

**Online appendix: Competitive effects of means-tested school vouchers. Figlio & Hart.**

**Table A1. Descriptive statistics on competition measures for eight most populous districts in schools with at least one private competitor within a five mile radius**

	Distance	Density	Diversity	Slots per grade	Churches nearby
<b>Statewide</b>	1.35 (1.06)	15.37 (12.64)	5.22 (2.29)	304.67 (295.02)	151.41 (117.61)
Broward	1.18 (0.73)	20.12 (10.97)	6.62 (1.73)	511.90 (254.90)	206.00 (107.93)
Miami-Dade	0.82 (0.55)	32.67 (13.06)	6.82 (1.06)	653.39 (329.62)	264.32 (149.89)
Duval	1.05 (0.74)	18.29 (7.90)	6.64 (1.52)	406.05 (255.34)	239.16 (147.51)
Hillsborough	1.17 (1.02)	18.34 (11.57)	6.10 (2.28)	309.54 (221.96)	176.70 (119.69)
Orange	1.29 (0.92)	18.24 (12.33)	5.88 (1.99)	411.69 (326.86)	179.17 (97.97)
Palm Beach	1.29 (0.85)	10.97 (5.68)	4.68 (2.04)	238.62 (1.51)	109.89 (61.15)
Pinellas	1.08 (0.92)	19.27 (9.25)	6.27 (1.75)	320.86 (175.25)	152.82 (63.02)
Seminole	1.45 (0.97)	14.35 (9.67)	5.46 (1.90)	220.03 (198.42)	119.16 (43.87)

Notes: Data from the Florida Education Data Warehouse, the Florida Department of Education's Florida School Indicators Reports, and the Florida Department of Education. Means include only children in schools with at least one local competitor (92.4 percent of the potential sample).

**Table A2. Correlations between pre-policy measures of competition and school-level attributes**

School attribute	Correlation with distance measure	Correlation with density measure	Correlation with diversity measure	Correlation with slots measure	Correlation with churches measure
Percent male	-0.001	0.026	0.030	0.029	-0.026
Percent black	0.227**	0.356**	0.361**	0.311**	0.613**
Percent Latino	0.141**	0.372**	0.213**	0.374**	0.142**
Percent English language learner	0.191**	0.430**	0.274**	0.434**	0.281**
Percent free/reduced price lunch	0.217**	0.399**	0.285**	0.285**	0.478**
School grade in 2001 (A=4, F=0)	-0.121**	-0.186**	-0.128**	-0.167**	-0.305**

Notes: Correlations marked \*\*\*, \*\* and \* are statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. Distance is reverse-coded, so that a positive coefficient represents a positive correlation between competition and the school characteristics in question.

**Table A3. Fixed effects regression estimates of the pre-policy trends of three most populous districts (Broward, Dade, and Palm Beach): National percentile rankings**

Competition measure	Estimated effect on average reading+math national percentile ranking effect sizes			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Fourth lead of program (1997-1998)	Third lead of program (1998-1999)	Second lead of program (1999-2000)	Lead of program (2000-01)
Distance	0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)
Density	0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
Diversity	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
Slots per grade	-0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)
Churches nearby	0.003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.004 (0.004)	0.009** (0.004)

Notes: Each row represents the key coefficient estimates (on the interaction between the measure of pre-policy private school penetration and a set of year indicators) from a separate regression model. The dependent variable is the school's average reading+math standardized national percentile rank. 1996-1997 is the omitted year. Standard errors that adjust for clustering at the school level are beneath parameter estimates. Models include school fixed effects and year dummies. Data come from Broward, Dade, and Palm Beach counties. Coefficients marked \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* are statistically significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. There are 2,508 school x year observations in 443 school clusters.

**Figure A1. Distribution of distance between students' public schools and the public school's nearest private competitor**

