total perfectly matches the post-aggregation total (i.e., the vote difference equals zero). The densities depicted in Figure A1 suggest that we observe no effect on the vote difference measure because treatment reduces rigging both for and against powerful candidates in a way that is roughly symmetric.

We next consider how treatment reduced votes for powerful candidates, while having mainly offsetting effects in terms of rigging both for and against the candidate. Figure A2 depicts Lee (2009) bounds for pre-aggregation votes, post-aggregation votes, and their difference. Recall that these are all post-treatment measures. Based on this figure, it appears that treatment operated by first creating a reduction in votes for powerful candidates in the pre-aggregation number, and then by creating greater fidelity between the pre-aggregation and post-aggregation totals.

The treatment letter indicated that we would be taking pictures of the results and then posting them on a website accessible to “the people of Afghanistan, the international community, and local and international media.” This makes clear that the technique would create broader awareness of the vote numbers on the declaration of results form. We speculate that the reduction at this stage may be because treatment reinforced the deterrent effect of posting the form at the polling center in the first place.

To summarize our findings in this section, we find that treatment both reduced votes recorded on the declaration of results form at the polling center and reduced rigging both for and against powerful candidates in roughly equal measure. As a result, treatment diminished the absolute difference between pre-aggregation and post-aggregation votes and decreased votes for powerful candidates at the end of the election.

We treat these results speculatively mainly due to data limitations. The estimand in this case is the treatment effect on polling centers that would report results irrespective of treatment. This is about 9.7 percent of the total number of candidate polling substation




Figure A1: Vote Difference Densities by Treatment Group

*Notes:* This figure depicts the kernel density estimates of the distribution of vote differences during aggregation. The vote difference during aggregation is created by subtracting the number of votes recorded on pictures of the declaration of results forms from the number of votes for the same candidate polling-station observation reported on the website of the Independent Elections Commission (IEC). The maximum number of votes that can be cast a polling station is 600 votes. We therefore drop one observation recoding -800 votes. Section A.1 describes the candidate connections data used to define candidate subsamples.

observations in our experimental sample and the behavior of the polling center managers that are always willing to report may be different. Specifically, polling center managers who are willing to post declaration of results forms irrespective of treatment may use the letter as an excuse not to record fake votes for candidates on the declaration of returns form. The behavior could be different in our general sample.






Figure A2: Trimmed Estimates of Effect on Three Measures

*Notes:* This error bars depict the upper and lower Lee (2009) bound estimates for votes recorded on the declaration of results form at the polling center prior to aggregation (votes before), votes scraped from the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) on its website (votes after) and the difference between votes after and votes before (votes diff). The dots correspond to the point estimate, ignoring attrition. The maximum number of votes that can be cast a polling station is 600 votes. We therefore drop one observation recoding -800 votes. Section A.1 describes the candidate connections data used to define candidate subsamples.

Table A4: Trimmed Estimates of Effect on Vote Differences

	Control				Treatment				Treatment Effect			
	Mean Post-Aggreg. Votes	Obs. (2)	Proportion Non-missing (3)	Mean Vote Diff. (4)	Obs. (5)	Proportion Non-missing (6)	Mean Vote Diff. (7)	Trimming Ratio [(6) - (3)]/(6) (8)	Trimmed Mean $E[Y Y < y_{(1-p)}]$ (9)	Trimmed Mean $E[Y Y > y_p]$ (9)	Lower Bound (8) - (4)	Upper Bound (9) - (3)
<i>Sample:</i>												
Full Sample	2.318	183659	0.097	0.079 (0.103)	203291	0.149	0.238 (0.073)	0.349	-0.264 (0.200)	0.629 (0.200)	-0.343 (0.220)	0.550 (0.219)
Incumbent	7.501	10491	0.118	0.337 (0.465)	11485	0.171	0.898 (0.275)	0.309	-0.506 (0.388)	1.804 (0.556)	-0.843 (0.602)	1.467 (0.744)
Most Connected Candidate	24.739	891	0.111	1.101 (4.326)	969	0.160	4.194 (1.841)	0.305	-0.935 (1.594)	6.944 (3.720)	-2.036 (4.611)	5.843 (5.925)
Prov. + District Aggregator Connection	36.161	440	0.182	3.750 (4.810)	480	0.260	4.320 (2.301)	0.302	-1.034 (2.125)	7.159 (4.325)	-4.784 (5.012)	3.409 (7.030)
Karzai Connection	21.484	1549	0.141	1.119 (1.877)	1600	0.204	2.884 (0.967)	0.311	-0.569 (0.709)	4.739 (1.556)	-1.688 (1.989)	3.620 (2.472)
Government Service	18.788	1944	0.142	0.422 (1.905)	2089	0.202	3.116 (1.100)	0.293	-1.424 (1.079)	5.822 (1.882)	-1.847 (2.214)	5.400 (2.658)

*Notes:* This table reports the details of calculating bounds for the treatment effect or using the method of ? for each candidate subsample. The outcome variable is the difference between pre-aggregation votes and post-aggregation votes. The unit of observation is the candidate - polling station. Each row provides results for the indicated candidate subsample. Columns (1) reports the mean post-aggregation vote total in the controls. Column (2) (Column (5)) reports the total number of potential observations in the control (treatment) sample. Column (3) (Column (6)) reports the proportion non-missing in the control (treatment) sample. Columns (4), (7), (8), and (9) provide the means in the control, untrimmed treatment, treatment trimmed above the (1 - p)th percentile, and treatment trimmed below the pth percentile respectively. The last two columns report the lower and upper bounds on the treatment effect. *Level of significance:* \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors obtained by bootstrapping polling centers 250 times with replacement are reported in parentheses.

## A.E Data Appendix

We use the following administrative data: (i) systematic political background investigations of the main candidates; (ii) geographic coordinates and security assessments of polling substations provided by ISAF; (iii) complaints about illegal election activities filed at the Electoral Complaints Commission; (iv) disaggregated vote counts from the Independent Elections Commission; and (v) data on adherence to electoral protocols from the Free and Fair Elections Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA). Additionally, we fielded a baseline survey of households living in the immediate vicinity of 450 of the 471 polling centers in our experimental sample a month before the election (August 2010). The 21 polling centers in the experimental sample not surveyed at baseline are in Kabul. We subsequently added these using additional funding made available after the baseline. The survey contained 2,904 respondents. To attempt to obtain a representative sample of respondents living near polling centers, enumerators employed a random walk pattern starting at the polling center, with random selection of every fourth house or structure. Respondents within households are randomly selected using Kish grid. The survey had 50 percent male and female respondents each and enumerators conducted it in either Dari or Pashto. Last, we obtain a primary measure of returns form manipulation by sending field staff to investigate whether election materials were stolen or damaged the day following the election (September 19), which we describe in ??.

## A.F Additional Figures and Tables

Table A5: Additional Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	# Observations
<i>Additional Fraud Measures</i>			
Election returns form manipulation (=1)	0.134	0.342	461
Number of Electoral Complaints Commission complaints by candidate	2.649	7.9	461
Number of Electoral Complaints Commission complaints against polling official	1.952	6.724	461
<i>Geospatial Measures</i>			
Polling Centers treated within 1km (=1)	0.505	0.501	461
Total Polling Centers treated within 1km	1.089	1.354	461
Total Polling Centers within 1km	2.219	2.508	461
Polling Centers treated within 1-2km (=1)	0.636	0.482	461
Total Polling Centers treated within 1-2km	2.362	2.473	461
Total Polling Centers within 1-2km	4.731	4.677	461

*Notes:* The first three rows are variables based on complaints data from the Electoral Complaints Commission. All three variables are the total number of complaints pertaining to the station. The last six rows are computed using GIS based on geographic coordinates for the polling substations in our sample provided by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The first column reports the mean, the second column reports the standard deviation, and the third reports the number of observations.

Table A6: Vote Changes During Aggregation by Candidate Type  
(Sample: Only Candidates with Investigations Data)

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>		Post-aggregation Votes - Pre-aggregation Votes						
Panel A - Votes		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Provincial Aggregator Connection (=1)		1.160 (1.746)						
Prov. + District Aggregator Connection (=1)			2.510 (1.910)				2.727 (1.736)	2.900 (1.772)
Karzai Connect. (=1)				-0.758 (2.317)				-0.970 (1.801)
Government Service (=1)					-1.577 (2.038)			-1.879 (2.834)
Incumbent (=1)						-0.570 (1.850)	-0.991 (1.646)	0.005 (1.981)
Constant		1.768 (1.269)	1.525 (1.241)	2.559 (2.264)	3.330** (1.476)	2.382 (1.746)	1.971 (1.870)	3.496** (1.678)
R-Squared		0.001	0.004	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.004	0.006
# Candidates		56	56	56	56	56	56	56
#Polling Stations		149	149	149	149	149	149	149
# Candidate - Polling Station Observations		891	891	891	891	891	891	891
<i>Dependent Variable:</i>		(Post-aggregation Share - Pre-aggregation Share) x 100						
Panel B - Vote Shares		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Provincial Aggregator Connection (=1)		0.384 (2.393)						
Prov. + District Aggregator Connection (=1)			1.171 (2.385)				1.499 (2.201)	1.149 (2.239)
Karzai Connect. (=1)				0.513 (2.097)				1.537 (2.736)
Government Service (=1)					3.294 (2.485)			4.936 (4.344)
Incumbent (=1)						-1.240 (2.457)	-1.476 (2.317)	-3.735 (4.066)
Constant		4.004 (2.450)	3.844* (2.280)	3.799 (2.420)	1.535** (0.653)	4.736 (2.884)	4.510 (3.017)	0.921 (1.668)
R-Squared		0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.003
# Candidates		57	57	57	57	57	57	57
#Polling Stations		149	149	149	149	149	149	149
# Candidate - Polling Station Observations		892	892	892	892	892	892	892

*Notes:* This table reports on political connections and the degree of aggregation fraud restricting the sample only to the 57 candidates with connections data. The unit of observation is the candidate - polling substation. Each column in Panel A reports results from an OLS regression using the difference between post-aggregation and pre-aggregation votes as the dependent variable and a dummy variable that equals one if a candidate - polling substation observation records the indicated connection(s) as an independent variable. Panel B repeats these specifications using the difference between pre-aggregation and post-aggregation vote shares (multiplied by 100) as a dependent variable. Both pre-aggregation and post-aggregation vote shares are calculated using pre-election polling station vote totals as the denominator. All specifications in both panels include province fixed effects and drop the five largest and five smallest observations of the dependent variable. No candidates record a connection to the district aggregator and not to the provincial aggregator so these coefficients cannot be estimated separately. *Sample:* treatment and control polling centers for which complete vote difference data are available. *Levels of significance:* \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors clustered by candidate and by polling center using the method of ? are reported in parentheses.

Table A7: Vote Changes During Aggregation by Candidate Type  
(Sample: Control Polling Stations)

<i>Dependent Variable:</i> Panel A - Votes	Post-aggregation Votes - Pre-aggregation Votes						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Investigated (=1)	0.506 (1.319)	0.370 (1.354)	-0.224 (1.549)	1.089 (2.088)	2.985 (2.393)	0.479 (1.316)	3.267 (2.262)
Provincial Aggregator Connection (=1)		0.522 (2.209)					
Prov. + District Aggregator Connection (=1)			3.499 (2.444)				4.320* (2.250)
Karzai Connect. (=1)				-0.967 (1.973)			-1.518 (1.949)
Government Service (=1)					-3.260 (2.817)		-3.707 (2.778)
Incumbent (=1)						0.072 (0.251)	0.187 (0.233)
Constant	0.085*** (0.030)	0.085*** (0.030)	0.087*** (0.031)	0.086*** (0.032)	0.087*** (0.031)	0.082*** (0.031)	0.084** (0.033)
R-Squared	0.016	0.017	0.018	0.017	0.018	0.016	0.021
# Candidates	1537	1537	1537	1537	1537	1537	1537
#Polling Stations	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
# Candidate - Polling Station Observations	17779	17779	17779	17779	17779	17779	17779
Connection(s) + Investigated = 0 (p-value)	0.701	0.691	0.070	0.923	0.860	0.681	0.076
Mean for Candidates Not Investigated	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.036
<i>Dependent Variable:</i> Panel B - Vote Shares	(Post-aggregation Share - Pre-aggregation Share) x 100						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Investigated (=1)	3.703 (2.740)	4.397 (3.646)	3.968 (3.412)	1.198 (1.794)	-0.471 (1.646)	3.748 (2.781)	-2.416 (1.942)
Provincial Aggregator Connection (=1)		-2.605 (2.965)					
Prov. + District Aggregator Connection (=1)			-1.234 (2.669)				-2.879 (3.737)
Karzai Connect. (=1)				4.147** (1.672)			4.388** (1.814)
Government Service (=1)					5.482 (4.788)		5.568 (5.422)
Incumbent (=1)						-0.118 (0.261)	-0.393 (0.469)
Constant	0.210** (0.085)	0.208** (0.085)	0.209** (0.085)	0.205** (0.085)	0.206** (0.085)	0.215** (0.086)	0.215*** (0.083)
R-Squared	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.014
# Candidates	1538	1538	1538	1538	1538	1538	1538
#Polling Stations	67	67	67	67	67	67	67
# Candidate - Polling Station Observations	17778	17778	17778	17778	17778	17778	17778
Connection(s) + Investigated = 0 (p-value)	0.177	0.226	0.119	0.120	0.189	0.176	0.087
Mean for Candidates Not Investigated	0.751	0.751	0.751	0.751	0.751	0.751	0.751

*Notes:* This table reports on political connections and the degree of aggregation fraud in the control sample. The unit of observation is the candidate - polling substation. Each column in Panel A reports results from an OLS regression using the difference between post-aggregation and pre-aggregation votes as the dependent variable and a dummy variable that equals one if a candidate - polling substation observation records the indicated connection(s) as an independent variable and an additional dummy that equals one if that observation has any background investigation data. Panel B repeats these specifications using the difference between pre-aggregation and post-aggregation vote shares (multiplied by 100) as a dependent variable. Both pre-aggregation and post-aggregation vote shares are calculated using pre-election polling station vote totals as the denominator. All specifications in both panels include province fixed effects and drop the five largest and five smallest observations of the dependent variable. No candidates record a connection to the district aggregator and not to the provincial aggregator so these coefficients cannot be estimated separately. *Sample:* treatment and control polling centers for which complete vote difference data are available. *Levels of significance:* \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Standard errors clustered by candidate and by polling center using the method of ? are reported in parentheses.

Table A8: Estimates of Impact on Total Votes by Candidate Connection

(Estimates Aggregating to the Candidate - Polling Center)

<i>Dependent Variable:</i>		Votes				
Panel A - Impacts on Most Connected Candidates	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
Letter Treatment (=1)	0.214 (0.942)	0.335 (0.875)	0.282 (0.290)	0.224 (0.349)	-0.024 (0.331)	
Treat x Most Connected		-21.656 (13.285)	-21.935* (13.233)	-23.053* (13.793)	-25.751*** (9.863)	
Most Connected (=1)		87.828*** (10.026)	79.144*** (9.960)	82.750*** (10.361)	74.585*** (8.023)	
Constant	6.539*** (0.672)	6.035*** (0.619)	6.113*** (0.192)	8.760*** (0.882)	7.521*** (0.657)	
R-Squared	0.000	0.031	0.093	0.089	0.101	
Stratum FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Full Covariates	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	
Trimming top 1% of votes for interacted candidate type	No	No	No	No	Yes	
R-Squared	0.000	0.024	0.079	0.077	0.094	
# Polling Centers	461	461	461	440	440	
# Candidate - Polling Center Observations	80060	80060	80060	66137	66108	
Mean of Dep. Var. in Controls	6.539	6.539	6.539	7.660	7.401	
Mean of Dep. Var. in Controls for Interacted Connection	-	93.863	93.863	98.073	88.991	
<i>Dependent Variable:</i>		Votes				
Panel B - Impacts by Connection Type	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
Letter Treatment (=1)	-0.027 (0.336)	0.008 (0.349)	0.071 (0.325)	-0.009 (0.321)	0.259 (0.345)	
Treat x Provincial Aggregator Connection	-21.474** (10.018)					
Treat x Prov. and District Aggregator Connection		-26.688* (15.791)			-13.561 (23.674)	
Treat x Government Service			-15.389** (6.550)		-12.725 (18.707)	
Treat x Karzai Connection				-9.913 (6.381)	3.959 (18.967)	
Provincial Aggregator Connection (=1)	71.140*** (7.939)					
Prov. and District Aggregator Connection (=1)		82.906*** (12.852)			43.531** (18.450)	
Government Service (=1)			64.459*** (5.079)		77.828*** (12.258)	
Karzai Connect. (=1)				50.969*** (4.792)	-19.332 (12.321)	
Constant	7.595*** (0.661)	8.145*** (0.677)	7.166*** (0.657)	7.084*** (0.624)	8.229*** (0.881)	
R-Squared	0.099	0.084	0.117	0.109	0.114	
Stratum FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Full Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Trimming top 1% of votes for interacted candidate type	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
R-Squared	0.091	0.078	0.108	0.103	0.098	
# Polling Centers	440	440	440	440	440	
# Candidate - Polling Center Observations	66118	66127	66116	66077	66137	
Mean of Dep. Var. in Controls	7.508	7.556	7.463	7.079	7.660	
Mean of Dep. Var. in Controls for Interacted Connection	84.798	98.928	76.144	62.673	-	

*Notes:* This table reports effects on post-aggregation vote totals by candidate connection. The unit of observation is the candidate - polling substation. Each column reports the results of an OLS regression where total post-aggregation votes is the dependent variable and a dummy variable that equals 1 when the candidate - polling substation observation has the indicated connection is the independent variable. Panel A reports treatment effect for the most connected candidate. Please see the text for details on how the most connected candidate variable is computed. Column (1) reports a bivariate treatment regression with no interaction terms; Column (2) reports the results when treatment is interacted with the most connected candidate; Column (3) reports a similar regression with stratum fixed effects included; Column (4) adds controls for the share of respondents reporting that they are Pashtun, Tajik, and whether the polling center was visited by international election monitors; Column (5) trims the top percentile of the dependent variable. Panel B reports results interacting the treatment dummy with each of the candidate connection dummies. All regressions reported in Panel B include stratum fixed effects, controls for the share of respondents reporting that they are Pashtun, Tajik, and whether the polling center was visited by international election monitors; and have the top percentile of the dependent variable trimmed. The number of candidate - polling substations observations change slightly because of duplicates values at the top percentile. The final two rows in Panel A and in Panel B report the mean of the dependent variable in the controls and in the controls among observations for the interacted candidate type. *Level of significance:* \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors clustered at the polling center level are reported in parentheses.

Table A9: Validation Tests the Randomization to Test for Spatial Externalities

	Transport Problems	Expects Violence	Vote is Secret	Can Identify MP	Traditional Authority
Panel A	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Received Letter (=1)	0.009 (0.026)	0.001 (0.026)	-0.018 (0.022)	0.014 (0.020)	0.017 (0.021)
Any PCs treated within 1km (=1)	0.015 (0.050)	0.096** (0.042)	-0.040 (0.035)	0.019 (0.035)	0.023 (0.036)
Total PCs within 1km (0-5)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.005 (0.009)	0.014* (0.009)	0.000 (0.007)	0.009 (0.008)
Any PCs treated within 1-2km (=1)	0.054 (0.047)	-0.002 (0.049)	0.030 (0.038)	0.021 (0.042)	0.070* (0.041)
Total PCs within 1-2km (0-24)	0.003 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.008** (0.004)	-0.011*** (0.004)
Constant	0.499*** (0.033)	0.471*** (0.034)	0.634*** (0.030)	0.390*** (0.036)	0.256*** (0.030)
# Observations	436	436	440	440	440
R-Squared	0.332	0.434	0.340	0.641	0.370
	Pashtun	Income	Electrified	District Gov. Keeps Fair	Visited by Int'l Monitors
Panel B	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Received Letter (=1)	-0.010 (0.018)	-66.909 (480.913)	-0.010 (0.016)	0.005 (0.012)	0.035 (0.035)
Any PCs treated within 1km (=1)	-0.007 (0.028)	487.848 (721.844)	0.030 (0.026)	0.019 (0.022)	0.068 (0.053)
Total PCs within 1km (0-5)	0.005 (0.007)	-145.416 (218.328)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)	0.021* (0.012)
Any PCs treated within 1-2km (=1)	0.014 (0.028)	-245.542 (724.078)	0.030 (0.031)	-0.024 (0.023)	0.004 (0.058)
Total PCs within 1-2km (0-24)	-0.006 (0.004)	144.201 (131.907)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.015* (0.008)
Constant	0.339*** (0.022)	10167.997*** (569.063)	0.674*** (0.023)	0.139*** (0.018)	-0.006 (0.049)
# Observations	440	435	440	438	440
R-Squared	0.817	0.301	0.778	0.502	0.226

*Notes:* Each column provides results from an OLS regression of the indicated dependent variable on a treatment dummy and variables to account for the number of neighboring polling centers that received treatment. Dependent variables are computed as averages of answers from respondents near the polling center in the baseline survey. These are: Any PCs treated within 1km (2km) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a polling center within a 1 kilometer (2 kilometers) radius received a treatment notification letter; Any PCs within 1km (1-2km) is a variable equal to the number of polling centers within a 1 kilometer radius (1 to 2 kilometer radius) received a treatment notification letter; 1 treated PC within 1km is a dummy that equals 1 if 1 polling center within a 1 km radius was treated and so on for 2 to 5 polling centers. The maximum number of polling centers treated within a kilometer in our sample is 5. The unit of observation is the candidate - polling substation. The sample is restricted to the most connected candidate only. The most connected candidate is identified using the procedure described in Section ???. The top percentile is trimmed and stratum fixed effects and controls for the share of respondents reporting that they are Pashtun, Tajik, and whether the polling center was visited by international election monitors are included in all specifications. *Level of significance:* \* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors clustered at the the polling center level reported in parentheses.



Table A10: Trimmed Estimates of Effect on Aggregation Fraud  
(Sample: Full Sample)

Control	(i) Number of Observations	183660		
	(ii) Proportion Non-missing	0.097		
	(iii) Mean abs(Vote Difference) for observed	0.817	Control Standard Error	0.210
Treatment	(iv) Number of Observations	203291		
	(v) Proportion Non-missing	0.149		
	(vi) Mean abs(Vote Difference) for observed	0.582		
	$p = [(v)-(ii)/(v)]$	0.349		
	(vii) pth quantile	0.000		
	(viii) Trimmed Mean: $E[Y Y > y_p]$	0.893	Treatment UB Std. Err.	0.246
	(ix) (1-p)th quantile	0.000		
	(x) Trimmed Mean: $E[Y Y < y_{(1-p)}]$	0.000	Treatment LB Std. Err.	0.245
Effect	(xi) Upper Bound Estimate = (viii) - (iii)	0.076	(xiii) UB Effect Std. Err.	0.249
	(xii) Lower Bound Estimate = (x) - (iii)	-0.817	(xiv) LB Effect Std. Err.	0.342
95 Percent Confidence Interval = [(xii) - 1.96*(xiv), (xi) + 1.96*(xiii)]				[-1.487, 0.564]
90 Percent Confidence Interval = [(xii) - 1.645*(xiv), (xi) + 1.645*(xiii)]				[-1.380, 0.486]

*Notes:* This table reports details of the ? procedure applied to the data on aggregation fraud. The sample is the full sample for which pre-aggregation and post-aggregation data are available (see the text for details). Rows (i) - (iii) provide values for the control group; rows (iv) - (vi) provide values for the untrimmed treatment group; rows (vii) and (viii) correspond to the treatment group after trimming the bottom p percentiles; rows (ix) and (x) correspond to the treatment group after trimming the top p percentiles. Rows (xi) and (xii) report the upper and lower bound respectively. The corresponding 95 percent and 90 percent confidence intervals are reported in the final two rows. There are 17,786 non-missing observations in the control group. Before trimming, there are 30,232 non-missing observations in the treatment group. After trimming, there are 19,688 (19,687) observations remaining in the treatment group after trimming the lower p (upper 1-p) of the distribution. Standard errors reported in this table are obtained by bootstrapping all polling centers in our experimental sample with replacement 250 times.

Table A11: Trimmed Estimates of Effect on Aggregation Fraud  
(Sample: Incumbents)

Control	(i) Number of Observations	10492		
	(ii) Proportion Non-missing	0.118		
	(iii) Mean abs(Vote Difference) for observed	2.840	Control Standard Error	0.801
Treatment	(iv) Number of Observations	11485		
	(v) Proportion Non-missing	0.171		
	(vi) Mean abs(Vote Difference) for observed	1.597		
	$p = [(v)-(ii)/(v)]$	0.308		
	(vii) pth quantile	0.000		
	(viii) Trimmed Mean: $E[Y Y > y_p]$	2.308	Treatment UB Std. Err.	0.572
	(ix) (1-p)th quantile	0.000		
	(x) Trimmed Mean: $E[Y Y < y_{(1-p)}]$	0.000	Treatment LB Std. Err.	0.498
Effect	(xi) Upper Bound Estimate = (viii) - (iii)	-0.531	(xiii) UB Effect Std. Err.	0.907
	(xii) Lower Bound Estimate = (x) - (iii)	-2.840	(xiv) LB Effect Std. Err.	0.981
	95 Percent Confidence Interval = [(xii) - 1.96*(xiv), (xi) + 1.96*(xiii)]			[-4.763, 1.247]
	90 Percent Confidence Interval = [(xii) - 1.645*(xiv), (xi) + 1.645*(xiii)]			[-4.454, 0.961]

*Notes:* This table reports details of the ? procedure applied to the data on aggregation fraud. The sample is all candidates with a recorded connection to the incumbent. Rows (i) - (iii) provide values for the control group; rows (iv) - (vi) provide values for the untrimmed treatment group; rows (vii) and (viii) correspond to the treatment group after trimming the bottom p percentiles; rows (ix) and (x) correspond to the treatment group after trimming the top p percentiles. Rows (xi) and (xii) report the upper and lower bound respectively. The corresponding 95 percent and 90 percent confidence intervals are reported in the final two rows. There are 1,241 non-missing observations in the control group. Before trimming, there are 1,964 non-missing observations in the treatment group. After trimming, there are 1,359 (1,358) observations remaining in the treatment group after trimming the lower p (upper 1-p) of the distribution. Standard errors reported in this table are obtained by bootstrapping all polling centers in our experimental sample with replacement 250 times.

Table A12: Trimmed Estimates of Effect on Aggregation Fraud  
(Sample: Most Connected Candidate)

Control	(i) Number of Observations	962		
	(ii) Proportion Non-missing	0.148		
	(iii) Mean abs(Vote Difference) for observed	10.310	Control Standard Error	5.476
Treatment	(iv) Number of Observations	1016		
	(v) Proportion Non-missing	0.201		
	(vi) Mean abs(Vote Difference) for observed	3.799		
	$p = [(v)-(ii)/(v)]$	0.265		
	(vii) pth quantile	0.000		
	(viii) Trimmed Mean: $E[Y Y > y_p]$	5.167	Treatment UB Std. Err.	2.053
	(ix) (1-p)th quantile	0.000		
	(x) Trimmed Mean: $E[Y Y < y_{(1-p)}]$	0.000	Treatment LB Std. Err.	0.802
Effect	(xi) Upper Bound Estimate = (viii) - (iii)	-5.143	(xiii) UB Effect Std. Err.	5.938
	(xii) Lower Bound Estimate = (x) - (iii)	-10.310	(xiv) LB Effect Std. Err.	5.566
	95 Percent Confidence Interval = [(xii) - 1.96*(xiv), (xi) + 1.96*(xiii)]			[-21.219, 6.500]
	90 Percent Confidence Interval = [(xii) - 1.645*(xiv), (xi) + 1.645*(xiii)]			[-19.466, 4.625]

*Notes:* This table reports details of the ? procedure applied to the data on aggregation fraud. The sample is all candidates with a recorded connection to the most connected candidate. Rows (i) - (iii) provide values for the control group; rows (iv) - (vi) provide values for the untrimmed treatment group; rows (vii) and (viii) correspond to the treatment group after trimming the bottom p percentiles; rows (ix) and (x) correspond to the treatment group after trimming the top p percentiles. Rows (xi) and (xii) report the upper and lower bound respectively. The corresponding 95 percent and 90 percent confidence intervals are reported in the final two rows. There are 142 non-missing observations in the control group. Before trimming, there are 204 non-missing observations in the treatment group. After trimming, there are 150 (149) observations remaining in the treatment group after trimming the lower p (upper 1-p) of the distribution. Standard errors reported in this table are obtained by bootstrapping all polling centers in our experimental sample with replacement 250 times.

Table A13: Trimmed Estimates of Effect on Aggregation Fraud  
(Sample: District + Provincial Aggregator Connection)

Control	(i) Number of Observations	441		
	(ii) Proportion Non-missing	0.184		
	(iii) Mean abs(Vote Difference) for observed	18.790	Control Standard Error	9.009
Treatment	(iv) Number of Observations	480		
	(v) Proportion Non-missing	0.260		
	(vi) Mean abs(Vote Difference) for observed	5.760		
	$p = [(v)-(ii)/(v)]$	0.295		
	(vii) pth quantile	0.000		
	(viii) Trimmed Mean: $E[Y Y > y_p]$	8.090	Treatment UB Std. Err.	4.089
	(ix) (1-p)th quantile	0.000		
	(x) Trimmed Mean: $E[Y Y < y_{(1-p)}]$	0.000	Treatment LB Std. Err.	2.030
Effect	(xi) Upper Bound Estimate = (viii) - (iii)	-10.700	(xiii) UB Effect Std. Err.	10.340
	(xii) Lower Bound Estimate = (x) - (iii)	-18.790	(xiv) LB Effect Std. Err.	9.090
	95 Percent Confidence Interval = [(xii) - 1.96*(xiv), (xi) + 1.96*(xiii)]			[-36.606, 9.566]
	90 Percent Confidence Interval = [(xii) - 1.645*(xiv), (xi) + 1.645*(xiii)]			[-33.743, 6.309]

*Notes:* This table reports details of the ? procedure applied to the data on aggregation fraud. The sample is all candidates with a recorded connection to both the district and the provincial aggregator. Rows (i) - (iii) provide values for the control group; rows (iv) - (vi) provide values for the untrimmed treatment group; rows (vii) and (viii) correspond to the treatment group after trimming the bottom p percentiles; rows (ix) and (x) correspond to the treatment group after trimming the top p percentiles. Rows (xi) and (xii) report the upper and lower bound respectively. The corresponding 95 percent and 90 percent confidence intervals are reported in the final two rows. There are 17,786 non-missing observations in the control group. Before trimming, there are 81 non-missing observations in the treatment group. After trimming, there are 89 (88) observations remaining in the treatment group after trimming the lower p (upper 1-p) of the distribution. Standard errors reported in this table are obtained by bootstrapping all polling centers in our experimental sample with replacement 250 times.

Table A14: Trimmed Estimates of Effect on Aggregation Fraud  
(Sample: Karzai Connection)

Control	(i) Number of Observations	1550		
	(ii) Proportion Non-missing	0.141		
	(iii) Mean abs(Vote Difference) for observed	8.831	Control Standard Error	3.701
Treatment	(iv) Number of Observations	1600		
	(v) Proportion Non-missing	0.204		
	(vi) Mean abs(Vote Difference) for observed	3.667		
	$p = [(v)-(ii)/(v)]$	0.309		
	(vii) pth quantile	0.000		
	(viii) Trimmed Mean: $E[Y Y > y_p]$	5.282	Treatment UB Std. Err.	1.782
	(ix) (1-p)th quantile	0.000		
	(x) Trimmed Mean: $E[Y Y < y_{(1-p)}]$	0.000	Treatment LB Std. Err.	0.675
Effect	(xi) Upper Bound Estimate = (viii) - (iii)	-3.549	(xiii) UB Effect Std. Err.	4.176
	(xii) Lower Bound Estimate = (x) - (iii)	-8.831	(xiv) LB Effect Std. Err.	3.772
	95 Percent Confidence Interval = [(xii) - 1.96*(xiv), (xi) + 1.96*(xiii)]			[-16.224, 4.636]
	90 Percent Confidence Interval = [(xii) - 1.645*(xiv), (xi) + 1.645*(xiii)]			[-15.036, 3.321]

*Notes:* This table reports details of the ? procedure applied to the data on aggregation fraud. The sample is all candidates with a recorded connection to Hamid Karzai. Rows (i) - (iii) provide values for the control group; rows (iv) - (vi) provide values for the untrimmed treatment group; rows (vii) and (viii) correspond to the treatment group after trimming the bottom p percentiles; rows (ix) and (x) correspond to the treatment group after trimming the top p percentiles. Rows (xi) and (xii) report the upper and lower bound respectively. The corresponding 95 percent and 90 percent confidence intervals are reported in the final two rows. There are 219 non-missing observations in the control group. Before trimming, there are 327 non-missing observations in the treatment group. After trimming, there are 227 (226) observations remaining in the treatment group after trimming the lower p (upper 1-p) of the distribution. Standard errors reported in this table are obtained by bootstrapping all polling centers in our experimental sample with replacement 250 times.

Table A15: Trimmed Estimates of Effect on Aggregation Fraud  
(Sample: Government Service)

Control	(i) Number of Observations	1945		
	(ii) Proportion Non-missing	0.143		
	(iii) Mean abs(Vote Difference) for observed	9.665	Control Standard Error	3.139
Treatment	(iv) Number of Observations	2089		
	(v) Proportion Non-missing	0.202		
	(vi) Mean abs(Vote Difference) for observed	5.126		
	$p = [(v)-(ii)/(v)]$	0.291		
	(vii) pth quantile	0.000		
	(viii) Trimmed Mean: $E[Y Y > y_p]$	7.217	Treatment UB Std. Err.	1.899
	(ix) (1-p)th quantile	1.000		
	(x) Trimmed Mean: $E[Y Y < y_{(1-p)}]$	0.013	Treatment LB Std. Err.	0.878
Effect	(xi) Upper Bound Estimate = (viii) - (iii)	-2.448	(xiii) UB Effect Std. Err.	3.666
	(xii) Lower Bound Estimate = (x) - (iii)	-9.652	(xiv) LB Effect Std. Err.	3.277
	95 Percent Confidence Interval = [(xii) - 1.96*(xiv), (xi) + 1.96*(xiii)]			[-16.075, 4.737]
	90 Percent Confidence Interval = [(xii) - 1.645*(xiv), (xi) + 1.645*(xiii)]			[-15.043, 3.583]

*Notes:* This table reports details of the ? procedure applied to the data on aggregation fraud. The sample is all candidates with a recorded history of government service. Rows (i) - (iii) provide values for the control group; rows (iv) - (vi) provide values for the untrimmed treatment group; rows (vii) and (viii) correspond to the treatment group after trimming the bottom p percentiles; rows (ix) and (x) correspond to the treatment group after trimming the top p percentiles. Rows (xi) and (xii) report the upper and lower bound respectively. The corresponding 95 percent and 90 percent confidence intervals are reported in the final two rows. There are 278 non-missing observations in the control group. Before trimming, there are 421 non-missing observations in the treatment group. After trimming, there are 299 (298) observations remaining in the treatment group after trimming the lower p (upper 1-p) of the distribution. Standard errors reported in this table are obtained by bootstrapping all polling centers in our experimental sample with replacement 250 times.




Figure A3: Treatment Effects by Candidate Connection

*Notes:* The depicted bands reflect 95 percent confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered. Vote totals above the 99th percentile are dropped when calculating the depicted means.

Polling Center Name: .....

Polling Center Code:.....

Date: .....

Dear Sir or Madam-

Greetings! I am an official election observer with the Opinion Research Center of Afghanistan (ORCA). My organization is providing this letter to collect some important information about your polling center and share it with our main office. Your polling center has been randomly selected from among polling centers in this province.

In our attempts to help Afghanistan have free and fair elections, I will return to this polling center tomorrow morning in order to take pictures of the results for every candidate in every station on the tally sheets after they have been posted.

The information will be posted on a website that belongs to local and international election observers so that it will be used by the people of Afghanistan, the international community, and local and international media. We will also compare the photos taken with the tally certified by the IEC in Kabul.

As recognition that you have read and understood this letter, please sign here: \_\_\_\_\_

Thank you kindly for your help and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Haj Abdul Nabi Barakzai

Deputy Head of ORCA

Name and Signature of manager of polling station:.....

Figure A4: Letter Delivered to Polling Center Managers





نام مرکز رای دهی: \_\_\_\_\_  
تاریخ: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ مرکز رای دهی: \_\_\_\_\_ کد

بہ حضور محترم آقای / خانم

مسیولیت نظارت 472 مراکز رای بر حسب توافقنامه کمیسیون مسئول انتخابات دفتر اورکا دهی را بر عهده دارد.

میباشد و برای او (ORCA) دفتر به مربوطیک تن از نظارت کنندگان رسمی دارنده مکتوب معلومات تا بتواند مرکز رای دهی تسلیم نمودند این تا این مکتوب را وظیفه سپرده شده است. این مرکز دفتر مرکزی شریک بسازد جمع آوری نموده و با مرکز رای دهی این و دقیق را از موثق این ولایت تمام مراکز رای دهی میان به صورت تصادفی از گز به شمول چندین مراکز دیرای دهی انتخاب شده است.

فردا صبح . ناظر ما یک انتخابات آزاد و مشروع در افغانستان کمک خواهیم کرد تقویت برای ما . نصب میگردد اخذ نامی مرکز رای دهی این که در این انتخابات کاندیدان لست آمد تا تصاویر از دخواه

گذشته مربوط به ناظرین انتخاباتی داخلی و خارجی این انتخابات در سائت اینترنتی تصاویر از این انتخابات ، موسسات خارجی ، و مطبوعات داخلی و خارجی خواهد شد تا تمام مردم افغانستان انتخابات را با این تصاویر حاصله از ناظر حیث مناسبت فاده کنند. و همچنان ما انتخابات در کابل نشر میشود مقایسه خواهیم کرد. مسئول کمیسیون

در پائین ای دبرای نتایج این که این مکتوب بدسترس شما قرار گرفت و شما انرا مطالعه نموده مضا نمائیید. لطف نموده ا

از همکاری شما قبلاً اظهار سپاس.

با احترام

حاجی عبدالنبی بارکزی

معاون دفتر اورکا

\_\_\_\_\_ امضای نام و

Figure A5: Dari Translation of Letter Delivered to Polling Center Managers